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Free Wi l l and Luck 
Gerald Kingsley Harrison 
Abstract 
The p rob lem o f free w i l l is a p rob lem about contro l and luck. I f causal determin ism is 
true, then everyth ing we do is u l t imate ly a matter o f luck, as i t is i f causal determin ism 
is false. Ei ther way we seem to lack free w i l l o f the k i nd needed for mora l 
responsibi l i ty . In this thesis a case is bu i l t for a certain type o f modest incompat ib i l is t 
v i ew on free w i l l . I t is argued that i t makes no di f ference in terms o f cont ro l whether 
determin ism or indetermin ism obtains. Wha t matters is that we have a certain k i nd o f 
ownership over what we do. Causal determin ism rules this out, but indetermin ism does 
not. Th is has the upshot that not on ly does free w i l l tu rn out to be compat ib le w i t h luck, 
exposure to a certain k ind o f luck is actual ly required, for unless w e are exposed to this 
k i nd o f luck our actions w i l l not be t ru ly ours. B y p rov id ing luck w i t h a posi t ive role 
this thesis invi tes a re-evaluat ion o f the reasons causal determin ism destroys free w i l l , 
and a re-evaluat ion o f our attitudes towards luck. I n short this thesis challenges the ant i -
l uck ism that lies behind the prob lem o f free w i l l . 
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Every th ing we do is u l t imate ly a matter o f luck. This does not preclude our possessing 
free w i l l and being mora l ly responsible for at least some o f what we do, p rov ided we are 
subject to luck in the r ight way. In fact, exposure to some luck is a requirement o f free 
w i l l . That , anyway, is the v i e w that w i l l be defended in what fo l l ows . 
1.1 Moral Luck 
M y interest i n the p rob lem o f free w i l l came about after reading Nage l ' s famous art icle 
" M o r a l L u c k " (1979) . ' In i t , Nagel pointed out that everyth ing we do seems u l t imate ly 
to be attr ibutable to factors outside our cont ro l . For instance, the k ind o f character that 
we have is a product o f our heredity and upbr ing ing , neither o f w h i c h were our do ing . 
The actions we per fo rm, the decisions we make: these are jus t the inevi table 
consequence o f our hav ing a part icular character or const i tu t ion i n a part icular 
env i ronment . Just as our upbr ing ing and heredity were not matters over w h i c h we 
exercised any cont ro l , nor was our envi ronment . Furthermore, the actual impact our 
actions have upon the w o r l d is again a matter o f luck. Whether m y actions are successes 
or fai lures depends on a mul t i tude o f factors, most o f w h i c h are outside m y cont ro l . 
Nage l usefu l ly out l ined four ways in w h i c h we are subject to luck: 
One is the phenomenon o f const i tut ive luck - the k i nd o f person y o u are, where 
th is is not jus t a quest ion o f what you del iberately do, but o f your inc l inat ions, 
capacit ies, and temperament. Another category is luck i n one's circumstances -
the k i n d o f problems and situations one faces. The other t w o have to do w i t h the 
causes and effects o f act ion: luck i n how one is determined by antecedent 
circumstances, and luck in the way one's actions and projects tu rn out. (1979, p. 
28) 
' N a g e ľ s a r t i c le was one o f a pa i r o n the sub jec t , the other be ing by B e m a r d W i l l i a m s . N a g e l ' s paper was 
a response to W i l l i a m ' s , and bo th o r i g i n a l l y appeared in the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, V o l . 
շ 
W e can term these four k inds o f luck: const i tut ive - luck in one's capacities and 
temperament; c i rcumstant ia l - luck i n one's circumstances; causal - luck in pr ior causes 
o f one's act ion; and resultant - luck i n the consequences o f one's actions. 
The p rob lem is that i f everything we do is u l t imate ly a matter o f the four k inds o f luck 
Nagel out l ined, this seems to threaten the idea that we can be mora l ly responsible for 
what w e do. H o w can i t be appropriate to consider someone b lamewor thy or 
praiseworthy for something they have done i f i t turns out that their do ing i t was jus t a 
matter o f luck? M o r a l responsibi l i ty (deserving praise or b lame), presupposes that we 
have contro l over what we do. Bu t i f everything is u l t imate ly a matter o f luck , then this 
calls in to question whether we real ly do have cont ro l , at least o f the k i n d that cou ld 
make us t ru ly b lamewor thy or praiseworthy for what we do. 
To see h o w natural and easy i t is to end up w i t h some start l ing and radical conclusions 
take an example o f resultant luck. A n assassin takes a im at the p r ime min is ter and 
shoots, in tend ing to k i l l h i m . However , a strong gust o f w i n d deflects the bul le t , miss ing 
the p r ime minister. Should this fluke occurrence affect the assassin's blameworthiness? 
W o u l d we say that the assassin w o u l d deserve more b lame, and a more severe 
punishment, i f his bul let had hi t the p r ime minister? W h y should a gust o f w i n d affect 
the assassin's blameworthiness? A f te r a l l , the assassin had absolutely noth ing to do w i t h 
whether or not the w i n d gusted. Put more dramat ical ly , the gust o f w i n d surely cannot 
have a bearing on wh i ch circ le o f hel l he is flung to (Thomson 1993， p. 207). O n 
ref lect ion, there seems to be a strong case f r om luck for saying that whether the assassin 
is actual ly successful or not is irrelevant. I t marks "no th ing mora l l y interest ing about 
t h e m " (Thomson 1993, p. 204) . Wha t matters is what the assassin intended to do, 
irrespective o f whether he was successful or not i n do ing it . So, considerat ions o f luck 
lead us to restrict the domain o f mora l responsibi l i ty to the internal w o r l d o f intent ions, 
decisions and so for th ― the domain o f the ' w i l l ' . Here at least, i t is assumed, we have 
some k i n d o f absolute or total contro l . 
Bu t luck can infect that internal w o r l d too. First, superf ic ia l ly , and then more 
fundamenta l ly , as we shall see. Imagine the assassin again. He is del iberat ing about 
50 ( 1 9 7 6 ) and we re subsequent ly rep roduced w i t h rev is ions i n W i l l i a m s ( 1 9 8 1 ) and N a g e l ( 1 9 7 9 ) 
respec t i ve ly . 
whether or not to shoot the pr ime minister, but jus t as he is about to reach his decis ion, 
he is interrupted by a coughing f i t , the occurrence o f wh ich was not under his cont ro l 
(Feinberg 1970). N o w we seem commi t ted to saying he is responsible for what he would 
have decided to do, had it not been for the occurrence o f the coughing fit.^ H o w can the 
coughing f i t be a l lowed to affect w h i c h circle o f hel l he is flung to? 
Note that by the same logic we w o u l d be commi t ted to saying the assassin is responsible 
for all the decisions he w o u l d have made, had circumstances not under h is cont ro l been 
di f ferent . For instance, maybe i f he had not had the depr ived upbr ing ing he had, he 
w o u l d n o w be succour ing the poor in a th i rd w o r l d country. It was on ly by luck that he 
d id not have such an upbr ing ing , and so he deserves praise for al l those laudable actions 
he w o u l d have per formed i f his luck had been di f ferent. 
This is the p rob lem o f responsibi l i ty in f la t ion . W h e n we try and adjust for luck - when 
we t ry and neutral ise its inf luence 一 we end up massively increasing both what we are 
b lamewor thy for (wh i ch n o w includes a l l those culpable decisions w e w o u l d have made 
had the oppor tun i ty presented i tsel f ) and what we are praiseworthy for (wh i ch n o w 
includes al l those laudable decisions that we w o u l d have made had the oppor tun i ty 
presented i tsel f ) . What we actual ly do provides on ly one part o f a much larger picture. It 
is on the basis o f the larger picture that our true mora l responsibi l i ty is determined. 
We are go ing to encounter the p rob lem o f responsibi l i ty in f la t ion later in the thesis. For 
wh i l s t discussed by those interested i n the prob lem o f mora l luck , i t is largely 
over looked by those w h o discuss the p rob lem o f free w i l l . Bu t at the momen t w e can put 
i t to one side because the in f la t ion p rob lem only has bite i f we can make sense o f our 
being mora l l y responsible at a l l . 
The in f la t ion p rob lem presupposes that the assassin is responsible fo r their decis ion (or 
w o u l d have been had they made i t ) . But what i f we are subject to luck al l the way 
t l i rough? What i f the assassin's decis ion i tse l f was a matter o f luck i n a more 
fundamental way than that out l ined above? It is at this point that we enter the terr i tory 
2 T h e r e are p r o b l e m s here rega rd ing the t ru th o f such counter fac tua ls 一 espec ia l l y i f w e assume that an 
agent has genu ine a l te rna t ive poss ib i l i t i es at ' r e s pons i b l e ' dec is ion m a k i n g m o m e n t s . H o w e v e r I d iscuss 
th is la ter - i n Chap te r 8 - and w i l l i gnore i t f o r the present as i t does no t a l ter m y m a i n po in t s here. 
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covered by the prob lem o f free w i l l . For the p rob lem o f free w i l l suggests that our 
decisions themselves are as much a matter o f our luck as gusts o f w i n d and the l ike. 
Here is h o w the problem o f free w i l l unfolds. Let us prov is iona l ly understand by the w i l l 
our conscious decision mak ing process. N o w , as I noted above we normal ly take 
ourselves to have a special species o f contro l over our decisions and choices. Our 
decisions are not things that happen to us, but things we do - we make decisions, as 
opposed to decisions occurr ing in IIS. A n d when we make decisions we typ ica l ly take 
ourselves to have been able to decide otherwise. In other words , we take ourselves to 
have alternat ive possibi l i t ies. 
The natural picture we have o f ourselves as free agents is of ten expressed in terms o f a 
metaphor o f a garden o f fo rk ing p a t h s . W e take our future to be l i ke such a garden ― 
consist ing not o f one future path, but many possible pathways branching out ahead o f 
us, and it is d o w n to us, through our exercise o f free w i l l , w h i c h future we actualise. 
Indeed, so fundamental and natural does this connect ion between hav ing alternative 
possibi l i t ies 一 an 'open ' future - and free w i l l seem to be that unt i l very recently i t was 
taken as v i r tua l l y ax iomat ic , at least for the k ind o f free w i l l needed for mora l 
responsib i l i ty . Free w i l l is essentially about hav ing genuine alternative possibi l i t ies. 
Th is in tu i t i ve ly attractive picture o f free w i l l has been w ide ly endorsed by phi losophers 
as disparate as Ar is to t le , Hume and Kant , and it continues to have many adherents 
today. 4 I t is an idea that is convenient ly encapsulated in the Pr inc ip le o f A l ternat ive 
Possibi l i t ies: 
P A P : A person is mora l l y responsible for what he has done on ly i f he cou ld have 
done otherwise. (Frankfurt 1969， p. 829) 
՜ 1 be l i eve the ' G a r d e n o f F o r k i n g Paths ' me tapho r is taken f r o m Jorge L u i s B o r g e s shor t s tory b y the 
same name, and has become the c o m m o n metaphor in the c o n t e m p o r a r y l i te ra ture o n free w i l l thanks to 
John M a r t i n F ischer (Bo rges 1974, pp . 8 1 - 9 2 ; F ischer 1994) . 
4 A r i s t o t l e , f o r ins tance, says that " w h e r e i t is in ou r p o w e r to act, it is also เท ou r p o w e r no t to a c t " ( 1 9 7 6 
p. 122 [11 ] 3 b l - 1 4 ] ) K a n t says that f o r free w i l l " t h e act as w e l l as its oppos i te must be w i t h i n the p o w e r 
o f the sub jec t at the m o m e n t o f its t a k i n g p l a c e " ( 1 9 6 0 , p. 4 5 ) . I t w o u l d take t o o l o n g to l is t a l l 
c o n t e m p o r a r y advocates o f the garden o f f o r k i n g paths v i e w , bu t some o f the m o s t p r o m i n e n t i nc lude 
G i n e t ( 1 9 9 0 ) ; Kane ( 1 9 9 6 ) ; van I n w a g e n ( 1 9 8 3 ) ; E k s t r o m ( 2 0 0 0 ) . 
The prob lem is that a certain thesis about the structural undeφ inn ings o f the universe -
k n o w n as causal determinism - seems to threaten this in tu i t ive picture o f free w i l l . 
Mat ters get worse. For on ref lect ion, i t appears that matters are no better i f causal 
de termin ism is false. Either way a strong case can be made for saying that everyth ing we 
do, is u l t imate ly out o f our contro l and as such a matter o f luck i n a way that undermines 
the propr ie ty o f many o f our attitudes towards ourselves and others. Th is is h o w the 
p rob lem unfo lds. 
It is possible that the thesis k n o w n as causal determin ism - the c la im that a l l the facts 
about the past, i n conjunct ion w i t h al l the laws o f nature, entai l one unique future - is 
true.^ I f this turns out to be the case then i t w o u l d seem that we do not have genuine 
alternat ive possibi l i t ies. Whatever actions we per fo rm, whatever decisions we make, 
there was never any possib i l i ty o f our hav ing decided otherwise. The garden o f f o r k ing 
paths, turns out to be jus t one path w i t h no junc t ions at any point . Our choices are jus t 
intermediate events in a long sequence that stretches back to the b ig bang. A l l we do is 
jus t the inevi table result o f our p rog ramming 一 programming that we had no hand in 
w r i t i ng . I n short, i f causal determin ism is true, then we lack u l t imate cont ro l , and so 
everyth ing we do turns out to be a matter o f our luck. 
1,2 The Problem of Free Wil l : Indetermînism 
I f causal determin ism is false ― so i f indetermînism is true - then we m igh t have genuine 
alternat ive possibi l i t ies and so an open filture. For i f indetermînism is true then it w o u l d 
be possible that, g iven exactly the same past and the laws o f nature, w e cou ld have 
decided otherwise on at least some occasions. Bu t i t is hard to see exact ly h o w 
indetermîn ism improves anyth ing where contro l is concerned. For example, imagine 
that Lar ry is to rn between doing what he th inks he mora l l y ought to do, and what he 
real ly wants to do. On the one hand he judges that he ought to phone his i l l f r iend 
D a v i d , but what he really wants to do is take a long hot soak i n a bath. In the actual 
sequence Larry decides to have a bath, but because his decision m a k i n g process was 
5 T h e m o s t w i d e l y accepted in te rpre ta t ions o f q u a n t u m mechan ics assume the w o r l d t o be i nde te rm in i s t i c , 
bu t th is i nde te rm inacy seems o n l y to be present at the m i c r o leve l and cancels ou t at the m a c r o l eve l . T h i s 
may o r m a y not be the case whe re our neura l events are conce rned ― so it does, at the m o m e n t , r e m a i n an 
open q u e s t i o n w h e t h e r ou r dec is ions and t h o u g h t processes are i nde te rm in i s t l e . B u t there ce r t a i n l y is a 
ve r y g o o d chance that d e t e r m i n i s m - o r s o m e t h i n g s u f f i c i e n t l y c lose to d e t e r m i n i s m - ob ta ins f o r our 
neura l events . 
6 
indeterminist le he cou ld have decided to phone Dav id r ight up to the moment o f the 
decis ion, g iven exactly the same laws o f nature and past circumstances. But then i t looks 
as i f i t was jus t a matter o f luck that Larry decided to have a bath rather than phone 
Dav id . For there is no th ing about Larry 's powers, capacit ies, states o f m i n d , character 一 
anyth ing at al l - that explains w h y Larry decided one way rather than the other. I f , fo r 
instance, God were to take Larry to one side and rew ind the c lock to the moment jus t 
pr io r to his decis ion and re-run the sequence a number o f t imes, sometimes Larry w o u l d 
decide one way, and sometimes the other. A n d there w o u l d be no explanat ion o f th is , 
beyond " d u m b luck " (Me le 1999b and 1998， pp. 582-583). So wh i l s t the denial o f 
determin ism - indetermin ism - can prov ide us w i t h alternative possibi l i t ies and so make 
it the case that i t is no longer inevi table that we make the decisions that we do, i t seems 
to do no th ing to prevent a l l that we do being a matter o f luck. In fact i t may even make 
matters worse. I f our decisions are jus t random, then we seem to have less cont ro l over 
them than we w o u l d i f determin ism were true. 
1.3 The Two Camps: Compatibilism 
There have been many reactions to the prob lem o f free w i l l and i t is "perhaps the most 
vo luminous ly debated o f al l phi losophical p rob lems" (Matson 1987, p. 158). Th is 
continues to be the case w i t h a t ru ly huge amount hav ing been wr i t ten jus t in the past 
for ty years w i t h so many new developments and variat ions on o ld posi t ions that i t has 
become increasingly d i f f i cu l t to keep track (Kane 2002, p. 3) . Nevertheless, w e can 
d is t inguish two broad camps. There are those who c la im that causal determin ism does 
not rule out free w i l l and mora l responsibi l i ty. Those in this camp are cal led 
compat ib i l is ts . There are those who ho ld that determin ism does rule out free w i l l and 
responsibi l i ty . These are the incompat ib i l is ts . There are d iv is ions w i t h i n these camps, 
and there are smal l bands who do not fa l l into either camp, but we w i l l ment ion these 
others later. 
The compat ib i l i s t has the burden o f exp la in ing jus t how we can have adequate contro l 
over what we do i f determin ism is true. The incompat ib i l is t has the burden o f exp la in ing 
h o w indetermin ism can prov ide us w i t h anything i n terms o f cont ro l . Bo th sides have 
employed various strategies to cope w i t h their respective prob lems. 
His tor ica l ly , the compat ib i l is ts have tended to favour a part icular reading o f PAP - a 
condi t iona l reading w h i c h renders it consistent w i t h the t ru th o f causal determin ism. 
Th is k i nd o f compat ib i l is t tries to show how, v iewed a certain way, we can reconci le the 
garden o f f o r k ing paths picture w i t h determin ism. As such determin ism should not be 
seen as the threat it appears. 
Bu t more recently there has emerged a new breed o f compat ib i l i s t who rejects PAP 
altogether, and so rejects the garden o f fo rk ing paths picture o f free w i l l , or at least 
argues that th is is not the k ind o f free w i l l needed for mora l responsibi l i ty. In effect this 
breed o f compat ib i l is t accepts that u l t imate ly al l that we do is a matter o f luck, but 
points out that this is consistent w i t h our exercis ing a robust type o f contro l over what 
we do, suf f ic ient for free w i l l o f a k i nd relevant to our being responsible. 
1.4 The Two Camps: Incompatibilism 
The incompat ib i l is t w i l l typ ica l ly a f f i rm the garden o f f o r k ing paths picture. T o deal 
w i t h the p rob lem o f luck they w i l l o f ten br ing in some k ind o f 'extra factor ' 一 a 
noumenal self, a soul, or more typ ica l ly o f modern incompat ib i l is ts , a dist inct k i nd o f 
occurrent causation - to del iver path-p ick ing contro l . Possession o f th is type o f contro l 
prevents al l that we do being a matter o f luck, and as such w e have the k i nd o f cont ro l 
suf f ic ient fo r responsib i l i ty grounding free w i l l . 
However , i t is mysterious exact ly how these 'extra factors ' del iver the contro l in 
quest ion, so increasingly we find incompat ib i l is ts t ry ing to do w i thou t them. For part o f 
what the garden o f f o r k ing paths picture encapsulates is the thought that free w i l l 
invo lves be ing the in i t ia t ing or u l t imate source o f one's actions, rather than being a 
t ransi t ional l i n k in an extended determinist ic chain. Sat is fy ing this demand does not 
seem to require addi t ional contro l o f the k ind that 'ext ra factors ' del iver. I f i t is 
indeterminist le wh ich way we w i l l consciously choose to decide then we are free f r o m 
domina t ion by the past and so what we do can be said to be i n some sense t ru ly up to us 
i n a way that wou ld not be the case i f casual determin ism were true. So there is r o o m to 
argue that i t is enough that we are the ul t imate sources or in i t iators o f our actions for us 
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tO h a v e t h e k i n d o f f ree w i l l n e e d e d f o r m o r a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . ^ I c a l l t h i s k i n d o f 
incompat ib i l i s t a 'source ' incompat ib i l is t , i n contrast w i t h the previous ' c o n t r o l ' 
incompat ib i l is t to denote the di f ference in focus. 
Because the source incompat ib i l i s t does not b r ing in any extra factors to del iver path-
p i ck ing cont ro l , u l t imate luck remains. This k i nd o f incompat ib i l i s t is therefore 
relevant ly analogous to certain compat ib i l is t posi t ions insofar as bo th have to tac i t ly 
acknowledge that u l t imate ly , al l that we do is a matter o f luck. So both source 
incompat ib i l is ts and compat ib i l is ts share the burden o f reconc i l ing free w i l l and 
responsibi l i ty w i t h u l t imate luck. 
1.5 Primary Goals and Chapter Synopsis 
In this thesis I w i l l be defending a source incompat ib i l is t v i e w o f the k i nd that Robert 
Kane has done much to develop. Bu t m y f irst goal is to b r ing to l igh t the real weakness 
o f compat ib i l i s t accounts o f free w i l l . Wh i l s t the tendency has been to focus on the 
supposed inadequacy o f compat ib i l is t cont ro l , and the way i n w h i c h i t exposes us to 
u l t imate luck , I argue that the most te l l ing prob lem facing the compat ib i l i s t is showing 
h o w w e can have ownersh ip over what w e do. Th i s p rob lem is brought out by the 
d i f f i cu l t y compat ib i l is ts have in deal ing w i t h cases i nvo l v i ng clandestine manipu la t ion . 
Th is first goal is played out in chapters 2， 3 and 4. In Chapter 2 I out l ine a number o f 
d i f ferent compat ib i l is t approaches to free w i l l , and I make some standard cr i t ic isms and 
go on to out l ine the reason-responsive v i e w o f those compat ib i l is ts w h o reject P A P 
altogether. I n Chapter 3 I tu rn m y attent ion to the basis upon w h i c h PAP is being 
rejected - the Frankfurt-sty le case, 1 argue that standard Frankfur t -Sty le cases do not 
wo rk , but I do a l l ow that a v a r i a t i o n developed by Fischer m igh t half wo rk . I t provides 
some evidence that path-p ick ing contro l o f the sort common ly thought to require the 
in t roduct ion o f extra factors is not needed for responsibi l i ty g round ing free w i l l . Bu t the 
case provides no counterexample to PAP. As such it invi tes us to quest ion the reason 
PAP is associated w i t h free w i l l and mora l responsibi l i ty. 
6 T h i s k i n d o f ' m o d e s t ' i n c o m p a t i b i l i s t pos i t i on has been suggested b y W i g g i n s ( 2 0 0 3 ) ; N o z i c k ( 1 9 8 1 ) ; 
and M e l e , and has been ex tens i ve l y deve loped by Kane ( 1 9 9 6 ) , and va r ia t i ons de fended b y Ba lagua r 
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Then in Chapter 4 I turn my attention to cases i nvo l v i ng covert non-constra in ing contro l 
一 or C N C contro l as i t has become k n o w n . I f o l l o w others in arguing that there is no 
relevant di f ference between being subject to C N C contro l and act ing under causal 
determin ism, and because the former subverts responsib i l i ty so too does the latter. I 
contend that what C N C control cases h igh l igh t is our lack o f adequate ownership over 
what we do under determin ism. 
M y second goal is to be as clear and honest about the k ind o f source incompat ib i l i s t 
pos i t ion I defend, i n a way that others w h o defend th is pos i t ion have not been. Rather 
than be ing coy or evasive about exposure to u l t imate luck, I encourage honest 
acceptance that in the absence o f extra factors, source incompat ib i l is t posi t ions leave the 
agent exposed to u l t imate luck. The attempts by some source incompat ib i l is ts to deny 
exposure to u l t imate luck al l fa i l , and display a background 'ant i - luckisทา' w h i c h I ho ld 
actual ly prevents the real mer i t o f the v i e w f r o m being seen. 
Th is second goal is pursued in chapters 5 and 6. In Chapter 5 I argue that incompat ib i l is t 
contro l is either incoherent or ine l iminab ly myster ious, and that either way it is a good 
idea to see h o w far one can go w i thou t i t . I out l ine two sorts o f 'modest ' incompat ib i l i s t 
pos i t ion ― modest because they do not b r ing i n any exot ic extra factors, but make do 
w i t h indeterminist le event causation. I argue that neither the Va ler ian var iety o f modest 
i ncompat ib i l i sm nor the act ion centred var iety associated w i t h Robert Kane prov ide any 
enhancement o f cont ro l , and as such these v iews leave one as exposed to u l t imate luck 
as one w o u l d be under determin ism. I consider Kane 's detai led responses to this k i nd o f 
charge, and f i nd them al l want ing. 
In Chapter 6 I consider whether there is a case for saying that indetermîn ism, as i t is 
in t roduced under either Va ler ian or Kanean modest incompat ib i l i s t v iews, erodes 
contro l . I answer no. We are neither better o f f , nor worse o f f , i n terms o f cont ro l than we 
w o u l d be under determin ism. 
M y th i rd goal is to h igh l igh t h o w genuine alternative possibi l i t ies prov ide us w i t h the 
k ind o f ownersh ip over what we do that had previously been shown to be lack ing under 
determin ism. In this way I show how exposure to certain sorts o f luck actual ly del ivers 
( 2 0 0 4 ) and E k s t r o m ( 2 0 0 0 ) . 
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something o f value, and as such we can start to see our exposure to luck in a more 
pos i t ive way. Source incompat ib i l i sm is thereby shown to be a more attract ive pos i t ion 
than its compat ib i l i s t r iva ls, bo th p rov id ing a depth o f ownership unavai lable under 
determin ism and v ind icat ing our in tu i t ive picture o f free w i l l as i nvo l v i ng an open 
future o f genuine alternative possibi l i t ies. 
A t the same t ime I also show the deficiencies o f certain fo rms o f source 
incompat ib i l i sm. This goal is pursued i n Chapter 7， where I reject Va ler ian 
i ncompa t ib i l i sm in favour o f Kane 's modest incompat ib i l i sm. I also consider a number 
o f object ions to my favoured pos i t ion, and make ref inements as necessary. I end the 
chapter by h igh l igh t ing that g iven what has been argued so far, the modest 
incompat ib i l i s t pos i t ion is to be preferred to its compat ib i l is t r ivals. 
M y fou r th goal is to show the most f ru i t fu l way source incompat ib i l i sm can be shown to 
its foil advantage against r iva l contro l incompat ib i l is t posi t ions. Wh i l s t the p rob lem o f 
free w i l l can be understood as a p rob lem to do w i t h luck and cont ro l , there is another 
p rob lem to do w i t h luck wh i ch has been v i r tua l l y ent irely neglected by free w i l l 
theorists. For the prob lem o f free w i l l is a p rob lem to do w i t h t ry ing to get mora l 
responsib i l i ty o f f the ground so to speak ― a p rob lem t ry ing to show h o w we can have 
adequate contro l over what we actual ly do. But gett ing responsib i l i ty o f f the ground is 
solves on ly h a l f the prob lem. There is then a p rob lem t ry ing to restrict responsib i l i ty to 
those actions we actually per fo rm, and not al l those we cou ld have per formed had 
factors not under our contro l been di f ferent . Th is second p rob lem is par t icu lar ly 
hazardous for those who ho ld ftindamentally ' an t i - l uck is ť posi t ions o f the k i n d 
mo t i va t i ng the need for path-p ick ing contro l . The source incompat ib i l i s t faces no 
s imi lar d i f f i cu l t ies here. 
A related goal involves drawing attention to an alternative story behind the supposed 
need for incompat ib i l i s t contro l i n contrast to the usual 'ant i l uck i s ť rat ionale. The story 
I propose sees incompat ib i l i s t contro l i n a restorative capacity, w i t h the ma in focus on 
the ownersh ip rather than contro l . Ref lect ion on the impl icat ions o f what consistent 
' an t i - l uck i sm ' w o u l d c o m m i t one to , combined w i t h the recogni t ion that 
incompat ib i l i s t -cont ro l wou ld st i l l leave us heavi ly exposed to luck, means that the ant i -
luck is t rat ionale behind incompat ib i l is t contro l should be dropped, and that the rationale 
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that I propose is preferable. Bu t once th is is accepted, then source incompat ib i l i sm 
appears a leaner, more attractive pos i t ion than cont ro l - incompat ib i l i sm. These two 
goals are pursued in Chapter 8. 
F ina l ly , hav ing shown h o w the modest incompat ib i l is t pos i t ion can outshine its r ivals I 
w i l l use Chapter 9 to draw together the ma in themes o f the prev ious chapters, and 
h igh l igh t both the l im i ts and the helpfulness o f what has been argued. 
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Chapter 2 
Compatibil ist strategies 
In this chapter I w i l l argue that causal determin ism threatens the idea that we have 
genuine alternative possibi l i t ies. I w i l l present a more detai led vers ion o f this argument 
before go ing on to consider various compat ib i l is t responses. I raise fami l ia r object ions 
to some o f the proposals. F ina l ly I sketch the k i n d o f compat ib i l i sm advocated by the 
most recent breed o f compat ib i l is ts, namely those who reject the need for alternative 
possibi l i t ies altogether. Cr i t ica l assessment o f the argument upon w h i c h they base their 
re ject ion o f PAP w i l l wai t un t i l the next chapter. 
2-1 The Consequence Argument 
I n the previous chapter I suggested that causal determin ism, i f t rue, w o u l d rule out 
al ternat ive possibi l i t ies. I w i l l now make that argument in more detai l . I t has become 
k n o w n as the T h e Consequence A rgumen t ' and is g iven its general f o r m i n the 
f o l l o w i n g o f ten quoted passage: 
I f determin ism is true, then our acts are the consequences o f the laws o f nature 
and events in the remote past. Bu t i t is not up to us what went on before we 
were born, and neither is i t up to us what the laws o f nature are. Therefore, the 
consequences o f these things ( inc lud ing our present acts) are not up to us. (van 
Inwagen 1983， p. 16) 
There are a number o f d i f ferent versions o f the argument that can be extracted f r o m the 
above passage, but they are al l essential ly the same insofar as i f one fa i l s , then they al l 
do (van Inwagen 1983, p. 57; for object ions see Fischer 1994, pp. 248-249 ท. 12). The 
vers ion that I w i l l out l ine be low is one g iven by Fischer in his 1 9 9 4 / I t depends upon 
three very plausible pr incip les and the assumption o f determin ism. The first Fischer 
cal ls the Pr inc ip le o f the Transfer o f Powerlessness: 
7 Others who have made versions o f this argument include: van Inwagen 1983, pp. 55-105; Ginet 1966 pp. 
87-104; Ginet 1983; Ginet 1990; Wiggins 2003; and in a theological context, Pike 1965՜ 
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[ I ] f a person is powerless over one th ing, and powerless over that th ing 's 
leading to another, then the person is powerless over the second th ing . . . . 
Suppose, for example, that a meteori te hits my house today, and that I am 
powerless to prevent this. Imagine, further, that the meteor i te is being enough 
to destroy my roof, so that i t is true that i f it hits my house, i t destroys m y roo f 
(and, again, I am powerless to alter this t ruth) . I t seems that i t f o l l ows that the 
meteor i te destroys my roof, and that I am powerless to prevent the destruct ion 
o f my roof. (Fischer 1994, pp. 8-9) 
The second pr inc ip le Fischer terms the Pr inc ip le o f the F ix i t y o f the Past. Th is pr inc ip le 
says that the past is now f i xed and out o f our contro l . I cannot, for instance, n o w change 
the fact that I had cornf lakes for breakfast th is morn ing . A s such, I do not have the 
power to do something w h i c h w o u l d require the past to be di f ferent. A s Fischer puts i t 
" the pr inc ip le says that i f a person'ร per fo rming a certain act ion w o u l d require some 
actual fact about the past not to have been a fact, then the person cannot pe r fo rm the 
act " (1994, p. 9). The th i rd pr inc ip le says something equal ly common-sensical about the 
laws o f nature, and can be termed the Pr inc ip le o f the F ix i t y o f the Laws (1994, p. 9). 
For instance, i t is a law o f nature 一 or seems to be - that noth ing can t ravel faster than 
the speed o f l ight . I f that is a law o f nature, then there is noth ing that I can do that is 
contrary to that law. The laws o f nature, l ike the past, are out o f our cont ro l . 
The four th and final ingredient is the thesis o f causal determin ism. So, at any g iven 
t ime , a complete statement o f the facts about the past, and a complete statement o f the 
laws o f nature, entails al l future truths. W i t h these ingredients in place, Fischer 's version 
o f the Consequence Argument can be presented as fo l lows. Agent s， per forms some act 
X , w h i c h we can take to be a mental act ion such as mak ing a decis ion at t ime է2: 
[ I ] f determin ism is true, and s i is the total state o f the w o r l d at tl， one o f the 
f o l l o w i n g condit ionals must be true: 
1. I f ร were to refra in f r o m do ing X at է2， i t w o u l d not have been the total state o f 
the w o r l d at t l . 
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2. I f S were to refrain f r o m do ing X at է2, then some natural l aw w h i c h actual ly 
obtains wou ld not obtain. 
3. I f X were to refrain f r om do ing X at է2, then either is w o u l d not have been the 
tota l state o f the wo r l d at i t , or some natural l aw w h i c h actual ly obtains w o u l d 
not obtain. 
Bu t i f (1) is true, then. . . [assuming the t ruth o f the Pr inc ip le o f the F i x i t y o f the 
Past] ร cannot refrain f rom do ing X at է2. S imi la r ly , i f (2) is true, then . . . 
[assuming the t ruth o f the Pr inciple o f the F ix i t y o f the Laws ] ร cannot refrain 
f r o m do ing X at է2. F ina l ly , i f ( l)，s t ruth impl ies that ร cannot ref ra in f r o m 
d ing X at է2， and (2) 's t ru th impl ies that ร cannot re f ra in f r o m do ing X at է2, 
then i t fo l lows that i f (3) is true, ร cannot refra in f r o m do ing X at է2. The 
conclus ion o f this argument is that i f determin ism is t rue, then ร cannot do 
anyth ing other than what he actual ly does at է2. General is ing this resul t , . . . i f 
de termin ism is true, none o f us is free to do other than what he actual ly does. 
(Fischer 1994, pp. 62-63) 
A l l the ingredients o f th is argument are plausible, common-sense pr inc ip les, and 
fur thermore determin ism is a thesis about the structural undeφ inn ings o f the universe 
w h i c h may very w e l l turn out to be true. G iven in addi t ion the in tu i t i ve p laus ib i l i ty o f 
PAP this argument appears devastating to free w i l l and mora l responsibi l i ty . 
What , then, does the compat ib i l is t say to this apparently devastat ing argument? W e l l , 
some acknowledge that we do need genuine alternative possib i l i t ies, but they deny that 
de te rmin ism actual ly rules them out. Others argue that we should understand the 
in tu i t i ve demand for an 'ab i l i ty to do otherwise ' condi t ional ly . W h e n we interpret the 
demand for an abi l i ty to do otherwise in this way, then i t tums out to be compat ib le w i t h 
determin ism. I n other words, these compat ib i l is ts accept that we do not have genuine 
alternat ive possibi l i t ies, but argue that we st i l l have an abi l i ty to do otherwise in a sense 
relevant to free w i l l and responsibi l i ty. Others try to d i f fuse the p rob lem o f free w i l l by 
arguing that we have over- intel lectual ised i t , and that i n fact our practices o f b laming 
and pra is ing are insulated against discoveries about the structural и п 0 е ф і п п і п § 5 o f the 
universe (and that there is something fa int ly absurd about th ink ing that such discoveries 
cou ld real ly make a di f ference). But the most popular recent strategy by compat ib i l is ts 
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has been to reject that we need alternative possibi l i t ies and the associated ab i l i ty to 
decide otherwise. Wh i l s t we may in tu i t ive ly feel that alternative possibi l i t ies are needed, 
these compat ib i l is ts argue that a certain k ind o f case ― k n o w n as a Frankfur t -sty le case ― 
shows this assumpt ion to be mistaken, at least w i t h respect to the k i n d o f free w i l l and 
contro l needed for responsibi l i ty. P A P , in other words , is false and the on ly k i n d o f 
contro l presupposed by mora l responsibi l i ty and free w i l l is o f a k i nd compat ib le w i t h 
determin ism. 
I t w o u l d be impossib le to do fu l l just ice to a l l the various compat ib i l i s t arguments that 
have been of fered w i t h respect to the above select ion o f posi t ions. Some o f the above 
are therefore go ing to have to be g iven rather short th r i f t . T w o o f the three posi t ions 
above w i l l be g iven some t ime in court. N o doubt not enough t ime to fu l l y do them 
just ice, but enough, I hope, to h igh l ight their def iciencies. The f i rst pos i t ion that is go ing 
to be g iven the most cursory treatment. 
2,2 Rejecting the Principles 
There are compat ib i l is ts w h o bel ieve that we do have genuine alternative possib i l i t ies, 
even i f de termin ism is true. Bu t in main ta in ing th is , they have to chal lenge one o f the 
above pr inc ip les, either the f i x i t y o f the past, the f i x i t y o f the laws, or the transfer 
pr inc ip le . Typ ica l l y , those who challenge the f i x i t y o f the past or the f i x i t y o f the laws 
are actual ly object ing to the sense o f ' cou ld have done otherwise ' that the consequence 
argument seeks to show determin ism deprives us of . 8 In other words, these 
compat ib i l is ts are real ly o f the second sort 一 they are advocat ing a condi t iona l analysis 
o f cont ro l . 9 Bu t those who question the transfer pr inc ip le leave open, i f their arguments 
w o r k , that we cou ld have genuine alternative possibi l i t ies even i f determin ism is true. 
Th is is because i f the transfer pr inc ip le is false, then the Consequence Argument does 
not establish its conclusion. That does not mean that we actual ly do have genuine 
alternat ive possibi l i t ies i f determin ism is t rue, but i t does mean that i t cannot be 
8 Those who have made such arguments include: Gallois 1977; Horgan 1985; Lewis 2003; Narvesen 
1977; Saunders 1968; Vihvel in 1991. น is also possible for the compatibil ist to question the nature o f 
causation and to appeal to a non-necessitarian view o f the laws o f nature. Hume is famous for advocating 
a non-necessitarian view of the laws. According to this view the same pasts are consistent with different 
laws, and as such the past being what it is, does not entail that there is just one future. See for instance, 
Berofsky 1987 chs. 8 and 9. 
One does not have to do this - for one could just out and out reject either the principle o f the f ix i ty o f the 
past or the f ix i ty o f the laws. But then that would be an extremely controversial move. 
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uncontrovers ia l ly demonstrated to be the case. 
A l t hough the arguments over the va l id i ty o f the transfer pr inc ip le are by no means 
sett led, I have no th ing to add to the discussion and i n m y v i e w the transfer p r inc ip le is 
suf f ic ient ly common-sensical to make any pos i t ion w h i c h depends upon reject ing i t , a 
h igh ly controversial pos i t ion . ' ^ U n t i l matters are settled here, I bel ieve the burden o f 
p r o o f l ies w i t h those who w o u l d reject the Transfer Pr inc ip le , and so w i l l s imp ly assume 
that the consequence argument works . The Consequence Argument makes it h igh ly 
plausible that determin ism is incompat ib le w i t h genuine alternative possibi l i t ies and we 
have no non-controvers ia l reason to th ink otherwise. That , I bel ieve, is as m u c h as one 
can expect in this area. F r o m n o w on I w i l l assume that determin ism real ly does rule out 
genuine alternative possibi l i t ies. Even i f I am wrong about th is , i t w i l l be instruct ive to 
explore what the impl ica t ions o f lack ing genuine alternative possibi l i t ies actual ly are. 
2.3 Conditional Analysis of Ability 
The next k i n d o f compat ib i l i s t accepts that we do not have genuine alternative 
possibi l i t ies o f the k i n d ru led out above. Bu t they reject that this means we lack the 
ab i l i ty to do otherwise. Th is is because these compat ib i l is ts give a condi t iona l analysis 
o f what i t means to say that someone could have done otherwise, and the condi t iona l 
analysis is consistent w i t h determin ism being true. 
Consider first i f determin ism is true, then no one has he ab i l i ty to do otherwise when the 
past and the laws are held fixed. However , what this k i nd o f compat ib i l i s t c la ims is that 
we do not need this k ind o f abi l i ty in order to have free w i l l and mora l responsibi l i ty . 
Rather the sense o f 'ab i l i t y to do otherwise ' relevant to free w i l l and responsibi l i ty is the 
ab i l i t y to do otherwise i f one chooses to do otherwise (Hume 1955， p. 73 ; Aye r 1954; 
Hobar t 1934; M o o r e 1993, pp. 299-313) . Hobbes was amongst the f i rst to suggest such 
an analysis when he said that "he is free to do a th ing, that may do i t i f he have the w i l l 
to do it , and may forbear, i f he have the w i l l to forbear" (Hobbes 1962, p. 240) . H u m e 
also gave a condi t iona l analysis o f f reedom: 
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[ I ] f we choose to remain at rest, we may; i f we choose to move, we also may. 
N o w this hypothet ical l iberty is universal ly a l lowed to belong to everyone w h o 
is not a prisoner and in chains. (1955, p. 104) 
M i l l propounded such a v i e w in the nineteenth century and G. E. M o o r e took the 
condi t ional analysis into the twent ie th century, where i t was also taken up by Aye r 
(1954) , Schl ick (1966) , Hobart (1934) , and Dav idson (1973) amongst others. It 
cont inues to be defended in one f o r m or another by B o k (1998) , Kap i tan (2002) , 
V i v h e l i n (1991X and Peacocke (1999). 
To get clearer about the condi t ional analysis (and ignor ing dif ferences in detai l between 
al l o f the above) consider the example o f a t d e v i s i o n remote contro l . We migh t say o f a 
remote contro l that i t changed the channel to B B C l because the B B C l but ton on its 
keypad was pressed. Bu t i t would have changed channels to B B C 2 / / t h e B B C 2 but ton 
had been pressed. The remote contro l is a contro l mechanism due to this fact about i t . 
W e w o u l d say o f someone who had possession o f this remote cont ro l , that though in the 
actual sequence they changed channels to B B C l , they had the ab i l i ty to change channel 
to B B C 2 , because i f they had pressed the B B C 2 but ton the channel w o u l d have changed 
accordingly. The compat ib i l i s t is saying that our decisions are exh ib i t cont ro l i n the 
same way: we decide one way in the actual sequence, but we could have decided 
otherwise, / / w e had wanted. Just as the t ruth o f determin ism w o u l d not i n any way 
render the te lev is ion remote contro l less o f a contro l mechanism, s imi la r ly the t ru th o f 
determin ism w o u l d not threaten our cont ro l either. Just as the remote contro l is sui tably 
responsive to its keypad, so we are suitably responsive to our wants or reasons. 
I t h ink we should admit that this is an analysis o f a k i nd o f cont ro l , and the contro l i n 
quest ion is compat ib le w i t h determin ism. A f te r a l l , we clearly w o u l d s t i l l have some 
species o f contro l over what we do even i f determin ism is true ( i f determin ism were 
announced to be true tomor row, w o u l d we feel out o f control? O f course not) . W e 
should also concede that very often i t is precisely this condi t iona l sense o f cou ld have 
done otherwise that we invoke. I m igh t say ' o h , we l l I cou ld have done that i f I 'd 
'0 Those who have challenged the Transfer Principle include: Widerker 1987; McKay and Johnson 1996; 
Slote 1982. And for replies to these challenges see: Fischer 1994, pp. 29-44; O'Connor 2000 pp. 3-15; 
Finch and Warf ield 1998. 
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wanted ' 一here I am clearly i n v o k i n g the condi t ional sense o f ' c o u l d ' . I am repor t ing that 
I have a certain abi l i ty . 
Bu t there are problems when it comes to mak ing the case for saying that this is the k i nd 
o f ab i l i ty to do otherwise associated w i t h free w i l l and responsibi l i ty. F i rs t ly , i t seems to 
del iver the w r o n g verdic t i n a number o f cases. For instance, i f Jack cannot go outside 
due to his agoraphobia, i t m igh t nevertheless be true that Jack w o u l d go outside i f he 
chose to . Granted, he is not go ing to choose է 一 because he has agoraphobia! B u t that 
does not alter the fact that he w o u l d i f he chose to. I n this case the condi t iona l analysis 
del ivers the verd ic t that Jack has the abi l i ty to go outside. Yet , Jack clearly was not free 
to go outside i n any sense relevant to free w i l l and responsibi l i ty (on this see Lehrer 
1966, and for discussion Berofsky 2002). 
M o r e devastat ingly, the condi t ional sense o f ab i l i ty j us t does not seem to be what w e are 
ta l k ing about w h e n we are ta l k ing about the k i n d o f alternative possibi l i t ies associated 
w i t h mora l responsib i l i ty . When we say that we have the ab i l i ty to decide otherwise, we 
sometimes mean that we have the abi l i ty to decide otherwise given conditions exactly as 
they are ՛ what Aus t i n referred to as the 'a l l i n ' sense o f can ( 1 9 6 1 ) . 1 1 Th is is especial ly 
so when it comes to cases i nvo l v i ng blame. W h e n we b lame someone for mak ing some 
mora l l y reprehensible decis ion we assume that they cou ld have decided otherwise. Bu t 
we assume here that they could have decided otherwise in these exact circumstances, 
rather than i n d i f ferent circumstances. I t seems ent i rely i r relevant what she w o u l d do i n 
d i f ferent circumstances. 
Tu rn ing again to the remote cont ro l , i t can be said to have cont ro l led the channel 
change, but i t d id not have contro l over how i t contro l led the channel change. For that 
was a matter determined by whichever o f its buttons had been pressed. I t d id not have 
cont ro l over h o w it exercised contro l i n other words. L ikewise we m igh t cont ro l our 
decisions in v i r tue o f the fact that we cou ld have decided otherwise i f he had wanted to. 
Bu t we lack contro l over our 'wan ts ' i n the same way that the remote contro l does not 
Austin gives a now famous example in a footnote to his paper Ifs and Cans: 
Consider the case where 1 miss a very short putt and kick myself because 1 could have holed it. 
It is not that I should have holed it i f I had tried: I did try, and missed. It is not that I should 
have holed it i f conditions had been different: that might o f course be so, but I am talking 
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cont ro l h o w its buttons are pressed. I t is th is k i n d o f ref lect ion that leads back to the 
concern about luck. I f we do not ultimately contro l h o w we decide in any actual 
sequence, then it looks as i f i t is j us t a matter o f their łuck that we found ourselves so 
const i tuted that on this part icular occasion i t was inevi table that w e w o u l d make the 
decis ion we d id . 
2.4 Hilary Bok 
Hi la ry B o k is a contemporary compat ib i l is t who defends the condi t iona l analysis, and it 
w i l l be instruct ive to see what she says at this point . B o k holds that i t is the condi t iona l 
understanding o f ab i l i ty that we are commi t ted to when we del iberate, and so the 
condi t iona l sense o f ab i l i ty to do otherwise is the one relevant to free w i l l and 
responsibi l i ty . To get clearer, let us f i rst d ist inguish between theoret ical reason and 
pract ical reason. When we employ theoretical reason we are t ry ing to determine what is 
the case - that is the purpose o f theoretical reasoning. Bu t the purpose o f pract ical 
reason is to find out what to do. (Pract ical reasoning can y ie ld two k inds o f judgement -
a judgement about what i t w o u l d be best, or what one ought to do - normat ive 
judgements ― and actual choices or decisions (Bok 1998 ch. 2 ; Kane 1996， p. 21) ) . 
Depending upon w h i c h perspective we are adopt ing ― the theoretical or the pract ical -
we have d i f ferent ends in m ind . Wha t B o k argues is that f r om the theoret ical perspective 
the compat ib i l is ts condi t ional analysis o f contro l does look empty and irrelevant. W h e n 
we adopt the theoretical perspective our decisions are jus t the inevi table output o f 
mechanical processes. Bu t when we adopt the perspective o f pract ical reason ― so when 
we are t ry ing to determine what to do - then the compat ib i l is t analysis appears correct, 
or at least it is the compat ib i l i s t 's not ion o f poss ib i l i ty that we entertain. W h e n we 
deliberate we take our alternatives to be condi t ional alternatives. F r o m the pract ical 
perspect ive, the type o f f reedom we have to assume we have is the compat ib i l i s t 
condi t iona l f reedom to decide otherwise. As B o k states: 
F r o m the practical po in t o f v i ew . . . our use o f [the compat ib i l i s t condi t iona l ] 
concept ion o f possib i l i ty , as opposed to the narrower poss ib i l i ty tout court [ the 
incompat ib i l i s t concept ion o f possib i l i ty ― something is possible on ly i f i t is 
about conditions as they precisely were, and asserting that I could have holed it. There is the 
rub. (1961, p. 218) 
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possible ho ld ing f i xed the past and the laws o f nature] , is bo th unavoidable and 
rat ional . I t is unavoidable because wh i l e we deliberate w e cannot possible 
employ a concept ion o f the alternatives that are avai lable to us that is narrower 
than the set o f actions that we w o u l d per fo rm were we to choose to do so. It is 
rat ional because, for the purposes o f del iberat ion, we must regard that quest ion 
as open, we should not regard the various actions that we w o u l d pe r fo rm i f we 
chose as d i f fe r ing w i t h respect to their possib i l i ty , since any o f them w o u l d be 
possible tout court i f we chose to per fo rm it. Moreover , to determine whether 
or not a part icular act ion is one w h i c h we w o u l d pe r fo rm i f we chose is to 
determine whether or not we can regard i t as a possible object o f choice: an 
act ion about w h i c h the quest ion whether or not we have reason to per fo rm i t 
can legi t imately be raised. (Bok 2003, p. 161) 
W h e n we are emp loy ing our pract ical reasoning, we are t ry ing to determine w h i c h 
amongst a set o f possible decisions we should make. Those possibi l i t ies that we w i l l 
take as real for us, are those w h i c h , i f we were to choose them, we cou ld realise. I n other 
words, I do not deliberate about whether or not to flutter around the r o o m , because I 
take i t that i t w o u l d not be possible for me to flutter around the r o o m even if I chose to. 
W e seek through pract ical reasoning, to nar row our range o f possibi l i t ies to those things 
that we cou ld do i f we chose to. Therefore, i t seems that when we adopt the pract ical 
perspective, w h i c h is to say, when we are actual ly t ry ing to determine what to do, we 
need on ly employ the compat ib i l is t condi t ional concept ion o f what i t is possible that we 
cou ld do. B o k then argues that this is the concept ion o f possib i l i ty relevant to free w i l l 
and responsibi l i ty . 
However , even i f Bok is r ight w i t h respect to the concept ion o f poss ib i l i ty that we 
employ when we are t ry ing to determine what to do, that does not mean that the 
compat ib i l i s t condi t ional analysis o f the abi l i ty to do otherwise is the correct one when 
it comes to the question o f whether we act freely and are mora l l y responsible. B o k ' ร 
point is relevant ly ident ical to a po in t that Hobbes made in the seventeenth century 
about the prospect o f God hav ing pre-determined al l that we do. Hobbes said that this 
may be the case, but g iven that we do not k n o w what G o d has pre-determined us to do, 
we st i l l have to deliberate about what to do in the normal way (Hobbes 1962， p. 174). I n 
pract ical terms, the news that God is cont ro l l ing us is irrelevant. L i kew ise , the news that 
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determin ism is true is, f r o m the pract ical perspective, i r relevant, fo r i t does not in i tse l f 
help me f igure out what I should do. Ye t the news that God has pre-determined a l l o f 
our actions is, very p lausib ly , relevant to the question o f responsib i l i ty and s imi la r ly so 
cou ld be the t ru th o f determin ism. 
I am go ing to elaborate further upon the problems that compat ib i l is ts have concerning 
cases i n v o l v i n g clandestine manipu la t ion ( o f the sort that G o d m i g h t be gu i l ty o f ) i n 
Chapter 4. A t the moment we can note that when it comes to assessing whether we have 
the k i nd o f free w i l l required for responsibi l i ty i t is not obvious that the pract ical 
standpoint is the correct one to take. For we do not jus t want to k n o w whether to b lame 
someone, (or to ho ld ourselves b lamewor thy) we want to k n o w whether they actual ly 
are b lamewor thy . As such B o k ' s focus on the pract ical perspective does not settle the 
matter o f w h i c h analysis o f poss ib i l i ty ― the condi t iona l or the uncond i t iona l ― is the 
correct one w i t h respect to responsibi l i ty. 
2-5 Fake Compatibilists 
For reasons already g iven, the condi t ional interpretat ion seems ar t i f i c ia l when of fered as 
an analysis o f the k i n d o f ab i l i ty to do otherwise we associate w i t h responsibi l i ty . I t does 
art iculate a k ind o f cont ro l , but i t is a k i nd o f contro l that leaves us exposed to u l t imate 
luck. The k ind o f contro l condi t ional abi l i t ies confer on us is o f a sort relevant ly 
ident ical to that exh ib i ted by te lev is ion remote controls and the l i ke . 
However , what needs to be borne in m i n d is that many ( though not Bok above) o f the 
compat ib i l is ts w h o have of fered the condi t ional analysis have a part icular v i e w about 
mora l responsibi l i ty . I t is this v i e w about mora l responsibi l i ty w h i c h explains why this 
k i nd o f compat ib i l i s t contro l seems to be the only k i nd needed. The v i e w about mora l 
responsib i l i ty i n quest ion is consequent ia l ist 
Consequential ist conceptions o f responsibi l i ty are defended by ' compat ib i l i s ts ' such as 
Dennett , M i l l , S idgwick , Schl ick, Stevenson, Smart, and Ayer . However , the 
consequential ist concept ion o f mora l responsibi l i ty is jus t not what we are ta lk ing about 
In the famous exchange between Bishop Bramhall and Hobbes this was precisely the point Bramhall 
made, arguing that i f God created our characters, and i f our characters caused us to behave as we do, then 
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w h e n we wonder whether determin ism threatens our free w i l l and responsib i l i ty . For the 
consequential ist concept ion o f mora l responsibi l i ty does not presuppose free w i l l at all. 
I charge then, that consequential ist ' compat ib i l i s ts ' are not actual ly compat ib i l is ts at a l l . 
T o get clearer about the consequential ist concept ion o f responsibi l i ty , let us first take the 
Ut i l i t a r ian as our standard bearer for consequential ism, and tu rn to S idgw ick for 
e luc idat ion. 
[T ]he determinist can give to the terms ' i l l -desert ' and ' respons ib i l i t y ' a 
s ign i f icat ion w h i c h is not on ly clear and def in i te, but, f r o m a ut i l i tar ian po in t o f 
v iew , the on ly suitable meaning. In this v iew, i f I a f f i r m that A is responsible 
for a harmfu l act, I mean that i t is r ight to punish h i m for i t ; p r imar i l y , i n order 
that the fear o f punishment may prevent h i m and others f r o m commi t t i ng 
s imi lar acts in the future. (1963, pp. 71-73) 
A s Watson puts i t , the idea is that praise and blame are jus t "ways o f grading people 
with a view to influencing their attitudes and conduct, rather than judging t h e m " (2003， 
p. 15). I f this is the fu l l story behind our practices o f b laming and pra is ing, pun ish ing 
and reward ing, then the only k i n d o f contro l that such practices seem to presuppose is 
the condi t iona l compat ib i l is t variety. The rationale goes, that i f b lame and praise are jus t 
too ls 一 ways o f gett ing people to change their behaviour - then i t on ly makes sense to 
b lame and praise those who exercise cont ro l over what they are do ing , for on ly they w i l l 
be responsive to such practices. '^ I f determin ism is true, then it w o u l d s t i l l make sense 
to t ry and alter people 'ร behaviour by these methods, for determin ism does not ru le out 
our hav ing condi t ional contro l . So, we get a connect ion between the appropriateness o f 
b lame and praise, and possession o f control.'"^ However , there are some w e l l - k n o w n 
object ions to this concept ion o f responsib i l i ty , object ions w h i c h h igh l igh t , amongst 
other th ings, h o w on this v i e w the connect ion between hav ing contro l and being 
responsible is not actual ly very strong. 
responsibility for what we do traces to God and not us (1844, p. 30 and see Kane 1996, p. 35). 
1 3 When we come on to look at reason responsive compatibil ist conceptions o f control it w i l l be apparent 
that the same rationale could be given. There really is no difference between the sort o f control exercised, 
it is rather that a source compatibilists does not try to pretend that their conception o f control is one that 
answers to what we normally take to be an ability to decide otherwise. 
' 4 Having a 'genuine' abil i ty to do otherwise might actually be an obstacle to consequentialist goals. It 
wou ld get in the way o f ensuring that people only behave in certain ways, for a genuine abil i ty to do 
otherwise introduces some uncertainty into the picture. 
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The most c o m m o n object ion to this consequential ist concept ion o f responsib i l i ty is that 
i t makes what one actual ly d id o f incidental importance demonstrated by the fact that a 
consequential ist rat ionale can be g iven for b laming someone who has done noth ing 
wrong . Th is cou ld come about for two main reasons 一 b laming you m igh t have 
benef ic ia l consequences on others ( i t may alter the behaviour o f others, or, i n the 
notor ious 'scapegoating cases' i t might al lay other 'ร fears or i n some other way 
contr ibute towards social c o h e s i o n ) . B l a m i n g you m igh t benef ic ia l ly alter your future 
behaviour. I n the latter case, imagine that you believe yourse l f to have done something 
w r o n g ( in fact you jus t dreamt i t ) . So long as you sincerely bel ieve th is , then b laming 
and punish ing you as i f y o u ' d actual ly done wrong migh t be j us t i f i ed , on the grounds 
that i f you go unpunished this m igh t lead y o u to th ink that y o u can get away w i t h 
wrongdo ing . A s long as y o u sincerely bel ieve you d id something w rong , i t does not 
actual ly matter whether you actual ly d id : the impl icat ions for your future behaviour are 
the same. 
The prob lem is that i f you accept this k i nd o f rationale for our practices o f b lam ing and 
prais ing, punish ing and reward ing, you cannot at the same t ime be too concerned w i t h 
what people actual ly do. I n other words, you cannot be too concerned w i t h whether 
those be ing b lamed and praised are actual ly gu i l ty o f anyth ing. The excuse 'bu t I d i dn ' t 
do i t ! ' cannot settle the issue o f an agent's blameworthiness (yet i t is hard to th ink o f a 
better excuse!). For the agent's blameworthiness is determined not by whether or not 
they actual ly d id anyth ing w rong , much less whether they d id anyth ing w r o n g freely, 
rather i t is determined by whether i t w o u l d be most ut i le to b lame this person i n the 
circumstances. That is w h y such a v i e w about mora l responsib i l i ty is radical ly at odds 
w i t h our c o m m o n sense concept ion, and w h y this k i nd o f v i e w jus t isn V compat ib i l is t . 
Acco rd ing to our common sense concept ion o f mora l responsibi l i ty , whether someone is 
t ru ly b lamewor thy or praiseworthy is a factual matter i n part determined by what the 
agent actual ly d i d , and whether or not the agent d id i t o f their o w n free w i l l where this 
includes hav ing exercised appropriate control .*^ The prob lem w i t h effect compat ib i l i sm, 
On the scapegoating problem see: McCloskey 1965, 1967 and 1973; Sprigge 1965; Smart 1973. 
I 6 There are other reasons to consider this conception o f responsibility at odds with our 'common sense' 
conception, not least the fact that when we blame and praise others we do not normally take ourselves to 
be engaging in an exercise in behaviour modif ication (Squires 1969， p, 2】 ΐ χ 
Smilansky makes this case too, and makes an interesting version o f the 'punishing o f the innocent' 
objection (2000, pp. 27-33; 1990b). 
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and w h y it is not real ly a fo rm o f compat ib i l i sm at a l l , is that it severs the intr insic l i n k 
between responsib i l i ty and free w i l l and makes matters external to the agent determine 
their b lameworth iness, namely whether or not i t w o u l d be most ut i le to b lame them. 1 8 I 9 
2.6 Strawsonian 'Reactive Naturalism' 
A d i f ferent compat ib i l i s t approach, but one w h i c h I ho l d shares some o f the same faults 
as that above, is Peter Strawson'ร ' react ive natura l ism' ( I bo r row the term f r o m 
Smi lansky 2000, p. 220) . Strawson'ร v i ew is expressed in his n o w famous, and much 
discussed ' 'Freedom and Resentment" (1962). In that w o r k Strawson introduces the 
useful term ― reactive attitudes - to refer to attitudes such as grat i tude, resentment, 
forgiveness and ind ignat ion. The reactive attitudes are "natural human reactions to the 
good or i l l w i l l or indi f ference o f others towards us as displayed in their att i tudes and 
act ions" (Strawson 2003, p. 80) I n the contemporary debate i t is be ing an 'apt target for 
the reactive att i tudes' 一 so being someone who is resent-worthy, forg ivab le , and so fo r th 
一 is taken to be what being mora l l y responsible is. 
So far that is f ine and settles noth ing regarding the quest ion o f whether mora l 
responsib i l i ty and free w i l l require genuine alternative possibi l i t ies. However , what is 
novel about Strawson'ร approach is that he claims that i t is a mistake to look for some 
k i n d o f deep ground or jus t i f i ca t ion for these attitudes and related practices. A s Watson 
puts it " t he . . . emphasis on abstract questions about the character o f the laws o f nature or 
o f the causal structure o f the w o r l d i s . . , out o f focus" (2003, pp. 15-16). For these 
One way to bring out the fact that effect compatibil ism just isn Ί a form o f compatibil ism is the fact that 
it is perfectly possible for a hard incompatibilist to agree that consequential considerations now constitute 
the only basis upon which to praise and blame. Yet the hard incompatibilist, believes this precisely 
because they believe that we do not have free w i l l . In other words, consequential justif ications take over 
(and no doubt alter what we are and are not blame/punished for, or ๒ light of) in the absence o f a free w i l l 
based just i f icat ion. 
I am not suggesting that the only basis upon which blame and punishment can be just i f ied in the absence 
o f free w i l l are consequential grounds. There's no obvious reason why an absence o f free w i l l should 
mean that we lack basic rights, and these could put some limits on the extent to which consequential 
considerations determine how severely we are punished etc. See for instance: Pereboom 1995, 2001 and 
2002 esp. pp. 479-480; Smilansky 2000, pp. 31-32). 
'9 Above I have dismissed 'consequentialist' compatibilists as not really compatibilists at al l . But in order 
to avoid misunderstanding let me say that what I have said above applies only to those who take a purely 
consequentialist approach to moral responsibility. It would not apply to those who believe, say, that it is 
on the basis o f consequential considerations that we actively blame and praise etc, but that such practices 
need to be restricted according to a set o f conditions ― conditions to do w i th control and free w i l l (so, i t 
would not be appropriate to blame someone for something that they have not done, even i f doing so would 
be uti le). 
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atti tudes, according to Strawson, do not stand in need o f j us t i f i ca t ion at al l - they 
constitute mora l responsibi l i ty. So， w h e n we express our b lame w e are not vo i c i ng the 
recogni t ion o f some characteristic in the agent w h i c h i tse l f jus t i f ies our expression o f 
blame i n any deep way, rather our expression o f b lame just is what i t is to ho ld someone 
b lamewor thy . A g a i n , our practice o f act ively punish ing some and reward ing others, 
s imp ly expresses our reactive att itudes, w h i c h do not themselves need j us t i f y i ng . A n d 
" [ 0 ] u r proneness to the reactive attitudes is a natural fac t . . . neither ca l l i ng for nor 
permi t t ing a general rat ional j us t i f i ca t i on " (p. Strawson 1980， p. 265) . A s Watson says: 
I n Strawson's v iew, there is no such independent no t ion o f responsib i l i ty that 
explains the propr iety o f the reactive attitudes. The explanatory p r io r i t y is the 
other way around. I t is not that w e ho ld people responsible because they are 
responsible; rather, the idea {our idea) that we are responsible is to be 
understood by the practice, w h i c h i tse l f is not a matter o f ho ld ing some 
proposi t ions to be true, but o f expressing our concerns and demands about our 
treatment o f one another. (1987, p. 258; see also Bennett 1980) 
Consider that, as many compat ib i l is ts l i ke to po in t out, most o f the d ist inct ions that we 
employ i n everyday l i fe to determine whether or not someone is b lamewor thy , are 
dist inct ions that w o u l d survive the revelat ion that determin ism is true. For instance, 
w h e n t r y ing to determine blameworthiness we ask whether any norma l excusing 
condi t ions apply ― d id the agent do what they d id accidental ly? B y mistake? 
Inadvertent ly? Were they mad? I f determin ism is true this does not threaten the va l id i ty 
o f any o f these d ist inct ions. I f determin ism is true we can st i l l d is t inguish between the 
mad and the sane, we can st i l l d ist inguish between the accidental and the in tent ional . I t 
s imp ly does not matter to the v iab i l i t y o f these dist inct ions whether or not the agent had 
genuine alternative possibi l i t ies. I t is he v iab i l i t y o f these dist inct ions that is alone 
needed for our concept ion o f responsibi l i ty to survive in a determinist ic w o r l d . I f 
de termin ism is t rue, then we st i l l sometimes behave badly towards one another, we st i l l 
somet imes in tent ional ly step on one another 'ร toes, and i n these cases the react ive 
attitudes (b lame, resentment and so for th) w o u l d s t i l l be 'ap t ' . I n th is way, mora l 
responsib i l i ty remains viable even i f determin ism is true. Strawson goes on to say that, 
26 
i f de tenn in ism were revealed to be true, we would not give up the reactive att i tudes, nor 
should we , and nor cou ld we i f we tried.^^ 
This v i e w yields compat ib i l i sm insofar as, i f correct, i t real ly does not matter whether 
determin ism is true or not. That we feel the reactive attitudes is a deep psychological 
fact about us, and is deeply embedded in our practices. M o r a l responsibi l i ty is, i f one 
l ikes, complete ly insulated against discoveries such as determin ism. A s Strawson 
h imse l f puts i t : 
The human commi tment to par t ic ipat ion in ordinary inter-personal 
relat ionships is, I th ink, too thoroughgoing and deeply rooted for us to take 
seriously the thought that a general theoretical conv ic t ion m igh t so change our 
w o r l d that, i n i t , there were no longer any such things as inter-personal 
relat ionships as we normal ly understand them; and being invo lved in inter­
personal relat ionships as we normal ly understand them precisely is being 
exposed to the range o f reactive attitudes and feelings that is i n quest ion. (2003, 
p. 81) 
Bu t despite hav ing been hugely in f luent ia l , there are some serious problems w i t h this 
k ind o f pos i t ion. In the f i rs t place, one cannot s imply cite the deep rootedness o f our 
practices as in some way demonstrat ing that they do not presuppose that our w o r l d is a 
certain way. In everyday l i fe we have to assume what phi losophers can put in doubt -
we jus t assume that, in the ma in , people have genuine alternative possibi l i t ies and 
adequate cont ro l over what they do. Granted, when we blame and praise people w e do 
not no rma l l y enquire into whether they had genuine al ternative possib i l i t ies - sat is fy ing 
normal d is t inct ions o f the type that are not threatened by determin ism is a l l that we do. 
Bu t that does not mean that our practices and beliefs to not conta in incompat ib i l i s t 
assumptions; it does not mean that / / พ e found out that the agent in quest ion lacked 
genuine alternat ive possibi l i t ies that we w o u l d not revise our judgement , that we w o u l d 
շ 0 i t is far from o b v i o u s that ou r react ive at t i tudes w o u l d rema in unchanged in l i gh t o f r ea l i s i ng the 
absence o f a desert base. I f , o n reภec t i on , w e come to see the d e t e r m i n i s m and the absence o f genu ine 
a l te rna t i ve poss ib i l i t i es as u n d e r m i n i n g ou r j u d g e m e n t s o f m o r a l r espons ib i l i t y , then a b a n d o n i n g ou r 
a t t i tudes, o r at least b e g i n i n g ล process o f r e v i s i o n , w o u l d seem poss ib le o r at least w e c o u l d in i t i a te a 
process o f r e v i s i o n . A f t e r a l l , w h e n we c o m e to real ise that a n o r m a l excus ing c o n d i t i o n ob ta ins ( tha t the 
person d i d n o t d o w h a t they d i d i n ten t i ona l l y f o r ins tance) then w e rev ise o u r a t t i tude . So w h y be so sure 
that w e canno t rev ise ou r at t i tudes when w e c o m e to see that e x c u s i n g c o n d i t i o n s o b t a i n in eve ry case (as 
an i n c o m p a t i b i l i s t t h i nks w o u l d be the case i f d e t e r m i n i s m ณ m s ou t to be t rue)? 
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not, i n other words , agree that b lame is not appropriate. W h y else do we even have a 
p rob lem o f free w i l l i f not because w e do th ink that there is something threatening about 
determin ism? I t is not as i f determin ism is obv ious ly benign. A s Nage l puts i t : 
W h e n we f i rst consider the possib i l i ty that al l human actions are determined by 
heredity and envi ronment , i t threatens to defuse our reactive att itudes as 
e f fec t ive ly as does the in fo rmat ion that a part icular act ion was caused by the 
effects o f a drug ― despite al l the dif ferences between the t w o supposi t ions. . . 
Some o f the external ly imposed l imi tat ions. . . on our actions are evident to us. 
W h e n we discover others, internal and less evident, our reactive attitudes 
toward the affected act ion tend to be defused... [ i t ] seems no longer attr ibutable 
i n the required way to the person w h o must be the target o f those attitudes. 
(2003, pp. 243-244) 
P. Strawson'ร son is, interest ingly, a cr i t ic o f his father 's pos i t ion, and he too points out 
that our natural attitudes contain incompat ib i l i s t assumptions at their core. 
The fact that the incompat ib i l is t in tu i t ion has such power fo r us is as much a 
natural fact about cogative beings l ike ourselves as i s . . . our . . , commi tmen t to 
the reactive att i tudes.. . What is more, the roots o f the incompat ib i l i s t in tu i t ion 
l ie deep in the... reactive attitudes. (G. Strawson 1986, p. 88) 
I n other words , Strawson cannot j us t assume that our practices, and our bel iefs about the 
appropriateness or aptness o f the reactive attitudes do not conta in, at their heart, 
incompat ib i l i s t assumptions about genuine alternative possibi l i t ies. 
2.7 Strawson'ร Rationality Argument 
Strawson c la ims that even i f we do th ink that determin ism subverts responsib i l i ty , and 
even i f we d id have a choice about whether or not to give up the reactive attitudes it 
w o u l d not be rat ional to do so. For the cost o f g i v ing up these att i tudes, and the 
impover ished f o r m o f l i fe that one w o u l d f i nd onesel f commi t ted to , means that i t 
s imp ly w o u l d not make sense to g ive such attitudes up. Le t นร suppose that th is is 
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correct."^' One m igh t say something s imi lar w i t h respect to someone w h o has structured 
their who le l i fe around a part icular re l ig ious v iew, and who happens upon a piece o f 
evidence that shows their chosen re l ig ion to be a complete sham (perhaps they discover 
that their re l ig ious text is the w o r k o f a fraudster). G i ven j ш է h o w central ly impor tant 
this person's bel iefs are, and g iven the extent to w h i c h their emot iona l and spir i tual 
we l l -be ing is n o w int imate ly t ied up w i t h their part icular re l ig ious v i e w , we m igh t j udge 
that in th is case the person has good reason to s imply ignore the evidence i n quest ion, 
and to cont inue as / / t he i r rel ig ious text was actual ly the communica t ion o f a god. 
Just as Kan t said that we should act under a regulat ive pr inc ip le to proceed as if God 
exists, so l ikewise al l Strawson has shown the commi t ted incompat ib i l i s t is that we have 
reason to proceed as г /de te rmin ism were false, even i f it turns out to be true. De lud ing 
ourselves and entertaining w i l d and extravagant hopes can be rat ional i f so much 
depends upon them.^^ Bu t that does not te l l us anything about what is in fact the case, 
and i t does not te l l us that our delusions do not, i n fact, require that the w o r l d be a 
certain way ― that there is not something that w o u l d v indicate our bel iefs, and 
something else that w o u l d count against them. 
Fur thermore, wh i l s t i t m igh t be rat ional to continue as i f determin ism were false, i t 
m igh t be equal ly rat ional to accept the t ru th and adjust - or t ry to adjust ― one's attitudes 
accord ingly . A g a i n , Peter Strawson'ร son Galen puts the ob jec t ion w e l l : 
A l t h o u g h our thoughts about determin ism appear in actual fact quite impotent 
to disturb our natural and unconsidered reactive att itudes and feel ings (this 
reveals one commi tment ) , i t also seems very d i f f i cu l t for us not to 
acknowledge that the t ru th o f de te rmin ism. . . b r ing the propr iety o f the reactive 
attitudes seriously into doubt (this reveals the other commi tmen t ) . Defenders 
o f the reactive attitudes may be unwise to seek to strengthen their pos i t ion by 
2' I t is no t c lear that i t is co r rec t . P e r e b o o m fo r instance, t h i nks that w h i l s t the rea l i sa t ion that w e do no t 
have free w i l l w o u l d lead to some rev i s ions o f ou r a t t i tudes, w e c o u l d s t i l l susta in m e a n i n g f i j i 
re la t ionsh ips f o r there are analogues o f m a n y o f ou r react ive at t i tudes that d o no t p resuppose the fa ls i t y o f 
d e t e r m i n i s m ( 2 0 0 1 , ch . 4 ; 2002 ) ľ 
22 Powys suggests tha t the art o f happiness fo r instance, requi res that w e tu rn away from the t r u t h : 
A r e we to b o w d o w n m e e k l y be fo re th is M o l o c h , c r y i n g , "b lessed is the b i t te r t r u t h ! Le t us and 
ou r d reams pass and per ish , so l ong as the h o l y , h o r r i b l e t r u th is recogn ised fo r w h a t i t i s ! " A 
t housand t imes n o ! I f this is the t r u t h o f th ings , let us h u g fiercely and obs t i na te l y each h is o w n 
l i f e - i l l u s i o n ! ( 1 9 7 4 , p. 17 and quo ted in S m i l a n s k y 2 0 0 0 , p. 2 6 6 ) 
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appeal ing to the fact that commi tment to the reactive attitudes is, un l ike the 
opposed commi tment , practically basic. For the incompat ib i l is t . . . may then 
reply that, wh i le the commi tmen t they are concerned to stress is o f an 
essential ly more theoretical character, i t appears to represent a s imple truth. 
There is a very real conf l ic t o f commi tment . (G. Strawson 1986， p. 89) 
So, even i f Strawson is r ight and it w o u l d not be rat ional to g ive up the reactive attitudes 
upon the news that determinism is true, that does not show the incompat ib i l i s t to be 
w r o n g ― i t does not show us that mora l responsibi l i ty and free w i l l do not require 
genuine alternative possibi l i t ies. 
W e can also note something else about Strawson'ร v iew. B y m a k i n g our being 
responsible depend upon our being held responsible, Strawson'ร v i e w makes our 
responsib i l i ty dependent upon matters external to the agent. For it is not in v i r tue o f 
some fact about the agent that they are b lamewor thy , but rather due to some fact about 
the tendencies o f those who blame us. I n this respect Strawson'ร v i e w seems 
ftindamentally misguided in exactly the same way as the consequential ist compat ib i l i s t 
was. A s Richard Doub le puts i t : 
I f i t is not enough to be to ld that the blame we receive is j us t i f i ed because i t 
contr ibutes to the greater good o f our society (thereby ra is ing the scapegoating 
ob ject ion to consequent ial ism), then it is not enough to be to ld that b lame 
reveals a deep tendency o f blamerร (or even those b lamed themselves) to feel 
and express their reactive attitudes. I n both cases, whether we ta lk about 
jus t i f i ca t ion or not, we try to account for blame by c i t ing facts that are extr insic 
to the person blamed. (Double 1996, p. 67) 
Fischer, w h o otherwise describes his approach to the quest ion o f free w i l l and mora l 
responsib i l i ty as 'S t rawsonian ' is sensit ive to this k ind o f ob jec t ion and h imse l f 
cr i t ic ises Strawson on the grounds that there need to be propr ie ty condi t ions govern ing 
w h e n it is and is not appropriate to consider someone b lamewor thy . I t cannot be lef t to 
depend upon whatever our received practices are, leaving us w i thou t any tools w i t h 
w h i c h to cr i t ic ise or revise those practices. 
зо 
Af te r a l l , once the actual appl icat ion o f the reactive att itudes is taken to be 
const i tut ive o f mora l responsibi l i ty , one wonders what should be said about 
situations in wh i ch communi t ies ho ld people responsible who in tu i t i ve ly are 
not. Does the mere fact that certain attitudes are taken toward an agent 
establish that he is an appropriate candidate for this treatment? Imagine, for 
example, a society in w h i c h severely retarded or menta l ly disturbed ind iv idua ls 
are resented, b lamed, and harshly punished for their fa i lure to adhere to the 
norms o f the commun i t y . . . The prob lem here is that . . . there seems to be a 
di f ference between being held responsible and actual ly being responsible. 
(Fischer 1994, pp. 212-213) 
Fischer goes on to propose 'propr ietary condi t ions ' on when it is, and when i t is not, 
appropriate to blame and praise someone for something that they have done. The 
p rob lem however, is that the instant one al lows that propr iety condi t ions are needed, 
then i t is open to the incompat ib i l is t to insist that genuinely avai lable alternative 
possibi l i t ies are one o f those condi t ions. I n other words, there is no th ing stopping an 
incompat ib i l i s t c la im ing that they too are 'S t rawsonian ' i n Fischer 's sense, but jus t 
disagreeing over the propr iety condi t ions govern ing the appropriateness o f the reactive 
att i tudes. 
In this section I have argued that p. Strawson'ร "react ive na tu ra l i sm" should be rejected 
i f proposed as the whole story about responsibi l i ty . For i t too makes our responsib i l i ty 
too dependent upon external grounds, namely the fact that b laming and pra is ing "reveals 
a deep tendency o f b lamers" (Doub le 1996, p. 67). To be aœ^ Strawson'ร account 
needs to be supplemented w i t h is some k i nd o f proprietary rules for when it is and is not 
appropriate for someone to be b lamed. However , the instant one concedes that such 
rules are needed, we are back in the o ld debate - for hav ing genuine alternative 
possibi l i t ies and an abi l i ty to do otherwise could be mainta ined to be amongst the 
propr ietary rules. 
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2.8 Reason Responsive Control 
I f we are reject ing Strawson's reactive natural ism, at least as the whole story about 
mora l responsib i l i ty then the compat ib i l is t seems commi t ted to either reject ing one o f 
the c o m m o n sense pr incip les contained in the consequence argument, or hav ing to g ive 
their condi t ional analyses o f ' c o u l d have done otherwise ' . 
However , i n recent years many contemporary compat ib i l is ts have taken an altogether 
bolder approach to the quest ion o f contro l and alternative possibi l i t ies. Rather than 
pursu ing either o f the strategies above, they have instead rejected that mora l 
responsib i l i ty requires alternative possibi l i t ies in any sense. Instead, a l l mora l 
responsib i l i ty requires is that an agent's decis ion be i n some way appropriately 
connected to their pr ior reasons. I f connected in the r ight way - so i f the process leading 
to decis ion is o f the r ight k i nd - then the agent can be said to have contro l led their 
dec is ion, and can be deemed responsible fo r hav ing made it. 
I w i l l elucidate the not ion o f contro l short ly. For one'ร in i t ia l react ion is l i ke ly to be to 
object that the compat ib i l is t cannot jus t reject the requirement for alternative 
possib i l i t ies: i f one's posi t ion is to be plausible one needs an argument showing that 
alternative possibi l i t ies are irrelevant. G iven jus t h o w deeply rooted the association 
between alternative possibi l i t ies, free w i l l , and mora l responsibi l i ty is, the argument had 
better be a very good one. 
Bu t this is exact ly what this modern breed o f compat ib i l is ts bel ieve themselves to have. 
The argument in quest ion is one that has come to dominate contemporary discussions on 
free w i l l . I t involves a certain sort o f case, k n o w n as a Frankfur t -Sty le case, so cal led 
after Har ry Frankfur t w h o f irst conceived էհ€ու.՛^^ These cases are supposed to consti tute 
counterexamples to the pr inc ip le o f alternative possibi l i t ies. I am going to discuss these 
cases in detai l in the next chapter, but it w o u l d be as w e l l to let Frankfur t present out l ine 
his case here: 
A c t u a l l y F r a n k f u r t ' s examp le is a va r i a t i on o f a case f i rs t presented by John L o c k e : 
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Suppose someone ― B lack, let us say - wants Jones to per fo rm a certain act ion. 
B lack is prepared to go to considerable lengths to get his way, but he prefers to 
avo id showing his hand unnecessarily. So he wai ts unt i l Jones is about to make 
up his m i n d what to do, and he does noth ing unless i t is clear to h i m (B lack is 
an excel lent judge o f such things) that Jones is go ing to decide to do someth ing 
other than what he wants h i m to do. I f i t does become clear that Jones is go ing 
to decide to do something else. B lack takes ef fect ive steps to ensure that Jones 
decides to do, and that he does do, what he wants h i m to do. Whatever Jones's 
in i t ia l preferences and incl inat ions, then, B lack w i l l have his w a y . . . 
N o w suppose that B lack never has to show his hand because Jones, for reasons 
o f his o w n , decides to per fo rm and does per fo rm the very act ion B lack wants 
h i m to pe r fo rm. In that case, i t seems clear, Jones w i l l bear precisely the same 
mora l responsibi l i ty for what he does as he w o u l d have borne i f B lack had not 
been ready to take steps to ensure that he do it . (Frankfur t 1969， pp. 835-36) 
So, in a Frankfur t -s ty le case there is some person, B lack , w h o does not intervene i n a 
process leading to an agent 'ร act ion, but w o u l d have intervened i f the agent had been 
about to decide to per fo rm some di f ferent act ion. G i v e n that the counterfactual 
intervener plays no role in the agent'ร del iberations and subsequent act ion, i t seems 
in tu i t i ve to consider that the agent is mora l l y responsible for their act ion. The mere 
presence o f the intervener seems, in tu i t ive ly , to be irrelevant, yet because o f their 
presence i t also seems true to say that the agent cou ld not have done otherwise. So， w e 
have a case i n w h i c h i t is in tu i t ive to consider someone b lamewor thy , despite the fact 
that they cou ld not have done otherwise. 
These cases appear to refute the pr inc ip le o f alternative possibi l i t ies. W e do not seem to 
need the open pathways into the future - one pathway w i l l do. I f this is t rue, then the 
ma jo r mo t i va t i on for th ink ing determin ism rules out mora l responsibi l i ty has gone, and 
m u c h o f the discussion o f the p rob lem o f free w i l l has been misguided. W e migh t st i l l 
wan( to have alternative possibi l i t ies; we migh t th ink that in the absence o f genuine 
alternat ive possibi l i t ies we lose a valuable k i n d o f free w i l l , but the fact remains - or so 
[ A ] m a n be ca r r ied w h i l s t fast asleep in to a r o o m whe re is a person he longs to see and speak 
w i t h , and be there l ocked fast i n , b e y o n d his p o w e r to get ou t ; he awakes and is g l ad to find 
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argues this part icular brand o f compat ib i l is t - that one st i l l has the k ind o f free w i l l and 
contro l presupposed by responsibi l i ty (Fischer 1994， p. 214). 
W i t h regard to the question o f luck, such cases imp l y that u l t imate luck is not a 
p rob lem. For the on ly way to prevent u l t imate luck is i f one is armed w i t h a genuine 
ab i l i t y to do otherwise. Bu t Frankfurt-Style cases show such an ab i l i ty to be irrelevant to 
the quest ion o f ք6տթօոտւեՍւէ>՛.^՛^ Thus l ikewise, exposure to u l t imate luck is shown to be 
irrelevant. 
I am go ing to be cr i t ica l ly assessing Frankfurt-sty le cases in the next chapter, therefore I 
w i l l restrict myse l f to g i v ing a flavour o f the k ind o f contro l that the Frankfur t ian 
compat ib i l i s t c la ims is al l that is needed fo r mora l responsibi l i ty . 
The f i rst th ing we can say, is that the modern compat ib i l i s t takes the important lesson 
f r o m Frankfur t -sty le cases to be that one should focus on what happens i n the actual 
sequence. Name ly , "wha t the agents actual ly do , and h o w their actions come to be 
pe r fo rmed" (Fischer and Ravizza 1998， p. 37). N o w some, k n o w n as 'mesh ' theorists, 
ho ld that what matters is that a certain internal harmony (mesh) existed between, say, 
the agent 's f i rst and second order desires, or between their decis ion and values. I am 
go ing to say something more about those who go d o w n this route i n Chapter 4 , so I w i l l 
say no th ing more here. Instead what I am going to do is prov ide on ly the very roughest 
o f sketches o f a reason-responsive mode l o f contro l . Others have more fu l l y developed 
such a c c o u n t s . M y object is j us t that w e should get some flavour o f the mode l o f 
cont ro l i n question. For tooughout the rest o f the thesis, when I ta lk about compat ib i l i s t 
cont ro l , I w i l l mean some k ind o f reason responsive contro l . 
h i m s e l f in so des i rab le c o m p a n y , w h i c h he stays w i l l i n g l y i n . (1965， B o o k 2 , ch . 11 sec. 10) 
24 N o t a l l accept th is . The re are some - somet imes re fe r red to as hyper i n compa t i b i l i s t s - w h o agree that 
genu ine a l te rna t ive poss ib i l i t i es are not needed and that Frank fur t -S ty le cases demons t ra te th is ( f o r 
ins tance H u n t 2 0 0 0 ; S t u m p 1999 ; Pe reboom 2 0 0 0 ) . H o w e v e r , t hey argue that w e s t i l l need to in i t ia te ou r 
ac t ions i f w e are to be respons ib le , and i f d e t e r m i n i s m is t rue then we do no t o r i g i na te o u r acts. T h e y m a y 
in a d d i t i o n c l a i m that i t is t h r o u g h o r i g i n a t i n g ou r act ions that w e exerc ise a spec ia l ' l u c k e r a d i c a t i n g ' 
species o f c o n t r o l ove r t hem. I f i n d it hard to assess th is lat ter c l a i m f o r t w o reasons that w i l l be e labora ted 
u p o n later in the thesis. F i r s t l y , I a m scept ica l abou t the coherence o f these ' s p e c i a l ' f o r m s o f c o n t r o l ( I a m 
a c o m p a t i b i l i s t abou t c o n t r o l ) . These concerns are a i red i n Chap te r 5. Second l y I d o no t b e l i e v e that I t is 
poss ib le that one c o u l d o r i g ina te one 's ac t i on and one not have genu ine l y ava i l ab le a l te rna t i ve 
poss ib i l i t i es . F rank f t i r t - s t y le cases р и ф о г ї to present us w i t h s i tuat ions in w h i c h th is is the case - but I 
be l i eve that t hey f a i l to do th is , an a rgument I w i l l be m a k i n g in the nex t chapter . 
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Take t w o darts players, A lan and M ichae l . A l a n is an excel lent shot, whereas M ichae l is 
useless. A l a n nearly always hits what he is a im ing at whereas M ichae l nearly always 
misses. I n their respective actual sequences, both A l a n and M ichae l take a im at the bul ls 
eye, and both h i t i t . However , we w o u l d want to say that A l a n ' s str ike was far more 
cont ro l led than M ichae l ' s . The reason here cannot be to do w i t h any ab i l i ty to do 
otherwise possessed in the actual sequence - for we can imagine that both A l a n and 
M ichae l had a counterfactual intervener mon i to r ing their a im ing process, ready to 
intervene should either show any ind icat ion that they w i l l miss (al ternat ively, one cou ld 
jus t imagine determin ism to be the case). Rather, the reason A l a n ' s t h row was more 
cont ro l led was because it issued f r o m a far more sensit ive or d iscr iminat ing mechanism 
or process. We ascertain this by asking, for instance, w o u l d A l a n have st i l l t h rown his 
dart i n the way that he d id i f the dart board was, say, a f ew mi l l imet res ftirther to the 
left? A l a n , we can imagine, w o u l d have th rown his dart a f ew mi l l imet res to the lef t i n 
this case, whereas M ichae l w o u l d not (and so w o u l d have missed the bul ls eye i n this 
counterfactual sequence). N o w what w e are do ing here is engaging once again i n a 
counterfactual analysis. Bu t this t ime we are employ ing such an analysis jus t to gauge 
what k i nd o f mechanism we have operat ing in the actual sequence, namely h o w 
responsive or sensitive i t is. In other words, we are jus t t ry ing to get a handle on what i t 
means to say that A l a n ' ร t h row was more contro l led than Michae l ' s . W e can say, on the 
basis o f our counterfactual analysis, that when i t comes to a im ing A l a n is far more 
sensit ive to changes in his circumstances than ever M ichae l is. 
W e can translate the above to the case o f an agent'ร decision mak ing process. Let us cal l 
the 'mechan ism ' o f an agent's decis ion, the process that br ings i t about (Fischer and 
Rav izza 1998, p. 38ท). F o l l o w i n g H a j i (1998, p. 75) and M e l e (1995, p. 177) w e can 
characterise intent ional del iberat ive act ion as hav ing the f o l l o w i n g consti tuents: A 
psychological basis for evaluative reasoning, l i ke desires, wants, and beliefs. These are 
psychologica l attitudes o f the agent that can be ci ted as a reason w h y they made the 
decis ion that they d id (he decided to make a cup o f tea because he wanted one)."^^ Then 
Those w h o h o l d o r w h o have deve loped such accounts i nc lude : Denne t t 1984 ; F ischer and R a v i z z a 
1998； H a j i 1998 ; F inagre t te 1972 ; Ger t and D u g g a n 1979; N e e l y 1974 . 
Here w e can d i s t i ngu i sh be tween h a v i n g a reason in an in terna l is t sense and h a v i n g a reason in an 
：temalist sense. I m a y have a reason to make m v s e i f a с Lin o f t e n in the ехґегпя і ічг ςρπςρ i f havino я n m externa l i s t sense. I m a y have a reason to make m y s e l f a cup o f tea in the ex terna l i s t sense i f h a v i n g a cup 
o f tea (as some m e d i c a l repor ts s h o w ) reduces m y r i sk o f d e v e l o p i n g cancer, even t h o u g h I a m c o m p l e t e l y 
unaware o f th is fact . I have an ' i n te rna l i s t ' reason w h e n I ac tua l l y have a pa r t i cu la r b e l i e f o r des i re . T h i s 
J^^y no t ac tua l l y m o v e me to ac t i on , bu t I have i t , i n the sense that it c o u l d p o t e n t i a l l y have m o t i v a t e d m e . 
I n the debate over free w i l l i t is in terna l is t reasons that are the p r i n c i p l e f ocus , as i t is o n l y in te rna l i s t 
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there is the judgement about w h i c h course o f act ion to pursue, and a decis ion made on 
the basis o f such a judgement . A decision can be said to terminate a del iberat ive 
process. The evaluat ive reasoning i tse l f can be said to be a func t ion o f the agent 'ร 
'background evaluative scheme' w h i c h Ha j i defines as being composed o f four 
constituents: 
1) bel iefs about normat ive standards to be invoked in assessing reasons for 
act ion; 2) mot iva t iona l factors l i ke long- term ends or goals that compr ise the 
agent's values; 3) bel iefs about del iberat ive pr inc ip les the agent regards as 
appropriate to arr ive at pract ical judgements about what to do or h o w to act i n 
part icular circumstances; and f ina l l y 4) mot i va t ion to act on the basis o f the 
normat ive standards in 1 and values in 2 using the del iberat ive pr inc ip les in 3. 
(1998, p. 125) 
The agent'ร background evaluative scheme is what is employed to assess their desires 
and so fo r th and arr ive at a judgement about what to do, or h o w to act. 
The idea is that an agent'ร decis ion is contro l led i f i t is appropriately sensit ive to the 
agent's pract ical del iberations. T o assess whether the mechanism leading to decis ion i n 
a part icular sequence is one that is appropriately sensit ive one holds f i xed the 
mot iva t iona l precursors o f the decision (so the agent's desire) and one holds fixed the 
agent's background evaluative scheme, and one considers whether there are scenarios in 
w h i c h , keeping these features fixed, the agent decides d i f ferent ly . I f there are then the 
agent 'ร decision in the actual sequence can be said to be responsive to the agent'ร 
reasoning process. Whereas i f there are no scenarios in w h i c h the agent, possessing the 
same mot iva t iona l precursor, acts otherwise, then the agent acts on the basis o f an 
irresist ible desire^ and as such d id not exercise contro l in the actual sequence (see H a j i 
1998, pp. 75-85) , 
I t w o u l d be as w e l l at th is po in t to d ist inguish between moderate and strong reason 
responsiveness. A mechanism can be said to be strongly reason responsive where i t 
a lways tracks, say, mora l reasons. If , then, there is a mora l reason not to X， then this 
reasons that can ac tua l l y feature in an e x p l a n a t i o n o f the agent 's ac t i on ( w e canno t e x p l a i n w h y I made 
" l y s e l f a cup o f tea b y c i t i n g the ex terna l i s t reason that d r i n k i n g such tea reduces m y r i sk o f d e v e l o p i n g 
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mechanism w i l l always issue in the decision not to X . N o w , in one sense this decis ion is 
perfect ly contro l led - for as ment ioned above what the reason-responsive account 
gauges is the sensi t iv i ty o f the agent'ร decisions to their reason. However , strong reason 
responsiveness is c lear ly an imp laus ib ly demanding cont ro l requirement and i t w o u l d 
have the upshot that i f an agent has a mora l reason to do X , yet fa i ls to do X , then they 
are not responsible. In other words, i f strong reason responsiveness were the contro l 
requirement for mora l responsibi l i ty then only the perfect ly v i r tuous cou ld be 
responsible, and it w o u l d be impossible to be responsible for wrongdoing.^^ A s Fischer 
and Ravizza put i t , a plausible cont ro l requirement w o u l d only be for a degree o f reason 
responsiveness that a l lows for a " looser k i nd o f f i t between reasons and ac t ion " (1998. 
p. 43) . 
A s i t stands the account stands in need o f var ious ref inements i f i t is to del iver the 
in tu i t i ve ly correct results in a suf f ic ient ly broad range o f cases.^^ A s I say, this is a task 
that Fischer, Ravizza and Ha j i amongst others, have undertaken. Bu t I bel ieve we can 
and should accept that the above is an ar t iculat ion o f a type o f cont ro l , a type o f cont ro l 
w h i c h w e can have under determin ism. W e should accept that, whether determin ism is 
true or not , we do exercise th is type o f cont ro l over what w e do. W e are, i n short, 
reason-responsive and thereby exh ib i t contro l over our decisions. Fur thermore, we 
should also accept that reason-responsiveness o f some degree is clearly a necessary 
requirement o f being a responsible agent. The important question is over the suf f ic iency 
o f this cont ro l . For noth ing about this fo rm o f contro l shows how our possessing i t does 
anyth ing to protect us against u l t imate luck. Reason-responsive contro l o f the k i n d 
cance r ) . 
27 B y pe r fec t l y v i r t uous I do not mean to ru le ou t in terna l c o n f l i c t s . A n agent 's m e c h a n i s m can be sa id t o 
be s t rong ly reason respons ive even i f the agent feels the t u g o f o p p o s i n g reasons and has to make an e f f o r t 
to do the r i g h t t h i n g . W h a t makes fo r s t rong reason responsiveness is that the m e c h a n i s m w i l l issue เท the 
r i g h t dec i s i on desp i te in te rna l con f l i c t s . T h i s means that s t rong reason responsiveness m i g h t no t i n v o l v e 
pe r fec t v i r tuousness by some v i r t i j e -e th ic i s t l ights . 
T h e r e are a n u m b e r o f d i f f i c u l t i e s f o r the account . Ce r ta in ' agen ts ' need to be r u l ed ou t , and reason-
respons iveness b y i t s e l f does not seem to be able to do th is . Fo r examp le , there are some peop le w h o m a y 
be ve r y oddly reason- respons ive . I m i g h t do o the rw ise o n l y i f I a m o f f e r e d a £ 1 0 0 i ncen t i ve , no m o r e , no 
less. I t is n o t at a l l c lear whe the r a m e c h a n i s m that is respons ive in that w a y can be cons ide red to be o f the 
r i g h t k i n d . A s F ischer and Rav i zza pu t i t ; 
I n j u d g i n g a m e c h a n i s m ' s r ecep t i v i t y [ to reasons] , w e are no t o n l y conce rned to see that a 
pe rson ac t i ng o n that m e c h a n i s m recogn izes a s u f f i c i e n t reason i n o n e ins tance; w e a lso w a n t 
t o see that the person exh ib i t s an approp r ia te pattern o f reasons r e c o g n i t i o n . I n o ther w o r d s , 
w e wan t to k n o w i f ( w h e n ac t i ng on the actual m e c h a n i s m ) he recognises h o w reasons f i t 
together , sees w h y one reason is s t ronger than another , and understands h o w the acceptance o f 
one reason as su f f i c i en t i m p l i e s that a s t ronger reason must also be su f f i c i en t . ( 1 9 9 8 , p p . 7 0 -
7 1 ) 
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out l ined is clearly not a f o r m o f ultimate contro l . As I ment ioned above, Frankfurt-Style 
cases seem to support the c la im that we do not need such ul t imate contro l i n order to be 
i n possession o f the k i n d o f free w i l l relevant to mora l responsibi l i ty. Bu t much depends 
upon whether Frankfurt-sty le cases actual ly show what they рифог Ї to show. That is a 
matter that I w i l l take up in the next chapter. 
2.9 Conclusion 
I have made the argument that determin ism rules out alternative possibi l i t ies and 
considered var ious compat ib i l is t responses. I dismissed those compat ib i l is ts whose 
strategy is to deny one o f the in tu i t ive pr inciples employed in the Consequence 
Argument , and I raised some standard object ions to some o f the other proposals, before 
f i na l l y go ing on to out l ine the k i nd o f reason-responsive contro l that the most recent 
breed o f compat ib i l is ts ho ld is suf f ic ient ( in terms o f contro l ) for free w i l l and mora l 
responsibi l i ty . Cr i t ica l assessment o f the Frankfur t -Sty le cases w h i c h inspired their 




I n the previous chapter we saw there is a new breed o f compat ib i l is t who ho ld that a 
certain k i nd o f case - the Frankfur t -Sty le case 一 demonstrates the irrelevance o f 
al ternat ive possibi l i t ies to the quest ion o f mora l responsibi l i ty. O n the basis o f such 
cases these compat ib i l is ts advocate the abandonment o f the 'garden o f f o rk ing paths' 
v i e w o f free w i l l , at least where mora l responsibi l i ty is concerned. 
However , a lot depends upon whether Frankfur t -Sty le cases actual ly work . In what 
f o l l ows I argue that the or ig ina l РгаіжпігЇ-8Їу1е case does not wo rk . I w i l l consider a 
number o f recent attempts to improve upon the or ig ina! , and I w i l l argue that al l but one 
fa i l too. 
Fischer 'ร var ia t ion might work . Bu t i f i t does, i t has l im i ted power. Fischer 's case 
suggests at most that responsibi l i ty does not require path-p ick ing cont ro l . I t does not 
challenge the idea that responsibi l i ty requires genuine alternative possibi l i t ies. In other 
words , Fischer 'ร case only half works , i f i t works at a l l . 
The in tu i t i ve association between alternative possibi l i t ies, free w i l l , and mora l 
responsib i l i ty is a ref lect ion o f t w o demands. First a demand for independence or 
or ig inat ion. Second a demand for path-p ick ing contro l . I f the arguments that f o l l o w are 
r igh t , F ischer 'ร case does not chal lenge the need for alternative possib i l i t ies, but rather 
w h y we need them. It may be more to do w i t h the first demand, rather than the second. 
3.1 The Case 
A l t h o u g h I gave Frankfur t 'ร or ig ina l case in the previous chapter, i t w o u l d be as w e l l to 
prov ide i t again here: 
Suppose someone 一 B lack , let us say ― wants Jones to per fo rm a certain act ion. 
B lack is prepared to go to considerable lengths to get his way, but he prefers to 
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avo id showing his hand unnecessarily. So he wai ts un t i l Jones is about to make 
up his m i n d what to do, and he does noth ing unless i t is clear to h i m (B lack is an 
excel lent judge o f such things) that Jones is go ing to decide to do something 
other than what he wants h i m to do. I f i t does become clear that Jones is go ing to 
decide to do something else, B lack takes ef fect ive steps to ensure that Jones 
decides to do, and that he does do, what he wants h i m to do. Whatever Jones's 
in i t ia l preferences and incl inat ions, then, B lack w i l l have his way . . . 
N o w suppose that B lack never has to show his hand because Jones, for reasons 
o f his o w n , decides to per fo rm and does per fo rm the very act ion B lack wants 
h i m to per fo rm. In that case, i t seems clear, Jones w i l l bear precisely the same 
mora l responsibi l i ty for what he does as he w o u l d have borne i f B lack had not 
been ready to take steps to ensure that he do it . (Frankfur t 1969, pp. 835-36) 
T o reiterate, what we have in the above si tuat ion, and what is characterist ic o f al l 
Frankfur t -s ty le cases, is the presence o f some counterfactual in tervent ion device - be i t a 
person, a drug, phobia, or post-hypnot ic suggestion. I n the actual sequence this device 
plays absolutely no role in what happens: i t is as i f i t is not there. For that reason its 
mere presence seems irrelevant to any assessment we migh t make o f the agenťs 
blameworthiness. However , its mere presence does mean that the agent cou ld not have 
decided otherwise, and thus PAP appears to have been refuted.^^ 
I w i l l first consider some inadequate defences o f P A P , wh i ch nevertheless prompted 
some m ino r adjustments to Frankfur t 'ร or ig ina l case. I w i l l then go on to consider what I 
take to be an altogether more devastating c r i t i c ism before consider ing a number o f 
recent responses to it. 
29 F r a n k f u r t - a c o m p a t i b i l i s t ― ho lds that w h a t h is examp les h i g h l i g h t is the P A P needs to be rep laced by 
the f o l l o w i n g p r i n c i p l e : " a person is not m o r a l l y respons ib le f o r w h a t he has done i f he d i d it o n l y because 
he c o u l d no t have done o t h e r w i s e " ( 1 9 6 9 , p. 8 3 9 ) . B u t th is rev ised p r i n c i p l e is also re f t i tab le b y F r a n k f u r t -
s ty le cases, i f , tha t is , they re fu te P A P . Fo r t o o o f t e n i t is assumed that i t is i n some w a y essent ia l t o a 
F rank fu r t - s t y l e case that the agent does no t k n o w about the coun te r fac tua l i n te rvener ( i n fac t , to m y 
k n o w l e d g e eveդюทe has assumed th is ) . B u t th is is асШа І Іу no t essent ia l . I m a g i n e a F rank fu r t -S ty le case in 
w h i c h Jones knows that B l a c k is g o i n g to make h i m dec ide to do X, unless he does X under h is o w n 
steam. Jones dec ides to X under his o w n steam, p rec ise ly because he b e l i e v e d that B l a c k was g o i n g to 
make h i m dec ide to X anyway . B u t i f X is a m o r a l l y reprehens ib le dec i s i on then i sn ' t Jones m o r a l l y 
respons ib le? I ce r ta in l y have the i n tu i t i on that he is. Y e t F rank fu r t ' ร p r i n c i p l e is v i o l a t e d in the case as 1 
have desc r i bed it. Fo r Jones o n l y dec ided as he d i d òecause he t hough t i t was g o i n g to be i nev i t ab le that 
he w o u l d m a k e the dec is ion in ques t ion . ( I make th is po in t in m y 2 0 0 4 , t h o u g h Ì deve lop i t there in a w a y 
that I w o u l d n o w no longer endorse. ) 
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3,2 Some Inadequate Defences of PAP 
The most s t ra ight forward way to undermine the power o f an Frankfur t -Sty le case is to 
c la im the si tuat ion invo lved does actual ly a l l ow for the possib i l i ty o f the agent do ing 
otherwise. W i t h this in m i n d , the f i rst such defence o f PAP that I want to look at here 
begins w i t h an assumpt ion about what the agent is responsible f o r , and assumes that the 
agent is responsible for the occurrence o f some part icular event. Th is defence involves 
assuming that some or al l o f the causal antecedents o f an event are essential to the 
ind iv idua t ion o f an event. O n this v i e w i f an event has d i f ferent causal antecedents (or 
relevant d i f ferent causal antecedents) f r o m an otherwise ident ical event then i t is not the 
same event. Th is is a controversial v i e w about event ind iv idua t ion , but there is no 
reason to th ink that a PAP defender w o u l d not m i n d being commi t ted to i t , i f that is 
what i t takes to defend PAP. W i t h these assumptions in place we can return to the 
Frankfur t -sty le case and not ice that in the actual sequence the agent causes some event 
to occur (say, the assassination o f the president) by themselves. However , in the 
alternative sequence in w h i c h the counterfactual intervener makes the agent assassinate 
the president, the event o f the president being assassinated is d i f ferent for i t has a 
d i f ferent causal history. The argument n o w is that the agent does have the power to 
cause some di f ferent part icular event to occur. I t is true that the agent does not have the 
power to prevent h imse l f f r om assassinating the president, however he does have the 
power to b r ing about some alternative event (van Inwagen 1983, pp. 166-171 and see 
Fischer 1994 р 137). 
The alternative poss ib i l i ty in question is not one that a defender o f Frankfur t -Sty le cases 
w o u l d necessarily reject ( though the part icular account o f event ind iv idua t ion it assumes 
cou ld be questioned on independent grounds (see Carter 1979 pp. 443-452) . I t is rather, 
as Fischer says " that this alternative possib i l i ty is not suf f ic ient ly robust to ground the 
relevant at t r ibut ions o f mora l respons ib i l i ty " (1994, p. 140). Consider the f o l l o w i n g , 
again f r o m Fischer: 
The existence o f various genuinely open pathways [ into the future] is al leged to 
be crucia l to the idea that one has contro l o f the relevant k i nd . Bu t i f this is so, I 
suggest that i t w o u l d be very puzz l ing and unnatural to suppose that i t is the 
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existence o f various alternative pathways a long w h i c h one does not act freely 
that shows that one has contro l o f the k ind in question. H o w exact ly cou ld the 
existence o f var ious alternative pathways a long w h i c h the agent does not act 
freely render it true that the agent has the relevant k i nd o f contro l ?... [N ]o te that 
even i f i t is granted that the terminus o f the alternative sequence i n the case o f 
Jones and B lack is a d i f ferent event f r o m the actual event o f Jones' vo t i ng for 
C l i n ton , i t also is evident that Jones w o u l d not be freely vo t ing for C l i n ton in the 
alternative sequence. (1994, p. 141) 
The po in t is that even i f the existence o f such an alternative possib i l i ty is granted, i t 
does not seem capable o f do ing the w o r k required o f i t , namely ground ing the agent's 
mora l responsibi l i ty . For this part icular flicker strategy "conft ises the ab i l i t y del iberately 
to do otherwise w i t h the possib i l i ty o f something d i f ferent occur r ing" (Fischer 1982).^^ 
There is an important point here. W e do, when we conceive o f ourselves as free, take 
ourselves to have alternative possibi l i t ies in wh i ch we freely decide otherwise. In other 
words, w e take ourselves to have alternative possibi l i t ies o f a certain robustness. A s 
such it is not enough for a PAP defender to al ight on jus t any alternative poss ib i l i ty and 
insist that i t shows the necessity o f the PAP condi t ion. For i f we can never freely decide 
otherwise, because, for instance, a counterfactual intervener is wa i t ing i n the w ings for 
a l l o f our decisions (a si tuat ion referred to as a ' g l oba l ' Frankfur t -Sty le case), then this 
is, in every way wor th car ing about, to be as b ig a cramp on our f reedom as determin ism 
w o u l d be. 
However , perhaps the real point being made by the PAP defender is that even i f the 
agent does lack the ab i l i ty to f reely decide otherwise, they nevertheless do have the 
abi l i ty to in i t iate an alternative act ion. For instance, i f i t is the case that, should the agent 
show any inc l inat ion o f choosing otherwise, in tervent ion w i l l take place, the c la im is 
that the agent does at least " in i t ia te , (albeit not complete) the choice to do o therwise" 
30 I t is a lso w o r t h p o i n t i n g ou t that i t is i r re levan t whe the r or no t the coun te r fac tua l i n t e r v e n t i o n i nvo l ves 
f o r c i n g the agent t o make a pa r t i cu la r dec i s ion . I t is t rue that in the o r i g i n a l F rank fu r t -S ty le case Jones 
f ree ly dec ides to d o w h a t B l a c k w o u l d o the rw ise have fo rced h i m to dec ide to do . B u t i t is i r re levan t w h a t 
B l a c k w i l l f o r ce Jones to dec ide to do in the coun te r fac tua l sequence, the case w o u l d be a coun te rexamp le 
to P A P even i f B l a c k s ' i n te rven t i on t o o k the f o r m o f k i l l i n g Jones. The above c r i t i c i sms o f F rank fu r t -S ty le 
cases there fo re seem to be f o c u s i n g on w h a t is an i r re levan t feature o f the s tandard F rank f t i r t - s t y l e case. 
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(Fischer 1994 p. 136). The ab і Uty to in i t iate a choice to do otherwise is arguably a 
robust enough alternative possib i l i ty to ground mora l responsibi l i ty. 
The p rob lem though is that Frankfur t style cases can be reconstructed in a way that 
removes even this k i nd o f possibi l i ty . For rather than i t be ing some alternat ive in i t ia t ing 
act ion on the part o f the agent that tr iggers the intervent ion, i t cou ld be some invo luntary 
sign, such as a blush or tw i t ch (B lumenfe ld 1971 p. 340-1). Here is F ischer 'ร vers ion o f 
a 'p r ior s ign ' Frankfurt-sty le case: 
H o w can the [counterfactual intervent ion] device te l l whether Jones is about to 
choose to vote Republ ican or Democrat? This is where the "p r i o r s i g n " comes 
in . I f Jones is about to choose at է2 to vote for Gore at էՅ， he shows some 
invo luntary sign ― say a neurological pattern i n his brain — at t l . Detect ing this, 
B lack ' s device does not intervene. Bu t i f Jones is about to choose at է2 to vote 
for Bush at էՅ, he shows an invo luntary sign ― a d i f ferent neurological pattern i n 
his bra in - at t l . Th is bra in pattern w o u l d tr igger B lack 's device to intervene and 
cause Jones to choose at է2 to vote for Gore, and to vote for Gore at էՅ. (2003, p. 
192) 
This ' s i g n ' is not an act ion - i t is not something the agent chooses to display. Therefore, 
i f we reconstruct the Frankfurt-Style case using a pr ior sign as the tr igger rather than an 
' i n i t i a t ing ac t ion ' the flicker o f f reedom in question disappears. For the pr ior s ign is not 
vo lun tar i l y displayed and therefore i t is not something that i t is w i t h i n the power o f the 
agent to display. 
However , wh i l s t these early cr i t ic isms o f Frankfur t 'ร or ig ina l case d id l i t t le more than 
prompt c lar i f icat ion and minor adjustment, another cr i t ic ism poses far more serious 
problems. These are problems to wh i ch I believe Frankfurt-Style cases, in their no rma l 
f o r m , caฌใot overcome.^' 
3 ' One l ine o f response that I have not cons idered here ma in ta ins that P A P is too deep l y en t renched to be 
rejected on the grounds of our intuitions about Frankfurt-Style cases ( C o p p 1997) . T h i s argument usually 
draws suppor t f r o m the assoc ia t ion be tween P A P and another , equa l l y w e l l en t renched p r i n c i p l e - the 
K a n t i a n p n n c i p l e that ' o u g h t ' imp l ies ՝ c a n \ For a f ter a l l , i f ought imp l ies can , then ough t no t imp l i es can 
re f ra in . B u t i f w e do somet imes do w r o n g , then th is means that it must have been poss ib le fo r us to re f ra i n , 
and hence the need f o r a l te rnat ive poss ib i l i t i es is generated (see W i d e r k e r 1 9 9 1 ; H a j i 1998 & 2 0 0 2 ; 
Schna l l 2 0 0 1 ; F ischer 2 0 0 3 a ) . T h e p o i n t then is that because F rank fb r t - s t y l e cases threaten P A P , they also 
threaten the K a n t i a n p r i n c i p l e , and re j ec t i ng bo th p r i nc ip les is j u s t t oo cos t ly , so w e shou ld re jec t ou r 
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3.3 The KaneAViderker Defence of PAP 
I t has n o w become " increasingly c o m m o n " to reject Frankfurt-Style cases on the basis o f 
the f o l l o w i n g argument (War f i e ld 1996, p. 221) . The argument has been made i n one 
f o r m or another by Kane (1985 and 1996), Widerker (1995a and 1995b), Ginet (1996) , 
and W y m a (1997) . For the sake o f s impl ic i ty I w i l l concentrate on Kane and Widerke r ' ร 
versions o f the argument. 
The f i rst step i n this argument is to recognise that i f a Frankfurt-Style case is to have any 
bite against an incompat ib i l is t defender o f PAP it cannot assume the t ru th o f 
determin ism. The who le point o f a Frankft i r t -sty le case is that i t presents us w i t h a 
scenario in w h i c h an agent is mora l l y responsible irrespective o f the presence o f a 
counterfactual intervener. That means that, absent the counterfactual intervener, the 
s i tuat ion needs to be one in w h i c h PAP is met for otherwise the case begs the quest ion 
against the incompat ib i l is t by jus t assuming that mora l responsibi l i ty does not require 
al ternat ive possibi l i t ies. In other words, the si tuat ion needs to be one in w h i c h , absent 
the counterfactual intervener, the agent genuinely cou ld have decided otherwise at the 
moment o f choice, ho ld ing f i xed a l l p r io r states and the laws o f nature. Bear ing this i n 
m i n d , Kane makes the f o l l o w i n g observat ion: 
The control ler , B lack , plans to make Jones do A . But he wai ts to see i f Jones is 
go ing to do A on his o w n and on ly intervenes i f Jones is about to do в 
instead. . , [Bu t ] the control ler cannot k n o w w h i c h one is go ing to occur 
beforehand unless he predetermines one o f them to occur. He can therefore 
wa i t un t i l he finds out whether [Jones] w i l l do A or B, but then it is too late to 
i n t u i t i ons instead. H o w e v e r , the p r o b l e m w i t h th is l ine o f response is that those w h o re jec t P A P m i g h t be 
equa l l y i n c l i n e d to re jec t the K a n t i a n p r i n c i p l e too. A f t e r a l l , the i n tu i t i ve appeal o f the K a n t i a n p r i n c i p l e 
sure ly l ies in the i n tu i t i ve appeal o f P A P , such that i f one re jects one, one is l i k e l y to re jec t the o ther (see 
F ischer 1999a and 2003a fo r th is k i n d o f response). T h e K a n t i a n p r i n c i p l e can , a f ter a l l , be c r i t i c i sed o n 
independent g rounds , such as the poss ib i l i t y o f genu ine m o r a l d i l emmas (see S i n n o t t - A r m s t r o n g 】988). 
A d d e d to w h i c h w e can note that con t ro l demands fo r m o r a l respons ib i l i t y are in genera l m o r e s t r ingent 
than those fo r ' d e o n t i c ' m o r a l i t y ( j udgemen ts o f r igh t , w r o n g , ough t and ough t no t ) . T h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f 
excuses test i f ies to this ( i f one has an excuse one has done w r o n g , but is not b l a m e w o r t h y f o r h a v i n g done 
so ) . So aga in , those w h o re jec t P A P f o r r espons ib i l i t y , are u n l i k e l y to t h i n k P A P is a r e q u i r e m e n t o f 
deon t i c m o r a l i t y ( t hough see H a j i w h o ho lds exac t l y th is pos i t i on and deve lops it i n his 2 0 0 2 ) . Some have 
also a rgued that it is poss ib le to detach the K a n t i a n p r i n c i p l e from P A P , and in th is w a y preserve the 
K a n t i a n p r i n c i p i e w h i l s t r e j ec t i ng P A P (see F rank f t i r t 1988, p. 98 and Y a f f e 1999) . I t h i n k such a t tempts 
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contro l the choice. Or he can intervene in the bra in , shutt ing d o w n the 
indeterminacy or its effects before either choice occurs, thereby determin ing the 
outcome he wants. In the latter case the choice w i l l be determined by the 
control ler and the control ler, not the agent, w i l l be ultimately responsible for 
i t . . . B y contrast, i f the control ler does not intervene to predetermine the 
outcome and the indeterminacy remains in place un t i l the choice is made.., then 
the agent, and not the control ler , is u l t imate ly responsible for it. Bu t then i t is 
also the case that the agent couid have done otherwise. (1996, p. 142) 
In other words, i f the agent's decision mak ing process is internal ly indeterminis t ic up to 
the momen t o f choice, then the agent w i l l have alternative possibi l i t ies at the moment o f 
choice, despite the presence o f the intervener.-^" 
Widerker concentrates on the exh ib i t i on o f a pr ior s ign to make the same po in t (1995a; 
1995b). The pr ior sign is supposed to prov ide B lack w i t h a basis fo r dec id ing whether to 
intervene. I f B lack knows that a tw i t ch f r om Jones at T l entails that he w i l l per fo rm the 
act ion that B lack wants h i m to per fo rm at T2 (and that therefore in tervent ion is 
unnecessary) then the relat ionship between the sign and the subsequent decis ion made 
by Jones must be determinist ic . The s ign must either determinis t ica l ly cause Jones to 
per fo rm the act ion in question "o r is i n some way associated w i t h something at t l that 
determin is t ica l ly causes [Jones to per fo rm the ac t i on ] " (Me le and Robb 1998, p. 100). 
But i f this is so the question has been begged. If , however, the exh ib i t i on o f the pr ior 
sign does not in any way determine Jones's subsequent decision " i t is hard to see h o w 
Jones'ร decis ion is unavo idab le" (Widerker 1995a, p. 251). I f the Frankfur t -s ty le case is 
not to beg the question i t must be the case that it is possible for Jones to exh ib i t the pr ior 
sign ( ind icat ing that he is go ing to do what B lack wants h i m to do such that B lack does 
not intervene) and Jones decides not to per fo rm the act ion i n quest ion: he does 
otherwise (Widerker 1995a, pp. 250-1) . 
d o o m e d , but aga in , I w i l l no t make such arguments here (F ischer responds to Y a f f e in his 2 0 0 3 , as does 
H a j i ๒ h is 2 0 0 2 , pp . 5 4 - 5 8 ) . 
32 O n e response í r o m a F r a n k f t j r t i a n ( t hough not one that has been e x p l i c i t l y m a d e ) m i g h t be to accept 
K a n e ' s p o i n t , bu t to then go on to po in t out that this is wha t the i n c o m p a t i b i l i s t is d r i v e n to in o rder to 
p ro tec t P A P f r o m re fu ta t i on . T h e i n c o m p a t i b i l i s t has to insist u p o n i n d e t e r m i n i s m r i gh t u p to the m o m e n t 
o f cho i ce , and th is , the F rank f i j r t i an m i g h t c l a i m , is g o i n g to g i ve the i n c o m p a t i b i l i s t ser ious p r o b l e m s 
w h e n it comes to e x p l a i n i n g exac t l y h o w the agent can have c o n t r o l l e d the resu l t i ng dec i s i on rather than i t 
j u s t b e i n g r a n d o m . In o ther wo rds , F rank fu r t -S ty le cases fo rce the i n c o m p a t i b i l i s t in to an embar rass ing 
s i tua t ion . T h e concern about i n d e t e r m i n i s m and con t ro l is taken up in Chapters 5 and 6. 
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What makes this argument so strong is that in the alternative scenario in w h i c h Jones 
does do otherwise and does exh ib i t the pr ior s ign, Jones is act ing freely. The alternative 
possib i l i ty that Kane, Widerker and others have uncovered is therefore o f the most 
robust k i nd . 
I bel ieve that this k ind o f argument is devastating to Frankft i r t -sty le cases. However , 
Frankfurt ians are a commi t ted band o f Frankfurt-Style case-users and between them they 
can muster considerable ingenui ty in defence o f their counterexamples. It w o u l d be 
foo lhardy to th ink that the above argument w o u l d be lef t as the last w o r d on the matter. 
Since the quest ion begging accusation has been made several responses have been 
fo r thcoming. I w i l l cr i t ica l ly assess four o f the most prominent ' rescue' attempts. The 
first three invo lve the presentation o f a new, or more detai led var ia t ion o f a Frankfur t -
style case in w h i c h agent-internal indetermin ism is preserved w i thou t this jeopard is ing 
the counterfactual intervener 'ร abi l i ty to rule out alternative possibi l i t ies. I n other words , 
they purpor t to present us w i t h a case i n w h i c h the agent'ร del iberat ive process is 
indeterminist le, yet it is also the case that the agent cou ld not have made a d i f ferent 
decision f r o m the one that they d id make. The f ina l k i nd o f case I w i l l consider is 
altogether bolder, insofar as determin ism is exp l i c i t l y assumed and the quest ion begging 
charge is chal lenged head-on. 
3,4 Mele and Robb'ร Rescue At tempt 
Let me start by consider ing the prominent ' rescued' Frankfurt-sty le case developed by 
Me le and Robb. In Me le and Robb 's ingenious var ia t ion the agent Jones's decis ion 
mak ing process is indeterminist le but , s imultaneous w i t h Jones's decis ion mak ing 
process runs another, determinist ic process. In the actual sequence, Jones's 
indeterminist ic process issues in Jones mak ing a part icular decis ion ( in their part icular 
case this is a decis ion to steal A n n ' ร car). However , the determinist ic process w o u l d 
have issued i n the same result had the indeterminist ic process not. W e can let M e l e and 
Robb describe exact ly h o w this cou ld be: 
A t Tl， B lack init iates a certain determinist ic process р in Jones's brain w i t h the 
in tent ion o f thereby causing [Jones] to decide at T2 (an hour later, say) to steal 
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A n n ' s car. The process, w h i c h is screened o f f f r om Jones's consciousness, w i l l 
determinist ical ly culminate i n [Jones's] decid ing at է2 to steal A n n ' ร car unless 
he decides on his o w n at T2 to steal i t or is incapable at է2 o f mak ing a decis ion 
(because, e.g., he is dead by է2). (B lack is unaware that i t is open to [Jones] to 
decide on his o w n at T 2 to steal the car; he is conf ident that р w i l l cause 
[Jones] to decide as he wants [Jones] to decide.) the process is i n no way 
sensit ive to any ' s i gn ' or what [Jones] w i l l decide. As i t happens, at T 2 [Jones] 
decides on his o w n to steal the car, on the basis o f his o w n indeterminis t ic 
del iberat ion about whether to steal i t , and his decis ion has no determinist ic 
cause. Bu t i f he had not jus t then decided on his o w n to steal i t , р w o u l d have 
determinist ical ly issued, at T 2 , in his decid ing to steal it. Rest assured that р i n 
no way inf luences the indeterminist ic dec is ion-making process that actual ly 
issues i n [Jones's] decis ion. (1998, pp. 101-2 & see also their 2003) 
In t r igu ing though this var iat ion o f a Frankfurt-Style case is, I do not bel ieve i t can w o r k 
w i t hou t assuming determin ism at a cr i t ica l juncture. Consider first, that i t is open to the 
incompat ib i l i s t to mainta in that the agent needs to have been able to decide otherwise up 
to the moment of decision-making. So, i n other words, i f one were to rew ind the c lock to 
the moment jus t pr io r to dec is ion-making and then rerun the sequence again, i t w o u l d be 
possible for the agent to decide otherwise. A s far as I can see Me le and Robb 'ร case 
does beg the question against this k i nd o f incompat ib i l is t , for M e l e and Robb 's case has 
to assume a determinist ic re lat ion pr ior to the decis ion-making moment . T o see th is , we 
can tu rn to an i l lust rat ion g iven by M e l e and Robb. 
M e l e and Robb imagine that someone migh t wonder h o w Jones can decide on his o w n 
i n the actual sequence, w i thout the determinist ic process hav ing caused h i m to decide as 
he d id . They prov ide the f o l l o w i n g answer. 
Considerat ion o f the f o l l o w i n g fanc i fu l machine w i l l prove useful i n answering 
this quest ion. The machine, designed by a specialist in machine art, produces 
art ist ic widgets o f d i f ferent shapes and colors. The colors o f the widgets 
produced are determined by the color o f a bal l bearing (bb) that hits the 
machine 's receptor at a relevant t ime. The machine, M , is surrounded by several 
automatic bb guns, each conta in ing bbs o f various colors. The relevant aspect o f 
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M ' ร mechanical design, for our purposes, is relat ively s imple. First , w i t h one 
qua l i f i ca t ion , i f a bb o f color X hits M ' ร receptor, and M is not already i n the 
process o f mak ing a widget , M է once starts a process designed to result i n the 
product ion o f an x-colored widget . Second, because two or more bbs sometimes 
hi t the receptor simultaneously, the artist has designed his machine i n such a way 
that whenever this happens (wh i le M is not busy mak ing a w idge t ) M at once 
starts a process designed to result i n the product ion o f a w idget the color o f the 
r ight -most bb . . . [Jones] is analogous to M in an impor tant respect. He is 
physical ly and psychologica l ly so consti tuted that i f an unconscious 
determinist ic process in his bra in and an indeterminist le dec is ion-making 
process o f his were to " co inc ide " at the moment o f decis ion, he w o u l d 
indetermin is t ica l ly decide on his o w n and the determinist ic process w o u l d have 
no effect on his decision. Th is si tuat ion is an analogue o f a case in w h i c h t w o 
bbs o f the same color s imultaneously h i t M ' s receptor. (1998, pp. 103-104) 
There is a sleight o f hand i n the above example. Str ict ly speaking, i n the mechanical 
example we have two bbs h i t t ing M ' s receptor simultaneously, and this pr io r event then 
results i n M issuing a blue widget . The blue w idget is the analogue o f Jones's decision. 
So i n fact we do not have two processes ' co inc id ing at the moment o f dec is ion ' , rather 
we have t w o processes co inc id ing just prior to decision mak ing . Th is is cruc ia l ly 
s igni f icant . I f this pr ior event 一 the event analogous to t w o bbs s t r ik ing the receptor at 
the same t ime - determines that Jones w i l l make a part icular decis ion, then irrespective 
o f whether the sequence o f events leading up to this point was indeterminis t ic or 
determinis t ic , Jones is not mora l ly responsible for this decision. For note, on the 
incompat ib i l i s t v i e w in quest ion, Jones needs to have the genuinely avai lable alternative 
poss ib i l i t y o f decid ing otherwise at the moment o f decision.^^ I f his o w n del iberat ive 
process is one that becomes determinist ic pr io r to dec is ion-making, then Jones w i l l lack 
T h i s need no t a lways be the case, but i f an agent is to be respons ib le fo r wha t they d o , then the i r ac t i on 
mus t u l t i m a t e l y t race to acts w h i c h were i nde te rm in i s t i c at the m o m e n t o f cho ice . T o a v o i d a lways h a v i n g 
to put in th is m o u t h f u l o f wo rds I w i l l take i t f o r granted that F rank f i i r t - s t y le cases need to w o r k f o r these 
ac t ions , so w e can assume that i t does have to be inde te rm in i s t i c at the m o m e n t o f cho i ce or else the 
ques t ion w i l l have been begged against mos t i n c o m p a t i b i l i s t pos i t ions . I t is poss ib le to de fend a va r i a t i on 
o f i n c o m p a t i b i l i s t p o s i t i o n a c c o r d i n g to w h i c h i t doesn 't need to be genu ine l y poss ib le f o r the agent to 
have dec ided o the rw ise at the m o m e n t o f cho ice . W e w i l l see later that M e l e has p roposed such a 
v a r i a t i o n . I t h i n k there are ser ious p rob lems w i t h such pos i t ions , no t least o f w h i c h w o u l d be the i r 
suscep t i b i l i t y to F rank f t i r t - s t y le cases. Part o f the va lue o f Frank fur t -S ty le cases can be seen to l ie in the i r 
f o r c i n g the i n c o m p a t i b i l i s t to recognise that i t needs to be inde te rmina te up to the moment of choice w h i c h 
dec i s i on the agent w i l l make. 
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the required alternative possibi l i t ies. Thus, even in the sequence in w h i c h Jones makes 
the decis ion under his o w n steam, Jones w i l l not be responsible. A t the crucia l moment , 
have lacked robust alternative possibi l i t ies: not due to the presence o f the determinist ic 
process, but due to the presence o f determin ism in his own del iberat ive process. 
It cou ld be that we can retain indetermin ism at the moment o f choice by (analogously) 
mak ing i t indeterminist ic what happens when a bb hits the r ight -most side o f the 
receptor. I n this case it may or may not issue in a blue widget . In other words, when 
Jones's o w n del iberat ive process reaches po in t A (analogous to a bb h i t t i ng the 
receptor) , i t is indeterministic whether this w i l l result i n Jones mak ing decis ion X or 
decis ion Y . Bu t i f this is so, then Jones does have robust alternative possibi l i t ies i n the 
sequence in w h i c h he makes a decis ion under his o w n steam. The presence o f the 
determinist ic process does noth ing to alter this. 
I t seems to me that Me le and Robb 's case does not improve upon the or ig ina l Frankfur t -
style case. Exact ly the same d i l emma arises. Ei ther determin ism has to be assumed at a 
crucia l junc ture (namely at some poin t pr ior to decision mak ing) ― i n w h i c h case the 
quest ion has been begged 一 or indetermin ism is left in place, in w h i c h case Jones retains 
robust alternative possibi l i t ies at the moment o f choice. 
Wha t M e l e and Robb need to do, is show h o w it is possible for the determinist ic process 
not to cause Jones to make the decis ion to steal Ann ' s car in the actual sequence, yet at 
the same t ime mainta in that i t w o u l d have caused Jones to make the decis ion to steal 
A n n ' ร car had Jones been about to decide otherwise. I do not see h o w this can possib ly 
be done. M e l e and Robb c la im that the determinist ic process w i l l not cause the decis ion, 
i f Jones makes it under his o w n steam. Bu t this requires a pre-decis ion mak ing 
coincidence o f the determinist ic and indeterminist ic processes ― and it is this w h i c h 
undoes their case. For they have to smuggle determin ism into Jones's own decis ion 
mak ing process. Let us turn to the second o f the four rev ived Frankfurt-Style cases, this 
t ime one devised by Eleanor Stump. 
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3.5 Stump's Case 
Eleanor Stump'ร version o f a Frankfurt-Style case focuses on mental acts (1990; 1995; 
1996; 1999). Menta l acts are correlated to a complex series o f neural f i r ings. As Stump 
says ' ' [พ ]hen I suddenly recognise my daughter 'ร face across a c rowded room, that one 
mental act o f recogni t ion, wh i ch feels sudden, even instantaneous, to me, is correlated 
w i t h many neutral f i r ings as in fo rmat ion f r o m the ret ina is sent th rough the opt ic nerve, 
relayed through the lateral geniculate nucleus o f the thalamus, processed in var ious parts 
o f the occip i ta l cortex, w h i c h take account o f figure, mo t ion , or ientat ion i n space, and 
color , and then processed further in cort ical association areas" (1999, p. 417) . Bu t the 
in terrupt ion o f such a series means that there is no mental act at a l l , rather than there 
being 'par t ' o f a mental act. She explains be low: 
I f the neural sequence correlated w i t h my recognis ing my daughter 'ร face across 
a crowded room is interrupted at the level o f the thalamus, say, then I w i l l have 
no mental at hav ing to do w i t h seeing her. I w o n ' t fo r example, th ink to myself , 
' T o r a moment there, I thought I saw m y daughter, but n o w I ' m not sure." I 
w o n ' t have a sensation o f almost but not qui te seeing her. I w o n ' t have a 
p remon i t ion that I was about to see her, and then I myster iously j us t don ' t see 
her. I w i l l s imply have no mental act regarding recogni t ion o f her at a l l . (Stump 
1999, pp . 417-418) 
I f we grant al l th is, then a seemingly non-quest ion begging РгаіжпігЇ֊8Їу1е case can be 
constructed i n w h i c h a counterfactual intervener can detect f r o m the complex series o f 
neural events what mental act i t w i l l be. As Fischer puts i t on Stump's behalf: 
If... the counterfactual ly intervening l iberal neurosurgeon, d id interrupt a neural 
sequence that was beginn ing (and wh i ch is such that, i f i t were completed, i t 
w o u l d const i tute, or correlate w i t h , a decis ion to vote for Bush) , Jones w o u l d 
not (according to Stump) have engaged in the mental act o f beginning to make 
a decision. Jones w o u l d have no mental act, jus t as Stump w o u l d not have 
begun to recognise her daughter, i f the sequence o f neural firings beginning in 
her retina had been terminated in the thalamus. (Fischer 2002, p. 295 and see 
also Stump 1999, p. 418) 
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But again, I fa i l to see h o w any o f this guards against the quest ion begging accusation. 
Presumably the point is supposed to be that the complex neural sequence w h i c h is 
ident ical to the mental act can i tse l f have been indeterminist ical ly in i t ia ted. I n this way i t 
remains indeterminist ic up to the moment o f decision w h i c h way the agent w i l l decide. 
However , because the moment o f decis ion actually turns out to be a pro longed neural 
sequence, this a l lows the counterfactual intervener space to w o r k out what decis ion is 
about to be instantiated by this neural sequence. Bu t then Stump, as w i t h M e l e and 
Robb, has smuggled in a determinist ic relat ion at the crucial point . I f this part icular 
neutral process w i l l determinis t ica l ly result i n Jones hav ing made a part icular decis ion, 
then at some poin t prior to the decis ion being made, Jones cou ld not have decided 
otherwise. Hence, the counterfactual intervener is a l lowed their rel iable basis for 
in tervent ion only at the cost o f mak ing Jones'ร decision mak ing process determinist ic at 
a crucia l juncture. 
Perhaps Stump w i l l reply that the neural sequence is not to be thought o f as a process 
w h i c h culminates in Jones mak ing a part icular decis ion, but rather that the who le 
sequence - this neural sequence, that is - is the Ժ601Տ10Ո.^՛* Bu t i f that is what Stump 
means, then Jones cou ld have decided otherwise up to the moment o f decis ion. F i rst ly , i t 
w o u l d have to be the case that the neural sequence and the decis ion occur 
s imul taneously 一 a point Widerker makes. For unless this is the case then the neural 
process is a determinist ic cause o f Jones's decision and the quest ion w i l l have been 
begged (see Widerker 2002, p. 326 fn . 8). Yet n o w it seems quite clear that the 
counterfactual intervener 'ร basis for intervent ion comes too late. The intervener can 
only get to w o r k so to speak, after the agent has exercised the relevant responsib i l i ty 
g round ing power. Widerker makes the po in t be low: 
Consider a scenario l ike the one described by Stump, except that i t does not 
feature a counterfactual intervener. . . In that scenario, there w o u l d be no reason 
to th ink that Jones cou ld not have decided otherwise or that he cou ld not have 
refrained f r o m the decision he made. Recal l that, on Stump's alternative account 
o f decisions, once the neural f i r ings a, b, с occur, Jones is... bound to decide to 
З 4 W i d e r k e r makes th is suggest ion on S t u m p ' s b e h a l f 一 o n l y then to re ject i t on the same g rounds as I a m 
about to . See his 2 0 0 2 , p. 326 . 
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vote for a Republ ican candidate. Th is means that the on ly way in w h i c h Jones 
cou ld have refrained f r o m his decis ion in that scenario, is by hav ing the power to 
b r ing about the non-occun-ence o f a, b, c， a power that he w o u l d have before the 
occurrence o f a， b, с and not after that. Bu t i f he has that power i n the said 
scenario (as he surely does), he must also have i t i n the scenario featur ing [the 
intervener] . That the latter scenario includes a potent ia l ly coercive neuroscope 
dos not change this fact, since its coercive inf luence w o u l d come into p lay 
on l y . . . at a t ime later than the occurrence o f a, b, c. Hence it does not affect 
Jones's power to br ing about the non-occurrence o f a, b, c. (2002, pp. 326-327) 
As far as I can see Stump's Frankfurt-Style case fai ls to do anyth ing to meet the quest ion 
begging charge. Just as w i t h the or ig ina l , and jus t as w i t h Me le and Robb 's var ia t ion, 
either determin ism has to be assumed at a crucial point (a po in t jus t p r io r to decis ion 
mak ing ) , or i t has to be a l lowed that the agent has robust alternative possibi l i t ies i n the 
actual sequence. So far PAP remains unthreatened. 
3.6 Pereboom'ร Rescue At tempt 
The th i rd o f the four rescue attempts I want to consider is also the f ina l at tempt at an 
' i nde te rmin ism preserv ing ' Frankfurt-Style cases. I t has recently been put f o rward by 
Derk Pereboom: 
Joe is consider ing whether to c la im a tax deduct ion for the substantial local 
registrat ion free that he pa id when he bought a house. He knows that c la im ing 
the deduct ion is i l legal , that he probably w o n ' t be caught, and that i f he is, he can 
conv inc ing ly plead ignorance. Suppose he has a very power fu l but not always 
over r id ing desire to advance his self-interest no matter what the cost to others, 
and no matter whether advancing his self-interest invo lves i l legal act iv i ty . 
Fur thermore, he is a l ibertar ian free agent. Bu t his psychology is such that the 
on ly way that i n this si tuat ion he could choose not to engage i n the tax evasion is 
for mora l reasons. H is psychology is not, for example, such that he cou ld decide 
not to evade taxes for no reason or s imp ly on a w h i m . In fact, i t is causally 
necessary for his decid ing not to evade taxes in this s i tuat ion that a mora l reason 
occur to h i m w i t h a certain force. A mora l reason can occur to h i m w i t h that 
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force either invo luntar i l y or as a result o f his vo luntary act iv i ty (e.g. by his 
w i l l i n g to consider i t , or by his seeking out a v i v i d presentation o f such a 
reason). Bu t a mora l reason occurr ing to h i m w i t h such force is not causally 
suf f ic ient for his decid ing not to evade taxes. I f a mora l reason were to occur to 
h i m w i t h that force, Joe cou ld , w i t h his l ibertar ian free w i l l , either chose to act 
on i t or act against i t (w i thout the intervener 'ร device in place). But to ensure that 
he decide to evade taxes, a neuroscientist now implants a device w h i c h , ere i t to 
sense a mora l reason occurr ing w i t h the specif ied force, w o u l d electronical ly 
st imulate his bra in so that he w o u l d decide to evade taxes. In actual fact, no 
mora l reason occurs to h i m w i t h such force, and he chooses to evade taxes wh i l e 
the device remains idle. ( 2 0 0 1 , quoted in Fischer 2002, pp. 297-298) 
The idea here is that the occurrence o f the mora l reason o f requisite strength on ly gives 
Joe the oppor tuni ty to exercise his l ibertar ian free w i l l by either act ing on the basis o f 
that reason, or not. So, i f the reason occurs to Joe, the intervener knows that i t is n o w 
possible that Joe w i l l decide not to evade taxes (we can assume that the intervener wants 
Joe to evade taxes). Because the intervener does not want to take any r isks, they 
intervene on this occasion forcing Joe to make the decision to evade. However , i n the 
actual sequence the mora l reason does not occur to Joe, and so there is no poss ib i l i i y o f 
Joe decid ing against evading taxes for mora l reasons, and hence no need for 
in tervent ion. 
However , the first th ing we can say is that i f Joe's decision to evade taxes is, i n the 
actual sequence, inevi table g iven Joe's internal s i tuat ion (so, irrespective o f the 
intervener 'ร presence) then an incompat ib i l is t is w i t h i n their r ights to ho ld P A P v io la ted 
such that Joe is not mora l l y responsible. The important quest ion is not whether a 
Frankfur t -s ty le case can be constructed w h i c h can rule out some al ternative possib i l i t ies, 
but whether one can be constructed w h i c h rules out relevant al ternative possibi l i t ies 
without hav ing to assume that they are already absent. So, does Pereboom'ร case 
present any k i n d o f counterexample to incompat ib i l is ts who mainta in that i t needs to be 
open, up to the moment o f decis ion, wh i ch way an agent w i l l decide? N o . For either i t is 
inevi table that Joe w i l l make the decision that he does at the moment o f decis ion 
mak ing - in w h i c h case the question has been begged against at least some 
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incompat ib i l is ts , or i t is not, i n w h i c h case Joe does have the relevant k i n d o f alternative 
possibi l i t ies avai lable to h i m . 35 
Perhaps Pereboom w i l l c la im that indetermin ism is preserved in the actual sequence up 
to the moment o f decision mak ing because there were alternative decisions that the 
agent cou ld have made. It is jus t that i n the actual sequence those alternatives w o u l d not 
have inc luded decid ing not to evade taxes for mora l reasons ― for the relevant mora l 
reasons d id not occur to Joe in the actual sequence. W e can, in other words , understand 
the counterfactual intervener as one who is more concerned that Joe does not make a 
part icular decis ion, rather than one who is concerned that Joe does make a part icular 
decis ion. 
Let us grant the above. In what sense, i f the above is true, does Joe lack alternative 
possibi l i t ies? He does not. The intervener 'ร presence only restricts Joe's op t ion range, or 
rather, restricts the basis upon w h i c h he can make a decision. Th is k i n d o f restr ic t ion 
can certainly have a bearing on an agent's responsibi l i ty. M o r a l responsib i l i ty is, after 
a l l , about more than free w i l l and PAP is not a suf f ic ient cond i t ion fo r responsibi l i ty . I 
w o u l d say that, irrespective o f the presence o f an intervener, i f the mora l reasons not to 
evade taxes do not occur to Joe, then Joe is not mora l l y responsible for the decis ion that 
he makes i n the actual sequence for Joe wou ld not have had the possib i l i ty o f act ing for 
mora l r e a s o n s . H e st i l l acts w i t h free w i l l insofar as i t was genuinely possible for h i m 
to have made a d i f ferent decision at the moment o f dec is ion-making. 37 In the same way, 
W e w i l l see later that there are var ia t ions o f i n compa t i b i l i s t pos i t i on a c c o r d i n g to w h i c h the re levan t 
i nde te rm in i s t i c breaks in an agent 's de l ibe ra t i ve process ( the process l ead ing to dec i s i on m a k i n g ) can 
c o m e ear l ier . Fo r instance, it m i g h t be ma in ta i ned that i f it is i nde te rm in i s t i c w h a t be l ie fs ' c o m e to m i n d ' 
d u r i n g an agent ' ร de l ibe ra t ions then the agent has re levant a l te rnat ive poss ib i l i t i es (a ce r ta in p i c tu re o f the 
fiiture as a fu tu re o f b r a n c h i n g pa thways is secured th is w a y ) . P e r e b o o m ' ร case does, I w o u l d h o l d , 
h i g h l i g h t the inadequac ies o f such a pos i t i on ― some th ing ľ 11 say m o r e about later, f o r I be l i eve there are 
o ther ways i n w h i c h th is k i n d o f pos i t i on can be shown to be inadequate. I k n o w o f no -one w h o e x p l i c i t l y 
de fends such a v a r i a t i o n o f i n c o m p a t i b i l i s t pos i t i on ( M e l e out l ines such a pos i t i on , bu t does no t endorse 
i t ) . 
Perhaps one w i l l c l a i m that m o r a l reasons should have occu r red to Joe. Bu t then , from the robust 
modes t l i be r ta r ian perspec t ive (and the con t ro l - l i be r t a r i an perspect ive a lso) th is is c l a i m that there was 
some ear l ie r p o i n t at w h i c h Joe had the genu ine poss ib i l i t y o f ac t i ng fo r m o r a l reasons, and had he done so 
m o r a l reasons w o u l d have occu r red to h i m at th is po in t . 
" One m i g h t ob jec t that in the actua l sequence the agent c o u l d have had m o r a l reasons occu r to t h e m 
t h r o u g h an act o f the i r o w n w i l l - P e r e b o o m d i d , af ter a l l , say that Joe c o u l d seek ou t a " v i v i d p resenta t ion 
o f such a [ m o r a l ] reason" . In o ther w o r d s , so l o n g as Joe possesses l i be r ta r ian c o n t r o l , i t was poss ib le f o r 
h i m to have b rough t such m o r a l reasons in to h is de l ibera t ions , and as such it remains i n tu i t i ve to cons ider 
h i m b l a m e w o r t h y in the actual sequence. B u t ๒ response w e can m a k e t w o po in ts . F i r s t l y , th is is a t w o -
stage process: f i rs t Joe br ings , t h r o u g h an act o f w i l l , the m o r a l reasons in to h is de l i be ra t i ons , and then he 
has the o p p o r t u n i t y to dec ide on the basis o f such reasons. T h e coun te r fac tua l in te rvener w i l l r u le ou t the 
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someone who is c o m p l e t d y insane migh t st i l l act w i t h free w i l l , but lacks moral 
responsib i l i ty because their opt ion ranges consist only o f crazy opt ions. So, in the case 
that Pereboom presents, the lack o f a genuinely available alternative poss ib i l i ty in w h i c h 
Joe acts on mora l reasons does, I w o u l d say, subvert Joe's responsibi l i ty . Pereboom has 
fa i led to present a case in w h i c h the agent is unproblemat ica l ly mora l l y responsible i n 
the actual sequence. Pereboom'ร case provides us w i t h no reason to th ink anyth ing 
suspect about PAP. 
3.7 Fischer's Rescue Attempt 
Thus far the rescue attempts I have been considering have a l l tac i t ly accepted that 
determin ism cannot be assumed i n the construct ion o f a Frankfurt-Style case, and have 
sought ways in wh i ch to rule out alternative possibi l i t ies wh i l s t leav ing in-place agent-
internal i n d e t e r m i n i s m . B u t John M a r t i n Fischer, (who has probably done more than 
anyone else to ensure Frankfurt-Style cases remain prominent in the debate over free 
w i l l ) takes a d i f ferent approach and challenges the quest ion-begging charge (Fischer 
1999a; 2002; fo r thcoming a).^^ Fischer c laims that even i f determin ism is exp l ic i t l y 
assumed in the construct ion o f the Frankfurt-Style case, this does not beg the question. 
T o see his reasoning i t is best to understand h o w he envisages the de te rmin ism-
assuming Frankfur t -s ty le case work ing . 
To begin w i t h , assume that determin ism obtains. Imagine an agent mak ing a mora l l y 
reprehensible decision. A n incompat ib i l i s t w i l l not agree that the agent is mora l l y 
responsible, due to the presence o f determin ism in the actual sequence. However , unless 
second stage, and as such i n the actual sequence the most that Joe can be b l a m e w o r t h y f o r is not h a v i n g 
b rough t the m o r a l reasons in to his de l ibera t ions . 
38 One ' rescue ' a t tempt that I have not cons idered in the m a i n b o d y o f th is chapter is H u n ť s * B l o c k a g e ՝ 
case ( the t e r m was co i ned , I be l ieve , by F ischer in his 1999a). In H u n ť s case w e assume that the agent 
makes a dec i s ion and that th is emp loys cer ta in neura l pa thways in the b ra in ( w e are assuming that the 
m i n d supervenes on the b ra i n ) , but other pa thways are b l o c k e d , and hence there was no p o s s i b i l i t y o f the 
agent d e c i d i n g o the rw ise ( H u n t 2 0 0 0 ) . B u t on th is one I f o l l o w Fischer w h e n he says the f o l l o w i n g : 
[ T ] h e examp le is d i f f i c u l t to imag ine (and thus p r o p e r l y eva lua te) . I f causal i n d e t e r m i n i s m 
obta ins in the actual neura l pa thway , h o w exac t l y can it be the case that the agent does not have 
access to events cons is t ing เท the b u m p i n g up against any o f the bar r ie rs ( i n te rmed ia te o r 
t e rm ina l )? A n d i f the agent rea l l y does not have access to any such * b u m p i n g ' events, h o w can 
U be the case that causal d e t e r m i n i s m does no t ac tua l l y ob ta in? ( 2 0 0 2 , p. 2 9 6 and see also 
1999a, p. 119) 
39 H a j i and M c K e n n a have also recen t l y endorsed such an app roach , or at least, have a rgued that the 
assumpt ion o f d e t e r m i n i s m does not necessar i ly beg the quest ion against the i n c o m p a t i b i l i s t (see the i r 
2 0 0 4 ) . 
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we are go ing to jus t start-out by assuming that free w i l l and mora l responsib i l i ty require 
the fa ls i ty o f determin ism then it w o u l d not be "d ia lect ica l ly kosher" to insist that the 
agent is not mora l l y responsible (Fischer fo r thcoming a, and quoted i n H a j i and 
M c K e n n a 2004, p. 309). Rather, judgement should be suspended.՚*^ W i t h this suspension 
agreed to , we then have the counterfactual intervener added to the scene. W e are inv i ted 
to see that the mere presence o f the intervener is irrelevant to any assessment we make 
o f the agent 'ร mora l responsibi l i ty in this s i tuat ion. I n other words , even the 
incompat ib i l i s t can agree that the mere presence o f the intervener is i r relevant to the 
agent 'ร non-responsib i l i ty . Th is is al l that is needed for the case to prov ide reason to 
abandon P A P , because both determin ism and the presence o f the intervener were 
suf f ic ient to rule out alternative possibi l i t ies. 
[ T ] w o causes make i t the case that Jones is unable to choose otherwise at T 2 : the 
pr io r cond i t ion o f the w o r l d (together w i t h the laws o f nature) and B lack ' ร 
counterfactual intervent ion. What the examples show is that the mere fact that 
Jones is unable to choose otherwise does not in / /56/ / ՝establ ish that Jones is not 
mora l l y responsible for his choice. Th is is because B lack ' s counterfactual 
in tervent ion is one o f the things that make it the case that Jones is unable to 
choose otherwise at T 2 , and yet i t is irrelevant to the grounding o f Jones's mora l 
responsibi l i ty . Consider ing this factor (the counterfactual in tervent ion) , and 
bracket ing any other factor that m igh t make it the case that Jones is unable to 
choose otherwise at T 2 , i t seems to me that Jones may w e l l be mora l l y 
responsible for his act ion. The mere fact that he lacks alternat ive possibi l i t ies 
cannot i n i tse l f be the reason that Jones is not mora l l y responsible, i f he is not 
mora l l y responsible. (Fischer, fo r thcoming a, sec. 4.5) 
Fischer capitalises on the fact that what real ly does the w o r k o f re fu t ing PAP is the 
in tu i t i ve irrelevance o f the counterfactual intervent ion machinery, rather than whether or 
not the agent is mora l l y responsible i n the actual sequence. He then points out that i f 
al ternative possibi l i t ies were the important ingredient needed for mora l responsibi l i ty , 
A l t h o u g h bo th H a j i , M c K e n n a and Fischer seem to t h i n k th is d ia lec t i ca l p o i n t is impo r t an t , I f a i l t o see 
w h y . F i sche r ' s case w o r k s ― i f it w o r k s - j u s t as w e l l i f the i n c o m p a t i b i l i s t is a l l o w e d to keep the i r 
assumpt ion that the agent in the de te rm in i s t i c set t ing most de f i n i t e l y is not respons ib le . T h i s is j u s t as 
w e l l , f o r i t seems to m e that it is d i a lec t i ca l l y kosher fo r the i n c o m p a t i b i l i s t t o keep that assumpt ion as the 
onus is o n those w h o re ject P A P to p r o v i d e the arguments . There is, in o ther w o r d s , a s tand ing 
p r e s u m p t i o n in f a v o u r o f i n c o m p a t i b i l i s m . 
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then one w o u l d expect that both the presence o f determin ism and the presence o f the 
counterfactual intervener wou ld be equal ly pert inent to an explanat ion o f the agent's 
non-responsib i l i ty . In much the same way, i f two assassins in f l i c t fatal shot wounds on 
the p r ime minister at exact ly the same t ime, it w o u l d be odd to exp la in the pr ime 
min is ter 'ร death by c i t ing the course o f jus t one bul let , and ignor ing the other. 
Some have responded to this k i nd o f case by po in t ing out that i t is not clear that in the 
actual sequence it is the counterfactual intervener 'ร presence that is do ing any w o r k 
ru l ing out the agent's alternative possibi l i t ies. It is the presence o f determin ism in the 
actual sequence that is ext ingu ish ing the alternatives, not the counterfactual intervener -
hence there is a very natural explanat ion o f their irrelevance to the agent's non-
responsib i l i ty . To be conv inc ing the case needs to be one i n w h i c h the agent'ร 
alternative possibi l i t ies are ruled out solely by the counterfactual intervener (see Goetz 
2005 forthcoming; Ha j i and M c K e n n a 2004, p. 309; Eks t rom 2002, pp. 311-312). In 
other words, commi t ted Frankfurt ians must continue to explore var iat ions such as those 
presented above by Me le and Robb, Stump and Pereboom. 
Th is response to Fischer 's case is understandable. Bu t a l though I defend P A P , I do not 
th ink Fischer 's argument can be dismissed quite so easily. Imagine that, per impossib le, 
i t is possible to construct a Frankfurt-Style case in w h i c h the agent is indetermin is t ica l ly 
caused to decide but also lacks alternative possibi l i t ies due to the presence o f a 
counterfactual intervener. We w o u l d have to agree that such cases prov ide a good piece 
o f evidence for the fa ls i ty o f PAP. Yet this evidence w o u l d stem f r o m the apparent 
i rrelevance o f the counterfactual intervener 'ร presence to the quest ion o f the agent's 
mora l responsibi l i ty . Th is is exact ly what Fischer 'ร case draws our attent ion to as w e l l . I 
grant that Fischer 's case migh t not be as compel l ing as a case in w h i c h determin ism is 
not assumed ( i f such a case could be devised). But nor can i t be complete ly ժւտաւտտշժ.՛^* 
However , I bel ieve that Fischer 's Frankfurt-Style case, i f i t works , actual ly on ly puts 
pressure on a part icular vers ion o f PAP. To see this we have to digress s l ight ly . 
m a k e th is p o i n t in m y f o r t h c o m i n g c. 
57 
3.8 PAP and Ult imacy 
In the previous chapter I pointed out that PAP is taken to encapsulate at least two 
demands. One is for genuine alternative possibi l i t ies in order to secure independence 
f r o m the past and thereby be the ul t imate 'source' o f what we do, rather than jus t being 
a l i nk i n a chain. The second demand is for path-p ick ing cont ro l , so that we do not jus t 
arb i t rar i ly make a di f ference. The second concern is the one that I have been focussing 
on so far, and it has been the ma in focus o f debates over free w i l l . 
However , jus t because the ' con t ro l ' demand has been the most focussed on , does not 
mean that i t is the most important or central. The demand that one not jus t be a l i nk i n a 
chain is also, on ref lect ion, a power fu l concern that cou ld easily be the more 
fundamenta l . Acco rd ing to Sorabj i , Ar is to t le asserts the U R cond i t ion when he says that 
" the concept o f an act ion being up to us is connected... w i t h the concept o f our being, or 
hav ing w i t h i n us, the " o r i g i n " (arche) o f the ac t ion" (1980, p. 234) . K l e i n has def ined 
the cond i t ion (wh i ch she calls the "บ I t imacy -cond i t i on " ) as " the sense that no th ing for 
w h i c h they are not responsible should be the source [or cause] o f their decisions or 
choices" (1990, p. 51).՛*^ As Kane says, the U R condi t ion "puts the emphasis for being 
up to us not on the power to do otherwise, but on the source or explanat ion o f the act ion 
that is actual ly per formed; that source must be " i n u s " " (1996, p. 34) . I f determin ism is 
true the U R cond i t ion is not met, for we are never the or iginators o f our actions i n a 
determined w o r l d , but are s imply one l i nk in a determinist ic chain extending into the 
past. 
I f there is indeterminacy i n our decis ion mak ing processes 一 i f , at the moment o f choice 
i t was genuinely possible for us to have chosen otherwise keeping a l l else constant -
then we terminate the explanat ion o f why we chose as we d id rather than d i f ferent ly . 
Someth ing, in other words, is u l t imate ly down to us, and caimot be expla ined by c i t ing 
factors external to ourselves. I am going to be saying much more about th is k i nd o f 
concern in coming chapters. The po in t to be recognised at the moment is that t radi t ional 
Frankfur t -sty le cases, i f they d id wo rk , w o u l d show that the demand for alternative 
possibi l i t ies cou ld be separated f r o m the demand for ' u l t imacy ' or ' sou rcehooď. For in 
K l e i n does not t h i n k that w e can ever be the t rue sources o f our ac t ions in the w a y requ i red by the 
u t l i m a c y c o n d i t i o n ( 1 9 9 0 ) . 
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a t radi t ional Frankfurt-Style case the agent's decision mak ing process is internal ly 
indeterminist le such that it w o u l d , in the absence o f an intervener, prov ide the agent 
w i t h genuine alternative possibi l i t ies in w h i c h the agent decides otherwise. I f the 
intervener 'ร presence rules out such alternative possibi l i t ies w i thou t antecedently 
de termin ing the agent'ร w i l l , then the agent remains the u l t imate source o f their decision 
i n the actual sequence, despite the lack o f alternative possibi l i t ies. PAP and the 
U l t imacy cond i t ion w o u l d come apart 43 
The fa i lure o f the tradi t ional Frankfur t -Sty le case means that there is no case for saying 
that P A P and U l t imacy come apart. Hav ing genuine alternative possibi l i t ies remains 
in t imate ly connected w i t h being the ul t imate source o f our act ions, and as such u l t imacy 
remains a plausible part o f the story behind the appeal o f PAP. However , be ing the 
u l t imate source o f on๙ s act ion does not require that one have the addi t ional path-
p i ck ing contro l associated w i t h PAP. To stress ― the requirement for path-p ick ing 
contro l is a separate demand. A l ternat ive possibi l i t ies are best seen as p rov id ing the 
space w i t h i n w h i c h such contro l can be exercised, whereas alternative possibi l i t ies, jus t 
in themselves, can prov ide U l t imacy . 
Th is means that we can dist inguish two versions o f P A P , one associated w i t h the more 
m i n i m a l requirement for u l t imacy, and one associated w i t h the more demanding 
requirement for path-p ick ing cont ro l . 
P A P I : A n agent is only mora l ly responsible for mak ing a part icular decis ion i f they had 
alternat ive possibi l i t ies i n wh i ch they decided otherwise. 
43 I t is i m p o r t a n t to recogn ise that f o r p rec ise ly th is reason Frankf iar t -s ty le cases, i f t hey can be go t t o 
w o r k , d o no t d i r e c t l y threaten i n c o m p a t i b i l i s t pos i t i ons that stress u l t i m a c y ra ther than c o n t r o l . The re are a 
n u m b e r o f such i n c o m p a t i b i l i s t s , m a n y o f w h o m p o s i t i v e l y d e f e n d Frankfurt-Sty le cases, i n c l u d i n g : H u n t 
2 0 0 0 ; P e r e b o o m 1995 & 2 0 0 0 ; S tump 1996 ; Zagzebsk i 2 0 0 0 . Some o f these, in pa r t i cu la r Pereboorn , also 
th inks tha t in th is w a y an i n c o m p a t i b i l i s t w h o stresses con t ro l can also s u r v i v e re fu ta t i on b y F r a n k f u r t -
sty le case, t h o u g h as I i nd ica ted in an ear l ie r f oo tno te , it is mys te r i ous to me h o w th is c o u l d be. B u t I w i l l 
no t argue th is p o i n t here. T h e m o r e genera l po in t I w o u l d make is that I t h i n k tha t Frankfurt-Style cases -
i f they w o r k e d - w o u l d put some k i n d o f pressure on these pos i t i ons , ra ther than s u p p o r t i n g t h e m (so I 
їНіїж the above w o u l d a l l be better adv i sed to s top d e f e n d i n g Frankfurt-Style cases j . Fo r so l o n g as 
u l t i m a c y and P A P are s t rong l y connec ted then p r o v i d e m u t u a l suppo r t f o r one another . Whereas i f they 
are d i sconnec ted then it is fa r easier to ca l l in to ques t ion whe the r u l t i m a c y is rea l l y a l l that va luab le af ter 
a l l - s o m e t h i n g F ischer l i kes to do ( 1 9 9 4 , 2 0 0 3 b ) . 
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P A P 2 : A n agent is on ly mora l l y responsible for mak ing a part icular decis ion i f they had 
alternat ive possibi l i t ies i n w h i c h they decided otherwise, and path-p ick ing contro l over 
w h i c h possib i l i ty was actual і sed. 
N o w we can return to Fischer 's Frankfur t -Sty le case. Consider that the t radi t ional 
Frankfur t -s ty le case ― i f i t cou ld be got to w o r k ― w o u l d have refuted both P A P I and 
PAP2 . Th is is because the t radi t ional Frankfur t -Sty le case presents นร w i t h an agent who 
is in tu i t i ve ly mora l l y responsible yet lacked alternative possibi l i t ies - something both 
P A P I and PAP2 say is impossible. But I c la im that what is interest ing about Fischer 'ร 
case, is that i t on ly threatens PAP2 , i f i t threatens anyth ing at a l l . 
Let us cal l an incompat ib i l i s t who puts the stress on u l t imacy a 'source' 
incompatibil ist."^^ P A P I is associated w i t h source incompat ib i l i sm. Let us cal l an 
incompat ib i l i s t w h o puts the stress on path-p ick ing cont ro l , a ' con t ro l ' ա շ օաթՅեե ւՍտէ . ՛ ^ ^ 
PAP2 is associated w i t h ' con t ro l ' incompat ib i l i sm. In Fischer 'ร case what both the 
'source ' and the ' con t ro l ' incompat ib i l is t need to be able to do is expla in the in tu i t ive 
irrelevance o f the counterfactual intervener. I f they can do th is , then the case is no threat 
to their respective posit ions. 
The ' con t ro l ' incompat ib i l is t cannot do this because alternative possibi l i t ies are needed 
by the contro l incompat ib i l is t i n order to clear room to faci l i tate the exercise o f their 
brand o f cont ro l . Because both the counterfactual intervener and the determin ism i n the 
actual sequence are ru l ing out alternative possibi l i t ies, then both are obstacles to the 
exercise o f this k ind o f contro l . One is no more o f an obstacle than the other. Thus the 
cont ro l - incompat ib i l i s t cannot jus t focus on the determin ism in their explanat ion o f the 
agent's non-responsibi l i ty . 
Bu t matters are di f ferent for the 'source' incompat ib i l is t . Th is is because for the source 
incompat ib i l i s t genuine alternative possibi l i t ies are the upshot o f one being the ul t imate 
source o f one 'ร act ion. A l ternat ive possibi l i t ies are not c lear ing r o o m for the exercise o f 
some abi l i ty . They are not mak ing space. A l ternat ive possibi l i t ies are jus t what an agent 
W i t h some qua l i f i ca t i ons to be made later, c o n t e m p o r a r y source i ncompa t i b i l i s t s w o u l d i nc lude : 
W i g g i n s 2 0 0 3 ; N o z i c k 1 9 8 1 ; Kane 1996 ; E k s t r o m 2 0 0 0 , . 
45 P r o m i n e n t ' c o n t r o ľ i ncompat ib iHs ts w o u l d i nc lude : van I n w a g e n 1983 & 2 0 0 2 ; C l a r k e 1993 & 1996 ; 
O ' C o n n o r 1995 ; R o w e 2 0 0 0 ; T a y l o r 1992. 
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w i l l have i f they are the u l t imate source o f their act ion. Th is means that the source 
incompat ib i l i s t can g ive a very natural explanat ion o f why i t is that the counterfactual 
intervener 's presence seems irrelevant to the agent'ร non-responsib i l i ty . For i t is in 
v i r tue o f the antecedent determinat ion o f the agent'ร w i l l that the agent is not the 
u l t imate source o f their decision. So the determin ism is the culpr i t , and not the 
counterfactual intervener. The determin ism is what is ext ingu ish ing the agent'ร 
sourcehood in the actual sequence. It is precisely because alternative possibi l i t ies w o u l d 
jus t be the incidental upshot o f one hav ing sourcehood that the intervener 's presence can 
be deemed irrelevant. 
There is another way to make the point . I f one were to remove the determin ism and 
make the agent'ร del iberat ive process indeterminate, then the agent w o u l d be the 
u l t imate source o f their act ion and w o u l d have genuine alternative possibi l i t ies ( i t w o u l d 
take a v iable t radi t ional Frankfur t -Sty le case to show the second part o f this c la im to be 
false). Bu t this is not so for the contro l incompat ib i l is t . For s imp ly remov ing the 
determin ism w o u l d not, in itself, y ie ld path-p ick ing contro l ( i t is true that some 
contemporary 'event causal ' incompat ib i l is ts do seem to th ink that i t m igh t , but I take 
issue w i t h them on that score in Chapter 5). Path-p ick ing contro l is something needed in 
addition to hav ing genuine alternative possibi l i t ies. Th is br ings out that for the contro l 
incompat ib i l i s t alternative possibi l i t ies have to be seen as fac i l i ta t ing the exercise o f 
pa th-p ick ing cont ro l , whereas w i t h the source incompat ib i l i s t al ternative possibi l i t ies 
are the upshot o f the sourcehood condi t ion being satisf ied. 
I f I am r ight above this is s igni f icant. I t means that not a l l р APs are the same. It means 
that F ischer 'ร case puts pressure on the abi l i ty or contro l aspect o f P A P , but not its 
'source ' aspect. In other words , Fischer 's case calls in to quest ion w h y PAP is a 
requirement o f mora l responsibi l i ty , rather than whether i t is. M o s t impor tant ly o f a l l , 
g iven the v i e w I w i l l be developing in coming chapters, Fischer 'ร case suggests that the 
reason PAP is a requirement o f the k ind o f free w i l l associated w i t h mora l 
responsib i l i ty , is to do w i t h being an ul t imate source o f what one does, rather than 
hav ing a special k i nd o f path-p ick ing contro l over what one does. 
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3,9 Objections to the Above 
One m igh t object that even i f I am r ight above, this does not real ly matter g iven that i t is 
precisely the contro l vers ion o f PAP that the compat ib i l is t is interested i n d ismissing. 
A f t e r a l l , i f Fischer 's case calls into question whether we actual ly need such cont ro l , 
then compat ib i l i s t contro l seems to be the only k i nd needed for responsibi l i ty. A s such 
u l t imate luck cannot be deemed the prob lem it is thought to be (and as w e shall see later 
( i n Chapter 8) Fischer does d i rect ly challenge whether u l t imate luck is such a prob lem) . 
So, what I have argued above w i l l not t rouble the compat ib i l is t . 
There is some mer i t i n this response. I f the compat ib i l i s t 's concern is jus t to show that 
compat ib i l i s t contro l is the on ly k i nd actual ly needed for responsib i l i ty then I bel ieve 
that Fischer 'ร case does prov ide some evidence for this. Hard ly compe l l i ng evidence, 
but evidence none-the-less. Bu t there is a di f ference between being a compat ib i l is t about 
cont ro l , and being a compat ib i l i s t about free w i l l and responsibi l i ty . I t is perfect ly 
consistent to be the former but not the latter, for free w i l l and responsib i l i ty are not 
p lausib ly on ly about contro l ( for instance, sanity is in general a cont ro l independent 
requirement for responsibi l i ty and is neutral between compat ib i l is ts and 
incompat ib i l is ts) . The concern about u l t imate sourcehood is a real concern and not one 
the compat ib i l i s t can jus t dismiss."*^ I t is not, after a l l , a concern that has jus t been 
invented to be an obstacle to compat ib i l i sm. It is not, in other words , an ad hoc reason to 
be an incompat ib i l is t . A compat ib i l is t is not a l lowed to jus t dismiss this k i nd o f concern 
about determin ism in the absence o f any argument. I w o u l d agree, that i f t radi t ional 
46 F ischer h i m s e l f o f t e n does d ismiss the conce rn abou t sou rcehood or at least seems to . H e says th ings 
l i k e th i s : 
Someone m i g h t say that in o rder f o r an agent to be m o r a l l y respons ib le f o r an a c t i o n , the agent 
mus t be c rea t ive in the sense o f b e i n g a se l f - i n i t i a t o r " or " s e l f - o r i g i n a t o r " o f the ac t i on . A n d 
the c l a i m w o u l d be that these ideas requ i re the absence o f causal d e t e m i i n a t i o n . N o w I can see 
w h y someone m igh t ins is t that r espons ib i l i t y requ i res th is sort o f i n c o m p a t i b i l i s t i c c rea t i v i t y , if 
one is c o m m i t t e d to the idea that moral r espons ib i l i t y requ i res a l te rna t i ve poss ib i l i t i es , bu t 1 d o 
no t see any reason to insist o n p rec ise ly this sort o f c rea t i v i t y , apart from such a p r i o r 
c o m m i t m e n t . ( 1 9 9 4 , p. 150) 
I n o ther w o r d s , he fa i l s to see the va lue in sou rcehood once i t is d i v o r c e d from the conce rn abou t 
a l te rna t i ve poss ib i l i t i es . I have a rgued here that it cannot be so d i v o r c e d . B u t a n y w a y , I f i n d it ha rd to 
unders tand exac t l y w h a t F ischer means w h e n he says th is . Does he m e a n that s o u r c e h o o d c o u l d o n l y be 
va luab le i f i t was associated w i t h h a v i n g genu ine a l te rna t ive poss ib i l i t i es? I f that is w h a t he means , then I 
a m i n c l i n e d to agree to th is ex tent - the i n tu i t i ve requ i remen t f o r a l te rna t i ve poss ib i l i t i es can be g i v e n a 
r a t i ona l i sa t i on in te rms o f sou rcehood . B u t I do no t unders tand w h y F ischer can g ran t tha t there is a reason 
to insist u p o n " s e l f - o r i g i n a t i o n " w h e n it is associated w i t h a l te rna t ive poss ib i l i t i es , ye t no reason at a l l , 
w h e n it is s h o w n (as he th inks it can be) t o be d i v o r c e d from a l te rna t ive poss ib i l i t i es . 
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Frankfur t -Sty le cases cou ld be got to wo rk , then the sourcehood requirement and P A P 
w o u l d be demonstrated to come apart. Th is , I wou ld agree, w o u l d weaken the case for 
source- incompat ib i l ism insofar as the requirement for sourcehood cou ld no longer be 
associated w i t h (and so be part o f the story behind) the in tu i t i ve ly appeal ing PAP. Bu t i f 
what I have argued here is correct, then PAP and sourcehood cannot be d ivorced. 
Fur thermore, to the extent that Fischer Frankfurt-sty le cases w o r k , then PAP and 
sourcehood are shown to be more closely l inked than before. For I 've argued that 
Fischer cases actual ly suggest that sourcehood is the real story behind the requirement 
for alternative possibi l i t ies. 
3.10 Conclusion 
B y chal lenging PAP Frankfur t -Sty le cases attempt to demonstrate that whatever value 
we m igh t attach to hav ing an open future, and whatever such an open future faci l i tates, 
i t is a l l i r relevant when it comes to the quest ion o f mora l responsibly. A n ab i l i ty to 
decide otherwise is not needed, and it is enough i f the agent has exercised jus t some 
f o r m o f compat ib i l is t contro l over their decis ion in the actual sequence. However , i n this 
chapter I have argued that PAP cannot be so easily dismissed. The arguments o f 
Widerker and Kane show the or ig ina l Frankfur t -Sty le case does not present us w i t h a 
s i tuat ion in w h i c h an agent lacks genuine alternative possibi l i t ies, and hence our 
in tu i t ions about such cases prov ide no evidence for the falsi ty o f PAP. 
Subsequent attempts to repair the damage done by Widerker and Kane 's cr i t ic isms, a l l 
f a i l . The on ly version that does any w o r k against PAP is Fischer 'ร determin ism-
assuming var ia t ion. But Fischer's version is d i f ferent f r o m the others and requires quite 
careful treatment. I agreed that wh i l s t Fischer 's version is a long way short o f decisive, 
i t does prov ide some evidence that an abi l i ty to do otherwise m igh t not be required for 
responsibi l i ty . However , PAP can be said to encapsulate at least t w o concerns about 
de termin ism, on ly one o f w h i c h is a concern about contro l . I argued that P A P , insofar as 
it encapsulates a concern about being the ul t imate source o f one'ร act ion, is not 
threatened in any way by Fischer 'ร case. A t most Fischer 's case serves on ly to aide our 
understanding o f PAP, rather than serving to provide us w i t h a reason to reject i t . 
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I f a Frankfur t -sty le case can cal l into quest ion any plausible іп їефге їа і іоп o f P A P , then 
this is good news for the compat ib i l is t . I f Fischer 's case calls into quest ion whether the 
ab i l i t y to decide otherwise 一 so path-p ick ing contro l - is real ly needed fo r responsib i l i ty , 
then F ischer 'ร case provides some evidence that luck at the u l t imate level m igh t not be 
such a p rob lem. That is al l w e l l and good for the compat ib i l is t , because i f determin ism 
is true, then everyth ing we do is a matter o f u l t imate luck. Fischer 'ร Frankfurt-Style case 
can therefore be seen as go ing some smal l way to a l lev iat ing concerns about luck and 
the adequacy o f compat ib i l is t contro l . 
However , compat ib i l i s t posit ions are not on ly subject to concerns about the adequacy o f 
compat ib i l i s t contro l . A s we shall see in the next chapter, cases i nvo l v i ng covert 
man ipu la t ion o f an agent'ร w i l l prov ide a power fu l case against compat ib i l i sm. 
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Chapter 4 
Compatibilìsm and CNC Control 
I n the previous chapter we considered whether Frankfur t -Sty le cases prov ide any 
evidence that PAP is false. I argued that they do not, and rebutted three o f the latest 
' repa i red ' Frankfurt-sty le cases. I d id a l l ow that Fischer 'ร var ia t ion prov ided some 
evidence that the demand for path-p ick ing contro l m igh t be misgu ided. Bu t i f that is 
r ight , then even though Frankfurt-sty le cases cannot show al l that some have c la imed for 
them, they do improve the prospects for compat ib i l i sm about cont ro l . 
However , compat ib i l is t v iews about free w i l l have two Ach i l l es ' heels. There 's the luck 
ob ject ion, w h i c h attacks the adequacy o f compat ib i l is t contro l but, there is also the 
ob jec t ion one gets f r o m cases i nvo l v ing "cover t non-const ra in ing" cont ro l or C N C 
c o n t r o l . T h e term was coined by Kane, who explains that C N C "contro l lers do not get 
their way by constraining or coercing others against their w i l l s , but rather by 
man ipu la t ion the w i l l s o f others so that the others (w i l l i ng l y ) do what the control lers 
desire" (Kane 1996, pp. 64-65) . 
The argument goes that i n cases in w h i c h an agent is subject to C N C contro l their 
responsib i l i ty is clearly subverted. Yet there is no relevant di f ference between such 
cases and those i nvo l v ing the antecedent determinat ion o f the agent's w i l l . I n other 
words , the reason C N C control undermines responsibi l i ty is because it involves the 
antecedent determinat ion o f the agent's w i l l . It is this l ine o f attack that I w i l l pursue in 
this chapter. M y argument develops in the f o l l o w i n g manner. 
M a n y compat ib i l is ts accept that C N C control subverts responsib i l i ty and p ick up the 
gauntlet o f t r y ing to expla in w h y w i thou t imp l ica t ing determinism."^^ Because C N C 
control lers do not jeopardise the agent'ร contro l , the compat ib i l is t has to acknowledge 
For d iscuss ion o f C N C c o n t r o l see: W a l l e r 1990 ; D o u b l e 1 9 9 1 ; M e l e 1995 ; Pe reboom 1995; F ischer & 
R a v i z z a 1998, chs. 7 & 8 ; H a j i 1998 pp . 21 -25 & շ ฒ ch . 8. 
48 F ischer and R a v i z z a ( 1 9 9 8 ) and H a j i ( 1 9 9 8 & 2 0 0 2 ) have been p r o m i n e n t amongs t those compa t i b i l i s t s 
w h o accept that C N C con t ro l presents a p r o b l e m and t r y to deal w i t h it . H a r r y F r a n k f u r t has also s t rugg led 
w i t h the issue, t h o u g h he n o w bi tes the bu l l e t and j u s t insists that an agent is m o r a l l y respons ib le even i f 
they are sub jec t to C N C c o n t r o l . T h e c o m p a t i b i l i s t G a r y W a t s o n hones t l y accepts that C N C c o n t r o l 
presents a m a j o r p r o b l e m fo r compa t i b i l i s t s w i t h o u t o f f e r i n g a so lu t i on to i t . 
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that it is the v io la t i on o f some k i nd o f Ownersh ip ' or 'deep at t r ibutab i l i ty ' cond i t ion 
w h i c h undermines the agent'ร responsibi l i ty. When an agent is subject to C N C contro l 
their act ions, though st i l l compat ib i l is t contro l led, are no longer real ly theirs. I then 
consider var ious compat ib i l is t attempts to articulate what is needed for ownership. I f i nd 
that in each case either the condi t ions out l ined fa i l to preclude being C N C control ler , or 
amount to s imply st ipulat ing that C N C contro l subverts ownership. F ina l ly , I argue that 
Frankf t i r t -sty le cases can actually be used to help underscore the lack o f relevant 
d is t inc t ion between the responsibi l i ty subvert ing qual i t ies o f C N C cont ro l , and causal 
determin ism. In short cases i nvo l v ing C N C contro l mot ivate an ownersh ip cond i t ion for 
mora l responsib i l i ty , and compat ib i l is t art iculat ions o f this cond i t ion fa i l . 
4.1 Coming To Be Who We Are 
H o w we come to be the k inds o f people that we are, is a process over w h i c h w e have 
not, u l t imate ly , exercised contro l . W e do not come into the w o r l d already fo rmed but 
rather " f r o m the very beginning that process [ o f self-creat ion] is g iven its o w n 
dis t inct ive slant by the inf luences o f heredity and env i ronment . " (Feinberg 1986 p. 34). 
A s Feinberg goes on to say: 
A t a t ime so early that the questions o f how to social ize and educate the ch i ld 
have not even arisen yet, the t w i g w i l l be bent in a certain def in i te d i rec t ion . . . 
F r o m the very beginn ing, then, the ch i ld must - inevi tably will 一 have some 
input in his o w n shaping, the extent o f wh i ch w i l l g row cont inuously even as the 
ch i ld ' ร character i tse l f does. A f te r that, the ch i l d can contr ibute towards the 
mak ing o f his o w n self and circumstances in ever increasing degree. These 
contr ibut ions are s igni f icant even though the ch i ld is in large par t . . . the product 
o f external inf luences over w h i c h he has no cont ro l , and his or ig ina l 
mot iva t iona l structure is something he jus t finds h imse l f w i t h , not something he 
consciously creates. A lways the sel f that contr ibutes to the mak ing o f the newer 
se l f is the product both o f outside inf luences and an earlier sel f that was not 
qui te as fiilly fo rmed. (1986, pp. 34-35; see also Arneson 1994, pp. 59-60) 
The or ig ina l sel f is not consciously self-created, and h o w it develops w i l l be a func t ion 
both o f i t , and the inf luences to w h i c h it is subjected. Yet Feinberg does not th ink this 
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undermines free w i l l . For the background character traits and evaluat ive schemes that 
g row th rough this process o f maturat ion can st i l l be part o f an 'authent ic ' self, i f " the 
habit o f cr i t ica l sel f - revis ion was implanted i n us early by parents, educators, or peers, 
and strengthened by our o w n constant exercise o f i t " (Feinberg 1986， p. 35) . In other 
words , a l though we have not contro l led our acquis i t ion o f the d isposi t ion to engage in 
cr i t ica l sel f - revis ion, this fact does not in any way subvert our free w i l l and 
responsib i l i ty , but rather can be seen as free w i l l enabling. 
These are important points w h i c h both incompat ib i l is ts and compat ib i l is ts have to 
recognise. Even the most hard- l ine incompat ib i l is t has to accept that we do not jus t 
appear on the scene ready made, but develop over t ime, and fur thermore that we need 
certain disposi t ions instal led i f we are to become responsible beings. The habi t o f se l f 
assessment and some k i n d o f normat ive competence both seem to be requirements here. 
Bu t the po in t the incompat ib i l is t w o u l d make, however, is that i t is not jus t the hav ing o f 
the d isposi t ion to self-revise that is important , i t is rather what this d isposi t ion 
faci l i tates. For the habit o f cr i t ical self-assessment w i l l l i ke ly invo lve seeing that one has 
alternat ive possibi l i t ies 一 that to some extent i t is up to oneself n o w h o w one develops. 
I n other w o r d , such a habit can be seen as in effect generating the alternat ive 
possibi l i t ies that we need i f we are to be the originators o f our act ions, and i f we are to 
exercise path-p ick ing contro l over them. 
The p rob lem the compat ib i l is t faces, however , and w h i c h is go ing to be the focus o f this 
chapter, is as fo l l ows . Wh i l s t we can dist inguish between free w i l l enabl ing, and free 
w i l l d isabl ing disposi t ions, the p rob lem for the compat ib i l is t is that a sophist icated 
covert contro l ler cou ld programme an agent to per fo rm certain future acts, consistent 
w i t h the agent cr i t ica l ly ref lect ing upon what they are do ing and possessing suf f ic ient 
normat ive competence. I n such cases the agent is subject to what has become k n o w n as 
covert non-constra in ing cont ro l , or C N C contro l . C N C control is to be contrasted w i t h 
constra in ing contro l . A n agent is subject to constrain ing contro l when a contro l ler forces 
them to do something against their w i l l , or places some obstacle i n the way o f their 
do ing what they want. In short " [ c ļons t ra in ing . . . control lers get their way by creating 
constraints or impediments that thwar t the w i l l s o f those they cont ro l , prevent ing other 
agents f r o m do ing what they want to d o " (Kane 1996, p. 64). Whereas i n cases o f non-
constra in ing cont ro l , " the control lers do not get their way by constra in ing or coercing 
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Others against their w i l l s , but rather by manipu la t ing the w i l l s o f others ร that the others 
( w i l l i n g l y ) do what the control lers desire" (Kane 1996, p. 64) . 
[ C N C contro l led] agents consequently do not feel frustrated or thwarted. They 
act i n accordance w i t h their o w n wants, desires or intent ions. Ye t they are 
contro l led nevertheless by others who have manipulated their circumstances so 
that they want , desire, or intend only what the control lers have planned. I n the 
most interest ing cases... the contro l led agents are unaware o f be ing manipulated 
or perhaps even unaware o f the existence o f their control lers. (Kane 1996, pp. 
64-65) 
W e can further d is t inguish between two types o f C N C cont ro l : G loba l and Loca l . G loba l 
C N C contro l involves the wholesale implanta t ion o f the agent'ร act ional elements, so 
the agent'ร psychological basis for decis ion mak ing and their background evaluat ive 
scheme. These migh t be implanted i n embryo f o r m , so to speak, the C N C contro l ler 
foreseeing that the agent w i l l , over t ime, develop a certain background evaluat ive 
scheme - one w h i c h w i l l ensure the agent acts in the way the C N C contro l ler wants 
them to. G loba l C N C control is o f a k i n d that a genetic manipulator o f the future m igh t 
exercise, or i t may be the k ind o f contro l that a god exercises over ստ.՛ ՛^ 
Loca l C N C contro l does not invo lve the wholesale construct ion or reconstruct ion o f the 
agent'ร cont ro l mechanisms, rather i t involves induc ing certain desires and bel iefs in the 
agent w h o is otherwise lef t intact. Loca l manipu la t ion takes place when a contro l ler 
induces i n the agent a part icular desire w h i c h they k n o w w i l l e l ic i t a part icular react ion 
f r o m the agent'ร ' i n p lace' mechanism. Thus, whereas Globa l man ipu la t ion invo lves the 
imp lan ta t ion or engineering o f the agent'ร contro l mechanism, local man ipu la t ion 
invo lves presenting the already fo rmed mechanism w i t h circumstances (and here I 
inc lude induced pro-att i tudes as part o f an agent'ร circumstances) in w h i c h i t w i l l react 
i n the way that the local control ler intends. It is possible that an agent can be g lobal ly 
cont ro l led w i thou t ever being local ly covert ly contro l led and vice versa. G loba l cont ro l 
invo lves pre-arranging matters so that an agent'ร future is f i xed and w i l l be what the 
49 T h i s k i n d o f g l o b a l C N C con t ro l is also i l l us t ra ted by Brave New World t ype b e h a v i o u r eng inee r i ng . 
G a r y W a t s o n uses the t e r m " B r a v e N e w W o r l d scenar ios " to mean g l o b a l C N C cases. B u t as K a n e po in ts 
ou t " C N C c o n t r o l i t se l f is a m o r e genera l n o t i o n than g l oba l scenar ios suggest, h o w e v e r , s ince i t can take 
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global contro l ler wants it to be. The global control ler s imply w inds up their carefu l ly 
engineered c lockwork toy and releases it . They can sit back; they do not have to act ively 
intervene after their in i t ia l act o f wholesale manipu la t ion . The local cont ro l ler o n the 
other hand intervenes, but not by bypassing the agent's reason responsive apparatus 
(again, that w o u l d be constraining local cont ro l ) , but rather by presenting i t w i t h 
incentives that it knows w i l l e l ic i t the desired reaction. 
There is some ambigu i ty over when exact ly local C N C contro l shades over in to G loba l . 
For instance, the local manipu lat ion o f the agent's evaluative scheme (so the basis upon 
w h i c h they assess the reasons prov ided by their desires etc) arguably constitutes G loba l 
man ipu la t ion . W e migh t say that an agent jus t is their evaluat ive scheme, or at least that 
i t is in some way essential to them, and to start p lay ing around w i t h that, is to start 
changing the agent 'ร essential ident i ty. 
The impor tant po in t about these types o f covert cont ro l , whether g lobal or loca l , is that 
i n al l events, what the agent does results f r o m the operat ion o f reason-responsive 
mechanisms, and therefore in terms o f compat ib i l i s t -cont ro l , the agent can be said to 
have cont ro l led their decision. That is the p rob lem. 
For as I ment ioned i n Chapter 2, there are some things w h i c h jus t should undermine 
mora l responsib i l i ty , and being subject to C N C contro l is p lausib ly one o f them. I f 
everyth ing we do is a funct ion o f what some C N C control ler wants us to do, then 
in tu i t i ve ly we are not mora l ly responsible. That , at least, is the in tu i t ion o f many. I f the 
compat ib i l i s t wants to respect such intu i t ions ― and many do - then they have to exp la in 
exact ly why one is not mora l l y responsible i n these cases. M o r e speci f ica l ly , they need 
to exp la in this i n a way that w i l l not show determin ism to be the culpr i t . 
4.2 Pereboom'ร Four Case Argument 
T o br ing out the prob lem consider the f o l l o w i n g ' four case' argument developed by 
Derk Pereboom: 
place to various degrees in everyday life as wel l as globally in Utopian scenarios like H u x l e y ' s " ( 1 9 9 6 , p. 
65 f h . 9 ) . 
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Case 1 ： M r . Green is l ike an ordinary human being, except that he was created by 
neuroscientists, who can manipulate h i m direct ly through the use o f rad io- l ike 
techno logy . . .The neuroscientists manipulate h i m by, among other things, 
pushing a series o f buttons jus t before he begins to reason about his s i tuat ion, 
thereby causing his reasoning process to be rat ional ly egoist ic. H is reasoning 
process is reasons-responsive, because it wou ld have resulted i n d i f ferent choices 
i n some situations in w h i c h the egoist ic reasons were otherwise. M r Green does 
not th ink and act contrary to character, since the neuroscientists typ ica l ly 
manipulate h i m to be rat ional ly egoistic. 
Case 2: M r . Green is l ike an ordinary human being, except that he was created by 
neuroscientists, who , a l though they cannot contro l h i m di rect ly , have 
programmed h i m to be a rat ional egoist, so that, in any circumstances l ike those 
i n w h i c h he now f inds h imsel f , he is causally determined to undertake the 
reasons-responsive process and to possess the set o f first and second-order 
desires that results in his k iU ing M s . Peacock. 
Case 3 ： M r . Green is an ordinary human being, except that he was determined by 
the r igorous t ra in ing practices o f his home and commun i t y to be a rat ional egoist. 
H is t ra in ing took place at too early an agent for h i m to have had the ab i l i ty to 
prevent or alter the practices that determined his character. M r . Green is thereby 
caused to undertake the reasons-responsive process and to possess the 
organisat ion o f first and second -o rde r desires that result i n his k i l l i n g M s . 
Peacock. 
Case 4: Physical ist determin ism is true. M r . Green is a rat ional ly egoist ic but 
(otherwise) ordinary human being, raised in normal circumstances. M r . Green's 
k i l l i n g o f M s . Peacock comes about as a result o f his under tak ing the reasons-
responsive process o f del iberat ion, and he has the specif ied organizat ion o f first 
and second-order desires. (Pereboom 1995, pp. 23-25) 
Pereboom th inks most o f us w i l l have the in tu i t ion that in cases 1,2, and 3 M r Green's 
responsib i l i ty for his act o f k i l l i n g has been subverted, and that case 4 is re levant ly 
ident ical to cases 1,2 and 3, and thus we should conclude that M r Green is not 
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responsible i n case 4 either. The reason w h y M r Green is not responsible in the first 
three cases is because what he does "results f r o m a determinist ic causal process that 
traces back to factors beyond his con t ro l " , wh i ch is also what one has i n case 4 
(Pereboom 1995, p. 25) . 
The mora l o f C N C cases is incompat ib i l is t . I t seems that the incompat ib i l i s t can, i t 
w o u l d seem, deal C N C control cases st ra ight forwardly. The contro l incompat ib i l i s t can 
po in t out that i f an agent has path-p ick ing cont ro l , then even i f a l l o f their act ional 
elements have been implanted, the agent w i l l s t i l l have ul t imate cont ro l over what they 
do. The C N C control ler w i l l not, through imp lant ing the agent'ร act ional elements, be 
able to ensure that the agent freely decides one way rather than another on a part icular 
occasion, for by hypothesis this w i l l be a funct ion o f h o w the agent'ร path-p ick ing 
contro l is exercised ― a matter that cannot be antecedently determined. Possession o f 
pa th-p ick ing contro l therefore ef fect ive ly thwarts C N C contro l . S imi la r l y , the source 
incompat ib i l i s t can c la im that meet ing the source requirements rules out a C N C 
contro l ler being able to determine w h i c h way an agent w i l l decide. Ei ther way, for one 
reason or another the C N C control lers power over the agent is reduced i f the 
incompat ib i l i s t control /sourcehood requirements are met. Whether the incompat ib i l i s t 
can actual ly deal w i t h C N C contro l cases quite as easily as I 've jus t imp l i ed is a matter 
for discussion - some th ink not (Ha j i 2002; Me le 1995). I t is a discussion that w i l l 
occupy part o f Chapter 7 where we w i l l see how some incompat ib i l i s t posi t ions fare 
better than others, and that al l require certain adjustments. For the t ime being, however, 
we can jus t note that the incompat ib i l is t looks far better equipped to deal w i t h cases 
i nvo l v i ng C N C manipu la t ion . 
4.3 CNC Control and Ownership 
W i t h a few notable exceptions, most contemporary compat ib i l is ts agree that cases 
i nvo l v i ng C N C contro l do subvert responsib i l i ty , and so therefore p i ck up the gauntlet 
o f t r y ing to exp la in why , w i thou t imp l i ca t ing determin ism. Because C N C control lers go 
through the agent 'ร w i l l so to speak, they do not subvert the agent'ร compat ib i l is t 
cont ro l . Whether one does what one does as a result o f the pr ior manipulat ions o f a 
C N C control ler , or whether one doe what one does as a result o f natural forces, i t makes 
no di f ference to the degree o f compat ib i l is t contro l one exercises (anymore than it 
71 
affects the degree o f contro l a te lev is ion remote contro l can be said to exh ib i t whether i t 
was assembled in a factory or assembled by natural forces). So instead o f focussing on 
cont ro l , the compat ib i l is t w i l l have to say that what C N C contro l attacks is the agent'ร 
ownersh ip over what they do. I bo r row the term ownership f r o m Fischer, and i t is m y 
preferred te rm, but others are referr ing to essentially the same cond i t ion when they ta lk 
about at t r ibutabi l i ty or autonomy. The un i t ing idea is that in some sense the agent's act 
does not t ru ly belong to them in C N C cases. 
W e have seen in previous chapters that this is a condi t ion that incompat ib i l is ts pr ize too 
- i t is one part o f the story behind PAP. Bu t jus t as there is disagreement over whether 
compat ib i l i s t contro l is adequate for mora l responsibi l i ty , so too there is r o o m for 
disagreement over whether determin ism provides circumstances i n w h i c h we can have a 
suitable f o r m o f ownership over what we do. In what fo l l ows I w i l l consider var ious 
compat ib i l i s t accounts o f ownership, and w i l l find them al l want ing . 
4.4 Hierarchical Accounts of Ownership 
A boundary cond i t ion on an acceptable account o f ' ownersh ip ' must be that i t is 
inconsistent w i t h being subject to C N C contro l . For a compat ib i l is t has to be able to say 
that the reason C N C control subverts responsibi l i ty is that it v iolates the ownersh ip 
cond i t ion . 
I n th is section I w i l l argue that acknowledg ing this point rules out what are k n o w n as 
I t m i g h t be suggested that wha t rea l l y concerns us abou t C N C c o n t r o l is the t h o u g h t that w e are sub jec t 
t o the m a n i p u l a n o n ร o f those w h o do no t have ou r best interests at heart. I n o ther w o r d s , i t is no t that w e 
are C N C c o n t r o l l e d that is the p r o b l e m , but ra ther that C N C con t ro l l e r s are u n l i k e l y t o have ou r best 
interests at hear t ( W a l l e r 1988, p ' 165) . 
H o w e v e r , th is is u n c o n v i n c i n g fo r t w o reasons. F i r s t l y , it is no t o b v i o u s h o w th is d is t ingu ishes C N C 
c o n t r o l from d e t e r m i n i s m . A f t e r a l l , i n w h a t sense does nature have our best interests at hear t? W h y , in 
o ther w o r d s , s h o u l d n ' t ou r concerns about d e t e r m i n i s m be exac t l y a k i n t o ou r concerns abou t C N C 
c o n t r o l ? Second l y , w e are l i k e l y t o fee l C N C subver ts r espons ib i l i t y even w h e n i t has been exerc ised i n 
o u r interests. A f t e r a l l , the re f l ec t i on that a benevo len t G o d is c o n t r o l l i n g a l l tha t w e do is s t i l l , t o mos t o f 
us, o b j e c t i o n a b l e . K a n e uses a m o r e prosa ic bu t t e l l i n g e x a m p l e : 
T h e p r o b l e m o f b e n i g n C N C c o n t r o l is also ev iden t in the case o f c h i l d r e n w h o m a y k n o w that 
t he i r parents are w e l l - i n t e n t i o n e d t o w a r d t h e m , ye t they resent parenta l a u t o n o m y a n y w a y . A s 
they reach the i r m a t u r i t y the c h i l d r e n w a n t some th i ng ove r and above the r e m o v a l o f fear that 
the i r parents w i l l choose Dadly f o r t h e m . T h e y w a n t an a u t o n o m y and d i g n i t y that they associate 
w i t h the p o w e r to run the i r o w n l i ves , to m a k e and take r espons ib i l i t y f o r t he i r o w n cho ices 
even at the expense o f m a k i n g mis takes and b e i n g worse o f f than i f t hey had let t he i r parents 
run the i r l i ves. ( 1 9 9 6 , p. 69 ) 
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hierarchical accounts o f ownership o f the k i nd associated w i t h Frankfur t , Watson and 
Tay lor (Frankfur t 1971; Watson 1975; Tay lor 1976). Acco rd ing to a hierarchical 
account what matters is that the agent has first order desires that are endorsed by their 
second order desires; Jones wants to do X , and he wants to want to do X . I n this case we 
have the appropriate mesh between f i rst and second order desires, and as such Jones can 
be said to have ownership over his do ing X . He has secured " the con fo rmi ty o f his w i l l 
to his second-order vo l i t i ons " (Frankfur t 1971， p. 16). Th is is to be contrasted w i t h cases 
i n w h i c h an agent has a f irst order desire that is not endorsed by a second order desire. 
Jones m igh t want a cigarette, but not want to want a cigarette. In these k inds o f case 
Jones's w i l l is not free, for Jones does not take ownership o f what he is do ing . F rom 
Jones'ร perspective his subsequent smok ing is go ing to str ike h i m as being as m u c h 
something that is happening to h i m , as something that he is do ing. Th is is h o w things 
appear when f i rst and second order desires are not al igned. Y o u do things that you want 
to do, but y o u do not want to want the things y o u want. O n this hierarchical v i e w 
ownersh ip is about internal harmony between one's first and second order desires (and 
however many other orders o f desires one has). W e can see h o w this k i nd o f v i e w is 
o f ten ef fect ive at de l iver ing the correct verdict about v ic t ims o f bra inwashing, addicts, 
obsessions, phobias and other neuroses. For though such people m igh t do what they 
want , they w i l l typ ica l ly not second order endorse their first order wants. The 
agoraphobic does not want to go out, but they do want to want to go outside. 
W e should , I th ink , agree that this k i nd o f analysis is ins ight fu l and something that a f u l l 
account o f ownership needs to include. A plausible account o f responsib i l i ty must 
invo lve " the ab i l i ty to step back and ask ourselves whether or not we should act on our 
var ious mot ivat ions and desires; to attain some cr i t ica l distance f r o m them and choose 
w h i c h to endorse, rather than act ing on them unref lect ive ly and accepting them 
uncr i t i ca l l y " ( B o k 2003, p. 162). Nevertheless the abi l i ty to act on our second order 
desires cannot constitute a fu l l account o f the k i nd o f ownership required for 
responsibil i ty^^ For the prob lem is s imp ly that the g lobal C N C contro l ler can see to i t 
that the agent second-order endorses al l that they do. For whether the appropriate mesh 
between f i rst and second order desires is a matter o f the current t ime slice propert ies o f 
the agentas mechanism, and has noth ing to do w i t h h o w the mesh came to obtain -
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noth ing , i n other words, to do w i t h its history. So, i f second-order endorsement is the 
f u l l story about ownership it w i l l fa i l to preclude global covert cont ro l . 
I f we came to [secure con fo rmi ty between second and first order desires] not by 
our o w n efforts but by bra inwashing or being manipulated by a cul t leader, or 
condi t ioned by behavioural engineers, or g iven a power fu l mind-a l ter ing drug, 
we migh t be satisfied w i t h the w i l l we had, but w o u l d lack autonomy. (Kane 
1996, p. 64) 
Har ry Frankfur t has h imse l f struggled w i t h the issue o f ownership. He has suggested 
that in a C N C case where a C N C control ler cont inuously manipulates an agent - so a 
case o f local C N C control - then the agent'ร responsibi l i ty is subverted for the f o l l o w i n g 
reason: 
[T ]he subject is not a person at a l l . H is history is ut ter ly episodic and w i thou t 
inherent connectedness. Whatever ident i f iable themes i t may reveal are not 
internal ly rooted; they cannot be understood as const i tu t ion or be longing to the 
subject 's o w n nature. Rather, they are prov ided gratui tously by an agency 
external to the subject. (1988, p. 53) 
However , i n a case o f g lobal C N C manipu la t ion , where the agent is p rov ided w i t h a 
stable character Frankfur t holds that the agent is mora l l y responsible for what he 
subsequently does, prov ided that he identi f ies " h imse l f w i t h some o f his o w n second-
order desires, so that they re not merely desires that he happens to have or to f i nd w i t h i n 
h imsel f , but desires that he adopts or puts h imse l f beh ind " (Frankfur t 1988, p. 53). 
I n the first case, Frankfur t seems to be supposing that local C N C manipu la t ion w i l l 
necessarily result i n a discordant agent history w i thou t connectedness. Th is is false. 
N o t h i n g prevents a local C N C control ler manipu la t ing an agent i n a way that preserves 
or cont inues or even br ings the "con t inu i ty and in te l l i g ib i l i t y essential to being a person" 
(1988, p. 53). Furthermore, by Frankfur t ' s o w n l ights his judgement regarding the 
agent 'ร responsibi l i ty in this k i nd o f case is not warranted. As Ha j i puts i t , " [ t ] he fact 
51 T h o s e w h o accept the p o w e r o f r e f l e c t i o n associated w h i c h h ie ra rch i ca l accounts m a k e cen t ra ! i n c l u d e ; 
N e e l y 1974 ; Benson 1987; Ger t and D u g g a n 1979; Dav i s 1979; Y o u n g 1979 ; Z i m m e r m a n 1 9 8 1 ; T a y l o r 
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that ident i f icat ion is not ' i n te rna l l y roo ted" is irrelevant, g iven a history insensit ive 
v i e w o f the sort o f agency presupposed by responsibi l i ty , to the status o f an agent as a 
person. Frankfur t 'ร remarks that the v i c t im ' s hav ing "no character or disposi t ions o f his 
own" (emphasis added) undercut his o w n v iew that one " m a k e s " one's desires one* ร 
own by ident i f y ing w i t h them, on the supposi t ion that ident i f ica t ion is h istory 
insens i t ive" (2002, p. 134). 
No te also that an agent's h is to iy m igh t be "episodic and w i thou t inherent 
connectedness" natural ly and not as a result o f manipu la t ion. It is not at al l obv ious that 
such an agent wou ld fa i l to be responsible for the decisions they actual ly make where 
contro l condi t ions are satisfied (as, by hypothesis, they are). I t is t rue, that there is room 
for disagreement here. His tor ica l ly Hume held that an agent " i s not answerable for 
[ immora l acts i f ] they proceeded f r o m noth ing in h i m , that is durable and constant" 
(1955, p. 98). There must come a point where a lack o f ' inherent connectedness' w o u l d 
lead to a lack o f responsibi l i ty. Bu t the fact remains that C N C cont ro l is not essential ly 
related to hav ing an episodic history that lacks connectedness, and we do not always 
consider a lack o f connectedness to subvert responsibi l i ty ( i f an agent acts out of 
character for instance, we st i l l m igh t consider them b lamewor thy , p rov ided w e th ink 
that they contro l led what they d id suf f ic ient ly ) . Th is makes i t far more natural to 
conclude that the agent's responsibi l i ty is subverted in this k i nd o f case because they are 
subject to C N C cont ro l , and not for reasons to do w i t h the stabi l i ty o f the agent's 
character.^^ 
I n the second case, Frankfur t 'ร point is that it does not matter h o w one came to be the 
way that one is. I f one ident i f ies w i t h the way that one is, one is responsible - for one 
has taken responsibi l i ty. I th ink this sounds ha l f -way plausible on ly i f man ipu la t ion is 
assumed to have taken place at the first order level and the agent comes to second-order 
endorse what is go ing on at that level (even here I th ink our in tu i t ions are not clear). 
1976 ; D w o r k i n 1970 & 1988; V e l l e m a n 1989 ; Z i m m e r m a n 1989; K a p i t a n 1 9 8 9 ; Kane 1996 p. 66 . 
5 2 1 say that the agent w o u l d be respons ib le whe re the i r d i scordan t character had been acqu i r ed as a resu l t 
o f a na tu ra l process, bu t needless to say Ī m a i n t a i n that in de te rm in i s t i c set t ings th is w o u l d no t be so. T h a t 
p re judges the o u t c o m e o f the a rguments I present here, so í ฝ ๒ ^ f o r the sake o f a rgumen t that 
de tenฑ in i sm does no t unde rm ine respons ib i l i t y un t i l w e have reason to t h i n k o the rw ise . 
53 N o t e also that even i f th is were s o m e h o w p r e c l u d e d , the resu l t i ng v i e w is s t i l l qu i te una t t rac t i ve . Fo r 
imag ine that the man ipu la ted agent real ises that the i r v o l i t i o n s have been ex te rna l l y i m p l a n t e d , but 
never the less " i d e n t i f i e s " w i t h t h e m , then o n th is v i e w the agent is respons ib le . It is charac te r is t i c o f the 
h i e ra r ch i ca l m o d e l o f o w n e r s h i p that " a c t i n g f r ee l y . . . is a mat ter o f r e s i g n i n g and adap t i ng onese l f to 
necess i t y " ( Z i m m e n ฑ a n 2 0 0 0 , p. 2 5 ) . 
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Bu t no th ing prevents the C N C manipulator f r o m hav ing engineered at the second order 
level too (Ha j i 2002, p. 135). In other words , the manipulator has designed the agent i n 
such a way as to ensure that they w i l l second-order endorse the way that they are and 
take responsibi l i ty . 
[ Y ] o u cou ld imagine any degree o f reflectiveness and self-awareness you w ish . 
Y o u may imagine persons so sophisticated that they are th ink ing about the 
appropriateness o f their four th - or f i f t h ― or twent ie th -o rde r desires. A n d yet 
they s t i l l m igh t be C N C contro l led by more sophist icated beings who have 
manipulated their highest order desires. ( A t the very highest level o f 
sophist icat ion one m igh t imagine God do ing the cont ro l l ing , since the problems 
posed by C N C contro l have their theological соипЇефаіІ8 i n problems o f d iv ine 
predestinat ion or foreordinat ion.) (Kane 1996, p. 66) 
Thus i t does not matter h o w many levels one adds, or h o w compl icated one makes the 
set-up, one can always introduce a more sophisticated C N C control ler to deal w i t h the 
extra compl ica t ion . There is no way o f ' bu i l d i ng ' one's way out o f this p rob lem by 
mak ing person's ever more reflective.^^ 
I t is suφ r i s i ng h o w many phi losophers seem to th ink that the subject ive ' t ak i ng ' o f 
responsibi l i ty is relevant to the question o f whether one actual ly is responsible. We see 
that Frankfur t th inks that this is important , but so do Fischer and Ravizza, H a j i , and G. 
Strawson. Yet i t seems to me ent irely irrelevant for t w o reasons. First for the reason 
g iven above: our mental act o f ' tak ing responsib i l i ty ' is as susceptible to C N C 
manipu la t ion as anyth ing else. Second, because we can fa i l to take responsib i l i ty , yet 
s t i l l be mora l l y responsible. Th is can be i l lustrated in the f o l l o w i n g way. Mos t o f us, i f 
we came to bel ieve that we were subject to C N C man ipu la t ion , w o u l d not take 
responsibi l i ty . Imagine that, tak ing this on board, some o f us decide that because we 
n o w have an excuse for al l that we do, there is no reason not to behave appal l ingly. W e 
du ly do so. W e then discover new evidence w h i c h suggests that we are not subject to 
C N C contro l after a l l . I have the in tu i t ion here that we are mora l l y responsible for those 
I t is no t even c lear h o w re f lec t i veness even begins to he lp ( w h i c h is ce r t a i n l y no t t o say that 
re f lec t i veness is no t r equ i r ed f o r r espons ib i l i t y ) . A s K a n e notes, " s o m e t i m e s re f l ec t i ve persons are 
suscept ib le to m a n i p u l a t i o n p rec i se l y because they are re f l ec t i ve , so l o n g as others k n o w enough to p red i c t 
the l ines the i r r e f l ec t i on w i l l t a k e " ( 1 9 9 6 , pp . 6 6 - 6 7 ) . 
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acts that we commi t ted wh i ls t be l iev ing ourselves to be subject to C N C contro l . In other 
words , I have the in tu i t ion that the be l ie f i n C N C contro l does not prov ide one w i t h an 
excuse. I f th is is right i t br ings out the object ive d imension to free w i l l and mora l 
responsib i l i ty . Whether one acts freely is not a matter determined solely by focussing on 
the agent's subject ive states. For there is no di f ference, in terms o f subject ive states, 
between someone who has the jus t i f i ed but false be l ie f that they are subject to C N C 
contro l and someone who has the jus t i f i ed true be l ie f that they are subject to such 
cont ro l . Ye t there is a di f ference in their free w i l l and mora l responsibi l i ty.^^ 
4.5 H i s t o r i c a l Accoun ts 
Given what has been said so far, i t looks as i f a compat ib i l is t account o f ownersh ip is 
go ing to have to be histor ical . It is go ing to have to make i t matter h o w the agent came 
to be the way they are, and not jus t focus on h o w the agent is now. B y mak ing certain 
h is tor ica l facts important , this brings i n an object ive d imension. W i t h this i n m i n d we 
can n o w look at the compat ib i l 
Fischer and Ravizza give a histor ical account o f ownership according to w h i c h 
ownersh ip is achieved as a result o f go ing through a certain process in w h i c h the agent 
comes to " take respons ib i l i ty " for their mechanism (1998, p. 200) . A s Fischer explains: 
[O ]ท the approach to compat ib i l i sm I favour, one looks carefu l ly at the history o f 
the behaviour in question. I f there is unconsented-to covert man ipu la t ion o f 
certain sorts, this can be the sort o f h istor ical factor that rules out mora l 
responsib i l i ty . O n my approach, one demands that the behaviour issue f r o m the 
agent 'ร o w n suitably reason-sensitive mechanism. That is, the agent must - i n a 
speci f ied sense - have "ownersh ip " o f the process that leads to the behav iour . . . 
These condi t ions are not met in the object ionable cases o f [ C N C con t ro l ] , and 
yet I w o u l d argue that they can be met in a context o f mere causal determinat ion. 
I f I am r i g h t here, t hen th is b r ings ou t s o m e t h i n g else too . E v e n i f w e be l ieve that w e are sub jec t to C N C 
c o n t r o l , i t r ema ins ra t iona l to con t i nue as if one is no t , j u s t in case one 's b e l i e f is fa lse. A n d the same 
ho lds t rue w i t h respect to the t r u th o f d e t e r m i n i s m . T h e i n c o m p a t i b i l i s t has g o o d reason to con t i nue as if 
d e t e r m i n i s m is fa lse, even ๒ the face o f g o o d ev idence fo r its t r u t h , f o r it IS a lways possible that one ' s 
b e l i e f is fa lse - and it w o u l d a f f o r d one no excuse i f th is t u rned ou t to be the case. 1 w i l l say m o r e abou t 
th i s in the f i n a l chapter , in a sect ion whe re I t u rn a t ten t ion to the ' ex i s tence ' ques t ion a n d the re la t i ve 
u n l i k e l i h o o d o f i n c o m p a t i b i l i s t free w i l l . Fo r the t ime b e i n g i t is enough that we note h o w C N C cases 
d r a w a t ten t i on to the fac t that free w i l l has an objective d i m e n s i o n . 
(Fischer 2003b, p. 203) 
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Fischer and Ravizza out l ine three necessary and suf f ic ient condi t ions for tak ing 
responsib i l i ty or achieving ownership. The first t w o stipulate that tak ing responsibi l i ty 
invo lves first coming to see oneself ''as an agent" (1998, p. 208; pp. 2 1 0 - 2 1 1 ; p. 238) . 
That is to say that we see ourselves as being agents o f change 一 as b r ing ing about certain 
outcomes in the wo r l d . Once one sees oneself as an agent the way is clear for us to 
satisfy the second cond i t ion w h i c h involves seeing ourselves as "a fair target for the 
reactive attitudes as a result o f how [we exercise] this agency in certain contexts" 
(Fischer and Ravizza 1998， p. 211). As has been pointed out earlier, these are the k inds 
o f condi t ions that cou ld be satisfied by way o f covert manipu la t ion. N o t h i n g prevents a 
sophist icated enough control ler engineering us such that we w o u l d go through this 
process. It is the th i rd cond i t ion w h i c h is supposed to rule this out: " the cluster o f bel iefs 
speci f ied by the f i rst two condi t ions must be based, in an appropriate way, on the 
ind iv idua l ' s ev idence" (1998, p. 238), So, the agent must "have a certain k i n d o f v i e w o f 
h imsel f , in order to be mora l l y responsible for his behaviour" , he must "see h imse l f as 
an agent who is an appropriate candidate for the reactive at t i tudes" (1998， pp. 220-3 ; p. 
229) . 
Bu t as Russell points out, " [ a ] t this cr i t ical juncture , however, the argument . . . seems to 
run out o f l ine... the reader is asked to accept that there is an in tu i t ive d is t inc t ion 
between appropriate and inappropriate ways that an agent comes to see h imse l f as an 
agent and a fa i r target o f reactive at t i tudes" (2002a, p. 598), Fischer and Rav izza s imp ly 
insist that " the relevant not ion o f appropriateness must remain unanalyzed" (1998， p. 
236). Nevertheless they feel conf ident that we can agree that i t is appropriate that what 
one does can be determined by natural forces, but not by the ar t i f ic ia l forces 
encapsulated by covert control lers o f various kinds. 
56 F i sche r ' s c l a i m that ' unconsen ted - to m a n i p u l a t i o n ' poses the p r o b l e m is m i s l e a d i n g . A l t h o u g h the 
c o n t r o l in ques t ion is unconsen ted- to , i t i nvo l ves the i m p l a n t a t i o n o f the consen t -enab l i ng m e c h a n i s m . T o 
th is ex tent the a l te rna t ive - that one 's mechan ism be acqu i red by some na tura l process 一 IS also no t one to 
w h i c h the agent c o u l d consent . T h e o n l y poss ib le w a y in w h i c h such consent c o u l d be ach ieved is post the 
process in ques t ion . T h e cover t con t ro l l e r c o u l d have so eng ineered th ings such that one w o u l d , 
re t rospec t i ve l y consent t o the i m p l a n t a t i o n process. T a l k o f consent is there fore u n h e l p f u l , f o r it i m p l i e s 
that the p r o b l e m stems from the agent 's i nab i l i t y t o c o n t r o l the process b y w h i c h they c o m e to acqu i re 
the i r reason- respons ive m e c h a n i s m , and i t is no t an o p t i o n f o r a c o m p a t i b i l i s t to see the p r o b l e m in th is 
w a y . I f they d i d , they w o u l d have to presuppose that c o n t r o l is p r i o r to o w n e r s h i p , and th is w o u l d o n l y 
ru le ou t cove r t c o n t r o l o f the type in quest ion i f the agent is p resupposed to have some k i n d o f l i be r ta r i an 
c o n t r o l . 
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A s an attempt to c i rcumvent the p rob lem o f covert contro l Fischer and Rav izza 'ร 
account comes down to the c la im that covert contro l undermines mora l responsib i l i ty , 
but determinat ion by nature does not. They jus t want us to see that one robs the agent o f 
ownership wh i ls t the other does not. U l t imate ly the condi t ions they out l ine do not 
exp la in why this is so and we jus t have an appeal to our in tu i t ions on the crucia l issue 
we want expla ined. Th is , I bel ieve, is not go ing to be persuasive to anyone not already 
convinced o f the t ru th o f compat ib i l i sm. So, to the legi t imate concern about the relevant 
di f ference between C N C contro l and causal determin ism Fischer and Ravizza have 
noth ing to say. 
4.6 Denne t t 
I w i l l n o w consider Dennett 'ร a p p r o a c h . D e n n e t t asks us to d is t inguish between 
contro l by purposeful agents, and determinat ion by nature. He then insists that i t is this 
d is t inc t ion w h i c h explains w h y in cases o f covert contro l the agent is not mora l l y 
responsible. W h e n an agent is subject to covert contro l they are subject to someone 
else's project: the project o f a pui-poseful agent. I f they had instead been subject on ly to 
natural determination then, because nature has no риф08Є, they would not have been 
subject to cont ro l . 
In response, f i rs t ly I believe the d is t inct ion Dennett draws to be ho l l ow . A s Kane points 
out, when i t comes to 'const ra in ing ' cont ro l , i t makes no di f ference to m y f reedom 
whether I am constrained by natural forces, or by a purposefu l , cont ro l l ing , agent. I t 
makes no di f ference to my f reedom, for instance, whether the w i n d s lammed the door 
shut lock ing me in the room, or whether Larry d id . So it is odd, to say the least, that 
57 Denne t t i n i t i a l l y t r ies to do w h a t I have j u s t d i sm issed as d o o m e d to fa i l u re above . N a m e l y he argue that 
as l o n g as the agen t ' ร c o n t r o l m e c h a n i s m is o f c o m p l e x i t y su f f i c i en t f o r " s e l f m o n i t o r i n g " then it w i l l be 
ab le to detect a n d undo " t h e process o f c o n d i t i o n i n g " (Denne t t 1984, p p . 3 3 - 3 4 ) . H o w t h o u g h , w h e n the 
c o n t r o l l e r w i l l have c o n t r o l l e d the f o r m this s e l f - m o n i t o r i n g w i l l take? Denne t t is here t r y i n g to ' b u i l d ' h is 
w a y out o f t r o u b l e . I have a l ready said wha t I w a n t to about those w h o t r y to do th is and so ignore th is 
aspect o f D e n n e t t ' s approach here. 
58 I find it o d d that Denne t t shou ld have any p r o b l e m w i t h C N C m a n i p u l a t i o n at a l l . Fo r Denne t t is a 
u t i l i t a r i an abou t respons ib i l i t y . I n o ther wo rds , he re jects that w e ever t r u l y deserve pra ise o r b l a m e , 
pun i shmen t o r desert . Rather ou r b l a m i n g and p ra i s i ng prac t ices are j u s t abou t a t tempts to manipulate one 
ano the r i n to c o n f o r m i n g to s tandards w h i c h ， in genera l , w i l l m a x i m i s e u t i l i t y . I n o the r w o r d s , D e n n e t t 
t h i n k s w e should be m a n i p u l a t e d , and that th is is w h a t ou r pract ices are a l l about ( w i t h the p r o v i s o that o u r 
prac t ices m i g h t need r e v i s i n g in o rder that we shou ld be m a n i p u l a t e d m o r e e f f e c t i v e l y ) (see Denne t t 1984 
esp. pp . 139 -144 ; and a lso Russel l 2 0 0 2 b fo r e labo ra t i on o f th is po in t , pp . 2 4 6 - 2 4 7 ) . 
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what is ent i rely irrelevant when it comes to constraining contro l should make such a 
s igni f icant d i f ference when it comes to C N C contro l . Th is is a po in t that Kane has made 
nicely be low: 
Y o u r power or f reedom to run or dance is no less impai red i f you are paralysed 
by natural causes than i f some other agent is ho ld ing you down . In each case, the 
s igni f icant th ing is that you cannot do something you want to do. It is true that 
you migh t feel resentment against your purposeful control lers, whereas 
resentment is misplaced against natural forces. . . N o w , i f the d is t inc t ion between 
С С contro l and mere determinat ion by natural causes does not make a di f ference 
i n our powers, when the results are the same, why should the d is t inc t ion between 
C N C contro l and mere determinat ion by natural causes make a di f ference in or 
powers, when the results are also the same? (Kane 1996, p. 68) 
Bu t secondly, I bel ieve that there is another way to put pressure on the s igni f icance o f 
Dennet t 'ร d is t inct ion. I ron ica l ly , the way in question involves using that favour i te too l 
o f compatibilists: the Frankfurt-Style case. 
I argued i n the previous chapter that t radi t ional Frankfurt-Style cases do not wo rk . 
However , I argued that Frankfurt-Style cases cannot show an incompatibilist that 
alternative possibi l i t ies are not needed for responsibi l i ty , because the Frankfurt-Style 
case has to assume determinism. But nothing I argued suggested that Frankfurt-Style 
cases do not w o r k for compat ib i l is ts. Furthermore, I d id a l l ow that Fischer 'ร vers ion 
worked to some degree - it presents some challenge to the idea that we need path-
p i ck ing cont ro l . That is enough for my argument here. Note also that nearly al l the 
compat ib i l is ts I take myse l f to be addressing here 一 so Dennett , Frankfur t , Fischer and 
Ravizza, H a j i - a l l th ink that Frankfurt-Style cases work . So my argument w i l l have bite 
against them. 
Consider first a standard case o f g lobal C N C contro l . Imagine a society o f the future i n 
w h i c h there has been suf f ic ient scient i f ic progress that i t is n o w possible to 'const ruct ' a 
human foetus, and to implant relevant act ional elements. I t is possible, g iven the 
extraordinary amount o f in fo rmat ion these engineers have, to ensure that the constructed 
foetus w i l l develop into a certain k ind o f person. In fact, the engineers can fine-tune to 
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the extent that al l o f the agent'ร future actions can be ensured. I n other words , i f , say, 
they want someone to per fo rm action X， in circumstances ร at t ime է in twenty years 
t ime, they can engineer a foetus so that it w i l l develop into a person w h o , at t ime t, w i l l 
be in circumstances s, and w i l l per fo rm act X . 
For many, inc lud ing myse l f and inc lud ing many compat ib i l is ts , our in tu i t ions are that 
such Globa l C N C control subverts responsibi l i ty. However , as we have seen, the 
compat ib i l is ts want to say that i f Global C N C control had been absent, and the foetuses 
had developed natural ly, then free w i l l responsibi l i ty w o u l d be in pr inc ip le possible for 
the adults that develop f rom such foetuses. 
Bu t now consider that exact ly the same technology that allows the brave new w o r l d 
engineers to ensure that their constructed foetuses develop in the r ight k i n d o f persons, 
also a l lows the engineers to tel l what k i n d o f a person a natural ly occurr ing foetus w i l l 
develop into. For reasons to do w i t h costs, these engineers prefer to deal w i t h natural ly 
occurr ing foetuses rather than construct ing them f rom scratch. What happens is that the 
engineers mon i to r the natural foetuses, and i f they see that a foetus is go ing to develop 
into the r ight k i nd o f person (a person who w i n do a l l the things they want them to at 
appropriate points) then they do not bother intervening. Compare t w o adults, Larry and 
D a v i d , both o f w h o m are ident ical in al l o f their character traits and other t ime-s l ice 
propert ies, but on ly one o f w h o m - Larry - was subject to active intervent ion on the part 
o f the genetic engineers. Dav id had natural ly been jus t as the control lers wanted h i m to 
be， and so in tervent ion had not been necessary. 
I n this k i n d o f case, the compat ib i l is t w o u l d have to say that Larry is not responsible, 
wh i l s t D a v i d is. Not ice that in Dav id ' s case he has been subject to a g lobal vers ion o f a 
Frankfurt-sty!e case. B y hypothesis, the intervener in a Frankfurt-Style case is irrelevant 
to an assessment o f an agent'ร responsibi l i ty , p rov ided the intervener does not actual ly 
intervene. Bu t the only di f ference between the case in w h i c h a l l the foetuses are 
manipu la ted, and the case in wh i ch they are not, is that i n one case we have act ive C N C 
cont ro l , wh i l s t i n the other the contro l is passive. 
Bu t now we can see that what explains w h y the agents are mora l l y responsible when 
passively g lobal ly contro l led but not when act ively g lobal ly contro l led cannot now be 
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being part o f someone else's project. B o t h Lar ry and D a v i d are as much part o f someone 
else'ร project. Dav id may set his o w n ends, but the control lers a l lowed this on ly because 
Dav id ' s ends accorded w i t h what they wanted for Dav id . In this respect there is no 
relevant di f ference here between passive and active covert cont ro l . A f t e r a l l , i f the 
covert cont ro l is act ive i t is st i l l the case that you set your o w n ends in the compat ib i l is t 
sense, for the control lers w i l l be sett ing their ends v ia your contro l mechanism. So, 
whatever the relevant di f ference is between active and passive covert cont ro l w h i c h 
explains why ( f r o m the compat ib i l i s ťs l ights) D a v i d is responsible wh i l s t Lar ry is not, i t 
cannot p laus ib ly be anyth ing to do w i t h being part o f someone else's project. So, we 
should reject Dennett 'ร explanation. Frankfurt-Style cases strongly suggest that it is 
i rrelevant that one is part o f someone else's project. I f active g lobal covert cont ro l 
undermines mora l responsibi l i ty it must do so for some other reason. 
I f we return to the di f ference between active and passive g lobal cover cont ro l I suggest 
that the most obvious explanat ion o f w h y the active variety undermines mora l 
responsib i l i ty wh i l s t the passive does not is that active involves causal determinat ion o f 
the agent's w i l l . I n other words, what jeopardises ownership is be ing determined, 
whether by nature or covert control ler. So Frankfurt-sty le cases, far f r o m support ing 
compat ib i l i sm, can actual ly be used to h igh l igh t the prob lem o f C N C cont ro l . 
Here is another way to make the same point . In a standard Frankfurt-Style case the 
counterfactual intervener models one aspect o f determin ism. The counterfactual 
intervener, as w i t h determin ism, rules out alternative possibiUties. N o w , the 
counterfactual intervener passively covert ly controls the agent i n the actual sequence, 
but by hypothesis their presence is irrelevant to the agent,s mora l responsibi l i ty . 
However , i f this intervener had intervened, their presence w o u l d be relevant to the 
agent's mora l responsib i l i ty ― they w o u l d undermine the agent's mora l responsibi l i ty . 
Bu t what has changed? W e l l , rather than passive covert contro l we have act ive covert 
cont ro l . So, passive covert control does not undermine mora l responsib i l i ty , but active 
does. The relevant di f ference between passive and active C N C contro l is that one 
involves the determinat ion o f the agent's w i l l wh i ls t the other does not. 
M y po in t above then is that jus t as the counterfactual contro l ler i n a Frankfurt-Style case 
models one aspect o f determin ism ― namely the fact that it ext inguishes our alternative 
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possib iüt ies - the active control ler be seen as mode l l i ng the other aspect o f de termin ism, 
namely antecedent determinat ion. 
4.7 H a r d C o m p a t i b i l i s m 
M y arguments in this chapter w i l l w o r k only on those compat ib i l is ts who accept that 
be ing subject to C N C contro l undermines one's free w i l l and mora l responsibi l i ty . Th is 
is most compat ib i l is ts , however, there are exceptions. Hobbes is probably the most 
famous compat ib i l i s t who held the hard l ine. Hobbes bel ieved that G o d controls al l that 
we do, and that this does not threaten our free w i l l . As Kane puts i t on Hobbes 's behalf, 
' [ ร ] i n c e we do not k n o w what God has predestined us to do, we must go on del iberat ing 
about the best way to l ive anyway, jus t as i f God had not predestined us . . . [ t ]he on ly 
f reedom we can have, Hobbes says, is the f reedom to do what we w i l l , and this f reedom 
we can have even i f we are predest ined" (Kane 1996, p. 67). Bu t there have been more 
recent advocates o f this bi te-the-bul let approach. 
Ferdinand Schoeman is one such compat ib i l is t . Regarding Globa l man ipu la t ion 
Schoeman holds that the agent who has had their entire reason-responsive mechanism 
ar t i f i c ia l l y implanted is st i l l mora l ly responsible for their subsequent decisions and 
choices. He says: 
I have been main ta in ing that even in the event o f g lobal man ipu la t ion , the person 
altered is every bi t as responsible for his subsequent behaviour as is the mode l 
on w h i c h he is moulded.. . So long as a person has the capacity to th ink and act 
on the basis o f relevant reasons, he is responsible for his subsequent behaviour. 
(Schoeman 1978: p. 296) 
Schoeman's argument is that there is no "c r i te r ion that dist inguishes induced f r o m 
natural desires that is relevant to the responsib i l i ty /non responsibi l i ty issue" (1978, p. 
295) . Because he starts out as a compat ib i l is t about mora l responsib i l i ty he sees the lack 
o f an adequate cr i ter ion as imp l y i ng that g lobal manipu la t ion must be compat ib le w i t h 
mora l responsibi l i ty . 
Despite s t ruggl ing w i t h the issue o f C N C cont ro l , Harry Frankfur t also concedes that i f a 
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manipu la tor succeeds i n p rov id ing a person w i t h a new character, then " [ t ] ha t person is 
then mora l l y responsible for the choices and the conduct to w h i c h hav ing the character 
leads" ： 
We are inevi tabiy fashioned and sustained, after a l l , by circumstances over 
w h i c h we have no contro l . The causes to w h i c h we are subject may also change 
us radical ly, w i thout thereby br ing ing i t about that we are not mora l l y 
responsible agents. It is İՄelevant whether those causes are operat ing by v i r tue 
o f the natural forces that shape our envi ronment or whether they operate through 
the deUberate manipulat ive designs o f other human agents. (Frankfur t 2002) 
I agree w i t h Schoeman and Frankfur t that there is no "adequate c r i t e r i on " o f ownersh ip 
that w o u l d d is t inguish between determin ism and covert contro l . That is precisely what I 
have been arguing here, and what I have c la imed Frankfurt-Style cases help h igh l ight . 
Bu t , as is clear, I see this as imp ly ing that determin ism undermines mora l responsib i l i ty 
as surely as covert contro l does. I f a compat ib i l is t jus t wants to d ig their heels in and 
insist that g lobal man ipu la t ion is not a p rob lem then there probably is not much that I 
can say to them. There isn ' t anything ľ d want to say - for as far as I am concerned it is a 
boundary cond i t ion on an adequate theory o f free w i l l that i t rules out responsib i l i ty i n 
manipu la t ion cases. I bel ieve that a posi t ion on free w i l l and responsibi l i ty that fai ls to 
f u l f i l this cond i t ion , is go ing to have an extremely hard t ime sel l ing i tse l f to any not 
already fu l l y commi t ted to it. 
4.8 C o n c l u s i o n 
I n the last chapter I argued that Frankfurt-Style cases do not consti tute a successful 
challenge to PAP. However , I a l lowed that Fischer 's version cast some smal l doubt on 
whether path-p ick ing contro l is needed for responsibi l i ty. Wh i l s t that does take some o f 
the heat out o f the luck-ob jec t ion, I have argued in this chapter that compat ib i l i sm faces 
another challenge. Namely , i t has to show that i t can prov ide an adequate account o f 
' ownersh ip ' . In c o m m o n w i t h others I have argued above that cases i nvo l v i ng C N C 
man ipu la t ion subvert responsibi l i ty and strongly impl icate determin ism as the real 
cu lpr i t . I have also brought to attent ion the way i n w h i c h Frankfurt-Style cases 
themselves can be turned against the compat ib i l is ts and help impl icate determin ism as 
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the root problem-
The arguments I have made suggest that the real p rob lem w i t h determin ism may not be 
that i t deprives us o f path-p ick ing contro l (and thereby exposes us to u l t imate l uck ) , but 
cou ld be more to do w i t h depr iv ing us o f ownership over what we do - the k i n d o f 
ownership that we see C N C contro l depr iv ing us of. Th is is jus t an in te r im conclus ion. 
A s I pointed out in the previous chapter, Fischer 'ร Frankfurt-Style case is hardly 
decisive, and so we are a long way short o f being able to dismiss the requirement for 
path-p ick ing contro l . It may be that indetermin ism cannot prov ide the k i n d o f protect ion 
against C N C contro l required for ownership. What we migh t say is that at this po in t we 
do have good reason not to be compat ib i l is ts , but we do not yet k n o w whether 




Indeterinínisiท and Control : I 
In the previous three chapters m y concern was w i t h compat ib i l i sm and the impl ica t ions 
o f de termin ism for free w i l l . I argued that there were t w o pr inc ip le concerns about 
determin ism. Fi rst ly , i f determin ism is true, then a l though we can st i l l be said to 
exercise contro l over what we do, u l t imate ly everything we do turns out to be a matter 
o f luck ― our c i rcumstant ia l and const i tut ive luck. Th is fuels the thought that what we 
need fo r responsib i l i ty is something more than compat ib i l is ts cont ro l : we need a type o f 
contro l that can clear some k ind o f luck-free footho ld . W e can cal l this the luck 
ob ject ion against compat ib i l i sm. The second concern was to do w i t h hav ing 
independence f r o m the past and ownership over what we do. Cases i nvo l v i ng C N C 
contro l drew attent ion to the inadequacies o f compat ib i l is t conceptions o f ownership. I f 
we are subject to C N C cont ro l , then there is a very real sense i n w h i c h our acts are not 
t ru ly ours, and there is no relevant d is t inc t ion between C N C contro l and determin ism. 
Bu t are matters any better w i t h indeterminism? This is the quest ion to w h i c h I turn i n 
th is, and f o l l o w i n g chapters. M y answer is a qual i f ied yes. B r ie f l y m y answer develops 
over the f o l l o w i n g four chapters i n the f o l l o w i n g way. I n this chapter and the next m y 
concern w i l l be w i t h cont ro l rather than ownership. I w i l l argue that indetermin ism does 
noth ing to enhance our cont ro l , but nor does it necessarily damage it either. Th is means 
that in terms o f exposure to u l t imate luck, we are no less exposed than i f determin ism 
were true. I n Chapter 7 I w i l l tu rn my attent ion to the ownership cond i t ion that we saw 
compat ib i l is ts had d i f f i cu l t y meet ing in Chapter 4. I w i l l argue that indetermin ism can 
prov ide us w i t h the k ind o f ownership necessary for mora l responsibi l i ty . I w i l l consider 
var ious cr i t ic isms and w i l l make ref inements as necessary. Worr ies about luck persist 
though, and in Chapter 8 I w i l l t ry to al leviate such concerns. I w i l l po in t out that path-
p i ck ing cont ro l , even i f we had i t , w o u l d do l i t t le to l im i t our exposure to luck , and that 
the impl ica t ions o f consistent ant i - luck ism are radical i n the extreme. I w i l l argue that 
there is a more plausible rationale behind the supposed need for pa th-p ick ing contro l 
wh i ch , when recognised, goes a long way towards showing w h y i t m igh t not actual ly be 
necessary after a l l . 
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Turn ing now to this chapter. As noted above, in this chapter I argue that indetermin ism 
does not enhance our contro l . I make the fami l ia r charge that path-p ick ing contro l is o f 
questionable coherence and can be had on ly at the cost o f mystery. I d ismiss extra factor 
incompat ib i l is ts in the f i rst part o f the chapter. I n the second part o f the chapter I 
consider modest 'event causal ' incompat ib i l is t posi t ions, focussing ma in ly on Robert 
Kane 's var ia t ion. I argue that these posi t ions, though they do their best to show i n a non-
myster ious way how our control can be enhanced by indetermin ism, u l t imate ly fa i l to 
make a conv inc ing case. In the f ina l part o f the chapter I consider Kane 's careful 
responses to the luck object ion, and dismiss each in tu rn . I argue that modest 
incompat ib i l is ts invi te confusion when they talk about 'u l t imate ' contro! , when what 
they real ly mean is exclusive compat ib i l is t contro l . Kane is as gu i l ty o f this as anyone 
else, and as we shall see in coming chapters, i t actual ly obscures part o f the posi t ions 
mer i t . 
5.1 T h e L u c k O b j e c t i o n 
Incompat ib i l is ts ho ld that free w i l l and responsibi l i ty require, at a m i n i m u m , the falsity 
o f determin ism. For on ly i f determin ism is false is i t possible for an agent to have 
genuinely avai lable alternative possibi l i t ies, and so on ly i f de termin ism is false is there 
any prospect o f the agent having contro l o f a k ind that w o u l d prevent everyth ing being 
u l t imate ly a matter o f luck, and only i f determin ism is false could the agent be the 
or ig inator o f thei r actions. 
Let us say that an agent has genuine alternative possibi l i t ies i f the agent, s， at t ime t, 
cou ld decide to X , or cou ld decide to Y , consistent w i t h the con junct ion o f a l l the facts 
o f the past relat ive to t, and the laws o f nature. Let us imagine that in the actual w o r l d 
Jones decides to X at t, and that Jones had genuine alternative possibi l i t ies. That means 
that i f we rew ind the c lock to jus t before t, and then play things through an indef in i te 
number o f t imes then i n some re-runs Jones w i l l decide to X , but in some he w i l l decide 
to Y . No te that everything is being kept f i xed jus t pr ior to t, inc lud ing Jones's values, 
bel iefs, and mot iva t iona l states. 
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These cases - cases where the c lock is rewound and the sequence run- through again ― 
are cal led ro l l -back cases. 5 9 They f o r m the basis o f the we l l k n o w n luck-ob jec t ion to 
incompat ib i l i sm, for after al l " i f there is noth ing about the agents' powers, capacit ies, 
states o f m i n d , mora l character and the l ike that explains this d i f ferent in ou tcome. . . the 
di f ference is jus t a matter o f l uck " (Me le 1998, pp. 582-583). 60 F o l l o w i n g Kane we can 
lay out the luck object ion s l ight ly more fo rma l l y as fo l l ows : 
a) In the actual w o r l d , person p... does A at t. 
O n the assumption that the act is undetermined at t, we may imagine that: 
b) In a nearby-possible w o r l d w h i c h is the same as the actual w o r l d up to t, p* 
(P'ร counterpart w i t h the same past) does otherwise (does B ) at t. 
c) Bu t then (since their pasts are the same), there is noth ing about the agents' 
powers, capacities, states o f m i n d , characters, disposit ions, mot ives, and so on 
pr ior to է w h i c h explains the di f ference in choices in the t w o possible wor lds . 
d) I t is therefore a matter o f luck or chance that р does A and p* does в at t. 
e) Р is therefore not responsible (praiseworthy or b lamewor thy , as the case may 
be) for A at է (and presumably Ր* is also not responsible for B ) (2003, pp. 310-
311) 
What the luck object ion does is challenge the contro l incompat ib i l is t to exp la in exact ly 
h o w indetermin ism can help in terms o f cont ro l ― h o w i t can o f fer us any enhancement 
o f our cont ro l over what we w o u l d have i f determin ism were true? Bu t that is j us t one 
aspect o f the challenge presented by the luck object ion. The luck object ion is sometimes 
also used to support the c la im that indetermin ism w o u l d actual ly w o r k to make matters 
worse in terms o f contro l . In other words, indetermin ism not on ly fai ls to help, i t does 
posi t ive damage too. One w o u l d have more contro l under determin ism. 
I th ink i t is useful to keep these two versions o f the luck object ion apart and to deal w i t h 
them separately. I w i l l call the first vers ion o f the luck ob ject ion the enhancement 
59 W h a t I a m about t o ca l l the l uck o b j e c t i o n is also o f ten re fe r red to as the ' R o l l B a c k ' a rgumen t , van 
I n w a g e n f i r s t d iscussed the r o l l back a rgument in h is 1983 (p . 141) . See also F ischer 1999a, p p . 100-103 
and M e l e 1995 pp . 195 -209 . 
6 ° I t has been made o r d iscussed in one f o r m or another by a l l o f the f o l l o w i n g : Ba lagua r 2 0 0 4 ; Be rns te in 
1995 ; B e r o f s k y 2 0 0 0 ; C la rke 1995 8ᄂ 2 0 0 2 ; D o u b l e 1991 & 1 9 % ; F ischer 1999a & 1 9 9 % H a j i 1999a; 
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argument, because it challenges the incompat ib i l is t to show h o w indetermin ism can 
possib ly enhance our cont ro l , and I w i l l cal l the second version the erosion argument, 
because it c la ims that indetermin ism diminishes our contro l . In this chapter m y focus 
w i l l be the enhancement argument, w i t h the next being devoted to the erosion argument. 
Before we consider the enhancement luck object ion we can note that ro l l back cases do 
h igh l igh t that, i f indetermin ism is true in such a way as to y ie ld genuine alternative 
possibi l i t ies in wh i ch the agent decides otherwise, then not everyth ing an agent does is 
u l t imate ly a matter o f their const i tut ive and circumstant ia l luck.^* Clear ly р and P'ร 
counterpart p * have the same const i tut ive and c i rcumstant ia l luck , yet make d i f ferent 
decisions. So a di f ferent k ind o f luck has to be invoked here. F rom n o w on , th is is h o w I 
w i l l be using the term causal luck. W e can say that according to the luck ob ject ion, i f 
indetermin ism is true i n such a way as to y ie ld genuine alternative possib i l i t ies, then 
everyth ing an agent does is a matter o f their const i tut ive, c i rcumstant ia l and causal luck , 
whereas i f determin ism is true, then everyth ing an agent does w o u l d be a matter on ly o f 
the former two . 
A l t hough I have been using the term in previous chapters, let me make clear that in what 
f o l l ows I w i l l refer to those who mainta in that in addi t ion to hav ing genuine alternative 
possibi l i t ies an agent needs 'pa th -p ick ing ' contro l as contro l incompat ib i l is ts , and I w i l l 
use path-p ick ing contro l and incompat ib i l is t contro l interchangeably. 
W i t h respect to the luck object ion, the contro l incompat ib i l is t is go ing to have to insist 
that i f the agent exercises incompat ib i l i s t contro l over their decis ion, then i t was no 
matter o f luck that the agent made one decision rather than another. So, whereas jus t 
s t ra ight forward indetermin ism w o u l d (we are assuming) render Jones'ร decis ion a 
matter o f causal luck, the in t roduct ion o f incompat ib i l is t contro l eradicates such causal 
luck. It w o u l d have been a matter o f causal luck wh i ch way Jones decided, but w i t h 
incompat ib i l i s t contro l in the picture, i t becomes a matter over w h i c h Jones exercises 
cont ro l . 
2 0 0 2 ; K a n e 2 0 0 2 ; 2 0 0 3 ; M e l e 1998; 1999; 1999b ; O ' C o n n o r 2 0 0 0 ; S t rawson 2 0 0 0 & 2 0 0 ^ S m i l a n s k y 
2 0 0 0 ; W a l l e r 1988. 
61 He re I con t rad i c t some th ing that Laณร ( 2 0 0 1 ) has sa id. Latus c la ims that o f N a g e ľ s categor ies o f l uck , 
' c a u s a l ' l u c k is redundan t f o r It is f u l l y cap tu red b y c i r cums tan t i a l and cons t i t u t i ve l uck . 
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Bu t there are d i f f icu l t ies when it comes to understanding what incompat ib i l i s t -cont ro l 
m igh t amount to, and h o w we could possibly have it. 
I n what f o l l ows I w i l l argue that unless an appeal to mystery is made, there is current ly 
no clear way to see h o w indetermin ism, wherever it is located, cou ld enhance an agent'ร 
cont ro l in such a way as to clear a luck-free footho ld . 
5.2 P a t h - P i c k i n g C o n t r o l 
What must path-p ick ing contro l invo lve? This is an extremely d i f f i cu l t quest ion to 
answer but as a f i rst attempt we migh t say that it involves hav ing the ab i l i ty to 
antecedently ensure w h i c h pathway one travels down . F o l l o w i n g Kane we can term this 
cont ro l Antecedent Determin ing Cont ro l : 
the ab i l i ty to be in , or b r ing about, condit ions such that one can guarantee or 
determine w h i c h o f a set o f outcomes is go ing to occur before i t occurs, 
whether the outcomes are one 'ร o w n actions, the actions o f others, or events i n 
the w o r l d generally. (Kane 1996， p. 144) 
Th is is a k ind o f contro l that we value in everyday l i fe and that we try to attain. When 
we p ick up a part icular sk i l l we have acquired an abi l i ty to ensure, w i t h i n certain l im i ts , 
that certain things happen. M y sk i l l at archery involves m y abi l i ty to ensure that most o f 
m y arrows h i t their target. W e can note that this is a k i n d o f contro l that is compat ib le 
w i t h determin ism: the t ru th o f determin ism wou ld not lead us to doubt that we have 
these k inds o f abi l i t ies, and that we can exercise such abi l i t ies when we want. 
Compat ib i l i s t contro l jus t is antecedent determin ing contro l o f some degree. Th is much 
we have seen in Chapter 2. 
Bu t what the cont ro l - incompat ib i l is t needs to do to get genuine path-p ick ing contro l o f a 
k i n d that cou ld eradicate causal luck is fuse possession o f antecedent de termin ing 
contro l w i t h genuinely avai lable alternative possibi l i t ies. Bu t this looks impossib le. The 
p rob lem is that our decisions could on ly be things over w h i c h we exercise antecedent 
ensur ing contro l i f we have a deeper sel f exercising such cont ro l . Bu t the same prob lem 
arises at the level o f the deeper self. For presumably this deeper se l f has a w i l l too. 
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Either its w i l l operates determinist ica l ly , or indeterminist ica l ly . I f determined, then it 
turns out that al l that we do u l t imate ly turns out to be a matter o f c i rcumstant ia l and 
const i tut ive luck operat ing at the level o f the deeper self. I f the agent's deeper sel f 
operates indeterminis t ica l ly , it looks as i f we have causal luck and no th ing has been said 
to meet the or ig ina l luck argument. I t w o u l d be no good i nvok ing a yet deeper self, for 
exact ly the same problems w o u l d arise for that sel f too. Susan W o l f is one amongst 
many w h o has made this point : 
I n order for an agent to be autonomous, i t seems, not on ly must the agent's 
behaviour be governable by her self, her sel f must in turn be governable by her 
sel f - her deeper self, i f you l ike - and this must in turn be governable by her 
(st i l l deeper?) self, ad infìnììum. I f there are forces behind the agent, so to 
speak, mak ing the agent what she is, then her contro l o f her behaviour is on ly 
intermediate, and therefore superf ic ia l . But i f there are no forces behind the 
agent mak ing the agent what she is, then her ident i ty seems to be arbitrary. 
( W o l f 1990,p. 14) 
Some m igh t th ink the invocat ion o f a soul or a sel f i n some immater ia l rea lm migh t be 
i n order. Bu t none o f these extravagant strategies w i l l w o r k either. 
I w o u l d th ink that the ' s e l f , even i f immater ia l , w o u l d act because o f its 
part icular attributes and that those attributes are inher i ted and undergo 
d e v ฝ ^ w i t h experience. W e w o u l d have no reasonable explanat ion for 
h o w the sel f gets to be the way it is unless i t derives its character potent ia l f r om 
b i r th . W e could not account for consistent behaviour on a person'ร part unless 
the sel f has an endur ing structure. (Wal ter 1978, p. 509, quoted i n Smi lansky 
2000, pp. 64-65) 
Thus neither i nvok ing deeper selves, nor immater ia l selves occupy ing some other realm 
w i l l be o f any help in addressing the basic prob lem. Bu t perhaps this is because we are 
t ry ing to understand path-p ick ing contro l i n terms o f compat ib i l is t cont ro l . What , then, 
i f we t ry to understand incompat ib i l i s t cont ro l as an altogether d i f ferent k i n d o f control? 
Name ly a k ind o f contro l that isn ' t a func t ion o f the way the agent is at a part icular t ime 
- that isn ' t to be understood as some process un fo ld ing in the agent. The prob lem 
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though, is understanding exact ly what this d i f ferent k i nd o f contro l cou ld be, and h o w i t 
could eradicate causal luck. A l t hough it fe l l out o f favour for a wh i l e , a number o f 
contemporary incompat ib i l is ts ta lk about a dist inct k i n d o f causation ― agent-causation. 
Th is k i n d o f causation is causation by an agent - a th ink ing or rat ional substance. A s 
van Inwagen puts i t : 
The fr iends o f agent causation ho ld that the causes o f some events are not (or 
are on ly par t ia l ly ) earlier events. They are rather substances - not changes i n 
substances, w h i c h are o f course events, but "substances themselves". Thus, 
they say, Thomas Reid caused the movements o f his f ingers when he wrote the 
sentence, "There is no greater impediment to the advancement o f knowledge 
than the ambigu i ty o f wo rds . " These movements, they insist, were caused 
s imp ly by Reid, and not by any change in Re id . (van Inwagen 2002, p. 169) 
Bu t again, in c o m m o n w i t h many others I see the words agent causation as noth ing more 
than a label for a mystery. Maybe i t can make sense, maybe there is the dist inct type o f 
causation in quest ion, but i t is mysterious h o w exactly this provides path-p ick ing contro l 
apart f r o m merely st ipulat ing that i t does. Possibly some agent-causalists ho ld that agent 
causation makes an agent mora l l y responsible jus t because it is n o w true that the agent 
caused the decis ion that they made, and that this happening was not determined to 
happen by any pr ior state o f affairs. But this does no th ing to show h o w agent-causation 
provides anyth ing i n terms o f contro l over what one w o u l d have in a determinist ic 
sett ing, or how the agent in the ro l l -back case can n o w be said not to be subject to causal 
luck. V a n Inwagen makes this po in t n icely be low: 
[ In ro l l -back scenarios the agent-causalist] m igh t say this: I f i t turns out that 
A l i c e agent-causes truth-antecedent cerebral events, this w i l l not be a matter o f 
chance because i t w i l l be she, Alice, who is the cause o f the event " i t s coming 
to pass that A l i c e agent-causes t ru th antecedent cerebral events." Bu t have we 
not got every reason to regard the occurrence o f this event - that is, the 
occurrence o f " i t s coming to pass that A l i ce agent-cause the event ' i ts coming 
to pass that A l i c e agent-causes t ru th antecedent cerebral even ts ' " - as a matter 
o f chance? I f the three events " the truth-antecedent cerebral events 'V' i ts 
coming to pass that A l i ce agent-causes the t ruth antecedent cerebral events" / 
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" i t s coming to pass that A l i ce agent-causes the event ' i ts coming to pass that 
A l i ce agent-causes t ruth -antecedent cerebral even ts ' " are the f i rst three terms 
o f an in f in i te series o f agent-caused events, is not the simultaneous occurrence 
o f al l the events in this sequence (as opposed to the simultaneous occurrence o f 
al l the events in an in f in i te sequence o f agent-caused events whose first 
member is " l ie-antecedent cerebral events") a mere matter o f chance? (2002, p. 
174) 
I n c o m m o n w i t h many others, I ho ld that incompat ib i l is t -cont ro l is incoherent when 
understood in terms o f compat ib i l is t antecedent ensuring cont ro l , and ine l im inab ly 
myster ious when understood in terms o f agent causation. 
5.3 Modest Incompatibilism: Valerianism 
I now want to turn to incompat ib i l is ts who have tr ied to rise to the challenge o f 
showing , in a non-myster ious way, jus t how the t w i n demands o f alternative 
possibi l i t ies and contro l can be met. Such posit ions do not make recourse to special 
k inds o f causation, but instead t ry to get by w i t h jus t s t ra ight forward event causation. 
F o l l o w i n g Ha j i I w i l l refer to these, honest, down-to-earth brands o f l iber tar ianism as 
modest l ibertar ian posi t ions. 
For our purposes we can dist inguish two kinds o f modest l ibertar ian p o s i t i o n . T h e 
di f ference concerns the locat ion o f the indeterminacy, and the first k i nd that we are 
go ing to consider is of ten cal led Va ler ian incompat ib i l i sm. 
T o see what Va ler ian incompat ib i l i sm amounts to, start w i t h a reason-responsive 
mechanism o f the k i nd that a compat ib i l is t can agree del ivers the sort o f contro l 
I have chosen to ignore non-causa l i n c o m p a t i b i l i s t v iews o f the type mos t p r o m i n e n t l y de fended by Ca r l 
G ine t ( 1 9 9 0 ; see also G o e t z 1997 and M c C a n n 1998) . A c c o r d i n g to th is v i e w free act ions have uncaused 
s i m p l y men ta l act ions at the i r core. W h a t marks out these men ta l events from o ther menta l events is the i r 
"ac t i sh p h e n o m e n a l q u a l i t y " ( G i n e t 1990, p. 13). H o w e v e r , by d e n y i n g that these men ta l events are caused 
th is v i e w faces the p r o b l e m o f e x p l a i n i n g in wha t poss ib le sense they are c o n t r o l l e d at a l l ( M e l e 1992; 0， 
C o n n o r 2 0 0 0 ; C la rke 2 0 0 2 ) . W h a t 1 argue here and ๒ c o m i n g chapters is no t j e o p a r d i s e d by h a v i n g 
i gno red non-causa l v i ews . I ndeed , to some extent m y arguments - because they u l t i m a t e l y i n v o l v e p l a c i n g 
the stress on cons idera t ions to do w i t h o w n e r s h i p rather than con t ro l - he lp non-causa l accounts . So I 
be l i eve i t to be safe to ignore such v i ews , and wa r ran ted on g rounds o f c l a r i t y and space. 
63 T h e t e r m was f i rs t used by Berns te in because Denne t t ( w h o I t h i n k was the f i r s t to suggest th is k i n d o f 
i n c o m p a t i b i l i s m ) c i t ed the poet V a l e r y (Denne t t 1978 ; Berns te in 1989; see also K a n e 1996， p. 2 3 6 ท. 9 ) . 
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suf f ic ient for mora l responsibi l i ty. So, the agent has the necessary psychologica l basis 
for evaluat ive reasoning, w h i c h w i l l inc lude bel iefs, values, and desires, and a 
background evaluat ive scheme. However , dur ing the process o f del iberat ion i t is 
causally open w h i c h beliefs w i l l come to m i n d . Th is does not mean that the output ― the 
decis ion - that the mechanism delivers as a result o f this process is uncont ro l led. I t jus t 
means that i t is n o w indeterminist le how the process w i l l tu rn out, because i t is causally 
open what ingredients 一 i n the f o r m o f bel iefs ― w i l l be fed in.^"^ 
Because it is open what beliefs w i l l come to m i n d , in t roduc ing indetermin ism in this 
way w i l l y ie ld genuinely alternative possibi l i t ies in wh i ch the agent decides otherwise,^^ 
A major advantage o f creating the agent-internal indetermin ism by mak ing it 
indeterminist le w h i c h beliefs come to m i n d is that the indetermin ism does not erode 
compat ib i l i s t contro l . In terms o f compat ib i l is t contro l the resul t ing decis ion is as 
contro l led as i t w o u l d be were the entire process determinist ic. A f te r a l l , we do not have 
contro l over w h i c h beliefs come to m i n d irrespective o f whether we are in a 
determinist ic or indeterminist le universe. As Ha j i puts i t , this v i e w provides 
" indetermin is t ic agency wh i l e imped ing or restr ict ing our contro l over what happens 
only i n domains i n w h i c h we have no greater contro l on the hypothesis that our w o r l d is 
determin is t ic . . . even i f determin ism is true, i t is false that, w i t h respect to each 
considerat ion 一 bel ief, desire ， and so on - that comes to m i n d dur ing our del iberat ion, 
we are i n contro l o f its coming to m i n d ; and some considerations that come to m i n d 
w i thou t our being in contro l o f their do ing so do ing may inf luence the outcome o f our 
de l ibera t ion" (Ha j i 1998, p. 28 & see also Me le 1995 ch. 12). Me le explains h o w this 
contr ibutes to our contro l : 
Considerat ions that indeterminis t ica l ly come to m i n d ( l ike considerat ions that 
A l f r e d M e l e , is one w h o has deve loped the v i e w in ques t ion ( t hough he does not f u l l y endorse it 一 M e l e 
is agnost ic be tween c o m p a t i b i l i s m and modest l i be r ta r i an i sm) ( 1 9 9 5 , p. 2 1 5 ) . Denne t t has also suggested 
a ve rs ion o f va le r i an i n c o m p a t i b i l i s m , but o n l y f o r the purposes o f re jec t i on , and l i k e w i s e w i t h F ischer 
(Denne t t 1978 ; F ischer 1995) . Some have also taken E k s t r o m i s v i e w to be V a l e r i a n (see C l a r k e 2 0 0 2 ) . 
H o w e v e r , E k s t r o m t h i n k s that free w i l l requ i res that an agent 's p re ference f o r m a t i o n be i nde te rm in i s t l e , 
bu t f o r E k s t r o m dec is ion m a k i n g is a f o r m o f pre ference f o r m a t i o n ( E k s t r o m 2 0 0 0 , p. 107) . T h i s is 
s o m e t h i n g that Ba lagua r has po in ted out , and he says that E k s t r o m has c o n f i r m e d it in p r i va te 
0 Օ Մ 6 տ թ օ ո ժ 6 Ո 0 6 (see Ba iaguar 2 0 0 4 , p. 380 ท. 2 ) . 
65 I t w i l l no t necessar i ly be the case that the agent c o u l d have dec ided o the rw ise . I t m a y be that i t was 
i nde te rm in i s t i c whe the r a pa r t i cu la r b e l i e f w o u l d c o m e - t o - m i n d d u r i n g an ep isode o f d e l i b e r a t i o n , ye t 
i r respec t ive o f whe the r th is b e l i e f w o u l d c o m e to m i n d or not it was s t i l l i nev i tab le that the agent w o u l d 
dec ide as they d i d . Needless to say, i f th is were always the case then the agent in ques t ion w o u l d never 
have the k i n d o f free w i l l necessary fo r m o r a l respons ib i l i t y ― at least no t by th is v i e w s l ights . 
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determinist ical ly come to m ind ) are noth ing more than input to del iberat ion. 
The i r coming to m i n d has at most an indirect effect on what the agent decides, 
an effect that is mediated by the agent's o w n assessment o f them. They do not 
settle matters. Moreover , not on ly do agents have the oppor tun i ty to assess 
these considerations, they also have the oppor tuni ty to search fo r addi t ional 
considerations before they decide, thereby increasing the probab i l i t y that other 
relevant considerations w i l l indeterminist ical ly come to m i n d . They have the 
oppor tun i ty to cancel or attenuate the effects o f bad luck ( for example, the 
undetermined coming to m i n d o f a mis leading considerat ions or an 
undetermined fai lure to notice a relevant considerat ion). A n d g iven a suitable 
indetermin ism regarding what comes to m i n d i n an assessment process, i t is not 
causally determined what assessment the agent w i l l reach. (Me le 2002, pp. 
544-545) 
However , the k i nd o f antecedent ensuring contro l that one has here is exact ly the same 
k i n d as one w o u l d have were it determinist ic w h i c h beliefs w o u l d come to m i n d . One 
does not have luck-eradicat ing contro l over h o w one responds to the bel iefs that come to 
m i n d . The agent'ร response w i l l exh ib i t cont ro l , insofar as i t w i l l be the output o f a 
reason responsive mechanism, but this w i l l do noth ing to prevent everyth ing the agent 
decides be ing u l t imate ly a matter o f luck. For i t remains the case that Jones reacts i n the 
way that he does to the beliefs that do come to m i n d because o f the way that he is. 
Fischer makes the same point : 
H o w can adding arbitrariness o f the sort envisaged - the lack o f determinat ion 
o f the bel iefs that come to m i n d dur ing del iberat ion 一 to a causally 
determinist ic process y ie ld genuine contro l? A l iber tar ian. . . w i l l contend that 
an entirely determinist ic process does not contain genuine contro l by the 
relevant agent. H o w , then, can insta l l ing the sort o f indeterminacy envisaged -
indeterminacy as to w h i c h be l ie f states w i l l come to the agent 'ร m i n d ֊ 
t ransform the sequence f r o m one o f lack o f contro l to one conta in ing control? 
Th is smacks o f alchemy. (1999b, p. 140) 
Bu t it m igh t be objected that indetermin ism introduced in this way does enhance an 
agent's contro l insofar as it del ivers a species o f ultimate contro l . For w i t h such 
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indetermin i sm in place then the agent gains a special k i nd o f ' 'agency that gives them a 
k ind o f independence and an associated k ind o f explanatory bearing on their conduct 
that they w o u l d lack in any determinist ic w o r l d " and they w o u l d "make choices and 
per fo rm actions that lack determinist ic causes in the distant past" (Me le 2002， p. 545). 
M e l e sees the indetermin ism as p rov id ing ul t imate cont rd l , where this is understood as 
an agent mak ing a decision for w h i c h there were not causálly suf f ic ient pr ior condi t ions 
that were external to the agent (Me le 1995, p. 211) . 
But I t h ink on ly confus ion comes f r om conceiv ing o f this as an enhancement o f cont ro l , 
though as we shall see the habit o f do ing is c o m m o n to nearly a l l modest 
incompat ib i l is ts . What u l t imate contro l actual ly means is that the agent achieves a k i n d 
o f exclusive contro l ( though I th ink i t is questionable whether Va le r ian v iews can 
prov ide suf f ic ient exc lus iv i ty ― a point that I w i l l be mak ing in greater detai l i n Chapter 
7) . Such indeterminacy m igh t be seen to answer the f i rst concern about de termin ism, 
namely that i f determin ism is true then we are jus t l inks in a chain and so are not the 
true sources o f our actions. (As w i l l become clear later, I question whether the v i e w can 
do even th is) . Bu t nevertheless, those are the k inds o f concern that this v i e w must be 
seen as addressing. What i t does not do is enhance an agent's cont ro l i n a way that 
w o u l d answer the luck object ion. For the k i n d o f exclusive contro l that the agent gets, is 
exclusive compat ib i l i s t contro l . U l t imate luck remains. 
5.4 Modest Incompatibilism: Kane 
W e have seen that an internal ly indeterminist ic mechanism cannot p rov ide the k i n d o f 
pa th-p ick ing contro l wanted i f the indetermin ism is located early in the del iberat ive 
process, but maybe matters change i f the indetermin ism is moved so that it is much later 
i n the del iberat ive process. I f i t is indeterminate what decis ion the mechanism w i l l issue 
at the moment o f choice, then perhaps this cou ld be said to del iver what is wanted. I t is 
indetermin ism up to the moment o f choice that defines a non-valer ian incompat ib i l is t . I 
w i l l use the term modest incompat ib i l i s t to refer to non-valer ian incompat ib i l is ts f r o m 
n o w on. 
Clarke refers to incompat ib i l i s t posi t ions wh i ch insist upon mak ing the agent's decis ion 
non-determin is t ica l ly caused "act ion-cent red" , because mak ing a decis ion I a mental 
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act ion (2002) . Robert Kane is the most prominent o f these modest incompat ib i l is ts , 
though others who have out l ined such v iews include Wigg ins (2003) ; Sorabj i (1980) ; 
N o z i c k ( 1 9 8 1 , pp. 294-316) ; Balaguar (1999 and 2004) ; and Eks t rom (2000) . Kane 
though has done most to develop a detai led account o f this k i n d o f v i e w i n his w o r k The 
Significance of Free Will (1996). I t w i l l be his v i e w that w i l l prov ide my pr imary focus 
i n the fo r thcoming discussion, though other s imi lar incompat ib i l is ts w i l l also be referred 
to. I w i l l begin by g iv ing an al l too rough out l ine o f this v iew, but one that w i l l serve 
we l l enough for our purposes here. 
O n Kane 's account our free w i l l stems f r om occasions o f mot iva t iona l conf l i c t , where 
an agent is torn between di f ferent courses o f act ion - torn decisions i n other words. 
Kane calls the decisions that resolve such internal conf l ic ts Sel f Fo rm ing Ac ts or SFAs, 
and he suggests that there are six k inds ( though he does not c la im these to be 
exhaust ive: 
[Se l f Fo rm ing Acts ] include acts o f the f o l l o w i n g k inds: 1) M o r a l choices or 
decisions, 2) prudent ia l choices or decisions, 3)ef for ts o f w i l l sustaining 
purposes, 4) attentional efforts directed at sel f cont ro l and se l f mod i f i ca t ion , 5) 
pract ical judgements and choices, and 6) chances o f in tent ion in act ion. (1996, 
p. 125) 
1 and 2 invo lve "conf l i c ts between what an agent believes ought to be done and what 
the agent wants or desires to d o " (Kane 1996, p 126). In the case o f prudent ia l conf l i c t 
this invo lves being torn between do ing what is in one'ร long term interests, and wha t is 
in one's immediate interests. In the mora l case the conf l ic t is between what one takes to 
be mora l l y required, and what one wants to do. One has a pract ical conf l i c t where one is 
to rn between opt ions neither o f w h i c h has mora l or prudent ia l reasons i n its favour (so 
Bur idan 'ร ass cases w o u l d be cases o f pract ical conf l i c t as w o u l d be conf l ic ts between 
values). 
So, on the occasion o f a to rn decis ion the agent recognises reasons for t w o opt ions, and 
they are to rn about w h i c h way to go, and neither set o f reasons seem to ou twe igh the 
others. The agent 'ร pr ior character and mot ives prov ide both the reasons w h y the agent 
is t r y ing to do, say, their duty, and the reasons why the agent is t r y ing to do otherwise. 
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A s Kane puts i t , the agent's " comp lex o f past mot ives and character.. . exp la in the 
conflict w i t h i n the agent's w i l l from both sides'' (1996, p. 127). U l t ima te ly the agent 
u l t imate ly jus t chooses. It is this k i nd o f case that Kane asks us to imagine cou ld be 
indeterminist ic so that the " m i g h t choose either way, al l past circumstances remain ing 
the same up to he moment o f cho ice" (1996, p. 127).^^ Kane offers us an analogy: 
Consider a quantum analogue. Imagine an isolated part ic le, such as an 
electron, m o v i n g toward a th in atomic barrier. Whether or not the part ic le w i l l 
penetrate the barrier is undermined. There is a probabi l i ty that i t w i l l penetrate, 
but not a certainty, because its pos i t ion and m o m e n t u m are not both 
determinate as i t moves toward the barrier. Imagine that the choice (to 
overcome temptat ion) is l ike the penetrat ion event. The choice one way or the 
other is undetermined because the process preceding i t . . . ( i .e., the e f for t o f w i l l 
to overcome temptat ion) is indeterminate. (1996, p. 128) 
A p p l y i n g this analogy to torn decisions ― or SFAs ― he elaborates further: 
There is a tension and uncertainty in our minds at such t imes o f inner conf l i c t 
w h i c h are ref lected in appropriate regions o f our brains by movement away 
f r o m thermodynamic equ i l i b r ium ― in short, a k i nd o f st i r r ing up o f chaos in 
the bra in that makes it sensitive to micro- indeterminacies at the neuronal level . 
A s a result, the uncertainty and inner tension we feel at such soul-searching 
moments o f se l f - format ion is ref lected in the indeterminacy o f our neural 
processes themselves. . . When we do decide under such condi t ions o f 
uncertainty, the outcome is not determined because o f the preceding 
indeterminacy - and yet i t can be w i l l e d . . . either way o w i n g to the fact that in 
such sel f fo rmat ion , the agents' pr ior w i l l s are d iv ided by con f l i c t i ng mot ives. 
(2003, p. 306; see also 1996 chs. 8-10) 
There is no need to conce ive o f t o rn dec is ions as o n l y c o n c e r n i n g impo r t an t issues such as whe the r to 
act m o r a l l y or se l f - in teres ted ly . A s Ba laguar says, " w e m a k e [ to rn dec is ions ] . .al l the t i m e , eve ry day o f 
ou r l i ves " . 
T o apprec ia te th is , cons ider a second case, i n v o l v i n g a dec i s i on m o r e mundane than R a l p h ' s . 
Jane is in a restaurant, de l i be ra t i ng about whe the r to o rder t i r am isu or a fruit p la te fo r desert. 
She th inks that the f o r m e r w i l l taste better but that the lat ter w i l l be bet ter f o r her hea l th . She 
has no c lue w h i c h reason is s t ronger and feels genu ine l y t o rn . Sudden l y , i t ' s her t u r n to o rder ; 
the wa i te r is l o o k i n g at her; she has to p i c k ; O h , G o d , " I ' l l have the t i r a m i s u , " she says. I.e. she 
j u s t chose. Per iod . (Ba laguar 2 0 0 4 , p. 3 6 3 ) 
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I said above that Kane out l ines 6 d i f ferent types o f SFAs or to rn decisions. So far I have 
ment ioned mora l conf l ic ts , prudent ial conf l ic ts and pract ical conf l ic ts . I w i l l br ie f ly 
out l ine the remain ing three. 
5.5 Efforts Sustaining Purposes 
As Kane sees i t , when we resolve a torn decision the "reasons for w h i c h one chooses 
causally inf luence the choice (w i thou t determin ing i t ) , wh i l e the choice, once made, 
reorganizes the mot ivat iona l structures o f the brain so that the reasons come to have a 
special role to p lay in ftiture behav iour" (Kane 1996, p. 139). So we can understand our 
SFAs as ' w i l l set t ing' i n this respect. B u t sometimes we have to make an e f for t to 
sustain a purpose rather than f o r m one. The ef for t arises due to there being a conf l i c t 
between sustaining the already-formed purpose or in tent ion, and one's inc l inat ions, such 
as o n ๙ s inc l ina t ion towards laziness, or one 'ร fears or d is l ikes. 
5.6 Acts of Attention 
Sometimes we could ensure that we make a part icular decis ion i f we cou ld br ing to 
m i n d a certain image. Kane gives an example o f a man st ruggl ing to give up smok ing 
who can only do so when he br ings to m i n d an image o f his father dy ing w i t h lung 
cancer. Bu t to do this i tse l f takes ef for t , and this gives rise to another occasion on w h i c h 
we migh t find our w i l l conf l ic ted: 
[T ]he focussing o f at tent ion may i tse l f be d i f f i cu l t and require ef for t , not on ly 
because it may be d i f f i cu l t to concentrate, or the object o f at tent ion may be 
unpleasant.. . but also, and more generally, because there may be resistance i n 
the w i l l toward doing anyth ing to temper or contro l what the agent otherwise 
67 T h e r e is r o o m f o r more to be added. A m o n g s t modes t i ncompa t ib i l i s t s there can be d isagreement over 
j u s t w h e n and h o w o f ten one faces to rn dec is ions. V a n I nwagen , f o r instance, ho lds that there are o n l y 
three types o f S F A . W e have S F A s in ' B u r i d a n ' ร A s s ' cases ( co r respond ing to K a n e ' s p rac t i ca l S F A s ) 
( 1 9 8 9 , p. 4 0 5 ) . Second ly there is the case where a du ty that one takes o n e s e l f t o have con f l i c t s w i t h one ' s 
i nc l i na t i ons or desires - co r respond ing to K a n e ' s m o r a l S F A s (van I n w a g e n 1989, p. 4 0 5 ) . T h e t h i r d k i n d 
o f case i nvo l ves in te rna l c o n f l i c t that arises t h r o u g h h a v i n g to choose be tween i n c o m m e n s u r a b l e values. 
W h e n d iscuss ing K a n e I have cons ide red th is a p rac t i ca l c o n f l i c t ( van I n w a g e n լ989， p. 4 0 5 ) . V a n 
I n w a g e n also ho lds that we rarely face such s i tuat ions and as such w e rare ly p e r f o r m directly free acts. 
B u t K a n e , and another modest i n c o m p a t i b i l i s t - Ba lagua r - bo th t h i n k that w e face S F A s qu i te regu la r l y . 
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Strongly wants to do . . . D u r i n g periods when the agents are mak ing such efforts 
to attend against resistance w i t h i n their w i l l s , the efforts cou ld be conceived as 
indeterminate ef forts. (Kane 1996, p. 157) 
5.7 Changes of Intentions in Action 
W h e n an agent comes to an al l - th ings considered best judgement about what to do, but 
then does otherwise then e have a case o f what Me le calls strict akrat ic act ion (1987， p. 
19). Assuming that such cases are possible, then such cases can also prov ide instances 
o f SFAs o f a part icular k ind . I n these cases the agent has settled on a course o f act ion, 
but then decides otherwise at the last moment . Kane suggests that these cases can be 
accommodated by his v i ew in the f o l l o w i n g way. What goes on i n such cases is a 
sudden bu i l d up o f tension due to a suppressed conf l ic t , rather than one preceded by 
del iberat ion as i n the more usual SFAs. A n d " [ t ] he ef for t to resist these suddenly 
strengthened incl inat ions w o u l d then be indeterminate, l ike previous ef for ts required to 
overcome countervai l ing inc l ina t ions" (Kane 1996, p. 170). 
A s I said, Kane does not propose the above as an exhaustive l ist o f al l the possible k inds 
o f occasions in w h i c h we face an internal conf l ic t , and there is room for disagreement 
over the length o f such a list. However , the pr inc ip le focus is on mora l conf l i c t cases, so, 
cases where there is an internal conf l i c t i n the agent between what they consider they 
mora l l y ought to do, and what they consider they prudent ia l ly ought to do. Such cases 
w i l l also be m y focus i n the remainder o f this chapter. 
5.8 Kane and the Luck Objection 
O n first inspect ion one migh t wonder h o w Kane 'ร v i e w does not jus t describe, i n detai l , 
what is go ing on in ro l l -back cases. For i f an agent's ef for t o f w i l l is indeterminis t ic i n 
any o f the six ways he out l ines, then, ho ld ing f i xed the agent's mot iva t iona l states etc, 
and past circumstances, one w i l l , i f one runs the sequence through an indef in i te number 
o f t imes, have occasions in w h i c h the agent decides one way, and occasions i n w h i c h 
they decide another way. I n other words , one seems to have jus t causal luck. H o w does 
this v i e w do anything to show h o w causal luck can be eradicated and a luck-free 
foo tho ld established? 
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I n my v i e w Kane caniiot show this. I actual ly endorse Kane 'ร account o f free w i l l , but 
un l ike Kane I do not їЬііж that his account offers us anyth ing more in terms o f contro l 
than w o u l d be available under determin ism. I n other words, in terms o f cont ro l , a l l this 
account of fers is compat ib i l is t contro l . But Kane h imse l f th inks otherwise 一 or at least, 
certainly seems to. He has g iven over much t ime and ink to t ry ing to answer the luck 
ob ject ion. I w i l l consider his var ious responses be low, al l o f w h i c h , I bel ieve, fa l l short 
o f show ing h o w our contro l has been increased. 
I w i l l first put in the f o l l o w i n g qual i f icat ions. A l t hough I am go ing to be saying more 
about this later, i t w o u l d be as w e l l to recognise here that Kane 's p r imary concern is to 
secure the "power o f agents to be the ul t imate creators (or or ig inators) and sustainers o f 
their o w n ends and purposes" (Kane 1996, p. 4)， In other words, Kane 'ร ma in focus is 
that f i rst concern about determin ism - the concern about ownersh ip and being the 
u l t imate source o f what we do. Kane has done more than anyone else i n the 
contemporary debate to draw attent ion to th is much over looked cond i t ion . I am ftilly 
behind Kane on that score, as w i l l become clear in later chapters. Nevertheless, Kane 
does also seem to want to say that his account secures greater contro l for an agent over 
what they could have in determinist ic settings. It is that wh i ch I take issue w i t h . 
I said i n the in t roduct ion to this chapter that we need to d is t inguish between the 
'enhancement ' vers ion o f the luck object ion and the erosion version. Related to what I 
have jus t said above, i t is not clear w h i c h version o f the luck ob jec t ion Kane is 
answer ing i n h is responses Ьеюพ (Kane is never exp l ic i t ) . I f he is answer ing the second 
concern, then I bel ieve that what he says has much mer i t . I f he is at tempt ing to answer 
the f i rst concern however, I th ink what he says has very l i t t le mer i t . In t ru th , Kane is 
a lmost certainly t ry ing to do a bi t o f both. But , at the r isk o f being unchari table, and in 
the interests o f c lar i ty , I am go ing to assume that Kane is t r y ing to answer the first 
concern ― as we shall see short ly, some o f what he says certainly suggests he th inks he is 
answer ing the first concern. 
101 
5,9 The Question Begging Charge 
A c o m m o n way for a contro l incompat ib i l i s t to respond to the luck ob jec t ion is to 
accuse i t o f being question begging (see Wigg ins 2003, p. 112 and for discussion 
Watson 2003, p. 10). For the luck object ion s imply assumes that in the ro l lback cases 
the reason that Jones decides one way rather than another is d o w n to luck rather than an 
exercise o f incompat ib i l is t contro l . Th is is true - i t is question begging - but on ly in the 
most mundane uninterest ing way. I t seems to me that the onus is on the incompat ib i l i s t 
to prov ide an explanat ion o f h o w i t cou ld be that we cou ld have causal- luck eradicat ing 
cont ro l , fo r unless this is fo r thcoming, the luck object ion seems to have been met by 
fiat. I t may be that in the end, i f path-p ick ing contro l is real ly thought to be necessary for 
mora l responsib i l i ty , that this is as much as the cont ro l - incompat ib i l i s t can do. Bu t then 
thei r case w i l l appea! only to those already commi t ted to incompat ib i l i sm. 
Kane h i m s e l f accepts al l o f this - he is against in t roduc ing extra factors to deal w i t h the 
p rob lem o f luck. So, he is not asking us to jus t accept that w e have a myster ious, 
unanalysable f o rm o f contro l . Bu t he nevertheless does ho ld that the luck ob ject ion begs 
the quest ion, because, as he puts i t " ' C h a n c ๙ and Muck' are terms o f ordinary language 
w h i c h c a n y the connotat ion o f " i ts being out o f m y cont ro l " . . . So using them already 
begs certain questions, whereas ' i nde te rm in ism ' is a technical te rm that merely 
precludes deterministic causation ( though not causation a l together)" (2003， p. 305). 
Th is is a much mi lder version o f the quest ion begging accusation. A s such I accept that 
there is something i n what Kane says here, but not much i f one is t r y ing to show h o w 
inde te rmin ism enhances cont ro l . I th ink i t should be accepted that us ing the te rm luck 
w i t h regard to ro l l -back cases is mis leading g iven that the k i n d o f luck we are ta lk ing 
about here is luck internal to the agent's w i l l . Of ten when we use the te rm luck we do 
mean to attr ibute something we have done to a factor external to ourselves - external to 
our conscious w i l l i n g self, that is. Causal luck o f the type that we see evidenced i n r o l l ­
back cases is not 'outs ide ' the agent'ร contro l i n the sense o f being due to some factor 
external to the operat ion o f the agent'ร conscious w i l l . The luck is inside the agent's 
cont ro l . Bu t there's an important d i f ference between someth ing being ' i ns ide ' the 
agent's cont ro l i n the sense o f being internal to the work ings o f the agent 'ร mechanism 
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( their e f for t o f w i l l ) , and something being under the agent'ร control i n a way that w o u l d 
eradicate luck. 
Consider the te lev is ion remote-control f r o m previous chapters. O n the ' K a n e ' remote 
cont ro l , w h e n t w o buttons are pressed simultaneously ― analogous to a con f l i c t i n the 
w i l l - i t becomes indeterminist ic w h i c h channel change w i l l result. I n this case w o u l d 
w e not say that i t is chancy w h i c h channel i t w i l l change to? The luck or chance is 
internal to a contro l mechanism, and granted, we w o u l d s t i l l say 一 or at least I w o u l d " 
that the resul t ing channel change was contro l led by the remote-contro l inasmuch as i t 
was sourced exclus ively to its internal operat ion. There is also a sense in w h i c h i t was 
under the mechanism's control to change to B B C l rather than B B C 2 - again inasmuch 
as no th ing external to the mechanism cou ld play any role in this. Bu t the sense in w h i c h 
the channel change is under the contro l o f the remote contro l is, I w o u l d say, consistent 
w i t h i t also hav ing been a matter o f luck that the mechanism changed channels to B B C l 
rather than B B C 2 . 
Ana logous remarks apply to the si tuat ion in SFAs. The agent- internal indetermin ism 
does secure a negative condi t ion - i t does mean that we cannot cite anyth ing external to 
the agent's e f for t o f w i l l as an explanat ion o f why the agent decided one way rather than 
the other. W e can say that it was t ru ly down to the agent w h i c h way they decided. Bu t 
that is consistent w i t h i t having been a matter o f luck wh i ch way the agent decided. 
One m igh t object that the barrier between what is inside, and what is outside the agent's 
w i l l is one w h i c h transforms what w o u l d be lucky i f outside, to contro l led i f inside. That 
is w h y there is a sense i n wh i ch we can say o f the remote-contro l that i t cont ro l led the 
channel change even though it was indeterminis t ic w h i c h way i t w o u l d change the 
channel. I grant this. Bu t i t w i l l not help to show h o w agent-internal indetermin ism can 
enhance con t ro l . For exact ly the same points cou ld be made by a compat ib i l i s t . They 
cou ld po in t out that the fact that one does not contro l the inputs to one's contro l 
mechanism does not mean that the outputs are not contro l led 一 they are cont ro l led, jus t 
i n v i r tue o f being the output o f a cont ro l mechanism. Yet this k i n d o f po in t , wh i l s t 
correct, does noth ing to meet the luck ob ject ion against compat ib i l i sm and so s imi la r ly 
cannot help Kane either. 
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Whi l s t Kane has a po in t about the appropriateness o f the w o r d luck, this is at best a 
te rmino log ica l po in t , and fur thermore al l o f what he says w o u l d ho ld good for the 
compat ib i l i s t too. Because u l t imate ly everything is a matter o f luck i f we on ly have 
compat ib i l i s t cont ro l , then noth ing Kane has said above shows us h o w agent-internal 
indetermin ism w o u l d change this. 
There is another way in w h i c h talk o f luck is s l ight ly mis leading, w h i c h Kane also picks 
up on. Consider that i t is tempt ing to see luck as some k ind o f force, such that to say i t 
was a matter o f luck that Jones decided one way rather than the other, is to say that 
Jones was t ry ing to decide, and then luck came in and settled matters. B u t as Kane says 
" th is is the wrong p ic ture" : 
O n the [modest incompat ib i l i s t ] v i ew just described, y o u cannot separate the 
indetermin ism f r om the ef for t to overcome temptat ion in such a way that first 
the ef for t occurs followed by chance or luck (or v ice versa). One must th ink o f 
the ef for t and the indetermin ism as fbsed; the ef for t is indeterminate and the 
indetermin ism is a property o f the ef for t , not something separate that occurs 
after or before the e f fo r t . . . There is no po in t at w h i c h the ef for t stops and 
chance "takes over" . She chooses as a result of the ef for t , even though she 
m igh t have fai led because o f the indetermin ism. (Kane 2003, pp. 313-314) 
A g a i n , I t h i nk that Kane is r ight about th is, but that i t does not help. For Kane 'ร po in t is 
analogous to one that compat ib i l is ts make about determin ism. Name ly that determin ism 
is of ten mis leading ly thought o f as a force pushing an agent.^^ A s Fischer points out, 
" [ t j he re is a commonsense not ion o f "push ing , " according to w h i c h there is a di f ference 
between (say) being pushed by a strong gust o f w i n d and s imp ly w a l k i n g d o w n a t r a i l " 
(2003, p. 209) . Th is di f ference is one that the t ruth o f determin ism w o u l d not jeopardise. 
S imi la r l y , there is a commonsense not ion o f luck according to w h i c h one fai ls to 
succeed i n do ing what one was t ry ing to do due to some external factor (a strong gust o f 
w i n d ) . Th i s is not the case where decisions themselves are concerned. For in the case o f 
torn decisions there is noth ing external af fect ing the outcome o f our ef for t . 
՝ T m s IS h o w E k s t r o m character ises d e t e r m i n i s m . 
Jones 's sub jec t i ve pe rcep t i on o f ava i lab le op t i ons is i r re levant ; in fact , the past pushes h i m in to 
one pa r t i cu la r dec is ion state, the o n l y state phys i ca l l y poss ib le at the t i m e , g i v e n the past and the 
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Bu t jus t as the compat ib i l i s t 's po in t does noth ing to save them f r o m the luck ob ject ion, 
so too Kane 'ร po in t ― a l though correct - does no th ing to save h i m f r o m the luck 
ob jec t ion either. To the compat ib i l is t one can s imply reply that though i t m igh t be 
mis lead ing to th ink o f determin ism as pushing an agent into mak ing one decis ion rather 
than another, i t nevertheless remains the case that i t was inevi table that the agent w o u l d 
make the decision that he d id and that as such it was jus t the agent'ร good/bad luck that 
he d id . L i kew ise to Kane one can say that though the indeterminacy o f the agent's e f for t 
does not inter ject or come- in f r o m the outside, it remains the case that i t was a matter o f 
the agent's luck that he decided one way rather than another. A l l Kane has done is warn 
us against mis tak ing this c la im - the c la im that i t was a matter o f luck that the agent 
decided one way rather than another - as the c la im that some outside force luck played a 
role in what happened. Bu t he s t i l l leaves us none the wiser h o w u l t imate luck has been 
eradicated. I n short, I do not th ink that there is any room to wr igg le out o f the luck 
ob ject ion by ta lk ing about h o w we migh t usual ly use terms l ike luck. 
Despi te what I have jus t said, it is nevertheless signi f icant that our ta lk o f luck does not 
seem qui te appropriate when it comes to decis ion-making. For i t may be that ta lk o f luck 
sounds tox ic to responsibi l i ty , precisely because we associate luck w i t h being subject to 
external factors. In other words, the tox ic i ty o f luck to responsibi l i ty cou ld be owed to 
the fact that we th ink we cannot be responsible for what we do i f i t is sourced 
exc lus ive ly to factors external to our w i l l - i f noth ing is lef t that is u l t imate ly down to 
us. A s such it may be that agent-internal causal luck is nowhere near as obv ious ly tox ic 
to responsib i l i ty as external luck is. I am going to say more about this in Chapter 8, for I 
th ink that it is impor tant ly correct. Nevertheless these comments do noth ing to show 
h o w agent internal indetermin ism enhances contro l . So despite my sympathy w i t h some 
o f what Kane says above, we are none the wiser h o w control has been increased. 
5.10 The 'Exact Sameness' Argument 
Another argument that Kane sometimes makes concerns the assumpt ion o f pr io r 
sameness made in the ro l l -back cases normal ly used to generate the luck ob ject ion. 
laws o f na tu re . . . Jones shou ld not be j u d g e d as m o r a l l y respons ib le f o r his dec i s ion and his act, 
g i v e n the push ing feature o f d e t e r m i n i s m . ( 1998 pp. 2 8 4 - 2 8 5 ) 
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Consider that for Kane indeterminacy is internal to the process ― the e f fo r t o f w i l l 一 that 
culminates in dec is ion-making: 'Чһе indetermin ism and the ef for t are " f used " : the 
indeterminacy is a property o f the ef for t and the ef for t is indeterminate" (Kane 1996, p. 
151).^^ Yet in ro l l -back cases everything is held f i xed jus t pr ior to dec is ion-making. 
Kane n o w objects that one cannot ho ld matters f i xed , where the indeterminacy is 
internal to the agent's w i l l . 
W i t h indeterminate ef for ts, exact sameness is not def ined. N o r is exact 
d i f ference either. I f the efforts are indeterminate, one cannot say the ef for ts had 
exact ly the same strength, or that one was exact ly greater or less great than the 
other. That is what indeterminacy amounts to. So one cannot say o f t w o agents 
that they had exact ly the same pasts and made exact ly the same e f fo r t and one 
got lucky wh i l e the other d id not. N o r can one imagine the same agent in t w o 
possible wor lds w i t h exact ly the same pasts mak ing exact ly the same ef for t and 
gett ing lucky in one w o r l d and not the other. Exact sameness (or d i f ference) o f 
possible wor lds is not def ined i f the wor lds contain indeterminate ef for ts or 
indeterminate events o f any k inds, (1996, pp . 171-172) 
I t is not clear w h y there cannot be exact s a m e n e s s . I t is even less clear how exact ly this 
argument is supposed to do anyth ing to meet the luck object ion. Even i f Kane is r ight 
above, one could s imp ly rew ind the c lock to a moment jus t pr io r to the beginn ing o f the 
ef for t o f w i l l and run the ro l l -back cases f r o m this point . One w o u l d s t i l l get t w o agents, 
ident ical up to the moment of the effort of will, and w h o subsequently make d i f ferent 
choices (Clarke 2002, p. 372; H a j i 1999b, p. 53; Me le 1999, pp. 279-280) . Unless I am 
K a n e admi ts , " [ t ] o f u l l y unders tand h o w th is f u s i o n c o u l d take p lace w o u l d b e . . . to unders tand the 
nature o f consc ious exper ience and its u n i t y . . . as w e l l as to unders tand h o w consc iousness and m i n d are 
re la ted , i f at a l l , to the i nde te rm inacy o f natura l processes. . . [ I ]ท o ther w o r d s , i t is poss ib le that the 
u l t i m a t e unde rs tand ing o f th is fijsion m a y l ie in the connection... be tween consc iousness and q u a n t u m 
r e a l i i y " ( 1 9 9 6 , p. 151). So, we have an admiss ion o f mys te ry in to K a n e ' s account . B u t the mys te r y in 
ques t ion is a mys te r y f o r eve ryone and not one pecu l ia r to an i n c o m p a t i b i l i s t v i e w . 
C l a r k e ce r ta in l y th inks there can: 
[ I ] ท a s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d sense, there can be exact sameness o f one w o r l d to another even i f there 
is i nde te rm inacy . In phys ics , the inde te rmina te pos i t i on o f a pa r t i c le m a y be charac ter ised by a 
w a v e f l i n c t i o n (one s p e c i f y i n g the p robab i l i t i es o f the pa r t i c l e ' s be ing f o n d , u p o n obse rva t i on , 
in va r ious de te rmina te pos i t i ons ) , and the par t i c le (o r its coun te rpa r t ) in a d i f f e r e n t w o r l d m a y 
be co r rec t l y character ised by exac t l y the same w a v e f u n c t i o n . ( 2 0 0 2 , p. 3 7 1 ) 
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miss ing something, this denial o f exact sameness or di f ference does noth ing whatsoever 
to meet the luck object ion.^ ' 
5.11 Choosing for Reasons 
Kane regular ly attempts to deflect concerns about luck in ro l l -back cases by po in t ing out 
that ro l l -back cases do not imp l y " that [Jones and Jones*] 1) d id not choose at a l l , nor 
does i t i m p l y that they d id not both choose 2) as a result of their efforts, nor that they 
d i d not choose 3) for reasons (d i f ferent reasons) that 4) they most wanted to choose for 
when they chose, nor that they d id not choose for those reasons 5) knowingly and 6)on 
purpose when they chose, and hence 7) rationally, 8) voluntarily, and 9) intentionally 
(Kane 2003, p. 320). Yet , as he goes on to say, "these are precisely the k inds o f 
condi t ions we look for when decid ing whether or not persons are responsib le" (2003, p. 
320) . 
Bu t note f i rs t , that Kane cannot, i f he wants to preserve his i ncompat ib i l i sm, insist that 
considerat ions 1-9 are the on ly ones relevant to establ ishing whether someone is 
responsible or not. For noth ing about the thesis o f determin ism precludes any o f 1-9 
be ing met. No th ing about the thesis o f determin ism impl ies that w e do not choose 
rat ional ly , on purpose, as a result o f our ef for ts and so fo r th . Fur thermore, i f 
de termin ism is true, then u l t imate ly everyth ing we do is a matter o f luck. A t the moment 
our concern is w i t h that version o f the luck object ion w h i c h asks h o w agent- internal 
indetermin ism cou ld do anyth ing to prevent eve iy th ing we do be ing a matter o f luck. So, 
s imp ly l is t ing a number o f considerations al l o f w h i c h are consistent w i t h everyth ing we 
do being u l t imate ly a matter o f luck cannot therefore show us h o w our cont ro l has been 
enhanced i n any way 7^ 
5.12 The Resultant Luck Argument 
Somet imes Kane actual ly tries to use a specif ic k i nd o f mora l luck to p rov ide support 
for the compat ib i l i t y o f agent-internal indetermin ism and responsibi l i ty : 
I n fa i rness K a n e n o w seems to a c k n o w l e d g e th is (See his 2 0 0 3 , p. 3 1 0 fri. 18). 
10^ 
Consider an assassin who is t ry ing to k i l l the pr ime min is ter but migh t miss 
because o f some undetermined events in his nervous system w h i c h m igh t lead 
to a j e r k i ng or waver ing o f his arm. I f he does h i t his target, can he be held 
responsible? The answer (as J. L. Aus t i n and Phi l ippa Foot successful ly argued 
decades ago) is "yes , " because he intent ional ly and vo lun tar i l y succeeded in 
do ing what he was trying to do ― k i l l the p r ime minister [Aus t i n 1961， pp. 153 
— 180 & Foot 1966]. Yet his k i l l i n g the pr ime minister was undetermined. W e 
m igh t even say in a sense that he got lucky i n k i l l i n g the p r ime minister , when 
he cou ld have fa i led. Bu t it does not f o l l ow , i f he succeeds, that k i l l i n g the 
p r ime minister was not his act ion, not something he d i d ; nor does it f o l l o w . . . 
that he was not responsible for k i l l i n g the pr ime minister . Indeed, i f anyth ing is 
clear, i t is that he both k i l l ed the pr ime minister and was responsible for do ing 
so. (2003, p. 308 one note omi t ted ; see also his 1996 pp. 54-56 & 2002^ p. 418) 
I t is not ent i rely clear how Kane intends that we should take his argument above. Kane 's 
acknowledgement that we migh t say o f the assassin that "he got lucky in k i l l i n g the 
p r ime min is te r " suggests that he is t ry ing to meet the second luck ob ject ion. Taken as 
such the argument can be interpreted as fo l lows . It was lucky that the assassin k i l l ed the 
pr ime-min is ter rather than missing. It is assumed that this k i n d o f luck (Nage ľs 
* resultant ' luck) does not subvert responsibi l i ty. W h y doesn't i t subvert responsibi l i ty? 
W e l l , because the agent d id what he d id on риф05е, intent ional ly , and so for th . W o r k i n g 
backwards, we note that the saiฑe holds true at the level o f decis ion mak ing . In one 
sense it was a matter o f luck w h i c h way the agent decided, but this does not w o r k to 
p rov ide the agent w i t h an excuse. The agent s t i l l decided in tent iona l ly , o n purpose and 
so for th . Therefore we have no reason to th ink that the agent d id not contro l their 
decis ion i n the appropriate way. 
Interpreted i n this way, i t is actual ly an argument designed to show that luck is not a 
problem, rather than an argument designed to show how u l t imate luck has been 
e r a d i c a t e d . T a k e n as such I believe i t has some meri t so long as i t is located in the 
7 2 I t is w h e n K a n e makes arguments such as the one above that one is t emp ted to see h i m as t r y i n g to 
answer the ' e r o s i o n ' a rgument . 
73 N o t e that th is k i n d o f a rgumen t w o r k s equa l l y w e l l f o r the c o m p a t i b i l i s t t oo . A f t e r a l l , a c o m p a t i b i l i s t 
c o u l d p o i n t ou t that r e m o v i n g the u n d e t e r m i n e d events so that the process f r o m dec is ion to the p r i m e -
m in i s t e r b e i n g shot is de te rm in is t i c , does no t u n d e r m i n e respons ib i l i t y e i ther. T h e c o m p a t i b i l i s t c o u l d then 
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context o f a w ider argument designed to show that luck is not a p rob lem 一 an argument 
that I w i l l be mak ing i n Chapter 8. However , taken in iso lat ion, the argument is not 
conv inc ing . For the fact is that our in tu i t ions about resultant luck are not clear. O f a l l the 
k inds o f luck , i t is the one we are most l i ke ly to be t roubled by. Th is means that Kane 'ร 
argument here lends i tse l f to being used to mot ivate the thought that causal luck is a 
p rob lem. A f t e r a l l , p lenty agree that on ref lect ion the assassin is not responsible for 
hav ing k i l l ed the p r ime minister, precisely because this was a matter o f luck (Sverd l ick 
1993, p. 182; Nagel 1979). The same luck present in the w i l l is l i ke ly to lead to the same 
conc lus ion about an agent'ร decisions themselves (Nagel 1979, esp. pp. 26-27) . Name l y 
that the agent did not exercise suf f ic ient contro l at the level o f decis ion mak ing . Taken 
as an argument to show that luck is not a p rob lem, i t is in serious danger o f back f i r ing . 
O n the other hand, we could interpret Kane 's argument in the f o l l o w i n g way. Kane 
m igh t be asking us to accept that i t was not u l t imate ly a matter o f luck that the assassin 
k i l l ed the p r ime minister, because the assassin freely decided to k i l l the p r ime minister . 
Then , we note that the agent freely decided to k i l l the p r ime minister despite the chance 
that he w o u l d decide otherwise, jus t as he freely k i l l ed the p r ime minister despite the 
chance o f fa i lure. But interpreted this way, the argument does no th ing to show h o w 
u l t imate luck has been eradicated, for the no t ion o f what i t is for a decis ion to be freely 
made is lef t unanalysed. I f Kane means by ' f ree ' , made on purpose, in tent ional ly and so 
fo r th , then Kane 's account o f the freeness o f a choice is compat ib i l is t , and as such 
w o r k b a c k w a r d s in exac t l y the same way , and argue that there fore d e t e r m i n i s m at the leve l o f dec i s ion 
m a k i n g i sn ' t a p r o b l e m 
In te res t i ng l y a c o m p a t i b i l i s t c o u l d also cons t ruc t a non -ques t i on b e g g i n g F rank f t i r t - s t y l e case i n th is way . 
T h e c o m p a t i b i l i s t c o u l d ask us to a c k n o w l e d g e that d e t e r m i n i s m external t o the agent is not t hough t 
necessary by any l i be r ta r ian vers ion o f P A P ( the agent does no t have a re levant a l te rna t i ve poss ib i l i t y due 
to the i nde te rm in i s t i c poss ib ly o f the i r m i s s i n g the p r i m e m in i s te r due to a j e r k in the i r a rm) . So, 
d e t e r m i n i s m can be safe ly and non-ques t i on b e g g i n g l y assumed external to the agent, thus p r o v i d i n g a 
coun te r fac tua l in tervener w i t h a re l iab le basis u p o n w h i c h to in te rvene. T h e in te rvener is not g o i n g to 
in te rvene at the leve l o f dec is ion m a k i n g ( t h e y ' v e no re l iab le basis u p o n w h i c h to d o so). Ra ther they w i l l 
i n te rvene i f it becomes apparent that the p r i m e m in is te r w i l l not get shot. I f , in the actua l sequence, the 
in te rvener does not have to in tervene, then i n t u i t i v e l y th is makes no d i f f e rence to the agent 's r espons ib i l i t y 
f o r the s h o o t i n g o f the p r i m e min is ter , even t h o u g h it was inev i tab le that the p r i m e m in i s t e r w o u l d get shot 
due to the in te rvener ' s presence. G i v e n the i r re levance o f i n e v i t a b i l i t y at the leve l o f events ex teraa l to the 
agen t ' s d e c i s i o n m a k i n g process, and g i v e n that such events can impac t u p o n the agen t ' s r espons ib i l i t y , 
then there is n o reason to t h i n k that a l te rna t i ve poss ib i l i t i es are needed at the leve l o f dec i s i on m a k i n g 
e i ther . 
I t h i n k th is v e r s i o n o f a F rank fu r t - s t y le case ( w h i c h I d o no t be l ieve has ac tua l l y been made , t hough see 
W i d e r k e r 1995, pp . 2 5 3 - 2 5 5 , w h e r e he seems to suggest the poss ib i l i t y o f such a v a r i a t i o n , o n l y t o d i sm iss 
i t ; and see also Rav i zza 1994) is u n c o n v i n c i n g 一 u n c o n v i n c i n g fo r the same reason that K a n e ' s a rgument 
is u n c o n v i n c i n g . 
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consistent w i t h u l t imate luck. On the other hand, i f Kane means by free, non- lucky, then 
his argument is flagrantly question begging. Clarke makes this po in t be low. 
[T]here is a more fundamental p rob lem in this second appeal to efforts to 
address the prob lem o f contro l . In the case o f the [assassin] we accept that he 
acts w i t h the control that suff ices for responsibi l i ty because we presume that 
his attempt to [assassinate] is i tse l f free. I f , on the contrary, we suppose that the 
attempt is not free, then we w i l l j udge that he does not freely [assassinate]. A n 
e f for t to make a certain choice can contr ibute in the same way to that choice 's 
be ing free, then, only i f the ef for t i tse l f is free. (2002, pp. 372-373, note 
omi t ted) 
One m igh t object to what has been said so far on the grounds that i t is qui te obvious that 
on this occasion, i t is the second luck ob ject ion that Kane is addressing. I n other words , 
Kane is not t ry ing , w i t h the above argument anyway, to show h o w agent- internal 
indetermin ism enhances contro l , rather he is jus t t ry ing to show that we should not be so 
qu ick to th ink that i t damages cont ro l , where the contro l i n quest ion is compat ib i l is t . 
However , wh i l s t I am sympathetic to th is point , K a n ๙ s subsequent remarks do not 
support i t , as we shall see. For Kane develops the resultant luck argument i n such a way 
as to try and y ie ld a genuine path-p ick ing contro l . It goes something l i ke this. 
First , i f we focus on the results o f the assassin's act, then what we w o u l d say i f the 
assassin missed in the actual sequence, is that he missed by accident, rather than 
in tent ional ly . The assassin has only one-way contro l over his shoot ing o f the p r ime-
minis ter : i f he succeeds, he contro l led his success, but i f he fa i ls , then this was a matter 
out o f h is hands. Bu t Kane then goes on to po in t out that at the leve l o f decis ion mak ing 
things are di f ferent. W e can imagine the assassin del iberat ing over whether to shoot the 
p r ime min is ter or not - he has reasons for both. It is indeterminist ic w h i c h way he w i l l 
decide, but the indetermin ism is coming f r om w i t h i n his w i l l : 
No te that, under these circumstances, the choices either way w i l l not be 
" inadver tent , " "acc identa l , " "capr ic ious , " or "mere ly random, " because they 
w i l l be willed by the [assassin] either way, when they are made, and done for 
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reasons either way [mora l convic t ions i f he decides against shoot ing the p r ime 
minister , f inancial mot ives i f he does] wh i ch [he]then and there endorses. 
O w i n g to the indeterminacies in [h is] neural pathways ， the assassin m igh t miss 
his target. . . But [he succeeds] despite the probabi l i ty o f fa i lure, [he is] 
responsible, because [he] w i l l have succeeded in do ing what [he was ] t r y ing to 
do. A n d so i t is, I suggest, w i t h se l f - fo rming choices, except that in their case, 
whichever way the agents choose, they w i l l have succeeded in do ing what they 
were t ry ing to do because they were simultaneously t ry ing to make both 
choices, and one is do ing to succeed. Thei r fa i lure to do one th i ng is not a mere 
fa i lure, but a voluntary succeeding in do ing the other. (Kane 2002, pp. 419-
421) 
So, at the level o f decision mak ing the agent has ' two w a y ' or 's tereo' cont ro l , or as 
Kane calls i t ' p lu ra l voluntary con t ro l ' (Kane 2002, p. 220) . I t h ink that i t is fa i r ly clear 
that Kane is i nv i t i ng us to see 'p lu ra l vo luntary con t ro l ' as pa th-p ick ing contro l o f the 
k ind that w o u l d eradicate causal luck. Bu t hav ing p lura l cont ro l does not invo lve hav ing 
more contro l than one w o u l d have in a determinist ic sett ing, and certainly no th ing that 
Kane has said above tel ls us how plura l cont ro l y ields luck eradicating cont ro l . 
Plura l contro l actual ly amounts to hav ing plural compat ib i l is t cont ro l , meaning that 
wh ichever way the agent decides on the occasion o f a t o rn decis ion, the resul t ing 
decis ion w i l l have been made for reasons, purposefu l ly etc. Ye t Kane has a tendency to 
talk as i f p lura l contro l is a k i nd o f luck eradicat ing contro l , or at least he seems to come 
per i lous ly close to saying this k i nd o f th ing. For he says things l i ke p lura l vo luntary 
contro l involves having " the ab i l i ty to cause or produce any one o f a set o f possible 
choices or actions each o f wh i ch is undetermined ... and to do so "at w i l l " (that is, 
rat ional ly ( for reasons), vo luntar i l y , and in ten t iona l l y ) " (2002, p. 431) . I t is the w o r d 
' ab i l i t y ' that is t roublesome here. For to use i t is to imp l y that the agent can antecedently 
determine w h i c h choice they make. In other words, i t looks to me as i f Kane is t ry ing to 
s l ip - in a special f o rm o f agency or causation o f precisely the k i nd associated w i t h the 
extra factor incompat ib i l is t v iews he rejects. ՚՛՛՛ Kane expressly rules this out, but to at the 
7 4 H o d g s o n also t h i nks that th is is wha t K a n e does - t hough H o d g s o n endorses th is k i n d o f a m e n d m e n t to 
K a n e l s v i e w , w h i l s t recogn is ing that K a n e h i m s e l f w o u l d wan t to re jec t the charge ( H o d g s o n 2 0 0 2 , pp . 
same t ime ta lk about undetermined choices as del iver ing an extra ' ab i l i t y ' to the agent 
that they w o u l d lack i n a determinist ic sett ing is at best ext remely mis lead ing, and at 
worst downr igh t false. Ye t Kane does persist in ta lk ing about p lura l vo luntary contro l as 
i f i t o f fered something more in the way o f contro l than compat ib i l is ts of fer (2002, p. 
431) : 
I th ink the " m o r e " contro l l ibertarians need is not more o f the same kind o f 
cont ro l compat ib i l is ts of fer , but rather another k i nd o f contro l al together. . . 
Wha t l ibertarians must require for undetermined SFAs [Se l f - f o rm ing acts], I 
bel ieve, is another k i nd o f contro l altogether (that compat ib i l is ts cannot obtain) 
֊ namely, ultimate cont ro l - the or iginate cont ro l exercised by gents when i t is 
" up to t h e m " w h i c h o f a set o f possible choices or actions w i l l now occur, and 
up to no one and noth ing else over wh i ch the agents themselves do not also 
have con t ro l . . . I t [ invo lves] the abi l i ty to cause or produce any one o f a set o f 
possible choices or actions each o f w h i c h is undetermined (hence non-
determin is t ica l ly) ֊ and to do so "at w i l l " (that is, rat ional ly ( for reasons), 
vo luntar i l y , and intent ional ly . (Kane 2002, p. 431) 
Bu t Kane 's use o f the w o r d contro l here is mis leading in a way already noted when 
discussing Va ler ian incompat ib i l i s t posit ions. Plura l vo luntary cont ro l invo lves hav ing, 
on occasion, exclusive contro l i n the sense that noth ing external determines w h i c h way 
one w i l l decide, yet whichever way one decides one w i l l have decided for reasons, on 
риф08е and so for th . Bu t this exc lus iv i ty does not y ie ld an increase in the agent'ร 
cont ro l i n any absolute way, and certainly not in any way that cou ld rule out u l t imate 
luck. For as w i t h the Va ler ian v i e w given earlier, the k i nd o f ' exc lus ive ' cont ro l that the 
agent has can on ly be compat ib i l i s t contro l . No th i ng has been said w h i c h shows h o w the 
agent cou ld have anyth ing beyond this.^^ 
109 -110 and see also h is 1999, p. 214 . K a n e discusses H o d g s o n ' s v i e w i n h is 2 0 0 2 , p. 4 3 4 ท. 15, w h e r e he 
c o n f i r m s that he does not take h i m s e l f to be i n t r o d u c i n g any k i n d o f ex t ra fac to r or non-even t causat ion) . 
75 Ba lagua r is another event -causal i n c o m p a t i b i l i s t in Kanean m o u l d . W h e n c o n s i d e r i n g the Muck ' 
o b j e c t i o n , Ba lagua r repl ies as f o l l o w s : 
N o , i t ' s no t just a mat ter o f l uck or chance. I t ' s t rue that, in some sense, R a l p h ' s dec i s ion was 
a rb i t ra ry (o r i f y o u l i ke , chancy or l u c k y ) . B u t th is chancy event was s t i l l a decision ( i t was 
consc ious , i n ten t iona l , pu rpose f l i l , and so on) and it was s t i l l Ralph 'ร dec i s i on : n o t h i n g ex terna l 
t o h i m m a d e h i m choose as he d i d . So i ť s no t o b v i o u s tha t R a l p h d i d n ' t au thor and c o n t r o l the 
dec is ion . Th i s is a de l icate mat ter . T h e ques t ion is whe the r the i n tu i t i ve n o t i o n o f being in 
control of what you do app l ies in th is case. I wan t to argue that i f R a l p h ' s dec i s ion was 
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I t is, I ho ld , very important to dist inguish between the c la im to have g iven an agent 
exclusive compat ib i l is t cont ro l , and the c la im to have suppl ied the agent w i t h more than 
jus t compat ib i l i s t cont ro l . B lu r r i ng this d is t inct ion leads to no th ing but confus ion. I t 
leads modest incompat ib i l i s t such as Kane and others, to th ink , or suggest, that they 've 
got something l ike a solut ion to the prob lem o f u l t imate luck. It makes them th ink that 
they 've got a way o f showing h o w al l that we do is not a matter o f luck , w i thou t hav ing 
to h ide behind myster ious forms o f agent-causation. Bu t as I hope m y discussion above 
has brought out, such accounts, whether o f the Va ler ian or Kanean modest var iety, do 
no such th ing. 
5,13 Conclusion 
I n this chapter I have argued that i f incompat ib i l is t path-p ick ing cont ro l is understood i n 
terms o f compat ib i l i s t antecedent ensuring contro l then i t is incoherent. I f i t is not 
understood in this way, then it is ine l iminab ly myster ious. Perhaps some are content to 
appeal to mystery, but this w i l l not persuade those not already commi t ted to 
incompat ib i l i sm. 
Modest 'event causaľ incompat ib i l is ts make no recourse to myster ious extra factors, 
and instead present accounts o f free w i l l in terms o f normal physical and psychologica l 
processes. Bu t their modesty costs them any r ight to have prov ided anyth ing i n terms o f 
contro l over what one w o u l d have in determinist ic settings. As such, where u l t imate 
luck is concerned, one is no better o f f under indetermin ism. 
I bel ieve that those who defend such accounts - Kane, Balaguar, Eks t rom, N o z i c k , and 
others ― are go ing to be, in general, reluctant to admi t th is, or w i l l do this in a rather coy 
and ambiguous way. Bu t I th ink this reflects the fact that (and this is a guess) the above 
unde te rm ined at the m o m e n t o f cho ice , then the i n tu i t i ve n o t i o n o f c o n t r o l c lea r l y does app l y 
(and that the n o t i o n o f au tho rsh ip does as w e l l ) , despi te the fact that the cho ice w a s , i n some 
sense, a rb i t ra ry or chancy or l ucky . ( 2 0 0 4 , p. 3 8 9 ) 
Ba laguar is not c lear, but from the above quote it does seem to me that Ba iaguar is c o n c e d i n g that i n terms 
o f c o n t r o l one has no greater con t ro l than in de te rm in i s t i c set t ings. Fo r i f d e t e r m i n i s m were t rue a l l o f 
B a l a g u a r ' ร above c la ims w o u l d also h o l d t rue. 
So l o n g as that is the case, w h a t the agent does is as much a mat ter o f l uck as it w o u l d be in a de te rm in i s t i c 
se t t ing . 
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have probably arr ived at their modest incompat ib i l is t posi t ions f r o m former cont ro l 
incompat ib i l i s t posi t ions. A s such they retain a deep seated conv ic t ion that compat ib i l i s t 
posi t ions are inadequate part ly because o f the qual i ty o f the contro l they of fer . For such 
reasons these modest incompat ib i l is ts are st i l l eager to show how their accounts of fer 
something extra i n terms o f contro l . 
Bu t , I ho ld that we make greater progress by being honest, and owning֊up that 
u l t imate ly everyth ing we do is u l t imate ly a matter o f luck irrespective o f whether agent-
internal indetermin ism obtains or not. I t is a revelat ion that modest incompat ib i l i sm can 
surv ive, and can survive i n better shape than compat ib i l i sm. Or so I w i l l argue i n the 
coming chapters. 
7 6 N o t h i n g p reven ts p roponen ts o f modes t i n c o m p a t i b i l i s t v i e w s appea l i ng to mys te ry in the same w a y that 
' ex t ra f ac to r ' i n compa t i b i l i s t s do . A f t e r a l l , s t r i c t l y speak ing i t is no less mys te r ious h o w an ex t ra fac tor , 
such as a specia l f o r m o f causat ion , c o u l d y i e l d p a t h - p i c k i n g c o n t r o l a n y m o r e than K a n e ' s p l u ra l 
vo luntar)^ c o n t r o l c o u l d y i e l d such con t ro l . I f one is g o i n g to ru le out causal l uck by f ia t , one can do i t j u s t 
as w e l l in the con tex t o f an event-causal v i e w as one can an agent-causal v i ew . 
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Chapter 6 
Indeterminism and Control : I I 
The conclus ion o f the previous chapter was that we are no better o f f i n terms o f contro l 
i f our decis ion mak ing processes are indeterminist le than we w o u l d be i f they were 
determinist ic . Bu t might indetermin ism actually make matters worse in terms o f 
control? I n other words, is the 'e ros ion ' version o f the luck ob ject ion correct? 
In what fo l l ows I w i l l argue that agent- internal indetermin ism does not damage cont ro l , 
or at least, i t does not damage contro l i n any responsibi l i ty subvert ing way. In terms o f 
contro l w e may be no better o f f w i t h indetermin ism, but we are no worse o f f either.^^ 
M a k i n g the case against the erosion argument w i l l concern me for the bu lk o f the 
chapter. However , concerns about indetermin ism damaging contro l are not the on ly 
respects in w h i c h indetermin ism is seen as a danger to our status as free, responsible 
agents. I w i l l consider three further concerns w h i c h have to do w i t h 'exp lana t ion ' , 
' ra t iona l i t y ' , and 'a t t r ibu tab i l i ty ' . I w i l l argue that the concerns here are misgu ided. 
I w i l l start w i t h a couple o f pre l iminary remarks. I f we understand the erosion argument 
to be the c la im that in terms o f contro l matters w o u l d be better i f determin ism were true, 
then the k i n d o f contro l indetermin ism is eroding must be compat ib i l i s t contro l . B y 
de f in i t i on , that is the only k i nd o f cont ro l that one can have in determinist ic settings. 
Relatedly, when I ta lk about contro l not being eroded i n a way that w o u l d subvert 
responsib i l i ty , I assume that I am addressing a compat ib i l is t . B y hypothesis, a contro l 
incompat ib i l i s t th inks we need more than compat ib i l is ts cont ro l for responsib i l i ty and so 
w o u l d t h ink responsibi l i ty subverted irrespective o f how much compat ib i l i s t cont ro l we 
have in determinist ic settings. 
フ7 T h e ' e r o s i o n ' ve rs ion o f the luck o b j e c t i o n has been made in one f o r m or another by : Be rns te in 1995; 
D o u b l e 1 9 9 1 , pp . 198 -199 ; Fischer 1999b ; H a j i 1999a & 2 0 0 ^ G. S t rawson 2 0 0 3 ; W a l l e r 1988. I focus 
on H a j i ' ร ve rs ion because H a j i does at least couch i t in te rms o f luck. 
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6.1 Valerian Incompatibilism 
I n the previous chapter I d ist inguished Va ler ian incompat ib i l i sm f r o m other k inds o f 
modest incompat ib i l i sm. A l though I am not a Valer ian incompat ib i l i s t , I th ink that it is 
clear that such v iews locate indetermin ism in a place where i t does not erode an agent'ร 
compat ib i l i s t c o n t r o l . F o r the Va ler ian incompat ib i l is t , to r em ind ourselves, locates 
indetermin ism in the coming to m i n d o f bel iefs, and we do not have contro l over such 
matters even i f determin ism is true (and nor w o u l d w e i f w e had incompat ib i l i s t 
cont ro l ) . A n agent can hardly be described as worse o f f i n terms o f cont ro l i f the 
inde te rmin ism is located i n a place over w h i c h we never w o u l d have had any conscious 
cont ro l o f any responsibi l i ty relevant k i nd under determinism. However , not al l agree. I 
w i l l consider a couple o f object ions. 
Clarke has recently pointed out that the in t roduct ion o f indetermin ism i n th is way m igh t 
be said to erode or damage a certain type o f "nonac t i ve" contro l . He explains: 
It cou ld be that, when an agent sets out to make up his m i n d about w h i c h o f 
several alternatives to pursue, a l l and only the most relevant considerat ions, or 
a l l and only those that he has t ime to consider, come p rompt l y to m i n d and then 
f igure rat ional ly and e f f ic ient ly in the product ion o f an evaluat ive judgement . 
In a determinist ic w o r l d in w h i c h our del iberat ions always ran i n this ideal 
fashion, we w o u l d exercise a valuable type o f nonact ive rat ional cont ro l i n 
del iberat ing. (2002, p. 380， ท. 19) 
I actual ly t h i nk that this is correct and I return to this k i n d o f concern later in the 
chapter. But at the moment i t suff ices to say this: the issue is whether indetermin ism 
w o u l d damage an agent's contro l in a way that could plausibly subvert responsibi l i ty . I t 
78 T h e V a l e r i a n c o u l d c l a i m that i n d e t e r m i n i s m ear ly in the ac t iona l p a t h w a y is one amongs t a set o f 
j o i n t l y su f f i c i en t cond i t i ons fo r respons ib i l i t y g r o u n d i n g free w i l l . A s such i t is qu i te cons is tent f o r a 
V a l e r i a n i n c o m p a t i b i l i s t to a l l o w that i n d e l e r m i n i s m e lsewhere is no t a p r o b l e m . A V a l e r i a n c o u l d a l l o w 
that i f i n d e t e r m i n i s m ob ta ined in the w a y o u t l i n e d by K a n e ' s account , and riot i n the * c o m i n g to m i n d ' o f 
be l i e f s , that th is t oo is su f f i c ien t f o r respons ib i l i t y . I do not t h i nk that any ac tua l l y say th is 一 f o r the m a i n 
m o t i v a t i o n f o r s u b s c r i b i n g t o V a l e r i a n i n c o m p a t i b i l i s m is p rec ise ly the conce rn abou t c o n t r o l - e r o s i o n 
v o i c e d about v i e w s such as K a n e ' s . B u t the p o i n t is that they c o u l d say th is , f o r the i r m o t i v a t i o n m i g h t 
p r i m a r i l y be a concern about secur ing u l t i m a c y . A n d it is p laus ib le that one c o u l d see bo th V a l e r i a n and 
K a n e a n modes t i n c o m p a t i b i l i s t v i ews as equa l l y g o o d o n that front. T h i s is s o m e t h i n g I ac tua l l y take issue 
w i t h in Chapte r 7 where 1 argue that V a l e r i a n v i e w s cannot secure u l t i m a c y o r ' s o u r c e h o o d ' in a w a y that 
w o u l d de l i ve r the k i n d o f owne rsh ip over wha t w e do that w e saw d e t e r m i n i s m subver t i n Chap te r 4 . 
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may be the case that indetermin ism, even located in what otherwise appears to be the 
ent i rely safe place that the Va ler ian incompat ib i l is t locates it， precludes possession o f 
the type o f ideal , nonact ive rat ional cont ro l Clarke out l ines above. Bu t no plausible 
pos i t ion on free w i l l can ho ld that ideal nonactive contro l is required for responsib i l i ty-
ground ing free w i l l . A f t e r a l l , i t certainly does not f o l l o w f r o m determin ism being true 
that we have ideal nonact ive rat ional cont ro l , and nor w o u l d i t f o l l o w i f , per impossib le, 
we cou ld possess incompat ib i l is t contro l . In both cases our exercise o f responsib i l i ty-
relevant cont ro l comes after bel iefs have come to m i n d - we exercise cont ro l over h o w 
we respond to such matters, rather than over such matters d i rect ly . I f we fa l l short i n 
terms o f ideal nonact ive rat ional contro l ― as we surely nearly a l l do ― then i t is hard to 
see h o w indetermin ism is do ing any responsibi l i ty-subvert ing damage. 
Fischer has also charged that Me le ' ร Va ler ian v i ew erodes contro l ： 
[E ]ven though the agent does not direct ly contro l what belief-states come to 
m i n d ( in the sense o f choosing them or w i l l i n g them) , they are envisaged as 
strongly connected to the agent'ร pr ior states to the extent that they are a 
deterministic product o f those past states. Under determin ism, one's pr io r 
states - desires, bel iefs, values, general disposit ions - determine the precise 
content and order ing o f the subsequent doxast ic states (that consti tute 
del iberat ion), even i f the agent does not d i rect ly control what doxastic states he 
w i l l be i n . . . I t may then be possible to argue that one does g ive up some 
measure o f cont ro l , when one shifts f r om th ink ing o f the doxastic sequence as 
determinist ic to th ink ing o f it as indeterminist le: one gives up the not ion that 
the states const i tut ing on๙s del iberat ions re an " o u t f l o w i n g " o f the agent's 
pr ior states in a strong sense. (1999b, p. 141) 
However , we can just reiterate that on any compat ib i l is ts v i e w the agent exercises their 
responsib i l i ty relevant contro l after their belief-states come to m i n d . I t is true that 
in tu i t i ve ly , an agent can plausib ly be considered responsible for what bel iefs came to 
m i n d dur ing some episode o f del iberat ion, i f , that is, they had earl ier made themselves 
such that certain bel iefs d id not come to m i n d . For instance, I o f ten inf t i r iate m y partner 
whenever she blames me for something I have fa i led to do by po in t ing out that i t " jus t 
d i dn ' t occur to m e " and that I cannot be b lamed for what d id not occur to me. This 
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excuse rarely works , because she charges that there was some earlier t ime when I d id 
not take steps to make myse l f such that these k inds o f th ing w o u l d occur to me. So, m y 
responsibi l i ty for what bel iefs occur to me traces to earlier free acts. I f I had made 
ef forts to make myse l f such that certain be l ie f states do occur to me, and indetermin ism 
is then int roduced into the processes that b r ing beliefs to m i n d , then w e cou ld see such 
indetermin ism as eroding my cont ro l . M y good w o r k is undone. The indetermin ism 
serves as an obstacle to my being able to antecedently ensure that certain bel iefs occur to 
me. Bu t this k i nd o f erosion o f cont ro l cannot be seen as subvert ing responsib i l i ty , for 
that m y responsibi l i ty u l t imate ly traces (on a compat ib i l is t v i ew ) to m y di rect ly free acts 
― acts w h i c h do not invo lve any exercise o f contro l over what belief-states come to 
mind；^ 
We can make the point another way. Imagine that i t is determinist ic what belief-states 
come to m i n d dur ing m y deliberations but I do t ry to make myse l f such that certain 
bel iefs w i l l occur to me on certain occasions. Unfor tunate ly , al l m y attempts are doomed 
to fa i lure ― i t is determinist ic that certain bel iefs w i l l never occur to me on the relevant 
occasions, irrespective o f any pr ior efforts I may have made.^° W e l l , unfortunate as that 
may be, i t cannot p lausibly destroy my responsibi l i ty for h o w I respond to what does 
occur to me on those occasions. 
So Fischer 's c r i t i c ism does not h igh l igh t a way in w h i c h indetermin ism w o u l d erode 
contro l i n any responsibi l i ty subversive way. It appears qui te clear that the t ru th o f 
determin ism w o u l d not guarantee that one had the type o f contro l i n quest ion. I n short, i f 
indetermin ism is located i n the coming- to m i n d o f certain bel iefs, then i n terms o f 
responsibi l i ty-relevant cont ro l , we are no worse o f f than under determin ism. 
6.2 Non-Valerian Modest Incompatibilism 
A s I po inted out i n the previous chapter, the luck object ion has, in recent years, been 
directed for the most part at Kane 's brand o f modest Incompat ib i l i sm. W h e n it comes to 
79 H a j i makes essent ia l ly the same po in t in his 2 0 0 2 , pp. 9 8 - 1 0 0 . O r at least I t h i n k he is - I f o u n d his 
d iscuss ion on th is p o i n t a l i t t le hard to f o l l o w , but i t d i d p r o m p t the po in ts I a m m a k i n g here, i r respect ive 
o f whe the r they accura te ly re f lec t wha t H a j i ac tua l l y meant . 
N o t e , I am not c o m m i t t i n g the fa l l acy o f t h i n k i n g that d e t e r m i n i s m entails that m y e f f o r t s to make 
m y s e l f a cer ta in w a y are d o o m e d to f a i l u re . I a m j u s t p o i n t i n g out that i t c o u l d be the case that , as i t 
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the erosion argument is has to be admit ted that matters are s l ight ly murk ie r than w i t h the 
Va ler ian v iew. However , I th ink that a good case can be made for saying that 
indetermin ism located between the agent's reasons and decision does not damage an 
agent's contro l i n any responsib i l i ty-subvert ing way, so long as attent ion is pa id to 
compar ing relevant cases. 
The compat ib i l i s t Ishtiyaque H a j i , is prominent amongst the large number w h o disagree 
(1999a; 2002, sec. 2). Ha j i maintains that where indetermin ism is jus t p r io r to decis ion 
mak ing , then what the agent lacks is antecedent p rox ima l cont ro l , w h i c h is cont ro l "to 
see to it that, in that rerun, he smokes rather than that he does not and v ice versa" (Ha j i 
2002, p. 110). 
W i t h fixed pasts, the di f ference in outcome i n Jones's and Jones* 's cases [these 
are the Jones and Jones* o f the reruns in H a j i ' ร vers ion o f the luck ob ject ion] 
appears to be merely a func t ion o f the indeterminacy i n the act ional pathways 
leading to choice. But i t w o u l d seem that no agent cou ld exert p rox ima l (or any 
other sort of) contro l over such indeterminacy to ensure a part icular outcome, 
(Ha j i 2002, pp. 110-111) 
Acco rd ing to H a j i , the relevant, destruct ive di f ference between an agent's torn decis ion 
being determined to be resolved i n a certain way, and i t being indeterminist ic w h i c h way 
it w i l l be resolved, is that in the latter case the agent cannot antecedently ensure the 
outcome. This is an abi l i ty that Ha j i th inks the agent w o u l d have i n a determinist ic 
sett ing. 
There are a number o f responses w e can ทาake. First, adopt for the sake o f argument a 
s t ra ight forward compat ib i l is t pos i t ion o f the type that H a j i and many other 
contemporary compat ib i l is ts endorse. Genuine alternative possibi l i t ies are not needed, 
and i t is enough that in the actual sequence the agent exercised compat ib i l i s t contro l 
over the decis ion that they made, where th is is a matter o f the r ight connect ions being 
(the agent decided for reasons and their response was an output o f a su f f ic ien t ly reason-
responsive mechanism operat ing against a suitable background evaluat ive scheme). 
happens, m y e f f o r t s w i l l fa i l because th is aspect o f m y menta l e c o n o m y is i m p e r v i o u s to m y at tempts to 
a l ter it. 
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N o w introduce agent external indetermin ism into the picture in the f o l l o w i n g way. Due 
to certain properties o f the agent'ร brain i t is indeterminist ic whether or not the agent 
w i l l suffer a massive stroke at t l . A s such there is now a genuine possib i l i ty that, rather 
than make the decis ion in question at t l , the agent w i l l die o f a stroke at t l . In one 
respect this clearly d iminishes the agent'ร antecedent determin ing cont ro l . The agent 
cannot, pr ior to t l , ensure that they make a part icular decis ion at t l , fo r they cannot 
ensure that they do not suffer the stroke. I f we replay the universe innumerable t imes, 
sometimes the agent w i l l make a decision at t l , sometimes they w i l l be dead at t l . 
Yet i t seems quite obvious that i f , in the actual sequence, the agent makes the decision 
in quest ion, then they are as mora l l y responsible as i f there had been no possib i l i ty o f 
an j^h ing else happening. A f te r a l l , in the actual sequence in w h i c h the agent makes the 
decis ion, al l the r ight connections were made and so the compat ib i l i s t contro l 
requirements are met. Wh i l s t the external indetermin ism cou ld be said to serve as an 
obstacle to the agent successful ly mak ing a decision at t l , i t does not serve as a 
responsib i l i ty-subvert ing obstacle. 
N o w w e can note that i f the indetermin ism is internal to the agent'ร decis ion mak ing 
processes rather than external, that does not make any di f ference in terms o f the 
re l iab i l i ty w i t h w h i c h the agent can ensure a part icular decis ion is made. In other words , 
i f i t is indeterminist ic whether Jones w i l l make decision X or be dead at t l , or 
indeterminist ic whether Jones w i l l make decision X , or decis ion Y， Jones's ab i l i ty to 
rel iably ensure that he makes decision X is equally damaged in both cases. Jones can no 
more antecedently ensure that he makes decision X at t l when the source o f the cont ro l -
d im in i sh ing indetermin ism is external to his w i l l , than he can when i t is coming from 
w i t h i n his o w n wi l l .^^ 
1 K a n e can also be seen to be m a k i n g th is k i n d o f po in t : 
Suppose y o u are t r y i n g to t h i n k t h rough a d i f f i c u l t p r o b l e m , say a m a t h e m a t i c a l p r o b l e m , and 
there is some inde te rm inacy in y o u r neura l processes c o m p l i c a t i n g the task - a k i n d o f chao t i c 
b a c k g r o u n d . . . W h e t h e r y o u are g o i n g to succeed in s o l v i n g the ma thema t i ca l p r o b l e m is 
uncer ta in and unde te rm ined because o f the d is t rac t ing i nde te rm in i s t i c neura l no ise. Y e t , i f y o u 
concent ra te and so lve the p r o b l e m never theless, w e have reason t o say y o u d i d it, and are 
respons ib le fo r it even t hough it was unde te rm ined whe the r y o u w o u l d succeed. (2002， pp. 4 1 7 -
4 1 8 ; see also 2 0 0 3 . p. 3 0 8 ) 
H o w e v e r , as p o i n t e d out in the p rev ious chapter , K a n e tr ies to use th is k i n d o f p o i n t to m a k e a case f o r 
i n d e t e r m i n i s m enhanc ing c o n t r o l , w h e n in fact wha t he has done is h i g h l i g h t h o w it does not erode 
con t ro l . 
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M y po in t here parallels a point I made i n the previous chapter. I argued that m o v i n g 
indetermin ism inside the ' w i l l ' cannot p lausib ly be said to enhance an agent's cont ro l 
any more than external indetermin ism can. Here I am saying that s imi lar ly , 
indetermin ism cannot be said to d im in i sh an agent'ร contro l when i t is moved inside the 
w i l l anymore than it can be said to d im in ish the agent's contro l when i t is external to the 
w i l l . A s I have already acknowledged above, there is a case for saying that 
indetermin ism diminishes contro l irrespective o f whether i t is internal or external to the 
w i l l , precisely because one can less re l iably ensure certain outcomes. Bu t m y po in t is 
that unless one wants to be commi t ted to the c la im that external indetermin ism rules out 
responsibi l i ty , one cannot c la im that internal indetermin ism is fatal to responsib i l i ty-
ground ing compat ib i l is t contro l . 
One m igh t object here, that m y above argument is relevant ly ident ical to Kane 's 
resultant luck argument g iven in the previous chapter, and as such I am vulnerable to the 
same cr i t ic isms that I myse l f made. For surety, one m igh t say, external indetermin ism is 
a p rob lem insofar as i t makes i t chancy whether we w i l l succeed i n our act ions, and so 
what m y above argument depends upon is pr io r acceptance o f the compat ib i l i t y o f luck 
and responsibi l i ty . In response, I agree 一 that is what I am asking. B u t un l i ke before i t is 
legi t imate for me to do so here, for I take i t that those runn ing the erosion argument w i l l 
be compat ib i l is ts , and as such they w i l l have to accept the compat ib i l i t y o f luck and 
responsibi l i ty . A f te r a l l , compat ib i l is t contro l does not prov ide protect ion against 
u l t imate luck, irrespective o f whether determin ism or indetermin ism is true. 
A d i f ferent response migh t be to point out that there is a relevant d i f ference when the 
indetermin ism is located between the agent'ร reasons and decis ion. For i f the 
indetermin ism is external, then a l though the agent cannot str ict ly speaking ensure that 
they make (say) decis ion X at t l ( for they migh t be dead at t l ) , they nevertheless can 
ensure that i f they make a decis ion at t l , i t w i l l be decision X . 
But there is something odd about saying that the agent can ensure that they make one 
decis ion rather than another, when the contro l in question is compat ib i l is t . For that 
impl ies that we decide to decide 一 that we choose to deploy some k i nd o f decis ion­
mak ing abi l i ty . Th is isn Y the case at the level o f decis ion mak ing . Or at least, we do not 
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u l t imate ly do this. That is the k i nd o f th ing we do through decis ion mak ing , not pr io r to 
i t . Rando lph Clarke has made this point : 
[ พ ] e need to d is t inguish the f o l l o w i n g t w o s igni f icant ly d i f ferent variet ies o f 
case: those in w h i c h there is indetermin ism between a basic act ion and an 
intended result that is not i tse l f an act ion, and those. . . i n w h i c h the 
indetermin ism is in the product ion o f a basic act ion itself. For the first sort o f 
case, suppose that you th row a bal l at tempt ing to h i t a target, w h i c h you 
succeed in do ing. The ba l l ' s s t r ik ing the target is not i tse l f an act ion, and you 
exercise contro l over this event on ly by way o f your pr io r act ion o f t h row ing 
the ba l l . N o w suppose that, due to certain propert ies o f the bal l and the w i n d , 
the process between your releasing the bal l and its s t r ik ing the target is 
indeterminist ic . Indetermin ism located here inh ib i ts your success at b r ing ing 
about a nonact ive result that you were (freely, we may suppose) t ry ing to b r ing 
about, and for this reason it clearly does d im in i sh your cont ro l over the result -
i t constitutes cont ro l -d imin ish ing luck. Bu t the inde te rm in ism. . . required by 
the sort o f event-causal l ibertar ian v i e w at issue here [Kanean modest 
incompat ib i l i sm] - is located d i f ferent ly . I t is located not between an act ion and 
some intended result that is not i tse l f an act ion, but rather i n the direct 
causation o f the decis ion, wh i ch is i tse l f an act ion. The contro l that an agent 
exercises in mak ing a decision does not ( typ ica l ly ) derive at al l f r o m any pr ior 
at tempt on her part to br ing about that decision. I n the ba l l - th row ing case, the 
indetermin ism constitutes cont ro l -d imin ish ing luck because it inh ib i ts the agent 
f r o m br ing ing about a nonact ive result that she is act ively t ry ing to br ing about. 
Bu t that explanat ion is not avai lable in the second k i nd o f case. Unless the 
argument f r o m luck of fers some alternative explanat ion, that argument is at 
best inconclusive. (2002, pp. 367-368, t w o notes removed) 
A s Clarke points out, external indetermin ism seems to d im in ish contro l because o f its 
locat ion between the agent'ร decision and their act ion, whereas th is is not where the 
indetermin ism is located on Kane 's v iew. The disanalogy means that there is a genuine 
quest ion mark over whether internal indetermin ism can correct ly be said to d im in ish 
cont ro l . 
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6.3 Indeterminism and Reason-Responsiveness 
I th ink we can go beyond what Clarke as said above. No te that the agent- internal 
indetermin ism, located between reasons and decis ion, is consistent w i t h the agent'ร 
decis ion hav ing been the output o f a reason-responsive mechanism, and so the 
compat ib i l i s t needs to give us some reason why exact ly compat ib i l i s t contro l condi t ions 
are not met.^^ On a plausible account o f reason-responsiveness, we ask whether ho ld ing 
fixed the relat ive strength o f the actions mot ivat iona l precursors and the agent's 
background evaluative scheme, there are situations in w h i c h a d i f ferent decis ion w o u l d 
be issued. Th is cond i t ion is satisf ied i n the case o f an indetermin is t ica l ly resolved to rn 
decis ion, for the agent w i l l sometimes make a di f ferent decis ion in ro l l -back cases ― 
cases in w h i c h al l pr ior condi t ions are held fixed, inc lud ing mot iva t iona l precursors and 
evaluat ive schemes. 
Wha t we need to remember is that on the model o f compat ib i l is t cont ro l (to w h i c h H a j i 
subscribes) what matters is the qual i ty o f the connections made i n the actual sequence, 
rather than what cou ld have happened in the actual sequence. So, unless i t is s imply 
st ipulated that one o f the qual i ty requirements is that an agent 'ร decis ion must be 
determin is t ica l ly caused by their pr ior reasons there is no reason to th ink that agent-
internal indetermin ism jeopardises this k i nd o f compat ib i l is t cont ro l . I f H a j i does say 
that a determinist ic causal re lat ion is what is required, then he has jus t begged the 
quest ion against the Kanean incompat ib i l is t . 
82 I focus on the reason- respons ive account o f compa t i b i l i s t s c o n t r o l . B u t i t is even m o r e s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d 
that o n o ther c o m p a t i b i l i s t accounts c o n t r o l cond i t i ons are met ๒ the re levan t cases. Fo r e x a m p l e , as w e 
saw in Chap te r 4 , h ie ra rch ica l ' m e s h ' accounts h o l d that an agent 's act o f w i l l was app rop r i a te l y 
c o n t r o l l e d j u s t i f the r igh t 'snap shot ' p roper t ies ob ta ined , where th is is a mat ter o f h igher and l o w e r o rder 
desires ' m e s h i n g ' . W e l l , it does not mat ter h o w th is mesh came about - that w i l l no t a f fec t the snap-shot 
p roper t ies . 
O n e m i g h t ob j ec t that h ie ra rch ica l v i ews are ' h a ท น o n y ' v i e w s , where ' m e s h i n g ' i n vo l ves first o rder and 
second o rder desires ag ree ing i n some appropr ia te sense. T h i s , i t m i g h t be ob jec ted , is no t wha t one gets 
in a t o r n - d e c i s i o n , f o r by d e f i n i t i o n the agent 's w i l l is d i v i d e d on such occas ions. B u t to th is w e can m a k e 
t w o rep l ies . F i r s t l y , a me ra r ch i ca l accoun t can h o l d that an agent con t ro l s the i r dec i s ion w h e n it accords 
w i t h the i r va lues , and i f one o f the poss ib le dec is ions w h i c h they are 4 o r n ' be tween w o u l d , i f made, 
acco rd w i t h the i r values ( th is w o u l d be the dec i s ion w h i c h the agent j u d g e d to be the best one on the basis 
o f her va lua t i ona l system, t hough whe the r she w i l l ac tua l l y make th is dec i s ion w i l l depend u p o n her 
motivational system (see W a t s o n 1975) ) then that one w o u l d be c o n t r o l l e d i f made. In o ther w o r d s , one 
w o u l d have here a ' o n e - d i r e c t i o n ' c o n t r o l ( the dec is ion w o u l d be c o n t r o l l e d i f i t t u rned ou t one w a y , but 
not i f i t t u rned out the o ther ) . Second ly , wha tever p rob lems to rn -dec is ions m i g h t t u r n up f o r a h ie ra rch i ca l 
v i e w (o r any o ther compa t i b i l i s t s v i e w ) , these p rob lems stem from the 4om， nature o f the dec is ions rather 
than whe the r o r no t they are de te rm in i s t i ca l l y o r i nde te rm in i s t i ca l l y reso lved . 
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The po in t can be made in a d i f ferent way. The erosion argument gets a lot o f its 
superf ic ial c red ib i l i ty f r o m not compar ing relevantly s imi lar cases. What needs to be 
borne i n m i n d is that on the Kanean v i e w it is on ly our to rn decisions that are 
indetermin is t ica l ly resolved, for i t is on ly on the occasion o f a to rn decis ion that 
indetermin ism is st irred-up in the w i l l . Assuming that there is absolutely no reason to 
th ink that we do not face torn decisions i f determin ism is t rue, then the cases we need to 
compare are to rn decisions that are resolved indeterminis t ica l ly and to rn decisions that 
are resolved determinis t ica l ly , and where this is the on ly di f ference between them. 
Take a very crude mode l o f compat ib i l is ts contro l (my argument w o u l d apply equal ly to 
more sophist icated versions). O n this mode l an agent's decis ion is appropriately 
contro l led i f he w o u l d have decided otherwise had he wanted to. To stress, i t does not 
matter whether the agent actual ly cou ld have wanted to decide otherwise i n the actual 
circumstances in w h i c h they make the decis ion, for al l w e are do ing is assessing the 
responsiveness o f the mechanism leading to the agent's decision. Bu t note that i n the 
case o f a torn decision we encounter problems. For in the case o f a torn decis ion, the 
agent wants to make t w o incompat ib le decisions, but can on ly actual ly make one. Th is 
mode l o f cont ro l cannot say that the agent w o u l d have decided otherwise i f she had 
wanted to, because by hypothesis she d id want to decide otherwise in the actual 
sequence. Le f t un-amended this account o f contro l w o u l d therefore del iver the curious 
result that an agent does not contro l their torn decisions, even i n determinist ic settings, 
So， unless the compat ib i l is ts wants to be in the embarrassing si tuat ion o f hav ing to say, 
counter- in tu i t ive ly , that we are not responsible for our torn decisions, ( irrespective o f 
whether they are resolved determinist ical ly or indetermin is t ica l ly) then the compat ib i l is t 
is go ing to have to endorse a no t ion o f 'moderate ' responsiveness generous enough to 
inc lude torn d e c i s i o n s . I n other words, the compat ib i l is t w i l l have to say that an 
agent 'ร decis ion issues f r om a suitably responsive mechanism prov ided there are a 
suf f ic ient ly broad range o f circumstances in w h i c h the agent w o u l d have made a 
d i f ferent decis ion i f there had been reason to, w i thout commi t t i ng themselves to the far 
stronger c la im that the agent w o u l d always decide otherwise i f there was reason to. Bu t 
n o w note that i f the compat ib i l i s t makes their reason-responsive condi t ions moderate 
83 A s po in ted out in Chapte r 2， any p laus ib le reason-respons ive account o f compa t i b i l i s t s con t ro l is g o i n g 
to have to be * mode ra te ' i f i t is to y i e l d the resul t that w e are ever b l a m e w o r t h y . 
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enough to cover torn decisions, then indeterminis t ica l ly resolved torn decisions w i l l 
satisfy such contro l condi t ions too. 8 ^ There is no way for the compat ib i l is t to avo id this 
w i thou t jus t st ipulat ing that a process or mechanism leading to decis ion needs to be 
determinist ic . In other words, there does not seem to be any non quest ion begging way 
in w h i c h the compat ib i l is ts can show why indeterminist ical ly resolved torn-decisions 
fa i l to satisfy moderate reason-responsiveness requirements. 
There is another way o f mak ing the case for w i l l - in te rna l indetermin ism not 
undermin ing cont ro l , d i f ferent f r om that above, but w h i c h again depends ― quite r igh t ly 
― upon compar ing detemใinist ical ly resolved torn decisions and indetermin is t ica l ly 
resolved torn decisions. In the previous chapter I used an example o f a T V remote to 
i l lustrate indeterminacy in the agent'ร ef for t o f w i l l . I n o w want to return to that 
example. Imagine you are of fered a choice o f two T V remotes for your te lev is ion. Bo th 
are equal ly rel iable i f you press one but ton at a t ime. But i f you press two buttons at the 
same t ime on the ' K a n ๙ remote cont ro l , then it w i l l be indeterminist le to w h i c h channel 
the remote w i l l sw i tch ( though it w i l l swi tch to one o f the t w o selected). Whereas i f you 
do the same on the ' H a j i ' remote contro l then a l though you w i l l not k n o w w h i c h o f the 
two channels it w i l l change to, i t w i l l be determinist ic wh i ch channel it w i l l change to. 
One migh t object that i f the remote control operates determinist ical ly , then w e can k n o w 
to w h i c h channel i t w i l l change i f two buttons are simultaneously pressed, p rov ided w e 
have enough in fo rmat ion about the env i ronment and internal work ings o f the 
mechanism on that specif ic occasion. Th is may be true in pr inc ip le , but I rule i t out here 
because when we are subject to a torn decision we do not k n o w w h i c h way we are go ing 
to resoive our decis ion un t i l we actually make the decision in quest ion, irrespective o f 
whether our to rn decisions are determinist ical ly resolved, or indetermin is t ica l ly 
resolved. I take i t that this is a fact about torn decisions - i f one knew h o w one was 
go ing to resolve one's torn decision one w o u l d thereby have resolved it (Bok 2003, p. 
157; Perry 1965, p. 239) . The st ipulat ion that we do not k n o w w h i c h way the H a j i 
84 T h e c o m p a t i b i l i s t m i g h t ob jec t that in cases o f t o rn -dec i s i on m a k i n g there is not one m e c h a n i s m or 
process ope ra t i ng , bu t t w o . T h i s іп їефге їа і іоп is lent suppor t by K a n e ' s o w n concep tua l i sa t i on o f t o r n 
dec is ions as i n v o l v i n g para l le l p rocess ing. B u t this w i l l no t he lp the compa t i b i l i s t s , f o r i f w e j u s t focus o n 
the m e c h a n i s m that issues i n the dec is ion i n the actual sequence, then th is m e c h a n i s m w i l l r epo r t the same 
degree o f responsiveness i r respect ive o f whe ther , in the actua l sequence, the dual process was one that 
con ta ined i nde te rm inacy . Fo r the oîher process is n o w to be t hough t o f as an external source o f 
in te r fe rence . A n d ex te rna l i n d e t e r m i n i s m does not a f fec t reason responsiveness. 
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remote w i l l change on every occasion in w h i c h two buttons are s imul taneously pressed, 
is warranted. 
G i ven th is , w h i c h remote w o u l d you p ick? W h i c h remote w o u l d you judge to give you 
greater contro l over your future channel-changing needs? I t seems to me that there is no 
relevant di f ference between them. Bo th w o r k equal ly w e l l when jus t one but ton is 
pressed at a t ime, and when t w o buttons are pressed at once, one is in no better pos i t ion 
to k n o w w h i c h way the ' H a j i ' w i l l change channels than one is w i t h the ' K a n e ' channel 
changer. 
Imagine that God gives you a choice between two d i f ferent k inds o f dec is ion-making 
contro l mechanisms. Whichever one you choose, i t w i l l be the mechanism by w h i c h you 
make your future decisions. There is absolutely no di f ference between the mechanisms, 
except when i t comes to torn decisions. A s w i t h the T V remotes, w i t h the ' K a n ๙ 
mechanism instal led i t w i l l be indeterminist le w h i c h decis ion you w i l l make on the 
occasion o f a torn decis ion, whereas w i t h the ' H a j i ' mechanism it w i l l be determinist ic. 
Bu t in both cases you do not know w h i c h decision you w i l l make un t i l such t ime as you 
actual ly make it . A n d nor do you k n o w pr ior to having the mechanism instal led, w h i c h 
way you w i l l decide when it comes to torn decisions (but we can assume that you w i l l 
face some torn decisions and that you k n o w that you w i l l ) . So w h i c h k i nd o f contro l 
mechanism w o u l d i t be wisest to have instal led, assuming that is, that one wants to 
max imise one's contro l over one's future decisions? A g a i n , i t seems to me that there is 
no relevant di f ference between the two . B y m y l ights the ' H a j i ' does not g ive one any 
greater cont ro l than the 'Kane' .^^ 
85 Ba lagua r has recen t l y argued s o m e t h i n g s imi la r . Ba laguar has a rgued that i f one focuses o n t o r n 
dec is ions in de te rm in i s t i c set t ings, then wha t exp la ins w h y the agent dec ided one w a y rather than another 
mus t be s o m e t h i n g " e x t r a - a g e n t i a l " : 
[ ร ] i n c e the agent 's reasons d o n ' t p i c k out a un ique best o p t i o n , a n y t h i n g that dose de te rm ine 
th is (e .g . , a non -men ta l b ra in event in the agent 's head) w o u l d p r e s u m a b l y be ex t ra -agent ia l , 
and so i f ou r t o rn dec is ions are de te rm ined then they are not under ou r c o n t r o l . (Ba lagua r 2 0 0 4 , 
p - 3 9 1 ) 
B u t Ba lagua r wan ts to c l a i m s o m e t h i n g s t ronger than I do . Ba laguar t h i nks that i n d e t e r m i n i s m in a to rn 
dec i s ion is " t he o n l y w a y to guarantee c o n t r o l fo r the agen t " ( 2 0 0 4 , p. 391 ) . I ce r ta in l y d o n ' t t h i nk that is 
r i gh t 一 t h o u g h m y d isagreement w i t h Ba laguar on th is po in t may be m o r e t e r m i n o l o g i c a l than a n y t h i n g 
else (and to some extent th is m a y be t rue w i t h respect to Kane too ) . Fo r Ba lagua r uses the w o r d ' c o n t r o l ' 
in such a w a y as to i nc lude wha t I w o u l d wan t to d i s t i ngu ish as u t i imacy . 
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I f this is r ight i t seems to me that there is no reason to see indeterminist le ef for ts o f w i l l 
as d im in i sh ing o f contro l in any way that matters. One migh t want to say that to rn 
decisions are less contro l led than non-torn decisions, precisely because when we are 
torn we do not k n o w w h i c h way we are go ing to decide un t i l we actual ly do decide. Bu t 
this w o u l d be a point about torn decisions, irrespective o f whether they are resolved 
determinis t ica l ly or indeterminist ical ly . 
6.4 Kane and Balaguar'ร Intu i t ive Argument 
W e can add to what I have said above the f o l l o w i n g in tu i t i ve argument, versions o f 
w h i c h have been made by both Kane and Balaguar (Kane 1996, pp. 182-183; Balaguar 
2004, p. 393) . Imagine you are subject to a torn decis ion, and eventual ly you jus t decide 
one way. Y o u r brain was being moni tored wh i l s t you were mak ing this decis ion. The 
doctor mon i t o r i ng your bra in tel ls you that, according to their readouts, i t was l i tera l ly 
indeterminist ic w h i c h way you w o u l d resolve your torn decis ion, up un t i l the moment 
you actual ly made the decision. U p o n hearing this w o u l d you conclude that y o u d i dn ' t 
contro l your decision? I wou ldn ' t . A n d Balaguar th inks i t " w o u l d be downr igh t b izar re" 
to th ink that one d idn ' t contro l i t (2004, p. 393). 
6.5 Retentive Contro l 
So far I have argued that we have no reason to th ink that w e w i l l have less 
responsibi l i ty-relevant contro l over our torn decisions i f they are resolved 
indetermin is t ica l ly than i f they are resolved determinist ical ly . However , I n o w want to 
turn to one respect in w h i c h we migh t feel that our contro l is d imin ished. Ear l ier , bo th 
Clarke and Fischer pointed out that there may be a case for saying that indetermin ism 
introduced in the way typical o f Va ler ian incompat ib i l i sm, m igh t d im in i sh certain 
varieties o f non-act ive contro l . 
I th ink that a s imi lar concern can be vo iced about Kanean modest Incompat ib i l i sm. 
Consider that one m igh t l ike the way that one current ly is ― one m igh t ident i fy w i t h 
one'ร values and so fo r th 一 and one migh t want to remain as one is. The prospect o f 
future SFAs where i t w i l l be indeterminist ic in w h i c h d i rect ion one's future 
development takes, w i l l therefore be o f concern. For these future SFAs on the hor izon 
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threaten to change you . These future SFAs seem to pose a threat to wha t I te rm 
' re tent ive ' contro l . I want to k n o w that I w i l l always act in certain ways i n certain 
sitนations, but SFAs deprive me o f any guarantees. 
I th ink that th is is a legi t imate wor ry . There are some, perhaps many aspects o f our 
characters that we want to ensure do not change, and i f SFAs are a necessary part o f 
what i t is to be free, then free w i l l entails that our characters are unfixed to some extent, 
and ИаЫе to alterat ion. But we should note t w o things. First ly , wh i l s t the prospect o f 
hav ing an un f i xed nature can be a cause for distress, so too can the opposite. The idea 
that our nature is f i xed is one that we are l i k d y to find jus t as unpalatable. O f ten 
determin ism is (wrong ly ) ident i f ied w i t h hav ing a fixed nature, and for that reason is 
seen as unpalatable. Th is is a point that I am going to be return ing to i n the next chapter. 
The second po in t is that wh i ls t determin ism gives one the prospect o f hav ing a fixed 
nature, i t certainly does not guarantee it ( i t is this mistake w h i c h people make when they 
w rong l y ident i fy determin ism w i t h hav ing a fixed nature ― as Dennett po ints out：， 
determin ism is the thesis that one has a f i xed future, not a fixed nature). There is no 
reason to th ink that i f determin ism is true, that one's v i r tuous nature w i l l remain f i xed . 
There is no reason to th ink that j us t because determin ism is true w e w i l l not face to rn 
decisions where we are conf l ic ted about the k inds o f people we want to be. A g a i n , one 
seems no worse o f f i f one's torn decisions are indetermin is t ica l ly resolved than i f they 
are determin is t ica l ly resolved. I n terms o f retent ive cont ro l , the r isk is posed by to rn 
decisions, whether o f the determinist ic or indeterminist ic k i nd . 
That completes m y discussion o f the erosion argument as i t pertains to cont ro l . There 
are types o f non-act ive contro l that both Va ler ian and Kanean modest incompat ib i l i sm 
can be seen to threaten, however such types o f cont ro l can be equal ly threatened i n 
determinist ic settings, and more impor tant ly , these types o f cont ro l are not required 
(above some threshold level) for responsibi l i ty. W i t h respect to responsibi l i ty-relevant 
compat ib i l is ts contro l 一 contro l i n h o w one reacts to what comes to m i n d , and cont ro l i n 
h o w one resolves one'ร to rn decisions ― there is no reason to see the indetermin ism as 
depr iv ing one o f any relevant degree o f contro l . 
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However , as I ment ioned above, the concern about indetermin ism do ing damage is not 
l im i ted to concerns about contro l . I now want to consider three other concerns about the 
avai lab i l i ty o f relevant types o f explanat ion; concerns about the rat ional i ty o f the agent's 
decis ion, and one concerns at t r ibutabi l i ty . 
6.6 Contrastive Explanat ion, Rationali ty and At t r ibu t ion 
H a j i , a compat ib i l is t , is prominent amongst those who make the 'e ros ion ' argument 
against Kanean brands o f incompat ib i l i sm. Bu t Ha j i th inks that the p rob lem is 
" in t imate ly t ied to lack o f an explanat ion in terms o f pr io r reasons o f the di f ference in 
choices" that an agent makes in " re - runs" o f torn decisions. He is not alone. M a n y 
others have couched the erosion concern in terms o f the lack o f a certain type o f 
explanat ion o f w h y the agent decided as they d id , rather than otherwise (Ayer 1954 pp. 3 
- 20 ; Doub le 1996; and Nagel 1986 pp. 113-117). The explanat ion i n quest ion is a 
'contrast ive exp lanat ion ' , wh i ch is to say an explanat ion o f w h y one th ing , rather than 
another, occurred. 
However , contrastive explanations are not the only k i nd o f explanat ion that there is. 
There are also ' p l a i n ' explanations. A p la in explanat ion is an explanat ion i n terms o f the 
events pr ior causes. I f an event is indeterminist ical ly caused, i t is st i l l caused, and as 
such a p la in explanat ion is st i l l avai lable. 
Return ing to the internal ly indeterminist le remote contro l - the ' K a n e ' remote - even 
when both B B C l and B B C 2 buttons have been simultaneously depressed we can give a 
p la in explanat ion o f w h y the remote changed channel to, say, B B C l , by c i t ing the fact 
that the B B C l but ton was pressed. We cannot expla in w h y the remote changed channel 
to B B C l rather than B B C 2 , for pr ior condi t ions were consistent w i t h either o f these 
events occurr ing. So a contrastive explanat ion is ru led out (note, not al l contrastive 
explanat ions are ru led out ― we can st i l l contrast ively exp la in w h y the remote changed 
channels to B B C l rather than I T V for example).^^ Th i s w i l l be so i n the case o f SFAs 
too. So Ha j i is correct 一 we cannot expla in w h y Jones decides one way i n some re-runs, 
8 6 C la rke has argued that w e can s t i l l p r o v i d e adequate cont ras t ive exp lana t ions in i nde te rm in i s t i c set t ings. 
See his 1996. 
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and a d i f ferent way in others.^^ Bu t the important po in t is that the lack o f contrastive 
explanat ion does not rule out the avai lab i l i ty o f a p la in explanat ion. 
W h y should the lack o f a relevant contrastive explanat ion be a p rob lem in i tself? I t 
w o u l d not do jus t to insist on it. For i f contrastive explanations are not avai lable i n any 
sett ing other than one i n w h i c h an agent'ร decision is determined by their pr ior reasons, 
then this jus t begs the question against the modest incompatibi l ist .^^ I t must rather be 
that the lack o f contrastive explanat ion is taken to indicate either a lack o f cont ro l 一 i n 
w h i c h case the arguments I have made in the preceding sections take over - or i t m igh t 
be taken to indicate a lack o f rat ional i ty or a prob lem w i t h respect to ' a t t r i bu t ion ' . (The 
latter is, it seems, how H a j i intends this point , as we shall short ly see.) 
There is a concern that w i t h the indetermin ism located between the agent's reasons and 
their decis ion, the decision made is insuf f ic ient ly connected to the agent'ร reasons for 
act ion (see Doub le 1996, pp. 69-76 and see also his 1991) 
However , we ' ve already noted above that for the agent'ร decis ion to have been 
indeterminist ic does not mean that the decision that was made w i l l not have been 
antecedently caused. I f an agent'ร decision mak ing process is indeterminist ic up to the 
moment o f decis ion, that does not mean that we cannot g ive a p la in explanat ion o f the 
agent's decis ion in terms o f the reasons that caused i t i n the actual sequence. So there is 
no reason to th ink that we w i l l not be able to l i nk the agents' decis ion w i t h their pr io r 
reasons. 
Another way to put this is to say that whichever way the agent decides their decis ion 
w i l l have teleological intelligibility, at least in the relevant cases. F o l l o w i n g Kane what 
we can say in cases where the agent has compet ing reasons for act ion, and it is 
indeterminist ic w h i c h decision the agent w i l l make, then it is nevertheless the case that 
whatever decis ion is made it is made for reasons, and so can be described as 'dua l 
ra t iona l ' : 
8 T h i s is s o m e t h i n g Kane acknow ledges , as does So rab j i 一 another event -causal i n c o m p a t i b i l i s t ( K a n e 
1996, p. 145; So rab j i 1980, p. 3 1 ; see also F ischer 1999a, p. 103 ท. 18) 
8 8 A n o t h e r equa l l y ques t ion b e g g i n g c r i t i c i s m , w h i c h I ' ve chosen not to m a k e par t o f the m a i n tex t o f th is 
chapter , concerns a c l a i m about cho ices themselves. For it m i g h t be a rgued by some that ' c h o i c e s ' cannot 
be i den t i f i ed w i t h u n d e t e r m i n e d events (see fo r instance, Berns te in 1995, p. 154) . U n d e t e r m i n e d events 
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The choice o f A y an agent is dual rational, i f and only i f , whichever way it 
goes.,, the outcome is a) the intent ional terminat ion o f an ef for t o f w i l l that is 
the agent 'ร . , , b) the agent has reasons for the choice (whichever occurs), c) the 
agent does it for those reasons, and d) g iven the agent's character and mot ives, 
it is, a l l things considered, rat ional for the agent to do i t at that t ime for those 
reasons. (Kane 1988， p. 446) 
Nevertheless, the cr i t ic m igh t insist that unless the agent 'ร decis ion is entai led by their 
reasons, then their decision is not ra t i ona l Fo l l ow ing Balaguar we can cal l such 
decisions strongly rat ional (2004， p. 395). Th is is as opposed to a weakly rat ional 
decis ion. 
[ A ] decis ion is strongly rational (g iven the agent's reasons for choosing) i f and 
on ly i f the agent 'ร (conscious) reasons for choosing entai l that the opt ion 
chosen is the best available opt ion. Second, a decis ion is weakly rational (g iven 
the agent's reasons for choosing) i f and on ly i f i t is consistent w i t h the agent's 
(conscious) reasons for choosing, (notice that weak rat ional i ty is certainly a 
k ind o f rat ional i ty ; in part icular, a decision that 's weak ly rat ional is not 
irrational i n the sense o f go ing against the agent's (conscious) reasons for 
choosing,) (Balaguar 2004， p. 395) 
In the case o f a torn decision the decision w i l l c learly fa i l to be strongly rat ional , 
because the decis ion w i l l not have been uniquely p icked out by the agent's reasons. 
However , the decis ion w i l l be weak ly rat ional , for i t is go ing to be consistent w i t h the 
agent 'ร reason set. The question then becomes whether weak or strong rat ional i ty is 
required for responsibi l i ty . For i f on ly weak rat ional i ty is required for responsib i l i ty , 
then the indetermin ism central to the robust modest l ibertar ian v i e w does not threaten 
responsibi l i ty . Bu t as Balaguar has pointed out, strong rat ional i ty is clearly not a 
requirement o f responsibi l i ty : 
Suppose someone said the f o l l o w i n g . . . Jane d id not have compe l l i ng reasons 
are j u s t th ings that happen . A s Kane po in ts out t hough , th is imp l i es that " i f a n y t h i n g is a cho i ce or ac t i on , 
it is d e t e r m i n e d " ( 2 0 0 2 , p. 4 2 3 ) . T h i s j u s t ru les out i n c o m p a t i b i l i s m by fiat. 
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that un iquely p icked out her choice o f t i ramisu, so she d id not choose the 
t i ramisu o f her o w n free w i l l , because her choice was not suf f ic ient ly ra t iona l . . . 
i t ' s pretty clear that this remark w o u l d seem downr igh t bizarre to jus t about 
everyone. In our ordinary discourse and thought , we s imp ly don ' t t h ink that 
because decisions l ike Jane'ร aren' t strongly rat ional , they are not free. (2004, 
p. 396) 
So, wh i l s t agent-internal indetermin ism does preclude strong rat ional i ty for to rn 
decisions, strong rat ional i ty is not p lausib ly a requirement o f responsibi l i ty . I f weak 
rat ional i ty is required (and it is not clear i t is) , then the relevant to rn decisions satisfy the 
weak rat ional i ty requirement. 
6.7 At t r ibu tab i l i t y 
A di f ferent k i nd o f concern is that the agent- internal indetermin ism means that we 
cannot connect what the agent actual ly decides w i t h any f i xed character. W h e n an 
agent's w i l l is indeterminate, there does not seem to be any stable character to attr ibute 
their act ions to. Consider Ha j i ' ร comments be low: 
Reconsider, now, the Jones/Jones* [ ro l l -back] case. Enterta in once again, the 
thought exper iment that God has a thousand t imes caused the w o r l d to revert to 
precisely its state at the moment jus t before Jones decides to smoke, and that on 
about ha l f these occasions, Jones decides to smoke and acts accordingly. 
Assume, again, that in each o f the reruns, Jones was t ry ing to do t w o compet ing 
tasks, and that whatever he ended up do ing, he w o u l d have done vo luntar i l y , 
in tent ional ly , and rat ional ly. Suppose, as I have proposed, responsib i l i ty gauges 
the mora l wo r th o f an agent w i t h respect to some episode in her l i fe - a person 
discloses what she stands for when she is mora l ly responsible for some deed. 
Then, g iven type identical pasts, when Jones does one th ing i n h a l f or so o f the 
reruns but something else in the others, there is no saying what Jones stands 
89 In fact , even i f I a m w r o n g above , it does not seem to me that ra t i ona l i t y mat ters that m u c h . W e do not 
t y p i c a l l y excuse someone j u s t because they have acted i r ra t i ona l l y . I r r a t i ona l i t y , in o ther w o r d s , is not 
n o r m a l l y t aken to ind ica te an absence o f r espons ib i l i t y g r o u n d i n g c on t r o l . I f someone is sys temat i ca l l y 
i r ra t i ona l then w e m i g h t be i n c l i n e d to say that they f a i l to sat is fy sani ty cond i t i ons and f o r that reason are 
no t m o r a l l y respons ib le . Bu t even here, th is w o u l d be because the agent was incapab le o f ac t i ng ra t i ona l l y , 
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for. (2002, pp. 118-119) 
The concept ion o f responsibi l i ty this c r i t i c ism presupposes is one according to w h i c h 
unless the decis ion that the agent makes in the actual sequence is strongly connected 
( for w h i c h we can read determinist ical ly caused) by the agent'ร character, then the 
decis ion cannot be "deeply ref lect ive o f w h o we are" (Double 1996, p. 76). The agent is 
on ly mora l l y responsible i f their decision "discloses in conduct one's mora l stance or 
commi tmen t v is-à-vis a part icular episode in one's l i f e " (Ha j i 2002, p. 118). H a j i c la ims 
that " [ o ] n e can ' t . . . disclose what one mora l l y stands for w i t h respect to a part icular 
act ion w i thou t its being the case that there is a contrastive explanat ion, i n terms o f pr io r 
reasons, o f w h y the agent per formed that act ion rather than some other" (2002, p. 143). 
H a j i ' ร concept ion o f responsibi l i ty draws heavi ly on what Gary Watson famously 
referred to as responsibi l i t ies 'a t t r ibu tab i l i ty ' face. Watson uses a quote f r o m Dewey to 
capture the no t ion he is after: 
when any result has been foreseen and adopted as a foreseen, such result is the 
outcome not o f any external circumstances, not o f mere desires and impulses, 
but o f the agent'ร concept ion o f his o w n end. N o w because the result thus 
f l ows f r om the agent'ร o w n concept ion o f an end, he feels h imse l f responsible 
for i t . . . The result is s imply an expression o f h imsel f ; a mani festat ion o f what 
he w o u l d have h imse l f to be. Responsib i l i ty is thus one aspect o f the ident i ty o f 
character and conduct. We are responsible for our conduct became that 
conduct is ourselves objectified in actions. (Watson 1996. p. 227) 
Watson goes on to say that " [ t ] he self-disclosure v i e w describes a core no t ion o f 
responsib i l i ty that is central to ethical l i fe and ethical appraisal. In v i r tue o f the 
capacities ident i f ied by the self-disclosure v iew, conduct can be attr ibutable or 
imputable to an ind iv idua l as its agent and is open to appraisal that is therefore appraisal 
o f the ind iv idua l as an adopter o f ends. A t t r ibu tab i l i t y i n th is sense is a k i nd o f 
respons ib i l i t y " (1996, p. 229). 
so the p r o b l e m seems to be one to do w i t h d e t e r m i n i s m and the absence o f re levant a l te rnat ive 
poss ib i l i t i es . 
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H a j i takes the self-disclosure v iew to i m p l y that unless the agent's acts are strongly 
connected to their pr ior reasons, meaning deterministically caused by pr ior reasons, then 
the agent 'ร act fai ls to disclose what the agent stands for. As such the agent is not 
responsible. 
What is assumed is that we are 'set ' so to speak, and our decisions indicate the k i n d o f 
person ― our character values etc 一 that we hold.^^ Here at t r ibutabi l i ty is achieved 
because our decisions can be sourced to some concrete pr ior ' us ' that is revealed or 
expressed in our actions. But to this concern the first th ing we can do is ask the 
compat ib i l is t exact ly h o w determin ism can plausibly help achieve the k i n d o f t igh t 
connect ion between an agent'ร act ion and their character in the k inds o f cases we are 
ta lk ing about. For we need to remember that the cases we are ta lk ing about ― the cases 
where the agent has genuine alternative possibi l i t ies ― are ones where the agent is to rn 
between di f ferent courses o f act ion. It strikes me as implausib le that a determin is t ica l ly 
resolved to rn decis ion can be said to be more expressive o f what the agent stands for , 
than an indetermin is t ica l ly resolved one. I n both cases the decis ion w i l l reveal 
something about the agent, and in both cases the decision can reveal something equal ly 
endur ing. 
There is a related point . H o w exact ly does the internal presence o f indetermin ism 
prevent this k i n d o f evaluat ion f r o m being made? I t is true that the indetermin ism 
present in d i rect ly free acts means that the agent 'ร past character does not entai l that they 
w i l l make one decision or another. But the agent's decision sets their w i l l (at least un t i l 
90 H a j i ' ร v i e w here can be c o m p a r e d in re levant respects w i t h that o f H u m e , fo r w h o m an agent can o n l y 
be respons ib le i f the i r acts are a t t r ibu tab le o r revea l i ng o f the i r character. 
A c t i o n s are, by the i r ve ry nature, t e m p o r a r y and pe r i sh ing ; and w h e r e they p roceed no t from 
some cause in the character and d i spos i t i on o f the person w h o p e r f o r m e d t h e m , they can ne i ther 
r e d o u n d to his honor , i f g o o d ; no r i n f a m y , i f e v i l . [ A ] person is not answerab le f o r [ i m m o r a l 
acts] i f t hey p roceeded f r o m n o t h i n g in h i m , that is durab le and constant . ( H u m e 1955, p. 98 ) 
T h e c lause that a person is not answerab le i f the i r ac t i on "p roceeded from n o t h i n g in h i m , that is du rab le 
and cons tan t " does i m p l y that an agent cannot be respons ib le fo r acts that are o u t o f character - i n th is 
respect H u m e ' s v i e w is sure ly w r o n g , f o r i n t u i t i ve l y w e are respons ib le fo r such acts so l o n g as cer ta in 
c o n t r o l c o n d i t i o n s are sat is f ied. T h e constancy c o n d i t i o n w o u l d , p l aus ib l y , no t be met in the case o f 
i n d e t e r m i n i s t i c a l l y reso lved t o r n dec is ions - bu t as I p o i n t ou t later, th is is an una t t rac t i ve i m p l i c a t i o n , f o r 
i t m a y t u r n out that ou r t o rn dec is ions rea l l y are i nde te rm in i s t i ca l l y reso lved . 
91 W h e n I say ' s e ť I do not mean to c l a i m that such a v i e w presupposes that w e cannot change ove r t ime . 
I t is j u s t that in wha teve r w a y our characters e v o l v e d , this was a f unc t i on o f h o w they we re , c o m b i n e d 
w i t h e n v i r o n m e n t a l factors . T h i s k i n d o f ' changeab i l i t y * con t r ibu tes n o t h i n g to ' o w n e r s h i p ' . T h e 
c o m p a t i b i l i s t w o u l d have to say that we have as m u c h ' o w n e r s h i p ' over wha t we do even if , as it tu rns out , 
ou r characters and a l l the de terminants o f ou r dec is ions are f i x e d and unchang ing . 
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they make another torn decision) in wh i ch case we can say that the agent'ร decis ion does 
indicate how they are - i t reveals what they 've jus t made themselves, rather than 
reveal ing what they were that led to them mak ing the decision. A s far as I 'm concerned 
this achieves everyth ing in terms o f at t r ibutabi l i ty avai lable i n determinist ic settings. 
The agent 's indeterminis t ica l ly resolved torn decision does reveal what the person 
stands for now. 
What we need to recognise is that on Kane's modest incompat ib i l is t v i e w our w i l l is not 
'set ' , by our character and va lues - we f i nd ourselves incomplete insofar as we are 
regular ly subject to SFAs, and it is through resolv ing our to rn decisions that we take a 
stance. It is as a result o f this on-go ing self-creat ion process that part o f what we are 
becomes non-attr ibutable to factors external to ourselves, and so deeply attr ibutable to 
oneself. Th is is something that I am going to say more about in the f o l l o w i n g chapter, 
but at the moment i t is enough to note that there is a strong case for saying that i t is 
precisely th rough agent-internal indetermin ism that one gains the depth o f a t t r ibutabi l i ty 
needed for responsibi l i ty . 
6,8 บท-attractive Implications 
I f I have been w rong so far and indetermin ism, as located on the Kanean v i e w , erodes 
contro l in a responsibi l i ty-subvert ing way, or in some other way (rat ional i ty , 
a t t r ibutabi l i ty) works to subvert responsibi l i ty, this w o u l d land H a j i , and any other 
compat ib i l is ts mak ing these cr i t ic isms, w i t h some unattract ive impl icat ions. For the fact 
is, that indeterminacy real ly migh t be a feature o f our torn decisions. Kane 's account is 
quite consistent w i t h a l l that we current ly k n o w about the bra in and its operations - the 
bra in is a dual processor, and it is possible that there could arise tension between the two 
processes, bo i l i ng up indetermin ism and so fo r th ― and these occasions cou ld be 
experienced by us as our torn decisions. I f this does turn out to be the case H a j i w o u l d 
find h imse l f hav ing to insist that we are not responsible for our torn decisions, though 
we are responsible for our non- torn decisions (by hypothesis, the indeterminacy i n the 
w i l l is not 's t i r red up ' on these occasions). This is rather peculiar. There must be 
something w r o n g w i t h a v i e w wh i ch says this. Ei ther responsibi l i ty goes or i t stays; a 
plausible v i ew should not a l l ow it to hang around in scraps l ike this. 
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6-9 Conclusion 
I n this chapter I have argued that agent-internal indetermin ism does not erode 
compat ib i l i s t contro l in a way that could p lausib ly subvert an agent's responsibi l i ty . I n 
the case o f Va ler ian incompat ib i l is t v iews, the indetermin ism does not erode the agent's 
act ive contro l in any way. I a l lowed that certain varieties o f non-act ive cont ro l m igh t be 
eroded to some extent, but that erosion in such domains cou ld not p lausib ly be taken to 
subvert responsib i l i ty , and that determin ism does not guarantee any greater contro l . 
W i t h respect to the Kanean modest incompat ib i l is t pos i t ion the indetermin ism is 
internal to the agent's w i l l on the occasion o f torn decisions. I argued that when one 
compares determinist ical ly resolved torn decisions w i t h indetermin is t ica l ly resolved 
ones, there was no reason to see the indetermin ism as eroding contro l i n any 
responsib i l i ty subversive way. 
I then went on to consider other ways agent-internal indetermin ism migh t be seen as 
threatening, inc lud ing threatening the rat ional i ty o f the agent's choices, and the 
at t r ibutabi l i ty o f the agent'ร choices. The concerns ere, in a l l these cases, misgu ided or 
quest ion begging. 
I do not pretend that any o f the arguments that I have g iven are decisive. T føoughout 
th is chapter I have argued as i f I am addressing a compat ib i l is ts audience. A cont ro l -
incompat ib i l i s t w o u l d deny that we w o u l d be responsible irrespective o f whether our 
decis ion mak ing processes are determinist ic or indeterminist ic so long as i n the latter 
case the indetermin ism is left unsupplemented. However , even the contro l 
incompat ib i l i s t cou ld agree that str ict ly speaking the indetermin ism, as i t is int roduced 
by either Va ler ian or Kanean incompat ib i l is t , w o u l d not render us more non-responsible 
than w o u l d be the case i f determin ism were true. 
I want to end this chapter w i t h a concern to be taken up in the next chapter. Assume that 
m y arguments above go through. When one combines the conclus ion o f this chapter 
w i t h the previous chapter, one m igh t be lef t wonder ing what value there is in agent-
internal indetermin ism. For wh i l s t i t may be reassuring that such indetermin ism does not 
do us harm in terms o f cont ro l , i f i t does not do us any good either, then it is reasonable 
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to wonder w h y i t matters whether such indetermin ism obtains or not. W h y not jus t be a 
compat ib i l is t? What posi t ive w o r k is the indetermin ism doing? H o w is i t pay ing its 
way? F o l l o w i n g Clarke, we can cal l this the 'g ra tu i ty ' object ion (2002, p. 374) . I t is this 
gratui ty ob ject ion that I take up in the next chapter. There I argue that agent- internal 
indetermin ism can prov ide us w i t h the k i nd o f independence and ownersh ip over our 
acts and characters that we saw C N C control lers toeaten i n Chapter 4. 
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Chapter 7 
The Helpfulness of Indeterminism 
I ended the previous chapter w i t h a p rob lem: i f agent-internal indetermin ism neither 
enhances nor erodes cont ro l , what posi t ive w o r k is i t doing? In this chapter I shall argue 
that i f we have genuine alternative possibi l i t ies this provides us w i t h a k i nd o f 
ownersh ip unavai lable under determin ism. 
I w i l l argue that it is important where in the agent'ร del iberat ive process the 
indetermin ism is located. I w i l l reject the Va ler ian model that places the indetermin ism 
early in the del iberat ive process, defending instead Kan๙s modest incompat ib i l i s t 
pos i t ion. I w i l l consider a number o f cr i t ic isms and ref ine modest i ncompat ib i l i sm as 
necessary. 
I w i l l end by arguing that we should assess modest incompat ib i l i sm by h o w w e l l i t fares 
against r i va l v iews, and that certain dialect ical delicacies need to be taken in to account. 
Whatever one's v i ew about the compat ib i l i t y o f responsibi l i ty and determin ism, modest 
i ncompat ib i l i sm is, I argue, a more attractive v i e w and provides mora l responsib i l i ty 
w i t h a more robust grounding than its compat ib i l is t r ivais. But , I w i l l acknowledge that 
my arguments so far w i l l have l i t t le persuasive power against a commi t ted contro l 
incompat ib i l i s t . D i f fe rent arguments are required to do that, and they w i l l be suppl ied i n 
the next chapter. 
7.1 Ult imacy and Ownership 
The conclus ion f r o m what has been argued so far is that the only k i nd o f contro l we 
have over what we do, is some f o r m o f compat ib i l is t contro l o f the reason responsive 
var iety. Bu t , cont ro l is not p lausib ly a l l there is to hav ing the k i n d o f free w i n required 
for mora l responsibi l i ty.^^ As noted in previous chapters, part o f the in tu i t ive picture o f 
92 The re are cond i t i ons that are s t r i c t l y speak ing neut ra l be tween c o m p a t i b i l i s m and i n c o m p a t i b i l i s m , such 
as sani ty and ep is temic cond i t i ons . It is because o f the neu t ra l i t y o f such cond i t i ons that I have i gno red 
t h e m in th is w o r k . T h a t is o b v i o u s l y not to say that they are not impo r t an t c o n d i t i o n s that a ā i l l accoun t o f 
free w i l l needs to discuss. I have chosen instead to focus on con t ro l and owne rsh ip insofar as these issues 
d i v i d e the c o m p a t i b i l i s t and i ncompa t i b i l i s t , and to see h o w these issues relate to a w i d e r p r o b l e m w i t h 
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free w i l l is to be the ul t imate source o f one's actions in some sense. It is here that we 
f i nd value in indetermin ism. For i f indetermin ism is located in such a way as to generate 
genuine alternative possibi l i t ies, we can be said to gain a valuable k i nd o f independence 
f r o m factors external to our conscious w i l l s , and in that way indetermin ism can prov ide 
นร w i t h sourcehood and thereby a degree o f ownership over what w e do. For to some 
extent what we do, and become, is rendered u l t imate ly d o w n to us. 
There 'ร a compat ib i l is t sense in wh i ch we are the sources o f our actions - fo r i t is st i l l 
we w h o make our decisions, even i f determin ism is true. T ry ing to put a posi t ive gloss 
on this compat ib i l is t sense o f sourcehood, Fischer says "even i f there is just one 
avai lable path into the ñi ture - I may be held accountable for how I walk down this 
path... Even i f I somehow discovered there is but one path in to the future, I w o u l d s t i l l 
care deeply h o w I wa l k d o w n this pa th . . . I w o u l d want to do i t my w a y " (1994, p. 216) . 
Fischer later refers to this alternative concept ion o f ownership as associated w i t h what 
he cal ls " the importance o f ind ispensabi l i ty" (2003, p. 207). 
No te that even i f causal determin ism obtains, invocat ion o f pr io r states o f the 
w o r l d plus the natural laws cannot expla in our behaviour and its upshots 
w i thou t also exp la in ing that we make a certain sort of contribution to them. 
That is, the pr ior condi t ions and laws o f nature expla in what happens on ly by 
also expla in ing that we make a certain sort o f cont r ibu t ion - that or 
del iberat ions have a certain character, for example. (2003, p. 207) 
However , the p rob lem w i t h these compat ib i l is t conceptions o f ownersh ip or sourcehood 
is one that we are already aware o f f r o m Chapter 4, namely that we can satisfy such 
condi t ions whilst being CNC controlled. Fischer does t ry to rule out C N C contro l by 
saying that indispensabi l i ty involves our mak ing a cont r ibut ion through our "unh indered 
del iberat ions" and then says that by unhindered he means "del iberat ions not impai red by 
factors uncontroversially thought to rule out mora l respons ib i l i ty " w h i c h includes, 
convenient ly , "man ipu la t i on " (2003, pp. 207-208) . But again here we have Fischer jus t 
ru l i ng out C N C manipu la t ion by st ipulat ion, jus t as we saw h i m do ing in Chapter 4. For 
l u ck that seems to be faced by both pos i t ions . Fo r an exce l len t d iscuss ion o f free w i l l and 'san i ty* see 
W o l f ( 2 0 0 3 ) . 
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İn what way exact ly does C N C manipu la t ion hinder or impa i r one 'ร del iberat ions except 
by antecedently determin ing their course? 
This suscept ibi l i ty to C N C control is precisely what br ings out the lack o f depth to 
compat ib i l is ts accounts o f ownership, and why they cannot p lausib ly satisfy any 
requirement o f ownership associated w i t h free w i l l and mora l responsibi l i ty . A l t h o u g h 
ownersh ip is, admit tedly , a rather vague not ion, once we accept that the on ly k i nd o f 
contro l on the market is compat ib i l is t contro l , then we can gauge the value we attach to 
independence and ownership in direct propor t ion to h o w much we disvalue being 
subject to C N C contro l . We can gauge h o w successfully a v i e w provides us w i t h 
ownersh ip over what we do by h o w successfully its condi t ions for free w i l l thwar t C N C 
control lers. In other words , a v i e w on free w i l l provides us w i t h the depth o f ownership 
necessary for responsibi l i ty i f it insulates us satisfactori ly against C N C contro l . In this 
way, despite the unavoidable vagueness o f ownership we can accurately test whether a 
v i e w provides it . 
7,2 O w n e r s h i p a n d C N C C o n t r o l 
W e saw in Chapter 4 that a sophisticated enough C N C control ler cou ld programme an 
agent to do what they wanted, consistent w i t h the agent sat isfy ing compat ib i l i s t free w i l l 
condi t ions. The mora ! o f such cases seems to be an incompat ib i l i s t one. For i f free w i l l 
entails a requirement for genuine alternative possibi l i t ies, then it w o u l d be impossible 
for a C N C control ler to both design a free agent and ensure that their agent f reely made 
one decis ion rather than another. For the C N C control ler w o u l d have to design their 
agent precisely so that on certain occasions, i t was genuinely open w h i c h decis ion the 
agent w o u l d make.^^ O n such occasions the C N C control ler cou ld not re l iab ly ensure 
that the agent made one decision rather than another. The most a C N C contro l ler cou ld 
do is to restrict an agent's opt ion ranges or the frequency at w h i c h such alternative 
poss ib i l i ty moments turn up. Even then, as we shall see later, free w i l l o f the 
responsibi l i ty grounding k i n d also places restr ict ions on the extent to w h i c h a C N C 
contro l ler cou ld exercise th is restr icted f o r m o f contro l . However , wh i l s t I t h ink that w e 
certainly should draw an incompat ib i l is t mora l f rom C N C control cases, i t nevertheless 
93 T h e con t ro l l e r c o u l d bypass the agent 's ope ra t i ng mechan i sm and in that w a y get the agent to m a k e the 
dec i s ion that they want , bu t in that case the con t ro l l e r w o u l d be exe rc i s ing cons t ra in i ng c o n t r o l and so 
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matters where in an agent,s del iberat ive process the indetermin ism is located. 
7.3 V a l e r i a n I n c o m p a t i b i l i s m 
W e are, by now, fami l ia r w i t h Va ler ian incompat ib i l i sm. W e can note that, by 
in t roduc ing indeterminacy early in the del iberat ive process, so that dur ing the process o f 
del iberat ion i t is causally open (at least on a suitable number o f occasions) w h i c h bel iefs 
w i l l come to m i n d it can be genuinely open what decis ion an agent's del iberat ive 
process w i l l issue in . In t roduc ing indeterminacy in this way does seem to secure genuine 
alternative possibi l i t ies. A n d as we saw in Chapter 5， M e l e th inks that this is enough to 
secure the relevant k i nd o f u l t imate sourcehood for ownership. 
However I ho ld that Va ler ian incompat ib i l is t posi t ions are no better at securing 
ownership o f the valuable k i nd , than are stra ight forward compat ib i l is ts conceptions o f 
free w i l l . For a C N C control ler could st i l l subvert an agent's responsib i l i ty by 
imp lan t ing a 'Va le r i an ' incompat ib i l is t mechanism. I n other words, a C N C control ler 
cou ld cont ro l an agent i n an in tu i t ive ly responsibi l i ty-subvert ing way, consistent w i t h 
the agent sat isfy ing Va ler ian condi t ions on free w i l l . 
Consider f i rst that i t is the fact that w i t h genuine alternative possibi l i t ies the C N C 
control ler is prevented f r o m antecedently ensuring that the agent makes one decision 
rather than another that e f fect ive ly thwarts their ab i l i ty to cont ro l the agent. Bu t there are 
di f ferent ways in w h i c h an agent migh t be unrel iable w i t h respect to dec is ion-making. 
O n the one hand an agent migh t be unrel iable when i t comes to mak ing one decision 
rather than another. But i t m igh t be the case that the agent cannot be rel ied upon to make 
a part icular decis ion, because they carøot be rel ied upon to stay a l ive, or not to have a 
stroke or such l ike. I t h ink that i t is fa i r ly clear that this k i nd o f unre l iab i l i t y does not 
secure the k i n d o f independence or u l t imacy needed for ownership. 
For instance i f the C N C 】паЫ^ had implanted a compat ib i l i s t cont ro l mechanism, 
but had also designed the agent so that i t is indeterminist le whether the agent remains 
conscious at certain po in t , this indeterminacy w o u l d not do anyth ing to del iver 
ownersh ip to the agent. For the fact is that wh i l s t the C N C contro l ler cou ld not , due to 
w o u l d cease to be a C N C con t ro l l e r and w o u l d v io la te even c o m p a t i b i l i s t f ree w i l l cond i t i ons . 
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the indeterminacy, ensure that the agent made a decision at the appropriate t ime, they 
cou ld ensure that i f the agent made a decis ion, that i t w o u l d be the dec is ion that they 
wanted the agent to make. In this k i nd o f case the agent'ร responsibi l i ty and free w i l l is 
in tu i t i ve ly undermined because i f they make any decis ion at a l l , they w i l l on ly make that 
decis ion w h i c h the C N C control ler programmed them to make. 
In the above case the indeterminacy is w h o l l y external to the agent'ร del iberat ive 
process. Bu t are matters d i f ferent where i t is indeterminist ic w h i c h bel iefs w i l l come to 
mind? W e l l , indeterminacy at this point does seem to secure alternative possibi l i t ies in 
w h i c h the agent decides otherwise (as opposed to pathways in w h i c h the agent is dead 
due to a stroke). Bu t it remains the case that the agent reacts in the way that he does to 
the bel iefs that do come to m i n d because o f the way the C N C control ler designed them. 
I n other words , the agent is a slave to what bel iefs come to m i n d , and the f o r m that 
slavery takes is a matter that the C N C control ler w i l l have determined. A l t h o u g h the 
agent does seem to have been prov ided w i t h genuine alternative possib i l i t ies i n w h i c h 
they decide otherwise, the agent st i l l seems to lack the crucial k i nd o f independence 
needed for ownership. 
7.4 V a l e r i a n I n c o m p a t i b i l i s m and F r a n k f u r t - S t y l e Cases 
The f o l l o w i n g argument can also be added to the case against Va ler ian incompat ib i l i sm. 
I n Chapter 4， I argued that a favour i te too l o f the compat ib i l is ts ― the F rank fu r t -S t y l e 
case - can actual ly be used to h igh l igh t that there is no relevant di f ference between be ing 
subject to C N C cont ro l , and being antecedently determined to act as one does. 
What I n o w suggest, is that i f an incompat ib i l is t posi t ion faci l i tates the construct ion o f a 
Frankfur t -s ty le case, then this incompat ib i l is t pos i t ion, because it is capable o f 
fac i l i ta t ing passive covert cont ro l , is therefore also capable o f fac i l i ta t ing act ive cover t 
cont ro l . I n other words , one way o f test ing whether an incompat ib i l i s t v i e w has located 
indetermin ism in a place where i t is capable o f de l iver ing independence and ownersh ip , 
9 4 W e can no te s o m e t h i n g in teres t ing here, s o m e t h i n g w h i c h underscores the w a y in w h i c h C N C 
con t ro l l e rs i m p l i c a t e d e t e r m i n i s m as the respons ib i l i t y and free w i l l s u b v e r t i n g cu lp r i t . Fo r cons ide r that 
w e can note from the above d iscuss ion that a reauc t i on in the C N C con t ro l l e rs c o n t r o l , does not 
a u t o m a t i c a l l y y i e l d an increase in the agent 's o w n e r s h i p . 
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İS tO see i f the indeterminism wi l l rule out passive covert contro l o f the kind exercised 
by Frankfur t -s ty le counterfactual interveners. 
Va le r ian incompat ib i l i s t posit ions fa i l this test. For by locat ing the indeterminacy early 
in the act ional pathway, a Frankfurt-sty le counterfactual intervener is af forded a rel iable 
basis upon w h i c h to intervene pr ior to dec is ion-making. I w i l l b r ie f ly out l ine such a 
case. Intervener N e w m a n , wants Jerry to make a part icular decis ion, p, at a part icular 
t ime 12. Jerry 'ร dec is ion-making processes contain indeterminacy at the level o f the 
coming to m i n d o f certain bel iefs. N e w m a n is mon i to r ing Jerry's bra in, and knows that 
Jerry w i l l make decision p at է2 unless a certain be l ie f comes to m i n d at t l . I t is 
indeterminist ic whether this be l ie f w i l l come to m i n d . However , i f this be l ie f comes to 
m i n d , then N e w m a n w i l l intervene in Jerry 'ร decision mak ing process, ensur ing that 
Jerry makes decis ion p at է2. I n the actual sequence the relevant be l ie f does not come to 
m i n d , and Jerry makes decision p under his o w n steam. Bu t there was no poss ib i l i ty o f 
his dec id ing otherwise. A n d hence, PAP is refuted for Va ler ian incompat ib i l i sm. 
Va ler ian incompat ib i l i sm shows i tse l f to be incapable o f de l iver ing the k i nd o f 
independence needed for ownership. 
7.5 K a n e a n M o d e s t I n c o m p a t i b i l i s m 
Whi l s t Va le r ian incompat ib i l i sm fai ls to introduce indetermin ism in a way that cou ld 
secure the k i nd o f independence f r o m the past required for ownersh ip , I ho ld that 
matters are d i f ferent when it comes to the k ind o f modest incompat ib i l i s t pos i t ion 
developed by Kane. It is securing this k i nd o f independence w h i c h is the pr imary 
mot i va t ion behind Kane's v iew. 
B y locat ing the indetermin ism i n the agent's ef for t o f w i l l on the occasion o f to rn 
decisions, i t becomes indeterminate in what way the agent w i l l consciously decide up to 
the moment of choice.^^ 
For reasons a l ready made clear in Chapter 3, this k i n d o f v i e w does not run a f o u l o f Frankfurt-Style 
cases. F o r because the agent 's e f f o r t o f w i l l is inde te rmina te u p to the m o m e n t o f d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g , there is 
no p r i o r basis u p o n w h i c h a coun te r fac tua l in tervener can in tervene. T h e v i e w there fo re passes m y test 
above . 
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One reason I bel ieve this del ivers the k i nd o f ownership w e need for free w i l l and 
responsib i l i ty goes as fo l lows . I f we d id have incompat ib i l is t contro l o f the myster ious 
k i nd ― so path-p ick ing contro l o f the k ind that w o u l d eradicate agent internal causal luck 
- then w e w o u l d have free w i l l by jus t about anyone'ร standards (van Inwagen 2002, p. 
168). A n d so, by hypothesis, we w o u l d have the requisite ownersh ip over what we do. 
I f , for instance, a C N C control ler implanted us w i t h a mechanism that (somehow) 
prov ided us w i t h incompat ib i l i s t cont ro l , then our responsib i l i ty for what w e do w o u l d 
be in no way tb*eatened by this histor ical fact. For the C N C control ler 一 as G o d is held 
by some to have done - w o u l d have given นร free w i l l . A n d thereby they w o u l d have 
re l inquished contro l over us. 
I f we were to remove the incompat ib i l is t cont ro l , wh i ls t leaving in place the 
indetermin ism accommodat ing i t , then the C N C contro l ler w o u l d have no greater 
cont ro l over what the agent d id , than i f the incompat ib i l i s t contro l were i n place. I n 
other words , the C N C control ler is in no better pos i t ion w i t h respect to their cont ro l over 
what w e do .^^ W e w o u l d have as much independence f r o m the past as i f w e have 
incompat ib i l i s t contro l . We w o u l d have as many paths into the future. In short, we 
w o u l d have as much 'up to us-ness' jus t through the w i l l - in te rna l indetermin ism, as we 
w o u l d i f such indetermin ism were supplemented w i t h incompat ib i l i s t cont ro l . 
There are a number o f concerns that migh t be raised against what I have jus t said. 
F i rst ly , there m igh t be a concern that w i thou t the incompat ib i l i s t cont ro l i n the p icture, 
the agent w o u l d gain ownership, but at serious cost in terms o f contro l . Bu t this is to 
make the erosion argument and so the arguments o f the previous chapter apply. 
Secondly, there is a concern that in terms o f independence and ownersh ip one gets 
everyth ing that one w o u l d get i f one had incompat ib i l i s t cont ro l , but nevertheless 
mainta ins that w i thou t the addi t ion o f incompat ib i l i s t contro l one w i l l not have enough 
contro l for responsib i l i ty , for responsibi l i ty requires something more than compat ib i l i s t 
96 O n e m i g h t ob j ec t th is w o u l d be also be the case i f the i n d e t e r m i n i s m were loca ted ear l ier , as w i t h 
V a l e r i a n v i ews . B u t th is is no t so ― the fact that ' V a l e r i a n ' i n c o m p a t i b i l i s t cond i t i ons fac i l i ta te c o v e r t 
passive c o n t r o l by a coun te r fac tua l in tervener are ev idence o f th is . I t ac tua l l y is poss ib le fo r someone to 
i m p l a n t an i n c o m p a t i b i l i s t mechan i sm and be able to ensure that the agent o n l y ever makes cer ta in 
dec is ions , w h i l s t , in the actua l sequence, it turns out that the agent acted freely on eve ry occas ion . In o ther 
w o r d s , on the V a l e r i a n v i e w , we can have j us t one path in to the fijture, bu t can t rave l that pa th freely, and 
a l l th is due to the designs o f a cover t con t ro l le r . N o n e o f th is is poss ib le w i t h the K a n e a n i n c o m p a t i b i l i s t 
p o s i t i o n . 
144 
contro l (see, for instance, Clarke 2002, p. 376). Th i s k i nd o f concern returns us to 
worr ies about the adequacy o f compat ib i l is t cont ro l , and i t is a concern that I w i l l tu rn 
my attent ion to in the next chapter, rather than here. 
Th i rd l y , there is a concern about whether the indeterminacy in the w i l l real ly can thwart 
C N C cont ro l . It is this type o f challenge that I w i l l consider in what fo l l ows , I w i l l 
consider a number o f such charges be low, inc lud ing one that I raise mysel f , h igh l i gh t ing 
a novel way in w h i c h a C N C control ler m igh t be able to exercise their cont ro l over the 
'Kanean ' agent. Wh i l s t I reject the other challenges to ownership, I argue that my o w n 
challenge calls for a sl ight mod i f i ca t ion in the modest incompat ib i l is t v iew. 
7.6 O b j e c t i o n : H a j i 
Ha j i agrees w i t h me about Valer ian incompat ib i l i sm. One is no better protected against 
ownersh ip subvert ing C N C control w i t h Valer ian free w i l l than one w o u l d be w i t h 
compat ib i l is t free w i l l . Bu t Haj i th inks that i f this is true, then the same holds true for 
modest incompat ib i l i s t posi t ions o f Kane 's variety:^^ 
[ I ] f v i c t ims o f [ C N C contro l ] are not responsible for their choices when 
indeterminacy in the act ional pathway o f events leading to choice occurs 
re lat ively early i n the pathway, and they are not responsible because they are 
v i c t ims o f [ C N C cont ro l ] , how can they be responsible when indeterminacy 
occurs further up in the pathway ending in the choice when they are s t i l l 
v ic t ims? We can grant that in her conf l ic t [the agent 's] e f for t o f w i l l that 
culminates in her decision to smoke is indeterminate and her resul t ing choice 
undetermined. Bu t presumably the mental actions that are an agent's ef for ts o f 
w i l l must, in some nontr iv ia l way, depend causally on the agent 'ร antecedent 
act ional elements l ike her values, desires, and bel iefs. But in [both modest-
l ibertar ian agent and robust modest- l ibertar ian agent] the relevant antecedent 
act ional elements have been heteronomously acquired. H o w , then, can [robust 
l ibertar ian agent] be mora l ly responsible for her choice to smoke i f we grant 
9 7 A l t h o u g h H a j i agrees w i t h m e about M e le ian i n c o m p a t i b i l i s m , 1 d i d n o t cons ide r H a j i ' ร a rguments i n 
the p r e c e d i n g sec t ion . T h i s was because H a j i ' ร a rgument was qu i te d i f f e ren t to m ine . H a j i ' ร a rgumen t was 
exac t l y the same as the a rgument that he has presented here rega rd ing K a n e a n i n c o m p a t i b i l i s m . 
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that [modest l ibertar ian agent] is not mora l l y responsible for her choice to do 
A ? (Ha j i 2002, p. 131) 
So, H a j i ' ร argument is that i f one agrees that indeterminacy early i n the "act iona l 
pa thway" offers noth ing i n terms o f ownersh ip , then m o v i n g the indeterminacy fur ther 
along cannot plausible change matters. I disagree, for the move a long the act ional 
pathway is s igni f icant. The move means that indeterminacy is, as I 've said above, n o w 
i n the place where incompat ib i l is t contro l w o u l d operate i f we had i t . The indeterminacy 
is n o w at the centre o f the action.^^ 
Bu t H a j i ' ร more basic point seems to be that i f a l l the basic elements o f an agent's free 
w i l l mechanism have been implanted, and i f the decis ion that the agent makes is sourced 
to those elements, then the agent'ร responsibi l i ty is undermined and no amount o f 
indeterminacy between those elements w i l l make any di f ference. 
Bu t this assumes that the real p rob lem that cases invo lv ing C N C man ipu la t ion br ings to 
our at tent ion is that the agent themselves d id not do the j o b o f imp lan t ing their act ional 
elements. I n other words, the real p rob lem is that the agent d id not " p u l l onesel f up into 
existence by the hair, out o f the swamps o f noth ingness" (Nietzsche 1966, p. 21) . Bu t 
this is an unduly demanding self-creation condi t ion to saddle the incompat ib i l i s t w i t h 
and I w o u l d reject that any plausible incompat ib i l is t pos i t ion can be commi t ted to i t . I 
am go ing to say more about this in the next chapter ― for i t is c o m m o n for the cr i t ics o f 
i ncompat ib i l i sm to inv i te us to associate the pos i t ion w i t h var ious out landishly 
demanding condi t ions. But for my риф08Є8 here, I th ink the quickest way to see that 
ownersh ip cannot invo lve ' pu l l i ng oneself out o f the swamps o f nothingness' is to once 
again re turn to m y pr inc ip le argument. I f an agent had incompat ib i l i s t cont ro l they 
w o u l d , by hypothesis have suf f ic ient ownership over what they do. Bu t qui te clearly th is 
agent does not have unrestr icted ownership. The choices that this agent makes and the 
character fo rmat ion process that they undergo, w i l l be made against a background not o f 
the agent's choosing. To use a w e l l - w o r n metaphor: the garden o f f o r k i ng paths the 
agent gets to negotiate is not one o f the agent'ร mak ing 一 but the agent does get to wa l k 
their o w n route w i t h i n that garden. A l l o f this stays the same i f one removes the 
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i ncompat ib i l i s t contro l but leaves in place the indetermin ism. For the incompat ib i l i s t 
cont ro l d id not give one more alternative possibi l i t ies, it d id not enlarge the scope o f 
one's background character traits and so fo r th . The garden remains as m u c h outside your 
cont ro l as i t w o u l d do i f you had incompat ib i l is t cont ro l , and the route you take through 
that garden is as much d o w n to you as i t w o u l d be i f you had incompat ib i l i s t cont ro l ― 
for after a l l , no th ing external to your w i l l is go ing to determine w h i c h paths you take. 
Wha t H a j i misses is that the p rob lem covert contro l h ighl ights is not str ict ly speaking 
the fact that one's mechanism has been implanted (for u l t imate ly one never controls the 
process o f mechanism acquis i t ion, implanted or not ) , but the fact that a l l that one 
subsequently does is n o w determined. A l l that one subsequently does is expla ined fu l l y 
i n v i r tue o f the fact that one had in place a mechanism o f th is or that k i nd i n 
circumstances o f this or that nature.^^ T o return to the metaphor o f the garden o f f o rk ing 
paths: we do not need an endlessly large garden, nor do we need to have bu i l t the garden 
ourselves. I t is enough that the garden i n w h i c h we find ourselves contains open 
pathways o f a certain qual i ty ; and i t is enough that i t is d o w n to us w i t h pathways we 
travel down . That is enough for us to have independence and ownersh ip . I t is a 
' rest r ic ted ' f o r m o f independence and ownership but, a restricted f o r m o f independence 
and ownersh ip is still a f o rm o f ownership. A n d this f o r m o f ownersh ip is still o f a 
deeper k i nd than avai lable under determin ism. 
N o t e that H a j i h i m s e l f mus t a c k n o w l e d g e the s ign i f i cance o f th is m o v e a l ong the ac t iona l pa thway , f o r 
w e saw in the p rev ious chapter h o w , a c c o r d i n g to H a j i , th is m o v e y ie lds an e ros ion i n c o n t r o l , whereas , by 
his o w n a d m i s s i o n , it w o u l d not i f i t were located ear l ier . 
Sch lossberger also misses th is p o i n t w h e n he makes the f o l l o w i n g argument : 
Suppose that W i l l i a m decides to g i ve me a pa r t i cu la r set A o f be l ie fs , a t t i tudes, d i spos i t i ons , 
etc. H e pe r f o rms neurosurgery , a l t e r i ng m y b ra in so that 1 have set A . N o w , b y chance I 
happened to have set A be fo re W i l l i a m began h is p rocedure . Thus m y b r a i n a f ter the p rocedure 
is no d i f f e ren t than i t was be fo re W i l l i a m began. A s a resul t , m y subsequent ac t ions are 0 
d i f f e r e n t than they w o u l d have been w i t h o u t the p rocedure . I a m j u s t as suscept ib le to ra t i ona l 
persuas ion as I was be fore , etc. Does W i l l i a m ' s p rocedure make any d i f f e r e n c e to m y m o r a l 
status? A m I hence fo r th abso l ved o f a l l m o r a l respons ib i l i t y? ( 1 9 8 6 , p. 4 5 ) 
Sch lossberger is a compa t i b i l i s t , and he is us ing the above po in t to argue that a l te rna t i ve poss ib i l i t i es are 
no t needed fo r respons ib i l i t y . B u t at the m o m e n t let us j u s t note that i f Sch lossberger ' ร i n i t i a l mechan i sm 
sa t is f ied the modes t i n c o m p a t i b i l i s t requ i rements , and i f the imp lan ted m e c h a n i s m also sa t is f ied those 
requ i remen ts , then Schlossberger w i l l be respons ib le fo r his subsequent dec is ions . B u t then i t rema ins the 
case that he w i l l have a l te rnat ive poss ib i l i t i es ( f o r this is j u s t par t and parce l o f sa t i s f y i ng the modes t 
l i be r ta r i an c o n d i t i o n ) . 
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7.7 O b j e c t i o n : D o u b l e 
I w i l l n o w turn to a c r i t i c ism made by Richard Double . Doub le has argued that a C N C 
contro l ler cou ld st i l l exercise a destructive k ind o f contro l over an agent, even i f the 
agent d id satisfy modest incompat ib i l i s t free w i l l condi t ions, for " a [ C N C ] control ler 
cou ld set up undesirable alternatives between wh i ch we wou ld make indeterminist ic 
choices that w o u l d leave us woe fu l l y unfree under the contro l ler 'ร d is junct ive con t ro l " 
(1996， p. 139; 1991, pp. 214-215; 1989). I n other words, a covert contro l ler m igh t 
imp lan t a mechanism wh i ch is indeterminate in the r ight k i n d o f way , yet the 
indeterminacy migh t range over a l im i ted range o f choices. For instance, a covert 
contro l ler m igh t want Jones to assassinate either the president or the f i rst lady - either 
w i l l do. Jones's reason-responsive mechanism has been implanted w i t h this i n m i n d , 
and a l though it w i l l be indeterminate w h i c h way Jones w i l l choose, i t is nevertheless the 
case that the implantat ion ensures that he w i l l choose one o f these opt ions. The 
argument w o u l d go that in this k i n d o f case Jones'ร mora l responsibi l i ty is in tu i t i ve ly 
undermined, and yet by my l ights Jones had ownership over his decis ion. 
I n response the f i rst th ing I w o u l d do is concede that Jones d id have ownersh ip over his 
decis ion, because it was u l t imate ly d o w n to h i m , there and then, to decide whether to 
assassinate the first lady or the president. No th i ng external to Jones made h i m decide as 
he d id . S imi la r ly , i f Jones were insane and his opt ion range consisted o f w h i c h out o f a 
range o f songs to be l low at the top o f his vo ice, then I w o u l d again grant that his 
decis ion w o u l d be one over wh i ch he 'd have ownership. Bu t this w o u l d be equal ly true 
i f , i n both cases, Jones had genuine incompat ib i l is t contro l over w h i c h decis ion he 
made. For as already pointed out, such luck-eradicat ing contro l does not g ive the agent 
cont ro l over their op t ion ranges, but on ly over wh i ch opt ion they actualise f r o m w i t h i n 
that range. Hav ing luck-eradicat ing contro l does not, for instance, g ive you a guarantee 
that y o u ' l l not go insane, nor does it guarantee y o u that a mad C N C contro l ler m igh t not 
restr ict your opt ion ranges, as in the case above. I n both cases ― go ing insane and hav ing 
one's op t ion range restricted 一 one has not been depr ived o f one's luck-eradicat ing 
cont ro l . S imi la r ly , one has as much ownership over what one does when insane, or 
when one's opt ion range is restr icted, as in standard cases. 
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But does this mean that I am commi t ted to the absurd c la im that Jones is mora l l y 
responsible for his decision to shoot the f i rst lady rather than the president, or that 
insane Jones is mora l l y responsible for his decision about w h i c h song to be l low? Yes 
and no. Imagine that the Jones in the above cases had incompat ib i l i s t cont ro l . W e l l , then 
he w o u l d be responsible, but he 'd be responsible for 'dec id ing to shoot the first lady 
rather than the president ' . In the insanity case, he 'd be responsible for 'dec id ing to 
be l l ow song X , rather than song Y ' . In other words, he 'd be responsible for some 
contrast ive fact. In both cases, the contrastive fact in question d id not conta in either a 
mora l l y permissib le opt ion ( in the case o f the assassination) or a mora l l y s igni f icant 
op t ion ( in the case o f the song-bel lowing) . A s such, these are not the k inds o f decis ion 
for w h i c h the agent can be b lamewor thy or praiseworthy. I n both cases the agent is 
' responsib le ' , but not mora l l y responsible. 
Wha t we can say is that where the k ind o f free w i l l needed for responsib i l i ty is 
concerned, i t is important not jus t that the agent have genuine alternat ive possibi l i t ies, 
but also that they are o f a certain qual i ty. I f the decision that the agent makes is one for 
w h i c h she is to be mora l l y responsible, it must be possible for the agent to have avoided 
wrongdo ing , and thereby avoided blame (Harr ison 2005; M c K e n n a 1997, pp. 73-75; 
W y m a 1997, p. 59; Otsuka 1998, p. 688). Otsuka calls this the "Pr inc ip le o f Avo idab le 
B l a m e " : 
Р A B : One is b lamewor thy for per fo rming an act o f a g iven type on ly i f one 
cou ld instead have behaved in a manner for w h i c h one w o u l d have been 
ent i rely blameless. (1998, p. 688) 
Assum ing that one can on ly have the possib i l i ty o f behaving in a manner for w h i c h one 
is ent i re ly blameless i f behaving i n that way is mora l l y permissible, then р A B entails 
that responsib i l i ty requires an opt ion range w h i c h includes mora l l y permissible 
opt ions. '«" 
Bu t i t is impor tant to recognise w h i c h way around my account puts matters. I f we are to 
be the u l t imate source o f our act, then no th ing external to us can have been a suf f ic ient 
"" ՚ P A B , i t seems to me , is an in tu i t i ve p r i n c i p l e , and it is in part sure ly because o f cons idera t ions to do 
w i t h P A B that P A P gets much o f its i n tu i t i ve appeal (a po in t I make in m y 2 0 0 4 ) . 
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cause o f our act. I f this condi t ion is satisf ied, then it w i l l be the case that we w i l l have 
genuine alternative possibi l i t ies in w h i c h we decide otherwise. Bu t what we are the 
u l t imate source o f - i n other words, what we have ownership over ― w i l l be a func t ion o f 
the alternative possibi l i t ies that were available to us at the t ime o f decis ion mak ing . So, 
the assassin has ownership over their contrastive decision to assassinate the f i rst lady 
rather than the president. 
What we do is assess the mora l signif icance o f this contrastive choice. Choosing to 
assassinate the f i rst lady rather than the president is actual ly not that mora l l y s igni f icant 
(un l i ke , for instance, choosing to assassinate the f i rst lady rather than water ing the 
plants). Where al l alternatives are bad, then at most the agent can be responsible on ly for 
hav ing p icked the worst o f two bad opt ions. But where both are equal ly mora l l y 
impermiss ib le , then whichever choice is made, the agent's op t ion range is not o f a k i nd 
that can legi t imise a judgement o f mora l responsibi l i ty 一 not because the agent d id not 
have the r ight k i nd o f contro l and not because the agent fa i led to be the u l t imate source 
o f what they d id , but rather jus t because o f the mora l qual i ty o f what they d i d , ' ^ ' 
The general po in t wo r th stressing can be put this way. We can say that i t is important 
that we make a real d i f ference, hence the need for alternative possibi l i t ies. I t is also 
impor tant that we make the di f ference, hence the need for internal indetermin ism so 
located that the di f ference in quest ion is u l t imate ly sourced to 4 i ร ' . Bu t i t is also 
impor tant that the di f ference we make be o f a suf f ic ient ly s igni f icant k ind. ' ^^ For part o f 
what responsibi l i ty marks is the fact o f this signif icance. I n cases where there was no 
' 0 ' O n e m i g h t raise some conce rn over m y charac ter isa t ion o f an o p t i o n range as b e i n g one that conta ins 
o n l y m o r a l l y impe rm iss i b l e op t ions . Fo r ought imp l i es can, and ough t -no t imp l i es can re f ra i n , so to say 
that a pa r t i cu la r o p t i o n is m o r a l l y impe rm iss i b l e is to presuppose that there is a pe rm iss ib le o p t i o n 
ava i l ab le . Hence , o p t i o n ranges in w h i c h a l l the op t i ons are m o r a l l y i m p e r m i s s i b l e are not poss ib le . 
T h i s is exac t l y the same k i n d o f a rgumen t that m a n y w o u l d use to argue against the p o s s i b i l i t y o f genu ine 
m o r a l d i l e m m a s . A n op t i on range in w h i c h a l l the op t ions are m o r a l l y i m p e r m i s s i b l e j u s t is a m o r a l 
dileiTUฑa, and so the a rguments against m o r a l d i l emmas au toma t i ca l l y app ly . N o w , let me say that I t h i n k 
the above po in t has mer i t , and w o u l d agree that in fact one cannot have such an o p t i o n range 一 or at least, 
one can , bu t i t w o u l d be incor rec t to descr ibe i t as one in w h i c h a l l the op t i ons are m o r a l l y impe rm iss ib l e . 
B u t th is concess ion w o u l d not a f fec t m y p o i n t in any way . Fo r m o r a l r espons ib i l i t y presupposes 
w r o n g d o i n g , and as such o p t i o n ranges in w h i c h n o o p t i o n is w r o n g carmot be ones fo r w h i c h the agent 
can earn b lame or pra ise, p rec ise ly Decause the agent w i l l not make a s ign i f i can t m o r a l d i f f e rence t h rough 
the i r ac t i on . 
'D2 A n o t h e r w a y in w h i c h the qua l i t y o f the op t i on range can be impo r tan t concerns the sani ty o f the range 
in ques t ion . I t is one t h i ng to be to rn be tween s topp ing and g i v i n g a id to someone in need, and w a l k i n g 
past to a t tend the impo r tan t mee t ing . B u t i f one is t o rn be tween g i v i n g a id o n the one hand , o r sc reaming 
obsceni t ies at the sky on the other then the agent is not respons ib le w h i c h e v e r w a y she chooses. Fo r tne 
o p t i o n range in ques t ion is an insane one. 
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mora l l y permissible opt ion avai lable, then whatever di f ference the agent makes, it w i l l 
not be a moraHy signi f icant di f ference. It w i l l not matter how much contro l the agent 
exercised over mak ing this di f ference. 
7.8 O b j e c t i o n : T r a c i n g V i e w s 
There is another way in w h i c h a C N C control ler m igh t st i l l pose a p rob lem for the 
modest incompat ib i l is t account o f free w i l l . I do not th ink the p rob lem insurmountable, 
and raise i t on ly because I bel ieve i t prompts a ref inement o f the account. 
T o make this part icular ob ject ion, i t is necessary that we fami l iar ise ourselves w i t h 
t racing v iews. I have already br ie f ly ment ioned tracing v iews in the previous two 
chapters, but we now need to say more. I n Chapter 5 we saw that Kane refers to 
genuinely indeterminist ic to rn decisions as sel f f o rm ing acts or 'SFAs，. Th is is because 
on these occasions the agent themselves determines the course their character 
development w i l l take. The idea is that the agent is, on these occasions, part ly 
cont r ibu t ing to their o w n future character 一 bu i ld ing up a stake, i f one l ikes, in their 
character. Bu t Kane also holds that an agent does not on ly have free w i l l on the occasion 
o f SFAs. Kane holds that an agent can have decided freely even i f their decis ion was 
determined by their character, so long as the agent had some stake in that character. 
Hav ing such a stake w o u l d mean that there w o u l d need to be SFAs i n the past 一 at some 
past t ime the agent w o u l d have had to have had genuine alternat ive possibi l i t ies. But 
genuine alternative possibi l i t ies are not always needed. 
What w e can do here is d is t inguish between direct ly free acts and ind i rect ly free acts. 
W e can say that direct ly free acts are SFAs. Indi rect ly free acts are acts w h i c h stem f r o m 
reasons and mot ives that are themselves due to earlier d i rect ly free acts. In other words , 
ind i rect ly free acts owe their ' freeness' to earlier SFAs. There we noted the in tu i t ive 
attractiveness o f t racing v iews: we consider the drunk responsible for their behaviour -
at least to some extent ― so long as we assume that they freely chose to get drunk. ՚^ ՜^  
Kane is not alone in endorsing a tracing v iew. Ar is to t le endorsed the t racing v i e w when 
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Һе said that " jus t as when one has once let go o f a stone, i t is too late to get i t back 一 but 
the agent was responsible for t h row ing i t , because the o r ig in or the act ion was i n 
himself . So too i t was at first open to the unjust and l icent ious persons not to become 
such, and therefore they are vo luntar i ly what they are" (1976, p. 124, 1114a 18-19). A n d 
i t is c o m m o n amongst contemporary incompat ib i l is ts ― whether o f modest var iety, or 
contro l - incompat ib i l is ts . '^ ' ' For the alternative is to adopt what is k n o w n ― f o l l o w i n g 
Fischer - as ' res t r i c t i v i sm ' (1994, p. 47). 
The restr ic t iv ist incompat ib i l i s t w o u l d restrict free w i l l and responsib i l i ty on l y to those 
occasions where the agent had genuine alternative possibi l i t ies. There is disagreement 
amongst incompat ib i l is ts about jus t h o w of ten we do have genuinely avai lable 
alternative possibi l i t ies. We saw i n Chapter 5 that Kane out l ined six k inds o f occasion 
associated w i t h SFAs, and th inks that we are subject to such occasions fa i r ly regular ly. 
Balaguar, another modest incompat ib i l is t o f Kane 's stripe, th inks that we make to rn 
decisions a great deal o f the t ime, wh i ls t van Inwagen th inks that we very rarely make 
such decisions. So, h o w restr ict ive rest r ic i t iv ism w o u l d be, is go ing to be a func t ion o f 
jus t h o w o f ten one th inks w e have genuine alternative possibi l i t ies. The fact is though, 
that whatever v i e w one takes here, i t is l i ke ly that res t r ic i t iv ism w o u l d lead to greatly 
d im in i sh ing what we are responsible for. A great deal o f what we do, a great deal o f the 
decisions that we make, are made unth ink ing ly , on the spur o f the moment . For al l such 
decisions, w e bear no responsib i l i ty on the restr ict iv ist v iew . I f one th inks 一 as van 
Inwagen does ― that we rarely have genuine alternative possibi l i t ies - then one is go ing 
to f i nd oneself coming per i lously close to being, to al l intents and purposes, a hard 
determinist . So let us assume that a viable incompat ib i l i s t v i e w (whether o f modest or 
contro l var iet ies), or at least one that does not want to be too revis ionary, w i l l endorse 
the t racing v iew. 
A r i s t o t l e discusses such cases, p o i n t i n g out that ' 'penal t ies are d o u b l e d f o r c o m m i t t i n g an o f f ence in a 
state o f d runkenness , because the source o f the ac t ion lay in the agent h imse l f : he was capab le o f no t 
ge t t i ng d r u n k , and h is drunkenness was the case o f h is i g n o r a n c e " ( 1 9 7 6 , p. 123). 
1 ， N o t e that t r a c i n g v i ews are not o n l y he ld by i ncompa t i b i l i s t s , C o m p a t i b i l i s t s h o l d t h e m too - see 
F ischer 1994， pp . 175-178 . The re is con t rove rsy ove r whe the r A r i s t o t l e h i m s e l f was c o m p a t i b i l i s t s o r 
i n c o m p a t i b i l i s t , So rab j i d e f e n d i n g the i n c o m p a t i b i l i s t i n te rp re ta t ion in his 1980, but others d e f e n d i n g a 
compa t i b i l i s t s i n te rp re ta t ion ( I r w i n 1980; F ine 1 9 8 1 ; B r o a d i e 1991) . I t is a rguab ly that any sensib le v i e w 
o n free w i l l mus t і п с о ф о г а ї е a t r a c i n g v i e w o f some k i n d . T h e p r o b l e m that і d r a w a t ten t ion t o , is one that 
concerns i ncompa t i b i l i s t s o n l y however , insofar as i ncompa t i b i i i s t s have a pu ta t i ve advantage on the issue 
o f o w n e r s h i p and C N C con t ro l . 
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The prob lem w i t h the t racing v i ew can be brought out by some remarks o f Ar is to t le 's . 
Ar is to t le points out that we do not contro l our disposit ions ― our character traits - i n the 
same way that we contro l our actions. Our disposit ions are on ly d i rect ly contro l led by us 
at the beginn ing " the ind iv idua l stages o f their development, as in the case o f i l lness, are 
unnot iceable" (Ar is to t le 1976, p. 126). In other words, whether our actions actual ly lead 
to the development o f a certain d isposi t ion is not something that is up to us, though i t 
was up to us to have per formed the acts wh i ch , may or may not, lead to a certain 
d isposi t ion being acquired. But if， through act ing unjust ly , a man develops a d isposi t ion 
to be unjust, Ar is to t le a l lows that " i t does not f o l l o w that he can stop being unjust , and 
be jus t i f he wants to ― no more than a sick man can become healthy, even though ( i t 
may be) his sickness is vo luntary, being the result o f incont inent l i v i ng and disobeying 
his doctors" (1976, p. 124). Ar is to t le does not th ink this precludes responsibi l i ty , 
precisely because it was u l t imate ly down to the agent to have made themselves that way 
even though " i t is no longer open to them not to be such" (1976, p. 124). Bu t I am less 
sure about this, and I th ink most incompat ib i l is ts should be too. Imagine that, up to now, 
most o f us have experienced a signi f icant number o f SFAs. That means that, as o f now , 
our characters are substantial ly, our o w n creation. A n d n o w imagine that the universe 
has, at th is moment , become determinist ic. So, f r o m n o w on, everyth ing we do w i l l be 
determined by the past and the laws o f nature. A n d , as i t happens, this means that our 
characters are n o w f i xed (this is not a necessary imp l i ca t ion o f determin ism ― but I am 
jus t asking that we imagine that, i n fact, this is the case in this instance). So, f r o m n o w 
on i t is not up to us to be di f ferent f r o m how we now are. O n the t racing v iew, we w i l l 
s t i l l be responsible for our decisions, or at least for those decisions we make w h i c h trace 
to the pre֊determinism SFAs. 
That m igh t not sound too wo r r y i ng to begin w i t h . Bu t consider that a c o m m o n wor ry 
about determin ism, is that i f determin ism is true, our characters are fixed. I f I am self ish 
and unk ind I am destined to remain so. Compat ib i l is ts are qu ick to po in t out that this 
does not f o l l ow . De te rmin ism is the thesis that there is on ly one future, but i t does not 
f o l l o w f r o m this that one has a 'T lxed personal nature" (Tay lor and Dennett 2002, p. 
271) . One's f i xed future may be one in w h i c h one's character undergoes many radical 
changes. 
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The latter [a fixed nature] is cause for d ismay, perhaps, but not the former [a 
fixed personal future] for i t could very we l l be one's f i xed personal future to be 
blessed w i t h a protean nature, h igh ly responsive to the "ac t i v i t y o f the self ." 
The total set o f personal futures, " f i x e d " or not, contains al l sorts o f agreeable 
scenarios, inc lud ing victor ies over adversity, subjugations o f weakness, 
reformat ions o f character, even changes o f luck. It cou ld be jus t as determined 
a fact that you con teach an o ld dog new t r icks as that you can' t . (Tay lor and 
Dennett 2002, p. 271) 
Bu t note that this reply by the compat ib i l is t fai ls to address the real concern. For wh i ls t 
one's nature m igh t be determined to be changeable, i t m igh t be determined to be fixed. 
De te rmin ism does not preclude hav ing a character that undergoes many changes dur ing 
its history, but nor does it guarantee it. For a compat ib i l is t this makes no odds to one's 
mora l responsibi l i ty . Provided the f i xed nature that you have is one that af fords you 
compat ib i l is t cont ro l over what you do ― as we l l it m igh t - then you are free and mora l ly 
responsible. 
A t f i rst glance the modest incompat ib i l is t v i e w seems to be ta i lor made to answer these 
k inds o f worr ies. The modest l ibertar ian can point out that on their v i e w you w i l l on ly 
be mora l l y responsible fo r what y o u do, i f your nature is not fixed. Y o u w i l l on ly be 
mora l ly responsible i f , at various junctures, it is genuinely possible for you to turn out 
d i f ferent ly . Bu t this attractiveness is shown to be threatened by m y comments above 
regarding the t racing v iew. W e can br ing this out by employ ing a C N C control ler . 
Imagine that a F rank fu r t -S t y l e counterfactual intervener is mon i to r ing Jones's decis ion 
mak ing processes. Jones makes a direct ly free decis ion or SFA. The counterfacmal 
intervener knows that Jones has jus t 'set his พ i l ľ such that, i f he remains this way he 
w i l l per fo rm an act w h i c h the intervener wants h i m to per fo rm, several years hence, 
other things being equal. Bu t other things w i l l only be equal i f Jones does not undergo 
any further se l f - fo rming episodes. So what the intervener does is render Jones's 
dec is ion-making processes determinist ic f r o m n o w on.iG5 I n other words , wh i l s t Jones 
' 0 5 One m i g h t w o n d e r exac t l y h o w the C N C con t ro l l e r c o u l d d o th is w i t h o u t ac t i ve l y i n t e r v e n i n g in a w a y 
that w o u l d subver t owne rsh ip . W e l l , one w a y w o u l d be to so arrange th ings that Jones w i l l never face 
another t o r n dec is ion - s o m e t h i n g the C N C con t ro l l e r k n o w s h o w to do , g i v e n the i r supreme in te l l i gence , 
k n o w l e d g e and power . 
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h imse l f sets his w i l l , the intervener ensures that i t remains set. A l l the subsequent 
decisions that Jones makes, p rov ided basic compat ib i l is t free w i l l requirements are met, 
w i l l be ones for w h i c h Jones w i l l be t ru ly responsible by the l ights o f the 
incompat ib i l is t . '^^ Ye t the intervener ensured that Jones w o u l d face no further 
opportuni t ies to change his w i l l . 
Maybe i n the short- term the intervener 'ร intervent ion does not subvert the agent's 
responsibi l i ty . But i n the long term it seems unfa i r that the agent should cont inue to be 
responsible, for (unbeknownst to them) they have no oppor tuni ty to change the way that 
they are. M y in tu i t ion is that this f o r m o f C N C cont ro l , a f o r m w h i c h invo lves depr iv ing 
a par t ly se l f -owned agent f r o m hav ing any further opportuni t ies to change themselves is 
subversive o f responsibi l i ty. It is not immediate ly subversive o f responsibi l i ty , but 
becomes so the longer the agent goes w i thou t hav ing any chance to change themselves, 
or endorse/re-af f i rm the way that they are.*^^ 
I do not th ink that m y cr i t i c ism above is devastating to the t rac ing v i ew , or modest 
incompat ib i l i sm. '^^ Rather i t h ighl ights the need for a ref inement. Where Kane focuses 
on past SFAs, I ho ld that what I have above shows that future SFAs also need to be 
made part o f what i t is to have free w i l l . Free w i l l is not j us t about hav ing had genuine 
106 I assume that modes t i n c o m p a t i b i l i s t s h o l d that it is enough that an agent sa t is fy c o m p a t i b i l i s t c o n t r o l 
c o n d i t i o n s f o r i nd i rec t free acts. I t m a y be that some th i ng less than c o m p a t i b i l i s t c o n d i t i o n s are a l l that are 
needed. A f t e r a l l , i n the ' d r u n k ' e x a m p l e used ear l ier , the agent does not sa t is fy c o n d i t i o n s o f modera te 
reason responsiveness f o r the i r acts p e r f o r m e d w h i l s t d r u n k , ye t i t remains i n t u i t i v e to cons ider t h e m 
m o r a l l y respons ib le f o r such acts. 
107 K a n e does seem w i l l i n g to accept that one c o u l d , at least, be e te rna l l y p r a i s e w o r t h y . F o r i n a f oo tno te 
K a n e endorses a pa r t i cu la r re l i g i ous use to w h i c h his account o f free w i l l has been p u t b y the p h i l o s o p h e r 
James Sennett . Sei inet t argues that there is a p r o b l e m o f heaven ly free w i l l . Fo r assuming that in heaven 
there w i l l , o f necessi ty , be n o w r o n g d o i n g , then there*ร a p r o b l e m say ing exac t l y h o w those o f us w h o get -
i n , w i l l re ta in ou r free w i l l . A c o m p a t i b i l i s t w o u l d have no t r oub le a n s w e r i n g th i s ques t ion . B u t the 
p r o b l e m then is that c o m p a t i b i l i s t free w i l l doesn ' t fac i l i ta te the free w i l l de fence against the p r o b l e m o f 
e v i l . The re i s n ' t t i m e here to exp lo re th is issue, bu t w e can take it as read that most theists are l ibe r ta r ians . 
Sennet t ' ร suggest ion is tha t those in heaven can re ta in t he i r free w i l l and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y p r o v i d e d the 
agents ' character was created t h r o u g h a su f f i c i en t n u m b e r o f s e l f - f o r m i n g acts d u r i n g the i r tenure o n ear th 
(Sennet t 1999) . So, ๒ heaven the agent ' s acts are free and respons ib le because they t race to ear l ie r , 
d i r ec t l y free acts on ear th . K a n e agrees that t h o u g h he does no t " u s u a l l y engage in heaven ly specu la t i on 
tha t "c rea tures in an o r t h o d o x heaven , i f they ac ted at a l l , w o u l d con t i nue to act * O f the i r o w n free w i l l s " 
in the sense o f " w i l l s o f t he i r o w n free m a k i n g " ( 2 0 0 2 , p. 4 0 8 f h . 5 ) . 
H o w e v e r , I t h i n k that m o s t i n compa t i b i l i s t s - i n c l u d i n g K a n e ― w o u l d no t be c o m f o r t a b l e w i t h the same 
i m p l i c a t i o n s r e g a r d i n g h e l l . Cons ide r that i f an agent nas, t h r o u g h a series o f S F A s , c o m e to acqu i re , and 
have a stake ๒ : a set o f v i c i o u s character t ra i ts , then in he l l ֊— assuming that th is is whe re t hey end up ― 
they c o u l d find themselves eternally b l a m e w o r t h y , p r o v i d i n g d e t e r m i n i s m ob ta ins in h e l l . T h i s , I take i t , 
w o u l d be ou t o f the sp i r i t o f i n c o m p a t i b i l i s m . T h e agent needs to have the o p p o r t u n i t y t o change the i r 
character . 
N o t e that the po in ts I have made above a p p l y to a l l w h o i ncompa t i b i l i s t s w h o e m p l o y t r ac i ng 
p r i nc i p l es , i n c l u d i n g c o n t r o l i ncompa t i b i l i s t s . 
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alternative possibi l i t ies, i t is also about hav ing alternative possibi l i t ies in the future. T o 
return to the metaphor o f the garden o f f o rk ing paths, we need to have regular forks both 
behind and in f ront o f us. I f we go too long w i thou t hav ing encountered a fo rk , then we 
are i n ef fect no longer in the garden o f f o rk ing paths and our ownersh ip over wha t w e 
have become starts to d im in ish . The k ind o f ownership that SFAs del iver is leasehold 
not f reehold. 
I admi t that this leaves matters vague. I have no theory that w o u l d te l l us how of ten an 
agent needs SFAs or the rate o f the deter iorat ion o f our ownership i n our background 
character traits. I have to hand this k i nd o f matter over to in tu i t ive judgement , I do not 
th ink that this is too much o f a prob lem however. For m y comments above regarding 
ownership and the tracing v i e w w o u l d apply not jus t to modest incompat ib i l is ts , but 
cont ro l incompat ib i l is ts too - at least those who subscribe to the t racing v iew. The 
p rob lem I have h igh l igh ted above, and to w h i c h I o f fer on ly in tu i t i ve judgement as a 
so lu t ion, is one that is not, str ict ly speaking, due to the modesty o f the modest 
incompat ib i l i s t pos i t ion . Furthermore, the p rob lem is also one for a compat ib i l i s t insofar 
as they too subscribe to t rac ing v iews. For instance, the man w h o gets d runk freely, but 
w h o , wh i l s t drunk, behaves appal l ingly, does not, wh i l s t drunk, exercise suf f ic ient 
compat ib i l i s t cont ro l over their behaviour (the w i l l not be suf f ic ient ly reason-
responsive). 
7.9 Luck and Ownership 
I f m y arguments above are r ight the interest ing upshot is that causal luck is actual ly 
required to del iver ownership. So, wh i l s t everything we do is u l t imate ly a matter o f luck 
whether determin ism or indetermin ism is true, it nevertheless matters what k inds o f luck 
we have been subject to. I f everything we do is a matter o f const i tut ive and 
c i rcumstant ia l l uck we lack ownership or deep at t r ibutabi l i ty . For in that case al l that we 
do traces to factors external to our conscious Willings. Bu t i f there is some causal luck in 
the m i x , and i f the causal luck in question is internal to our w i l l s , then we do have 
ownersh ip , precisely because o f luck 's presence. Another way to put this w o u l d be to 
say that whether determin ism or indetermin ism is true, everyth ing we do is a matter o f 
luck , bu t in the latter case there is the possib i l i ty o f some o f what w e do being a matter 
o f O u r ' luck. 
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Luck , as noted many t imes, is of ten seen as tox ic to responsibi l i ty. Bu t here we see that 
i t has a posi t ive side too. It can actual ly del iver something that many o f us value. I f we 
could have a luck-eradicat ing abi l i ty to decide otherwise, then that too w o u l d g ive us the 
said ownership. Causal luck is not necessary for ownership ( i f pa th-p ick ing cont ro l is 
possible). But incompat ib i l i s t -cont ro l o f the luck eradicat ing var iety w o u l d g ive us 
ownersh ip for the same reason, namely the presence o f alternative possibi l i t ies securing 
independence f r o m the past. 
7.10 Help from Hard Incompatibilists and Hard Determinists 
I n this section and the next I w i l l t ry to al lay some fears about the relevance o f 
ownersh ip to mora l responsibi l i ty. I n this section I w i l l look to the hard incompat ib i l is ts 
and the hard determinists for insight. 
I have so far said l i t t le about the occupiers o f these camps. Hard determinists are 
incompat ib i l is ts w h o bel ieve that determin ism actual ly obtains and so bel ieve that we 
lack free w i l l and are not mora l l y r e s p o n s i b l e . H a r d incompat ib i l is ts d i f fe r on ly 
insofar as they acknowledge that indetermin ism could we l l be true, but th ink that we 
st i l l lack free w i l l because it is un l i ke ly that it obtains in the r ight k i n d o f way (or that 
we lack the k i nd o f extra factor needed for incompat ib i l is t contro l ) . " * ՛ The di f ference 
between the two is academic, and I w i l l refer to both as hard incompat ib i l is ts f r o m n o w 
on. For what unites both is the be l ie f that we lack free w i l l . 
What is interest ing about the hard incompat ib i l is ts is they of ten spend a great deal o f 
t ime t r y ing to persuade us that the absence o f free w i l l is not as bad as w e migh t 
t h i n k . " ' A n d what is interest ing about most l ibertarians (so, incompat ib i l is ts w h o 
bel ieve that we do have free w i l l ) is that normal ly bel ieve the opposite. 
One m i g h t h o l d that th is v i e w is re fu ted by w h a t w e k n o w from q u a n t u m mechan ics . A c c o r d i n g to 
standard і п і е ф г е ї а і і о п з the w o r l d is i nde te rm in i s t i c at the m i c r o leve l ( there are a l te rna t i ve іп Іефге Іа І І0П5 
w h i c h keep mat ters de te rm in i s t i c , name l y B o h m ' ร h i d d e n var iab les іп їефге Іа Ї іоп ( B o h m 1984) ) . H o w e v e r 
at the m a c r o leve l i n d e t e r m i n i s m m i g h t be cance l l ed ou t fo r a l l p rac t i ca l риф05Є5. I t ce r ta in l y appears so 
f o r mos t events , and i t c o u l d e l l be the case fo r ou r m e n t a l events t o o . 
T h e t e r m ' h a r d i n c o m p a t i b i l i s t ' was c o i n e d b y P e r e b o o m ( 1 9 9 5 ) . 
" ' N o t a l l say th is . S m i l a n s k y , t hough no t s t r i c t l y speak ing a hard i n c o m p a t i b i l i s t (he be l ieves that free 
w i l l is imposs ib l e as opposed to poss ib le bu t not ac tua l ) , th inks that th ings w o u l d be s u f f i c i e n t l y bad fo r 
there to be m o r a l reason to m a i n t a i n the i l l u s i o n o f free w i l l ( 2 0 0 0 ) . 
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But let us suppose that the hard incompat ib i l is t is r ight , and that a great deal o f what we 
take to be at stake, actual ly isn' t . Nevertheless, the hard incompat ib i l is t ― i f they are not 
to sl ip in to being a compat ib i l is t 一 w i l l s t i l l accept that something w i l l change i f we lack 
free w i l l . Rather than d isput ing what the hard incompat ib i l is t says, w e should instead 
focus on that ' someth ing ' . A n d we should ask what k i nd o f free w i l l i t w o u l d take to 
del iver that ' someth ing ' . When we do this we can, I ho ld , see the central i ty o f 
ownersh ip and the p laus ib i l i ty o f modest incompat ib i l i sm. 
Consider first Ted Honder ich. Honder ich believes that our in tu i t ive no t ion o f free w i l l -
the garden o f f o r k i ng paths model - supports certain ' l i f e hopes' . Th is invo lves a "sor t 
o f l i fe-hope, whether about being an actress, surv iv ing a batt le, or whatever, is to have a 
hope best character ized.. . [as the] hope for an un f ixed fu ture . . . i n w h i c h we are not 
creatures o f our envi ronment and our disposi t ional natures" (1988, v o l . 2， p. 22) . In 
add i t ion , determin ism also threatens an important sense o f ind iv idua l i t y : 
[Under Determin ism] what [the person] d id is explained by something that is 
not ind iv idua l to, or pecul iar to [the person] . . . [our actions can be expla ined] i n 
such a way that i t wou ld f o l l o w that another person o f l i ke disposi t ions w o u l d 
i n the same si tuat ion per fo rm a l ike act ion. (Honder ich 1988, v o l . 2 p. 68) 
N o w we can turn to the modest incompat ib i l is t concept ion o f free w i l l and see that i t 
del ivers the un f i xed future support ing ' l i f e hopes' o f the k i nd Honder ich ment ions 
above, and it also del ivers the important sense o f ind iv idua l i t y that determin ism 
undercuts. It does this without b r ing ing in extra factors. Nevertheless, w e migh t 
speculate whether ' l i f e hopes' and senses o f ind iv idua l i ty have anyth ing to do w i t h 
mora l responsib i l i ty o f the desert k i nd . I bel ieve they do ― that we can see our practices 
as being i n part about respecting or mark ing our ind iv idua l i t y and uniqueness. B u t there 
is, I th ink , another way o f showing the importance o f ownership. Here we can tu rn to 
another prominent hard incompat ib i l is t ― Derk Pereboom. 
Pereboom accepts that acknowledging that we lack free w i l l means hav ing to g ive up 
"ou r ord inary v i e w o f ourselves as b lamewor thy for immora l actions and praiseworthy 
for those that are mora l ly exemplary" (2002, p. 479) . A n d Pereboom believes that this 
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w o u l d damage our l i fe hopes, because " [ i ] t is not unreasonable to object that l i fe-hopes 
invo lve an aspirat ion for praiseworthiness"(2002, p. 481) . But he argues that we can 
separate out certain aspects o f our l i fe hopes f r o m praise and blameworth iness: 
[AJchievement and l i fe-hopes are not obv ious ly connected to praiseworthiness 
in the way this object ion supposes. I f an agent hopes for success in some 
endeavor, and i f she accomplishes what she hoped for, in tu i t i ve ly this outcome 
can be her achievement even i f she is not praiseworthy for i t ― a l though the 
sense i n w h i c h i t is her achievement may be d imin ished. (2002, p. 481) 
Wha t we can note f r o m the above is that Pereboom does acknowledge that not being 
pra iseworthy (or b lamewor thy) means recognising that to some extent the sense i n 
w h i c h what one does is one's achievement is d imin ished. The mora l I d raw f r o m this is 
that free w i l l is that in vir tue o f w h i c h one's sense o f achievement is enhanced. A n d as I 
have argued above, i f what we do is u l t imate ly d o w n to us, and cannot be attr ibuted to 
factors external to our conscious Wi l l ings, then we do have reason to see wha t we do as 
our achievement in a deeper sense than w o u l d be the case under determin ism. A s such 
modest incompat ib i l i s t free w i l l does prov ide what is needed to render us apt targets for 
the reactive att i tudes. 
M y argument here goes as fo l lows. We first ask what exact ly we w o u l d lose through the 
recogni t ion that we are not t ru ly praise or b lamewor thy for anyth ing that we do. It is not 
unreasonable to draw Pereboom'ร conclusion that we w o u l d lose a certain sense o f 
achievement. O f course, we migh t st i l l be act ively praised and b lamed, for these 
practices m igh t be jus t i f i ed on f ree-w i l l independent grounds (their u t i l i t y for instance). 
A n d w e migh t st i l l express blame and praise for others (again, on f ree-w i l l independent 
grounds). Bu t beneath i t a l l , our recogni t ion that we are not truly b lamewor thy or 
praiseworthy w o u l d rob us o f that sense o f achievement. 
I bel ieve that we should infer f r o m this that part o f what being t ru ly pra iseworthy or 
b lamewor thy is about is recognising our achievements (and fai lures). The recogni t ion 
that determin ism is true (or recognising that we are subject to C N C contro l ) y ields the 
same sense o f loss o f true achievement as comes f r om recognis ing that we are not t ru ly 
praise or b lamewor thy for what we do. N o w I th ink that i t is not unreasonable to 
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conclude f r o m this, that true blame and praiseworthiness is in t imate ly connected w i t h 
the (admi t ted ly vague) sense o f loss o f achievement that comes through recognis ing that 
we are not the ul t imate or iginators or sources o f what we do. A concept ion o f free w i l l 
that restores that sense o f achievement can therefore reasonably be seen as o f a k i nd 
capable o f grounding true blame and praiseworthiness. 
In other words, our actions are ones for w h i c h we are aptly b lamed or praised i f they are 
attr ibutable to us in a suf f ic ient ly deep sense. The kinds o f achievements and fai lures 
that we make under determin ism are not o f the r ight k i nd , precisely because they are not 
u l t imate ly attr ibutable to us. W e lack ownership over such acts. Bu t i f we have modest 
incompat ib i l i s t free w i l l then our actions are more deeply attr ibutable to us, and so we 
can see our acts as truly our achievements, and as such acts for w h i c h i t w o u l d be apt to 
praise or b lame us. 
So, what Pereboom and Honder ich do is help focus our attent ion on what w o r k free w i l l 
actual ly does, and why we migh t value being t ru ly mora l ly responsible. B o t h th ink that 
once we focus our attention in this way we w i l l see that the absence o f free w i l l is not so 
bad after al l ( indeed, i t may have benefits 一 see Pereboom 2002, pp. 487-488 and 
Smi lansky 1994). I f this is true then i t actually takes the heat o f f free w i l l to some 
extent. For to the extent that our practices and l i fe hopes do noi depend upon our 
possessing free w i l l , then a concept ion o f free w i l l does not have to show h o w it can 
support such practices. What free w i l l o f the k ind associated w i t h mora l responsib i l i ty 
has to do, is jus t make-good that wh i ch we w o u l d lose through not being t ru ly mora l l y 
responsible. I f that comes d o w n to los ing a sense o f achievement and true ownersh ip 
over what we do, then that is what a plausible concept ion o f free w i l l has to restore. A n d 
that is precisely what modest incompat ib i l i sm does. 
7.11 Responsibility and Dialectical Delicacies 
Whi l s t sympathetic to the need for genuine alternative possibi l i t ies, and sympathetic to 
the need for the deeper k i nd o f ownership that alternative possibi l i t ies prov ide, some are 
go ing to remain doubt fu l that the modest incompat ib i l is t accounts impiOve prospects for 
mora l responsib i l i ty over st ra ight forward compat ib i l i sm. What I have jus t argued i n the 
above section may go some way towards a l lev iat ing such concerns. Bu t I suspect that 
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they w i l l st i l l harbour doubts that i n whatever sense we gain a deeper sense o f 
achievement w i t h modest incompat ib i l is t free w i l l , the fact remains that we st i l l fa l l 
short o f hav ing what i t takes to ground true responsibi l i ty. For instance consider 
C larke 'ร remarks. 
I find less reason to th ink that an event causal-causal l ibertar ian v i e w improves 
upon a comparable compat ib i l is t account when it comes to mora l 
responsibi l i ty. I f determin ism is true, misdeeds may st i l l be w i l f u l and 
deliberate, exercises o f a capacity to consider reasons and act on one's 
appreciat ion o f them. There may consequently st i l l be a type o f jus t i f i ca t ion for 
praise and blame, reward and punis l iment. Such reactions may be appropriate 
expressions o f our feel ings and our judgements about past behaviour; they may 
contr ibute to mora l educat ion and may encourage good behaviour and 
discourage bad; and they may help protect us f r o m miscreants. Incompat ib i l is ts 
typ ica l ly ho ld , however, that a very impor tant type o f j us t i f i ca t ion w o u l d 
always be lack ing: none o f these reactions w o u l d ever be deserved. Less 
categorical ly, some incompat ib i l is ts a l l ow that, i n a determinist ic w o r l d , there 
m igh t be a type o f desert o f these k inds o f reactions or o f some version o f these 
reactions, or that they may be deserved to a degree. Bu t i t is then said that there 
w o u l d be an important type o f desert miss ing, or that an impor tant vers ion o f 
these reactions w o u l d not be deserved, or that these reactions w o u l d not be 
f u l l y deserved.. . Whatever the impl icat ions o f determin ism for desert real ly 
are, the impl icat ions for desert o f our having jus t the var iety o f act ive contro l 
that is characterised by an event-causal l ibertar ian v i e w are, i t seems, the same. 
(2002, p. 376) 
Clarke is a contro l incompat ib i l is t . To a contro l incompat ib i l i s t the modest 
incompat ib i l i s t posi t ion sound half r ight. By the contro l incompat ib i l i s t ' ร l ights what 
modest incompat ib i l is t posi t ions get r ight is the need for genuine alternative 
possib i l i t ies, and the value o f the k ind o f ownership that such alternat ive possibi l i t ies 
del iver. Bu t a contro l incompat ib i l is t is normal ly convinced that the ma in p rob lem w i t h 
compat ib i l i sm is the inadequacy o f compat ib i l is t contro l . By a cont ro l incompat ib i l i s t ' s 
l ights, compat ib i l is t control is jus t not up to the j o b o f mak ing us t ru ly mora l l y 
responsible. F rom the contro l incompat ib i l is t perspective therefore, the modest 
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incompat ib i l i s t v i e w w i l l appear to fa l l short o f g i v ing us a l l that is needed. I f a v i e w 
tries to get away w i thou t enhancing our compat ib i l i s t cont ro l , then the contro l 
incompat ib i l i s t is go ing to f i nd i t want ing . Th is is exact ly the source o f C larke 'ร 
concern: 
[The modest incompat ib i l i s t v i ew ] secures a type o f leeway or openness not 
avai lable in a determinist ic w o r l d , but the v i e w provides the agent w i t h no 
addi t ional posi t ive power to determine what he does; i t does not secure any 
greater degree o f active contro l . A n d this is what seems to be needed i f there is 
to be a di f ferent verdict concerning desert and hence responsibi l i ty . (2002, p. 
376 note omi t ted) 
A contro l incompat ib i l i s t , wh i ls t almost certainly sympathetic to the need for a deeper 
k i nd o f ownership than avai lable under determin ism is probably not go ing to be taken 
a l l the way to modest incompat ib i l i sm by what I have argued so far, because after a l l , 
their o w n v i e w del ivers the deeper k i nd o f ownership too ( for alternative possibi l i t ies o f 
the k i n d that del iver ownership are required to accommodate incompat ib i l i s t cont ro l ) . 
In Chapter 5 I argued that incompat ib i l is t contro l is either incoherent or inherent ly 
myster ious. That is certainly something to be counted against cont ro l i ncompat ib i l i sm 
and w h i c h does not s imi la r ly apply to modest incompat ib i l i sm. Bu t those were very 
c o m m o n charges and the contro l incompat ib i l is t is used to them. The fact is that the 
contro l incompat ib i l i s t is w i l l i n g to bear a degree o f mystery as an acceptable cost o f 
their pos i t ion. So, to persuade a commi t ted contro l incompat ib i l i s t something more than 
what I have argued so far is go ing to be needed. I bel ieve such arguments are avai lable, 
and w i l l present one in the next chapter. 
W e should not assess modest incompat ib i l i sm solely by h o w attractive i t appears 
compared to contro l incompat ib i l i sm. W e should also assess i t by h o w attract ive i t 
appears compared to compat ib i l i sm. A n d I certainly ho ld that what I have argued so far 
should have bite against the compat ib i l is t . C N C cases present a serious challenge to the 
v iab i l i t y o f compat ib i l i sm, one that compat ib i l is ts themselves are sensit ive to (see 
Watson 1987). A s I have shown above, the modest incompat ib i l i s t pos i t ion of fers a 
pr inc ip led way around the prob lem. I have argued in previous chapters that an impor tant 
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part o f the modern compat ib i l is ts armoury, the Frankfurt-Style case, does not wo rk . Th is 
means that in addi t ion to the concerns over C N C control the compat ib i l is t has stacked 
against them the fact that they can neither satisfy the in tu i t i ve ly plausible PAP 
cond i t ion , nor reject i t on any non question begging g rounds . " ^ The modest 
incompat ib i l i s t pos i t ion, on the other hand, validates PAP and provides us w i t h free w i l l 
o f a sort imperv ious to C N C contro l . 
I t is true that the compat ib i l is t pos i t ion is a s impler pos i t ion than the modest 
incompat ib i l i s t pos i t ion ― but this s impl ic i ty comes at considerable cost, as we have 
seen, costs that I bel ieve i t to be foolhardy to bear. I t is also true that the compat ib i l i s t 
has the luxury o f not hav ing to wor ry so much about discoveries regarding the structural 
underpinnings o f the universe (on this see Fischer 1994, pp. 6-7 & p. 207) . B u t this in 
i tse l f is not a good reason to be a compat ib i l is t . A v i ew does not become more l i ke ly to 
be correct, s imp ly because the condit ions i t maintains need to obtain are l i ke ly to obtain. 
A f te r a l l , imagine that, as a result o f some dis turb ing discoveries, i t becomes h igh ly 
l i ke ly that we are be ing C N C contro l led by super- intel l igent beings o n another planet. 
Th is discovery w o u l d not in i tse l f increase the p laus ib i l i ty o f the hard compat ib i l i s t 
pos i t ion (the hard compat ib i l is t being one who believes free w i l l and C N C contro l are 
compat ib le) . So we should not judge compat ib i l i sm by h o w secure it renders its 
concept ion o f free w i l l compared to modest incompat ib i l i sm. I f we do, then the least 
demanding pos i t ion is always going to w i n . A n d that is preposterous. 
So, when compared to compat ib i l i sm, I ho ld that my arguments so far show modest 
incompat ib i l i sm to be a very much more attractive posi t ion. A n d so when Clarke says 
that " [พ ]ha teve r the impl icat ions o f determin ism for desert real ly are, the impl ica t ions 
for desert o f our hav ing jus t the variety o f active contro l that is characterised by an 
event-causal l ibertar ian v i e w are, i t seems, the same" he is very much mis taken (2002, 
p. 376). H is mistake stems f r om the fact that he is assessing the modest incompat ib i l i s t 
pos i t ion f r o m the perspective o f a contro l incompat ib i l is t and thereby fai ls to attend to 
certain dialect ical delicacies (2002, p. 376). We should judge modest i ncompat ib i l i sm 
by h o w w e l l i t fares against its r ivals. M y arguments so far should be seen as p r imar i l y 
h igh l igh t ing the advantages o f modest incompat ib i l i sm over compat ib i l i sm. A n d on that 
՚ ՛ 2 A n o t h e r advantage , one that I have chosen no t t o pursue here, is that t h r o u g h v a l i d a t i n g P A P , the 
modes t i n c o m p a t i b i l i s t v i e w also va l idates the K a n t i a n p r i n c i p l e that ough t imp l i es can . I t is a cost o f a 
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f ront I bel ieve that as a v i e w about the k ind o f free w i l l needed for mora l responsib i l i ty 
modest incompat ib i l i sm w ins resoundingly over compat ib i l i sm. 
7.12 Conclusion 
I n this chapter I have argued that agent internal indetermin ism can prov ide us w i t h a 
degree o f independence f r om the past and thereby provide us w i t h a deeper k i n d o f 
ownersh ip over what we do than avai lable under determinism. The shallowness o f 
compat ib i l i s t ' ownersh ip ' was brought out in Chapter 4 by cases i nvo l v i ng C N C 
cont ro l . A b o v e I have argued that agent internal indetermin ism can prov ide insulat ion 
against C N C cont ro l , and thereby secure the depth o f ownership required for mora l 
responsibi l i ty . 
I t matters where indetermin ism is located, and I have argued that i f i t is located too early 
i n the del iberat ive process - namely in the coming- to -mind o f bel iefs and desires ― then 
i t w i l l not contr ibute to an agent 'ร ownership. However , if， as w i t h Kane 's account, the 
indeterminacy is between the agent's reasons and their decision 一 in their e f for t o f w i l l 
i n other words - then it can del iver the k ind o f ownership in quest ion. For noth ing 
external to the agent'ร e f for t w i l l exp la in why they decided as they d id . Indeterminacy 
here makes the agent no more or less an ul t imate source o f their act ion, than i f they had 
incompat ib i l i s t contro l . 
Wh i l s t we migh t be able to gain broad agreement on the in tu i t ive value o f independence 
and ownersh ip , there remains a persistent concern that w i thou t the supplement o f 
incompat ib i l i s t -cont ro l , then whatever ownership we may gain through indetermin ism, 
i t is not enough to take us al l the way to true responsibi l i ty. In response to this concern I 
argued that we should assess modest incompat ib i l i sm by how w e l l i t compares to r iva l 
v iews, and when we do this we need to respect certain dialect ical delicacies. For 
instance, when j udg ing how we l l modest incompat ib i l i sm fares against compat ib i l i sm, 
w e should not assume the perspective o f a cont ro l incompat ib i l is t , as th is w i l l d is tor t the 
assessment. 
c o m p a t i b i l i s t v i e w that it has to re jec t the K a n t i a n p r i n c i p l e (see F ischer 1999a; H a j i 2 0 0 2 ) . 
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I ended by c la im ing that my arguments so far show that there is a strong case for 
favour ing modest incompat ib i l i sm over compat ib i l i sm when i t comes to mora l 
responsibi l i ty . Bu t I also acknowledged that I have said l i t t le that w o u l d persuade a 




Taking The Sting Out of Luck 
I n Chapter 5 I argued that short o f appeals to myster ious extra factors everyth ing an 
agent does is u l t imate ly a matter o f luck, irrespective o f whether determin ism or 
indetermin ism is true, for the only k i nd o f contro l that we have is compat ib i l is t . In the 
previous chapter I argued that the agent-internal indetermin ism characteristic o f Kane 's 
modest incompat ib i l i sm can prov ide us w i t h an independence y ie ld ing a deeper k i n d o f 
ownersh ip over what we do than avai lable under determin ism. I n other words , i t can 
matter h o w we are subject to luck. A certain k i nd o f luck 一 agent- internal causal luck -
can make it the case that what we do, and what we become, is to some degree ' up to us ' 
rather than being solely attr ibutable to factors external to us. 
Nevertheless, however necessary independence and ownership may be for responsib i l i ty 
g round ing free w i l l , the exposure to u l t imate luck w i l l , for many, be the crux o f the 
issue. M a n y w i l l main ta in that whatever value attaches to ownership, the issue o f 
u l t imate luck settles the issue o f free w i l l and responsibi l i ty in favour o f n i h i l i sm 
(Smi lansky 2000; G. Strawson 2002; 2003; Pereboom 2002; Clarke 2002) . Ex t ra factors 
are needed and, i f not avai lable, there is no alternative to d raw ing the hard 
incompat ib i l i s t conclus ion: none o f us are mora l l y responsible for anyth ing. 
Bu t I bel ieve that for those not already predisposed to n i h i l i sm about mora l 
responsib i l i ty , such a conclus ion is premature. Those predisposed to introduce extra 
factors, may yet be persuaded they are not needed. In this chapter I w i l l argue that there 
is a strong case for be l iev ing ul t imate luck is not the p rob lem many take it to be. 
First I w i l l consider Fischer 'ร attempt to deal w i t h u l t imate luck. I agree w i t h Fischer 'ร 
basic approach, but w i l l use i t to cal l into quest ion the rat ionale behind the 
incompat ib i l i s t demand for path-p ick ing contro l . 
I w i l l c la im i t is uncontroversial that i f we could have incompat ib i l i s t cont ro l we w o u l d 
satisfy cont ro l requirements for responsibi l i ty . I w i l l then warn against iden t i f y ing 
incompat ib i l i s t contro l w i t h a demand for unrestr icted cont ro l . 
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I w i l l go on to argue that once we recognise that incompat ib i l i s t con t ro l , i f w e cou ld 
have i t , w o u l d on ly amount to a restricted f o r m o f cont ro l , we must recognise the 
widespread and ine l iminab le invo lvement o f luck in a l l that we do and its consistency 
w i t h our mora l responsibi l i ty . I f we insist that the reason incompat ib i l i s t contro l makes 
us uncontrovers ia l ly responsible is due to its luck-eradicat ing propert ies, then we are 
commi t ted to what I term 'an t i - l uck i sm ' . I f one is to be true to one'ร ant i - luck ism then 
the remain ing inf luence o f luck is in need o f neutral isat ion. F o l l o w i n g Z immerman , I 
w i l l out l ine jus t what such neutral isat ion w o u l d imp ly . 
I argue that on ref lect ion i t is sensible to drop the ant i - luck is t rat ionale for 
incompat ib i l i s t cont ro l . I t is not plausible that incompat ib i l i s t cont ro l is needed for luck 
eradicat ion purposes: i t per forms so poor ly on this f ront and commi ts us to radical 
revisions to our practices. Th is gives us reason to explore the possib i l i ty that 
incompat ib i l i s t cont ro l cou ld be associated w i t h the sat isfact ion o f some other cond i t ion 
一 one consistent w i t h u l t imate luck. The requirement for independence and ownersh ip 
discussed in the previous chapter is the natural candidate. 
F ina l ly I argue that the responsibi l i ty in f la t ion p rob lem faced by ant i - luckists, cou ld 
p lausib ly also apply to compat ib i l is ts . I argue that un l i ke the compat ib i l i s t , the modest 
incompat ib i l i s t pos i t ion can deal w i t h the in f la t ion p rob lem i n an in tu i t ive and 
pr inc ip led way. 
8.1 Fischer's Moore Shift 
Given what I have argued so far, both modest incompat ib i l is ts o f a Kanean persuasion 
and compat ib i l is ts have to acknowledge that everything we do is u l t imate ly a matter o f 
l u c k . O n both v iews, the only type o f contro l that one has is compat ib i l i s t cont ro l , and 
compat ib i l i s t cont ro l cannot protect against u l t imate luck. Few, however , have direct ly 
addressed the p rob lem o f u l t imate luck. Fischer - a compat ib i l i s t ― is one o f the 
exceptions. He comes out f igh t ing . 
A n d th is w o u l d a lso a p p l y t o V a l e r i a n i n c o m p a t i b i l i s t pos i t i ons too , i f they we re s t i l l i n the r u n n i n g . 
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14 Fischer does not t ry to deny ul t imate luck.""* We saw in Chapter 3 that Fischer is 
p rominent amongst those contemporary compat ib i l is ts who use Frankfurt-Style cases to 
deny that path-p ick ing contro l is needed for responsibi l i ty. Instead Fischer h ighl ights 
that " [ พ ] e are at every point thoroughly subject to factors ent irely outside our contro l ... 
[พ ]e are not even in a t iny bubble o f cont ro l , but we are, in a sense, s w i m m i n g in a vast 
ocean o f chance and l uck " ( fo r thcoming b). He elucidates: 
Suppose m y parents had beaten me merci lessly when I was very young , so that 
I had s igni f icant physical (neurological) and emot ional damage. I f the damage 
had been suf f ic ient ly bad, I wou ld never have developed into an agent at a l l . 
A n d yet it is quite clear that I never had any contro l over whether m y parents 
beat me i n this way. S imi la r ly for an in f in i te ly large number o f factors. For 
example, I had no contro l over whether I was born w i t h a s igni f icant bra in 
lesion that w o u l d impai r or expunge m y agency. Had I been bo rn w i t h such a 
les ion, I w o u l d never have developed into an agent at a l l , or w o u l d have 
developed into an agent w i t h a very d i f ferent character and set o f disposi t ions. 
A g a i n : I had no contro l over the fact that I was not dropped o n m y head 
(accidental ly or del iberately) by my parents when I was very young. But had I 
been dropped on my head in a certain way, I w o u l d not have developed into an 
agent at a l l , or m igh t have developed into a very d i f ferent sort o f agent. 
W h e n one begins to th ink about this sort o f th ing , one qu ick l y realises that we 
are incredib ly lucky to be as we are. I had no contro l over the fact that I was not 
h i t by a bol t o f l ightening when I was young (or, for that matter, yesterday), or 
that I was not hit by a meteori te, and so fo r th . But had any o f these things 
occurred, I w o u l d not be the way I am today 一 and I certainly w o u l d not be 
t yp ing this paper at m y computer! L i f e is extraordinar i ly f ragi le , and ( f r om a 
certain perspective) we are remarkably lucky to be agents at a l l , or the 
part icular agents we are (w i t h the part icular disposi t ions, values, and 
psychologica l propensit ies we actual ly have). In tu i t i ve ly speaking, I am not 
Denne t t , another c o m p a t i b i l i s t w h o does discuss the issue o f l uck , takes a d i f f e ren t , and a l together 
unsa t i s fac to ry app roach . Denne t t argues that to ta l k o f u l t ima te l uck is to misuse the t e r m ' l u c k ' - i n th is 
w a y h is response is s i m i l a r to some o f K a n e ' s in Chap te r 5. B u t n o reason wha tsoeve r is g i v e n w h y w e 
camio t t a l k o f u l t ima te l u c k - w e c lear ly can, the idea does not seem absurd at a l l , o r in any w a y 
u n i n t e l l i g i b l e (see Denne t t 1984, pp . 9 2 - 1 0 0 , and f o r d iscuss ion see S m i l a n s k y 2 0 0 0 , p p . 4 5 - 4 6 and 
Russe l l 2 0 0 2 b , sec. 5 ) 
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"u l t ima te ly responsib le" for m y part icular psychologica l traits or even for m y 
very agency. We are not "u l t imate ly responsible" for the " w a y we are", and yet 
i t jus t seems crazy to suppose that we are thereby re l ieved o f mora l 
responsibi l i ty for our behaviour. (Fischer fo r thcoming b) 
Conc lud ing that we are not responsible is what some w o u l d , and have, concluded.**^ 
Bu t the po in t Fischer makes is that i t w o u l d be an equal ly legi t imate dialect ical move to 
take the widespread inf luence o f luck to imp l y that luck-eradicat ing contro l cannot be 
what our c o m m o n sense concept ion o f responsibi l i ty presupposes. 
One could say that such a picture [ i n wh i ch we have luck eradicat ing cont ro l ] is 
endorsed by commonsense but utter ly impossible to f u l f i l . Or one could say 
that such a picture, being obv ious ly and st ra ight forwardly impossib le to f u l f i l , 
cannot be the picture endorsed, upon ref lect ion, by commonsense. The latter 
poss ib i l i t y . . . seems to me to be the path recommended by a certain sort o f 
ph i losophica l matur i ty and w isdom. Be that as i t may, m y more m i n i m a l po in t 
(to wh i ch ľ d retreat i f pressed) is s imply that the latter approach is no less 
plausible than the former. (Fischer, fo r thcoming b) 
The prob lem o f u l t imate luck, as has of ten been pointed out, bears resemblance to the 
p rob lem o f scept ic ism in general, where "condi t ions wh i ch seem perfect ly natural , and 
w h i c h g r o w out o f the ordinary procedures for chal lenging and defending c la ims to 
knowledge threaten to undermine al l such claims i f consistently app l i ed " (Nagel 1979, 
p. 27 and see also D u f f 1996, p. 332). Wha t Fischer is suggesting above is a dialect ical 
move analogous to Moore ' ร shi f t regarding the prob lem o f scept ic ism about knowledge. 
Rather than direct ly refute the sceptical challenge to knowledge, M o o r e swi tched to our 
c o m m o n sense be l ie f that we know we have a hand before นร, and then asked us to 
recognise that by our everyday standards the sceptic's standards are undu ly demanding 
(see Unger 1984 & 1986; M o o r e 1962). Granted, we do not have to take up the c o m m o n 
sense everyday perspective and can instead v i ew things f r o m the more demanding 
リ 5 P r o m i n e n t amongs t those w h o conc lude and a f f i r m that we are no t respons ib le are S m i l a n s k y ( 2 0 0 0 ; 
2 0 0 2 ) G. S t rawson ( 1 9 8 6 ; 2 0 0 2 ; 2 0 0 3 ) and P e r e b o o m ( 1 9 9 5 , 2 0 0 2 ) . B u t there are a lso the c o n t r o l 
i n c o m p a t i b i l i s t s w h o be l i eve that w h i l s t w e w o u l d be non- respons ib le i f e v e r y t h i n g w e d i d t u r n e d ou t t o 
be a mat te r o f l uck , in fac t we do have l uck -e rad i ca t i ng con t ro l and so w e are respons ib le af ter a l l (so 
these are con t ro l - l i be r t a r i ans ) . A m o n g s t these w e can n u m b e r O ' C o n n o r ( 2 0 0 2 , 2 0 0 3 ) and C l a r k e ( 2 0 0 2 , 
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sceptic 's perspective. Bu t the point is that one perspective is not the r ight one, and 
there's as much jus t i f i ca t ion to take it as a fixed point that one knows one has a hand 
before one, as there is to take as a fixed po in t the sceptics demanding standard. Wha t 
Fischer is do ing is saying exactly the same th ing regarding contro l and responsibi l i ty . 
W e cou ld see luck 'ร invo lvement in al l that we do as a p rob lem, one w h i c h threatens to 
undermine responsibi l i ty. But then again, one can instead decide to see the 
ine l im inab i l i t y o f luck as a sign that luck is not a p r o b l e m . " ^ As Smi lansky puts i t : 
W h i l e compat ib i l is ts l ike Dennett have t r ied to convince us that luck is not 
mean ing fu l l y present in pert inent cases, Fischer takes the opposite approach, i n 
the attempt to neutralise the st ing o f luck. Since sceptics must agree, then their 
o w n luck-based argument is put in jeopardy. I f we do not m i n d the necessary 
presence o f luck in our l ives, then w h y should we be wor r ied about the threat o f 
'u l t imate l uck '? (2004, ms. p. 2 and quoted in Fischer forthcoming b. p. 9). 
I bel ieve that Fischer 'ร approach has meri t . Fischer 's interest in mak ing this argument is 
obv ious ly to make us more hospitable to compat ib i l i sm. Bu t in what fo l l ows I w i l l be 
us ing essential ly the same argument to cal l into question why incompat ib i l i s t cont ro l o f 
the luck-eradicat ing var iety is thought by so many to be necessary for responsibi l i ty . The 
standard rat ionale is that incompat ib i l is t luck-eradicat ing contro l is needed precisely 
because o f its luck-eradicat ing properties 一 an assumption that I te rm ant i - luckist . Bu t I 
t h i nk that considerat ions s imi lar to those that Fischer has brought to our at tent ion above 
render this rat ionale implausib le. 
2 0 0 3 ) , t h o u g h C l a r k e seems cu r ren t l y to be in the process o f g i v i n g up h is l i be r t a r i an i sm in f a v o u r o f ha rd 
I n c o m p a t i b i l i s m . 
116 N a g e l ru les ou t th is k i n d o f app roach in his f amous ar t i c le on M o r a l L u c k say ing that " [ i ] t w o u l d 
thererore be a mis take to argue Մ օ ա the unaccep tab i l i t y o f the conc lus ions to the need f o r a d i f f e r e n t 
accoun t o f the cond i t i ons o f m o r a l respons ib i l i t y . T h e v i e w that m o r a l l uck is p a r a d o x i c a l is no t a mistake, 
e th i ca l o r l o g i c a l , b u t a pe rcep t i on o f one o f the w a y s i n w h i c h the i n t u i t i v e l y acceptab le c o n d i t i o n s o f 
m o r a l j u d g e m e n t threaten to unde rm ine it a i r ( 1 9 7 9 , p. 2 7 ) . Bu t I t h i n k N a g e l is t o o hasty here. A s I w i l l 
p o i n t ou t in the nex t chapter , our in tu i t i ons abou t a n u m b e r o f cases - cases whe re i t is t e m p t i n g to i n v o k e 
l u c k - can be e x p l a i n e d in n o n - l u c k terms. So, f o r instance, ' r esu l tan t ' l u c k i n tu i t i ons can be e x p l a i n e d in 
te rms o f our f e e l i n g that the appropr ia te g r o u n d fo r r espons ib i l i t y is the agent 's charac ter ra ther than the 
ac tua l impac t they make u p o n the w o r l d . 
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8,2 Restricted Contro l 
A l t h o u g h i t is hard to see how we cou ld have incompat ib i l i s t con t ro l , i t is 
uncontrovers ia l that i f we somehow cou ld have genuine alternative possibi l i t ies and 
causal- luck eradicat ing path-p ick ing contro l over wh i ch possib i l i ty is actualisedj then 
we w o u l d have a solut ion to the p rob lem o f responsibi l i ty g round ing free w i l l (van 
Inwagen 2002, p. 168). Compat ib i l is ts , for instance, do not th ink that possession o f 
incompat ib i l i s t contro l wou ld undermine responsibi l i ty , they jus t do not th ink i t is 
necessary for respons ib i l i t y . "^ Mos t sceptics on ly bel ieve i t is impossib le that 
condi t ions cou ld obtain wh i ch wou ld legi t imise judgements o f mora l responsibi l i ty . B u t 
they w o u l d a l l ow that i f , per impossible, a certain combinat ion o f condi t ions did obta in, 
then we w o u l d be mora l l y responsible. I f we are focussing jus t on the cont ro l 
requirements for responsibi l i ty then it is uncontroversial that incompat ib i l i s t contro l is 
suf f ic ient for responsibi l i ty. The free w i l l debate is largely over whether such 
incompat ib i l i s t contro l is possible or necessary not over its suf f ic iency. 
Bear ing this in m i n d , and w i thou t tak ing back anything I argued in Chapter 5, I n o w 
want to d raw attent ion to a mistake that many cri t ics o f incompat ib i l i s t cont ro l make. 
The mistake involves ident i fy ing incompat ib i l is t contro l w i t h something that it is not. 
To see this, it w i l l f i rst be useful to make use o f a d is t inc t ion d rawn by M ichae l 
Z i m m e r m a n between restricted contro l and unrestr icted cont ro l : 
'17 I t is t rue that some compa t i b i l i s t s ― f o l l o w i n g H o b b e s ' s lead - m i g h t p re tend no t to unders tand 
i n c o m p a t i b i l i s t c o n t r o l in any sense. B u t I t h i n k th is is d i s ingenuous . I agree that i n c o m p a t i b i l i s t c o n t r o l is 
mys te r i ous , tha t does no t mean that i n c o m p a t i b i l i s t c o n t r o l I t se l f makes n o sense . W e d o , I t h i n k , k n o w n 
w h a t the c o n t r o l i n c o m p a t i b i l i s t is t a l k i n g about . T h e f o l l o w i n g remarks by H o n d e r i c h are, in m y v i e w , 
exac t l y r i gh t : 
Suppose I have no idea o f w h y the petun ias o n the b a l c o n y need sun, bu t a m persuaded they d o , 
n o d o u b t b y g o o d ev idence . Desp i te the ev idence , I have no acqua in tance at a l l w i t h 
pho tosyn thes is , no t even any b o y ' s o w n science o f the mat ter . I t does no t f o l l o w , p r e s u m a b l y , 
that I lack the idea that the petunias need รนท. I c o u l d have the idea, t o o , in a p re -sc ien t i f i c 
soc ie ty whe re news o f the sc ience o f the t h i n g w o u l d f o r a l ong t ime m a k e no sense. C o u l d I no t 
also have the idea, in a later soc ie ty , i f al o f m a n y at tempts to exp l i ca te the need had b r o k e n 
d o w n in obscu r i t y and indeed c o n t r a d i c t i o n ? . . . 
T h e friends [ o f i n c o m p a t i b i l i s t c o n t r o l ] speak no nonsense w h e n i t t ransp i res tha t t hey canno t in 
some w a y e x p l a i n h o w it comes abou t that there is [ i n c o m p a t i b i l i s t c o n t r o l ] , o r w o u l d c o m e 
abou t i f there we re any. T h e y s t i l l speak no nonsense in w h a t wen t be fo re i f t he i r a t tempts to 
e x p l a i n are themselves pieces o f nonsense. ( 2 0 0 2 , p. 4 7 4 ) 
I assume in w h a t f o l l o w s that mos t compa t i b i l i s t s w o u l d accept that the i n c o m p a t i b i l i s t is no t t a l k i n g 
nonsense. Rather , they s i m p l y d ispute that i n c o m p a t i b i l i s t c o n t r o l is ac tua l l y poss ib le , and whe the r i t is 
ac tua l l y needed. 
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[ พ ] e should dist inguish two ways in wh i ch something may be beyond 
someone'ร contro l . Roughly , one may be said to enjoy restricted cont ro l w i t h 
respect to some event jus t i n case one can br ing about its occurrence and can 
also prevent its occurrence. One may be said to enjoy unrestricted or complete 
contro l w i t h respect to some event jus t i n case one enjoys or enjoyed restricted 
contro l w i t h respect both to i t and to al l those events on w h i c h its occurrence is 
cont ingent. Thus an vent may be beyond someone'ร cont ro l ei ther i n the sense 
that i t is not in his unrestricted contro l or in the stronger sense that i t is not 
even i n h is restricted contro l . (1993, p. 219 one note omi t ted) 
Unrestr ic ted cont ro l , as Strawson, Smi lansky, Wolf， and many others po in t out, seems 
to be what one w o u l d u l t imate ly need to satisfy the requirement for incompat ib i l i s t 
cont ro l (Strawson 2003; Smi lansky 2000; W o l f 1990). I argued one can be led to this 
conc lus ion in Chapter 5. We f irst assume that essential to incompat ib i l i s t cont ro l is that 
i t eradicates causal luck o f the k ind witnessed in ro l l -back cases. Then we argue that 
eradicat ing this luck requires a deeper sel f who is exercising this cont ro l , but that the 
p rob lem o f causal luck at this deeper level s imply re-arises, and hence the regress 
begins. I t w o u l d seem, f o l l o w i n g this reasoning, that to eradicate causal luck , the agent 
needs is cont ro l over the way that they are, and that this w o u l d require cont ro l over a l l 
those factors that contr ibuted to the agent's being the way that they are. I n other words, 
i t looks as i f we need unrestricted contro l . W e do not have unrestr icted cont ro l : i t w o u l d 
invo lve hav ing contro l over whether or not the sun rises, or whether or not we have a 
fatal stroke, and, more basical ly, whether or not we were born. Unrestr ic ted contro l is 
p la in ly incoherent, " a sort o f rape and pervers ion o f l og i c " as Nietzsche put i t (1966, p. 
21) . For to have unrestr icted contro l ― so contro l over everything that is i n any way 
necessary or suf f ic ient for one act ing as one does - is to need contro l over com ing into 
existence. Th is is impossible. 
However , what we nevertheless need to recognise is that cont ro l -cont ro l , i f we cou ld 
have it , w o u l d not amount to hav ing contro l over a l l those factors that contr ibuted to an 
agent's being the way that they are. Unrestr ic ted contro l is not incompat ib i l i s t contro l . 
N o sane cont ro l - incompat ib i l is t th inks that they actual ly have unrestr icted contro l or 
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need i t fo r mora l responsibi l i ty. '^^ For instance, one o f the most voci ferous cr i t ics o f 
i ncompat ib i l i sm (and compat ib i l i sm) , G. Strawson, accepts that very of ten we do take 
ourselves to have incompat ib i l is t cont ro l o f the sort needed for mora l responsib i l i ty and 
o f the sort that he th inks is impossible, and he gives the f o l l o w i n g example as an 
i l lus t ra t ion: 
Suppose you set o f f for a shop on the evening o f a nat ional ho l iday, in tending 
to buy a cake w i t h your last ten pound note. O n the steps o f the shop someone 
is shaking an O x f a m t in . Y o u stop, and i t seems complete ly clear to you that i t 
is ent i rely up to you what you do next. That is, it seems to you that you are 
t ru ly , radical ly free to choose, i n such a way that you w i l l be u l t imate ly mora l l y 
responsible for whatever you do choose.. . as one stands there, one'ร f reedom 
and true mora l responsibi l i ty seem obvious and absolute to one. (2003, pp. 216-
217) 
I n these cases we do not th ink that we have unrestr icted contro l . In such cases we do not 
th ink that i t is ent i rely up to us whether the sun rises or whether we cont inue to l ive. It 
m igh t be objected that what ľ v e said above misses the point in that unrestr icted contro l 
is what is needed in order to satisfy the contro l incompat ib i l i s t ' s demands. There is no 
way o f hav ing path-p ick ing contro l unless one has unrestr icted contro l . Th is w o u l d be 
another way o f saying that i t is impossible to eradicate causal luck (or causal luck 
internal to the agent) w i thou t also hav ing to eradicate al l other sources o f luck 
( inc lud ing c i rcumstant ia l and const i tut ive) . The po in t is not that the cont ro l -
incompat ib i l i s t actual ly believes that we have unrestr icted cont ro l , or that the be l ie f that 
we possess incompat ib i l is t contro l is the be l ie f that we have unrestr icted cont ro l . Rather, 
Some have ma in ta i ned that free w i l l i nvo l ves s o m e t h i n g l i ke unres t r i c ted c o n t r o l . B o t h Descartes and 
Sart re seem to , h o l d i n g that ou r free w i l l is abso lu te and u n l i m i t e d b y c i r cumstances . Descar tes , f o r 
ins tance, descr ibes ou r free w i l l as " s o free in its nature that it cannot be c o n s t r a i n e d " ( 1 9 7 6 , p. 2 1 ) . M o r e 
recen t l y Rogers A l b r i t t o n has v o i c e d h is o w n s y m p a t h y to th is k i n d o f v i e w . B u t I a m at a loss t o 
unders tand exac t l y w h a t th is means, and A l b r i t t o n h i m s e l f accepts that i t is ha rd to m a k e sense of . W e 
ce r ta in l y cannot , su re ly , be he ld to have c o n t r o l ove r a l l o f ou r c i rcumstances ― bu t none o f the above 
d e n y that . Instead w h a t is be ing ma in ta i ned is that o u r c i rcumstances in n o w a y cons t ra i n o u r w i l l s . So 
even the above do not acco rd us unres t r i c ted c o n t r o l i n the sense that I a m t a l k i n g abou t above . I t is no t 
even c lear that ' r es t r i c t ed ' i n c o m p a t i b i l i s t c o n t r o l as I unders tand i t , does no t a lso a m o u n t to the 
un res t r i c ted c o n t r o l o f A l b r i t t o n and others. Fo r ๒ a sense m c o m p a t i b i l i s t c o n t r o l is un res t r i c ted w i t h i n 
ce r ta in boundar ies 一 w h i c h sounds con t rad i c t o r y bu t i sn ' t . H o w e v e r , I leave th is ma t te r un reso l ved - I 
s i m p l y d i smiss the above v i e w s as b e i n g i ncomprehens ib le and I assume that mos t m o d e r n c o n t r o I -
i n c o m p a t i b i l i s t s agree. 
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i t is that when w e try to analyse what this contro l has to invo lve we are dr iven to hav ing 
to insist that we need unrestr icted cont ro l . 
Bu t unrestr icted contro l is not a so lu t ion to the contro l incompat ib i l i s t ' s p rob lem. W h e n 
w e arr ive at the demand for unrestr icted contro l we do not th ink ' ah , yes, that is what 
incompat ib i l i s t contro l is " . I t is a mistake to ident i fy incompat ib i l i s t -cont ro l w i t h 
unrestr icted c o n t r o l . I t is a mistake that makes the demand for incompat ib i l i s t cont ro l 
look unduly demanding. It gives the impression that incompat ib i l is t cont ro l is a demand 
for a m a m m o t h amount o f contro l ― when in fact i t i sn ' t at a l l . I t is, however, 
conceptual ly demanding. But i t is not demanding in requi r ing that we have a 
considerable amount o f contro l . 
The po in t is that contro l - incompat ib i l is ts and compat ib i l is ts do not d i f fe r very greatly in 
the degree o f contro l they take themselves to have. Cont ro l - incompat ib i l is ts do not see 
themselves as something ak in to Gods capable o f rais ing and lower ing the รนท. The 
di f ference is not so much the degree o f contro l that each takes themselves to have, but 
the k i n d o f cont ro l . The k i nd the incompat ib i l is ts take themselves to have clears a smal l 
luck- f ree foo tho ld , but that is a l l . The di f ference comes d o w n to this for the 
compat ib i l is ts everything that one does is u l t imate ly a matter o f luck , whereas for the 
cont ro l - incompat ib i l i s t everything that one does is largely a matter o f luck. For once we 
recognise incompat ib i l i s t contro l for what i t is - a restricted f o r m o f cont ro l ― we have 
to recognise that possession o f such contro l st i l l leaves us exposed to a large measure o f 
c i rcumstant ia l and const i tut ive luck. Every th ing that we do w o u l d be infected w i t h 
c i rcumstant ia l and const i tut ive luck. It is jus t that these luck factors w o u l d not be the 
who le story or explanat ion o f w h y one d id what one d id . 
8.3 L u c k and Responsibility In f la t ion 
I made t w o points above. Fi rst ly , i t is uncontroversial that i f we cou ld have 
incompat ib i l i s t cont ro l , and so i f we cou ld have a k ind o f contro l that eradicates agent 
' 1 9 N o t e i t is no t spec i f i ca l l y the res t r i c ted nature o f th is c o n t r o l that makes i t mys te r i ous o r incoherent . 
Fo r i f one takes away the res t r ic ted requ i remen t , then one still has a d e m a n d f o r s o m e t h i n g mys te r i ous o r 
i ncoheren t . F o r h o w c o u l d w e poss ib l y have an unrestricted p o w e r o f se l f -c rea t ion? I n o ther w o r d s , the 
' r e s t r i c t e d ' na ture o f i n c o m p a t i b i l i s t c o n t r o l does no t m a k e fo r a m o r e mcohe ren t m i x than a p l a ๒ 
r e q u i r e m e n t f o r unres t r i c ted c o n t r o l . I n the same w a y that the demand f o r a square c i r c l e is incoheren t , the 
d e m a n d f o r a square t r i angu la r c i r c l e is not more i ncoheren t . 
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internal causal luck, then we w o u l d satisfy contro l requirements for responsibi l i ty . 
Secondly, incompat ib i l is t contro l is not a requirement for unrestr icted cont ro l . 
Incompat ib i l i s t contro l is actually a very modest k i nd o f cont ro l , for al l i ts mystery. 
Possession o f such contro l wou ld clear a smal l luck-free foo tho ld , a luck- f ree centre to 
our act ions, but a l l that we do w o u l d remain heavi ly luck infected. I n terms o f exposure 
to luck , the di f ference between hav ing jus t p la in compat ib i l is t cont ro l and hav ing 
incompat ib i l i s t contro l as we l l is the di f ference between luck go ing al l the way through, 
and most o f the way through. 
T o get clearer about l uck ' ร cont inu ing invo lvement , consider that path-p ick ing cont ro l , 
i f we had it , w o u l d not give us contro l over the nature or frequency o f junc t ions . In other 
words , even i f we could have incompat ib i l is t cont ro l , this w o u l d not g ive us contro l 
over the op t ion ranges we p ick f r o m , or h o w of ten we get to p ick. The nature o f our 
op t ion ranges w i l l be determined by our circumstances, and by our const i tu t ion. One 
cannot, for example, choose to do something that i t d id not occur to one to do. One 
cannot choose to do something that one has no desire or mot i va t ion to do. Ye t what i t 
occurs to us to do, and what we are mot ivated to do, are matters that w o u l d not be under 
our incompat ib i l i s t contro l ( i f we had i t ) . 
One can, to some extent, take contro l o f these matters, by cu l t iva t ing certain habits and 
so fo r th . Bu t the extent to wh i ch one has the opportuni ty to do this w i l l be a func t ion o f 
matters outside one's contro l . (As we saw Ar is to t le note in the previous chapter, 
whether or not one's efforts to cul t ivate certain habits are successful is again, a matter 
that is not under on๙s incompat ib i l is t contro l . ) One's in i t ia l desires and mot iva t ions, 
and what in i t ia l l y occurs to one ― these are matters over wh i ch one cannot have 
exercised any incompat ib i l is t contro l . As O 'Connor ― a cont ro l - incompat ib i l i s t o f the 
agent-causal type ― acknowledges: 
W e enter the wo r l d w i t h power fu l and deep behavioural and at t i tudinal 
disposit ions. L o n g before we mature to the po in t o f mak ing sophist icated, 
ref lect ive choices, we are placed in environments that m o u l d and add to those 
disposit ions. Such factors heavi ly inf luence our early choices, even i f they do 
not causally determine al l o f them. They certainly do determine that B i l l y w i l l 
choose f r om only a very l im i ted range o f opt ions in any g iven s i tuat ion, a range 
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that w i l l d i f fe r quite a b i t f r o m that open to Susie under s imi lar circumstances. 
These choices and cont inu ing contingencies o f c ircumstance, i n tu rn , w i l l 
sharply c i rcumscr ibe the opt ions B i l l y considers at a more ref lect ive stage, 
when we begin to ho ld B i l l y accountable for his act ions. . . 
Surely one must concede in response that responsibi l i ty for "shaping w h o I a m " 
and for the choices that ensure f r o m this comes in degrees and, indeed, can 
on ly sensibly be measured w i t h i n a l im i ted scope o f possibi l i t ies. W e cannot 
ho ld B i l l y responsible for fa i l i ng to consider an op t ion ent i re ly outside the 
range o f his experience. A n d his responsibi l i ty for passing by opt ions that are 
w i t h i n the range o f his experience but that he has had precious l i t t le 
oppor tun i ty to consider as attractive is attenuated.,. Perhaps the impor tant 
po in t to emphasise here is that the [contro l incompat ib i l i s t ] can . . . accept 
perfect responsibi l i ty for one's choices and character is not j us t cont ingent ly 
lack ing in human beings but is impossib le: i t w o u l d require perhaps perfect 
indi f ference at the outset, or at least an openness to al l possible courses o f 
act ion. The coherence o f that idea is doubt fu l . (2002， pp. 351-352) 
Our op t ion ranges are determined by the іп Їеф Іау between our g iven character and our 
circumstances, and these are u l t imate ly out o f our contro l - even our incompat ib i l i s t 
cont ro l , i f we had it . I t is on ly w i t h i n these boundaries that incompat ib i l i s t cont ro l can 
get to wo rk . Even then, there is luck. For to exercise incompat ib i l is t cont ro l requires that 
one stays a l ive or conscious. A g a i n , this is not a matter over w h i c h incompat ib i l i s t 
cont ro l gives one any contro l . The p la t fo rm f r o m w h i c h w e cou ld operate 
incompat ib i l i s t contro l is floating in an ocean o f luck. Even though our compat ib i l i s t 
cont ro l can be said to be enhanced by possession incompat ib i l is t con t ro l , on ref lect ion 
the enhancement in question is surpr is ingly sl ight. Every th ing that we do remains 
heavi ly luck infected. 
I ho ld that recogni t ion o f the above calls into question the rationale behind the need for 
incompat ib i l i s t contro l . For i t becomes implausib le , once one recognises jus t h o w great 
l uck ' s invo lvement is in everything we do, for incompat ib i l is t cont ro l to be needed in its 
luck eradicat ing capacity: it performs so poor ly on that score. 
176 
8.4 Response 
The contro l incompat ib i l is t m igh t respond to what has been said so far by po in t ing out 
the di f ference between everything that one does being complete ly a matter o f luck , and 
everyth ing that one does being part ia l ly lucky is a very s igni f icant one. Incompat ib i l i s t 
cont ro l does secure a luck free foo tho ld , and that th is is al l that is needed fo r 
responsibi l i ty . For in securing a luck-free foo tho ld , incompat ib i l is t cont ro l i n effect 
renders a l l these other sources o f luck benign. 
This is unconv inc ing. Or at least it is unconv inc ing i f one holds that the reason we need 
incompat ib i l i s t contro l is precisely to clear a luck-free footho ld . For i f one gives that 
k i nd o f rat ionale 一 the ant i - luckist rat ionale - then one cannot jus t ignore the man i fo ld 
ways in w h i c h luck remains a huge factor in a l l that we do. I f we have l iber tar ian contro l 
then what we do is not complete ly a matter o f luck. Bu t as already pointed out (and 
acknowledged by O 'Connor i n the above quote) everyth ing w e do is also a (h igh) degree 
lucky. A n d i f 100% luck rules out responsibi l i ty , i t w o u l d be odd i f 9 5 % luck were no 
p rob lem at a l l . For what k i nd o f concern over 100% luck w o u l d not apply also to 9 5 % 
luck? For instance, i f we judge it unfair to b lame someone for something that was 100% 
lucky for them, then it is also unfair to blame someone for something that was 9 5 % 
lucky. Anti֊luckism, in other words, commi ts one to tak ing luck seriously, wherever i t 
impacts upon an agent's responsibi l i ty. I f one refuses to do this 一 i f one jus t insists that 
remain ing sources o f luck are benign and do not raise any issues - then one can hardly 
cr i t ic ise the compat ib i l is t for ignor ing u l t imate luck. For the only d i f ference between 
oneself and the compat ib i l is t w i l l be that the compat ib i l is t turns a b l i nd eye to slightly 
more luck than you do. 
I n summary, i f one holds that incompat ib i l is t contro l makes us responsible because i t 
eradicates some luck, then one cannot j us t i f y ignor ing a l l the other ways in w h i c h luck is 
invo lved in what we do and are responsible for. But what w o u l d tak ing such luck 
seriously invo lve? 
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8.5 The Implications of Consistent Ant i -Luck ism 
Michae l Z i m m e r m a n has recently h igh l ighted jus t what consistent an t i - luck ism yields 
(2002). A s we saw above, Z i m m e r m a n usefu l ly dist inguishes between restr icted and 
unrestr icted contro l . He agrees that responsibi l i ty presupposes on ly some f o r m o f 
restr icted contro l . He is ambiguous over whether that cont ro l need be incompat ib i l i s t or 
compat ib i l i s t , but for our purposes we can assume that i t is incompat ib i l i s t (to the best 
o f m y knowledge, Z immerman is an incompat ib i l is t , though for reasons to do w i t h luck , 
he th inks i t does not real ly matter w h i c h side one takes). Z i m m e r m a n is also ant i - luck is t 
and bel ieves (quite consistently) that to the extent that luck factors p lay a ro le i n what 
we do, such inf luence needs to be 'neutra l ised ' . 
He argues that because responsibi l i ty on ly p lausib ly presupposes some k i n d o f restr icted 
cont ro l , then the widespread invo lvement o f luck in al l that we do does not i m p l y that 
our responsib i l i ty is subverted for what we actual ly do. I n other words , l uck ' ร 
invo lvement does not prevent responsibi l i ty gett ing o f f the ground, for l uck ' ร 
invo lvement is consistent w i t h our hav ing some species o f restr icted cont ro l , and 
restricted contro l is al l that it is plausible to suppose responsibi l i ty requires. Bu t 
nevertheless, luck does need neutral is ing. Luck ' ร invo lvement is not, i n other words , 
benign. Its invo lvement renders our practices radical ly unfair . The genera! pr inc ip le that 
Z i m m e r m a n invokes is as fo l l ows : 
[ I ] f a) someone's being F (where ' F ' designates some complex property 
compr is ing both epistemic and metaphysical components) is suf f ic ient for that 
person'ร being morally responsible to some degree X, then, i f b) it is true o f ร at 
some t ime that he or she w o u l d be Fif р were true, and c) р 'ร be ing true is not 
in S's control at that time, then d) ร is morally responsible to degree X. (2002, 
p. 565 fn . 53) 
The imp l i ca t ion o f this pr inc ip le is that we are mora l l y responsible not j us t for what we 
freely do in the actual w o r l d , but for al l that we would have freely done had factors not 
under our contro l been di f ferent. Thus, Jones the assassin does not get o f f the hook 
s imply because a strange thought occurred to h i m , d iver t ing h i m f r o m dec id ing to pu l l 
the tr igger. I f Jones w o u l d have made that decision had the luck factor (the strange 
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thought occurr ing to h i m ) not occurred, then he is as mora l l y responsible as if he had 
made i t , even though in the actual sequence he d id not. I f Jones in the actual w o r l d , 
succeeds in assassinating the p r ime minister , then he is responsible for hav ing done th is , 
but so too is his соип їефаг Ї Jones* in a nearby possible w o r l d i n w h i c h a gust o f w i n d 
d iver ted the bul let. 
Fur thermore, an agent is mora l l y responsible not jus t for the decis ion that they make i n 
react ion to the circumstances in w h i c h they actual ly find themselves, but also those 
decisions they w o u l d have made had they faced di f ferent op t ion ranges. W i t h regard to 
const i tut ive mora l luck the agent is mora l l y responsible not jus t for the decis ion they 
make, but also for a l l those decisions they w o u l d have made had their background 
character traits been di f ferent. In other words, the impl icat ions o f luck neutral isat ion are 
radical i n the extreme. It "opens up the floodgates, as i t were, when i t comes to 
ascript ions o f responsibi l i ty ― o f laudabi l i ty as w e l l as cu lpab i l i t y " ( Z i m m e r m a n 2002, 
p. 370) . You r responsibi l i ty ceases to be restricted to what you actual ly do, but expands 
to inc lude al l that you w o u l d have done. What you actual ly do is jus t one smal l piece i n 
a much larger picture. Y o u r mora l l y upstanding acts in the actual w o r l d can be seen as 
jus t one vote in a massive elect ion in w h i c h all o f your possible selves are vo t ing . 
It m igh t be objected that in the cases where the agent fai ls to make a part icular decision 
due to factors not under their cont ro l , there is noth ing for w h i c h they can be mora l l y 
responsible. I n the case where Jones is unconscious at է2 it makes no sense to talk o f 
Jones being mora l l y responsible for what he w o u l d have done. Wha t exact ly is Jones 
being he ld mora l l y responsible for? B y hypothesis he d id not actual ly do anyth ing. In 
answer, Z i m m e r m a n proposes we should d is t inguish between the scope and degree o f 
someone's mora l responsibi l i ty (2002, p. 560). Jones, we can say, is responsible for less 
than he w o u l d have been had he not been rendered unconscious. Bu t that is a matter o f 
the scope o f his mora l responsib i l i ty , not its degree. A l t hough he is mora l l y responsible 
for less, he is mora l l y responsible to the same degree as he w o u l d have been had he not 
been rendered unconscious. The mora l luck that requires neutral isat ion is that w h i c h 
concerns the degree o f an agent'ร b lameworthiness, not its scope. The ob jec t ion was that 
there is noth ing that Jones cou ld be mora l ly responsible for, g iven that i n the actual 
sequence he does noth ing at al l at է2. Bu t n o w we can say that wh i l s t the scope o f Jones' 
mora l responsibi l i ty has " d w i n d l e d to no th i ng " his degree o f mora l responsib i l i ty 
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remains the same (Z immerman 2002,p. 564). Jones, we can say " i s responsible; he is 
j us t not responsible for anyth ing ..[h]e is, as I shall put i t , ' responsible tout cour t " * 
(Z immerman 2002, p. 564). He explains: 
Lest this appear unduly paradoxical , let me hasten to add that i t is nonetheless 
the case that [Jones] is responsible in v i r tue o f something, and this something 
jus t is his being such that he w o u l d have freely [decided to X ] , had he had the 
cooperat ion o f certain features o f the case. A l l responsib i l i ty , inc lud ing 
responsibi l i ty tout court , is fundamental ly relat ional . I t is precisely because 
[Jones] is responsible in v i r tue o f the very same sort o f fact (the fact that he 
w o u l d have freely [decided to X ] , had he had the cooperat ion. . . o f certain 
features o f the case) in v i r tue o f w h i c h [Jones* - counterfactual Jones w h o does 
successfully make decis ion X ] is responsible, that [Jones and Jones*] are 
responsible to the same degree. (Z immerman 2002, pp. 564-565) 
No te , i f one were a compat ib i l is t then it looks as i f the consistent appl icat ion o f 
Z i m m e r m a n ' s pr inc ip le wou ld seem to threaten to render everyone's responsib i l i ty tout 
court the same. In other words, everyone wou ld be as responsible as everyone else. For 
i t w o u l d be axiomat ic that Jones w o u l d have done what Susie d id i f he had been i n her 
exact shoes (where this invo lves hav ing her character and history in the exact 
circumstances in w h i c h Susie found hersel f) , and it was not a matter under Jones's 
cont ro l that he was not in Susie's shoes (Smi lansky 2000， p. 45).*^^ I n other words, 
responsib i l i ty wou ld be dissolved (see Z immerman 2002, pp. 570-571).^՚^^ 
に G I f one is a ' f ree w i l l e i ther w a y ' c o m p a t i b i l i s t and one somet imes faced t o r n i nde te rm in i s t l e dec is ions , 
t hen Z i m m e r m a n ' s p r i n c i p l e w o u l d i m p l y that one is respons ib le not j u s t f o r the dec i s i on that one ac tua l l y 
made , bu t also the dec is ion that one c o u l d have made we re i t no t f o r one 's causal l uck . 
' շ ւ F r o m a c o m p a t i b i l i s t ' s perspec t i ve it is an in te res t ing quest ion w h e t h e r the i m p l i c a t i o n s o f 
Z i m m e r m a n ' s v i e w are such as to render the c o m p a t i b i l i s t in the same p o s i t i o n as the h a r d de te rm in i s t . Is 
eve ryone b e i n g as respons ib le as eve ryone else equ iva len t to no-one b e i n g respons ib le fo r any th ing? I 
t h i n k that the answer here is no , foe the f o l l o w i n g reason. A s s u m i n g that in p rac t i ce w e w o u l d con t i nue to 
pun ish and r e w a r d i r respect ive o f whe the r na rd d e t e r m i n i s m or c o m p a t i b i l i s m is t rue (mos t ha rd 
de te rm in i s t s s t i l l t h i nk it justifiable to pun ish peop le 一 i t is j u s t that the j u s t i f i c a t i o n is n o r m a l l y 
Consequen t ia l i s t rather than deser t -based) , then in the f o r m e r case pun i shmen t w o u l d at s t i l l r espond to an 
agent ' s desert , whereas in the lat ter it w o u l d not . I t w o u l d no t respond to a pe rson ' s f u l l desert - f o r that to 
be the case w e w o u l d a l l have to be pun ished and rewarded equa l l y , w h i c h is c l ea r l y p rac t i ca l l y 
imposs ib l e . Never the less , the punís๒ฑents that peop le rece ive w i l l s t i l l be deserved , even i f i t is the case 
that those w h o rece ive such pun i shmen t deserve more pun i shmen t than they rece ive . G e t t i n g par t o f w h a t 
y o u deserve is s t i l l ge t t i ng some th i ng y o u deserve. B u t note that the v i e w c o u l d be p r a c t i c a l l y equ i va len t 
to a consequen t i a l i sm o r ha rd d e t e r m i n i s m , f o r there w o u l d be no reason to res t r ic t b l ame and pra ise to 
w h a t the agent ac tua l l y does. H o w e v e r , the scapegoat ing ob jec t i on to s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d consequen t i a l i sm 
w o u l d no t a p p l y - f o r we w o u l d no t be innocen t o f those mat ters f o r w h i c h w e are b e i n g pun i shed . 
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Z i m m e r m a n does, however, acknowledge that there are l im i ts to neutral isat ion ― l im i ts 
placed by what one considers essential to the agent. There is something incoherent 
about saying what Jones w o u l d have done i f he had been a d i f ferent person 
( Z i m m e r m a n 2002, pp. 574-575; see also Statman 1993， pp. 12 - 13; Rescher 1993, pp. 
156-157). Th is means that " the role that luck plays i n the determinat ion o f mora l 
responsib i l i ty may not be ent i rely e l im inab le . . . because, regardless o f jus t w h i c h 
personal characteristics should be said to be essential to persons, i t is presumably correct 
to say that some are" (Z immerman 2002, p. 575). Bu t as Z i m m e r m a n acknowledges, 
wh i l s t th is may show h o w some l im i ts can be put on neutral isat ion, i t remains the case 
that i f one is ant i - luckist one should st i l l neutralise to the greatest extent possible, w i t h i n 
the boundaries set by what is essential to the agent. 
Another ob ject ion is that neutral isat ion presupposes that there is some fact o f the matter 
about what an agent w i t h incompat ib i l i s t contro l w o u l d have done. For i f we can say for 
certain what the agent w o u l d have decided, then we must presuppose a necessary 
connect ion between the agent'ร antecedent circumstances (their mot iva t iona l states, 
desires etc.) and their subsequent decision. Th is is fine i f one is ta l k ing about 
compat ib i l i s t free w i l l . However , this necessity w i l l be miss ing i f the agent has 
incompat ib i l i s t free w i l l . In other words, one cannot say what the agent would have 
freely decided i f free w i l l is understood in incompat ib i l is t terms, precisely because what 
they w o u l d have decided is not determined by pr ior circumstances ( Z i m m e r m a n 2002, 
pp. 572-573) . There is no t ruth about what an agent w i t h incompat ib i l i s t cont ro l w o u l d 
have done in d i f ferent circumstances. 
I t is debatable whether there can be true counterfactuals when it comes to agent's 
incompat ib i l i s t free acts - Plant inga th inks there can be, wh i l s t others th ink not 
(Plant inga 1974， p. 173; those w h o do not : Adams 1977; van Inwagen 1997; H o f f m a n 
and Rosenkrantz 2002， ch. 6). Th is is a d i f f i cu l t and controversial matter, but I assume 
that those who w o u l d want to b lock luck neutral isat ion w o u l d not m i n d being 
commi t ted to denying the t ruth o f such counterfactuals. So it seems that there is a way 
for the ant i - luck is t incompat ib i l is t to b lock neutral isat ion. 
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But this is a rather smal l v ic tory. Even i f there cannot be true counterfactuals about 
incompat ib i l i s t free acts, this is no real help when it comes to addressing the under ly ing 
unfairness to w h i c h neutral isat ion was the proposed answer. For deny ing that there is 
any t ru th value to relevant counterfactuals does not magical ly mean that agents are not 
gett ing o f f the hook by luck or that our practices are fair. I t leaves us perplexed about 
h o w one cou ld adjust for such luck. It means we jus t have to l i ve w i t h a very large 
measure o f unfairness. 
The above point about there being no fact o f the matter appi ies on ly to d i rect ly free acts. 
Bu t as was noted i n the previous chapter, unless one is go ing to take up a restr ict iv ist 
pos i t ion , most incompat ib i l is ts w i l l a l l ow that an agent can be responsible for their 
ind i rect ly free acts jus t so long as they trace, in appropriate ways, to an earl ier d i rect ly 
free act. Neutra l isat ion w o u l d apply to indi rect ly free acts. For example, Jake freely 
decides to get drunk and exercises incompat ib i l is t contro l over this decis ion. Wh i l s t 
drunk, he gets into a f ight and breaks someone'ร leg. Jake'ร act o f breaking someone's 
leg was not a d i rect ly free act, for Jake, we can assume, d id not exercise incompat ib i l i s t 
cont ro l over his do ing this. Bu t the tracing v i ew a l lows one to say that Jake is 
responsible both for gett ing drunk, and for breaking someone's leg because the latter act 
traces to Jake's d i rect ly free act o f dec id ing to get drunk. 
Yet i t is on ly thanks to Jake'ร c i rcumstant ia l luck that he broke someone's leg, rather 
than k i l l ed someone. Because we are deal ing w i t h an indi rect ly free act there is no 
p rob lem i n saying that Jake w o u l d have k i l l ed someone in d i f ferent circumstances. Th is 
is because only Jake'ร d i rect ly free act was indeterminist ic. Jake'ร ind i rect ly free act was 
(or cou ld have been) necessitated by antecedent circumstances. So, t racing v iews , w h i c h 
save the incompat ib i l is t f r o m hav ing to l im i t responsibi l i ty to d i rect ly free acts, n o w 
exposes the ant i - luckist incompat ib i l is t to neutral isat ion. 
The ant i - luckist incompat ib i l is t cou ld restrict responsibi l i ty to d i rect ly free acts, and i n 
this way avoid the neutral isat ion prob lem. Bu t this w o u l d be to seriously l im i t 
responsibi l i ty . Furthermore, as I pointed out above, this w o u l d not do anyth ing to 
demonstrate that the agent's d i rect ly free acts are not heavi ly luck infected. Thus the 
ant i - luck is t w o u l d jus t have to accept a very large measure o f unfairness by their o w n 
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l ights. The on ly sel l ing point o f this v i ew w o u l d be that matters are slightly less unfa i r 
than w i t h compat ib i l i sm. But that is hardly a r ing ing endorsement for the pos i t ion. 
In short, once one takes ant i - luck ism seriously, neither compat ib i l i sm or 
i ncompat ib i l i sm look attract ive, precisely because o f the relat ive ineffect iveness o f 
incompat ib i l i s t contro l at eradicat ing luck. I f we could have incompat ib i l i s t cont ro l , we 
real ly w o u l d not have much more contro l than i f we have jus t compat ib i l i s t cont ro l . 
8.6 A n Alternat ive Rationale for Incompatibi l ist Contro l 
The upshot o f my discussion above is that i f one is go ing to take the ant i - luckist 
rat ionale for incompat ib i l is t cont ro l seriously, one is go ing to find onesel f d r i ven to 
mak ing the k i nd o f radical revisions to our common sense concept ion o f responsibi l i ty 
out l ined above. A l ternat ive ly one is go ing to have to seriously restrict responsib i l i ty and 
at the same t ime admit that incompat ib i l is t contro l works on ly to make matters s l ight ly 
fa irer than they w o u l d be i f we on ly had compat ib i l is t contro l . Such considerat ions cast 
serious doubt on the p laus ib i l i ty o f the ant i - luckist rationale for incompat ib i l i s t cont ro l . 
Here then, we can take Fischer 's lesson. W e can see luck 'ร deep invo lvement in a l l that 
we do as ind icat ing not a p rob lem, but rather luck 's non- tox ic i ty . In other words, we 
make the Moore-Sh i f t . But h o w migh t we have come to see luck as tox ic to 
responsib i l i ty? 
In the previous chapter I stressed the value o f being, to use Kane 's phrase, an 
independent source o f act iv i ty and o f thereby hav ing a degree o f ownersh ip over what 
one does and becomes. I also argued that agent-internal indetermin ism, unsupplemented 
by incompat ib i l i s t cont ro l , w o u l d secure these goods. Bu t I noted in Chapter 6 that there 
C o n s i d e r also that it is n o w w i d e l y accepted that y o u cannot te l l t h r o u g h i n t rospec t i on whe the r y o u 
have i n c o m p a t i b i l i s t c o n t r o l (see D o u b l e 2 0 0 2 ; Kane 2 0 0 5 ; C h i s h o l m 1976 ; T a y l o r 1966 ; van I n w a g e n 
1983 ) . O u r in te rna l exper ience o f c o n t r o l l i n g ou r dec is ions is consis tent w i t h d e t e r m i n i s m b e i n g t rue. 
T h e r e ' s a case fo r say ing that ou r in te rna l exper ience w o u l d be illusory i f d e t e r m i n i s m w e r e t rue ― f o r w e 
some t imes (o r some o f us a n y w a y ) take i t that w e have genu ine a l te rna t i ve poss ib i l i t i es . B u t ๒ the first 
p lace , that seems to v ind i ca te modes t I n c o m p a t i b i l i s m o f the K a n e a n sor t ra ther than c o n t r o I -
i n c o m p a t i b i l i s m , and f u r t he rmore th is does no t demons t ra te that w e ac tua l l y have i n c o m p a t i b i l i s t free w i l l . 
I n shor t , c o m i n g in to possession o f i n c o m p a t i b i l i s t c o n t r o l is not some th i ng that one w o u l d be aware o f -
i t is n o t as i f one w o u l d sudden ly fee l ' e m p o w e r e d ' . A n d th is j u s t tes t i f ies t o the m o d e s t y o f th is c o n t r o l . 
W e can have i t , w i t h o u t rea l i s ing , and we can lose it w i t h o u t rea l i s ing . G i v e n j u s t h o w i m p o r t a n t some 
cons ide r possess ion o f th is c o n t r o l to be， i t is ra ther o d d that it can be so i nd i sce rn ib l e . 
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İS a legitimate, though mistaken, concern that agent-internal indeterminism would erode 
our contro l . Th is suggests the possib i l i ty o f g i v ing the f o l l o w i n g story. 
W e want the genuine alternative possibi l i t ies that agent internal indetermin ism of fers i n 
order to secure independence and ownership. Bu t then we ref lect that the genuineness o f 
the alternative possibi l i t ies threatens our compat ib i l is t contro l . I t is for that reason that 
we th ink a new k i nd o f contro l is needed. Incompat ib i l is t contro l is something we take 
ourselves to need in an open-future wo r l d in order to protect against contro l -eros ion, but 
i t is not the reason we want to be in an open-future w o r l d . I t was securing those other 
goods ― the goods o f independence and ownership ― that we were after. A f te r a l l , what 
value is there in hav ing incompat ib i l i s t contro l as opposed to jus t compat ib i l i s t contro l 
i f i t is not to do w i t h being independent and hav ing ownership? O n this story the 
rat ionale behind incompat ib i l is t contro l is that i t is needed in a restorative capacity. 
Compat ib i l i s t contro l is not inadequate for responsib i l i ty per se. I t is jus t that we do not 
th ink that we can have compat ib i l i s t contro l and genuine alternative possibi l i t ies at the 
same t ime, and hence the need for incompat ib i l is t contro l . 
The story I have suggested above strikes me as eminent ly plausible. Yet i t is over looked. 
Near ly al l cont ro l - incompat ib i l is ts see genuine alternative possibi l i t ies as p r imar i l y jus t 
c lear ing r o o m to accommodate incompat ib i l is t cont ro l . So their idea is not that 
incompat ib i l i s t cont ro l is restorative. Rather it is that possession o f path-p ick ing contro l 
y ie lds an overal l enhancement o f contro l in some absolute sense - an enhancement over 
and above what cou ld be achieved i n determinist ic settings. 
S im i la r l y w i t h the compat ib i l is t . W h e n the compat ib i l is ts such as Fischer and H a j i po in t 
out that alternative possibi l i t ies by themselves w o u l d not enhance contro l they 
presuppose that enhancing contro l could be the only reason alternative possibi l i t ies 
w o u l d be part o f the necessary requirements for responsibi l i ty. I n other words , they 
123 For ๒s tance , R a n d o l p h C la r ke is a c o n t r o l i n c o m p a t i b i l i s t w h o never theless agrees that agen t - i n t ema l 
i n d e t e r m i n i s m o f the k i n d that one f i nds w i t h K a n e ' s v i e w , does not erode c o m p a t i b i l i s t c o n t r o l . H e 
w o u l d , in o ther w o r d s , agree w i t h the conc lus ions I d r e w in Chap te r 5 and Chap te r 6. H o w e v e r , w h e n i t 
comes to m o r a l r espons ib i l i t y he th inks that w h i l s t " [ ร ] u c h a v i e w secures a type o f l eeway o r openness 
not ava i lab le in a de te rm in i s t i c w o r l d , . . . the v i e w p rov ides the agent w i t h no add i t i ona l pos i t i ve p o w e r to 
de te rm ine w h a t he does; it does no t secure any greater degree o f ac t i ve c o n t r o l . A n d th is is w h a t seems to 
be needed 1 there is to be a d i f f e ren t ve rd i c t c o n c e r n i n g desert and hence r e s p o n s i b i l i t y " ( 2 0 0 2 , p. 3 7 6 ) . I n 
o ther w o r d s , C l a r k e t h i nks that compa t i b i l i s t s c o n t r o l needs s u p p l e m e n t i n g i f w e are to have the k i n d o f 
free w i l l necessary f o r m o r a l r espons ib i l i t y . 
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presuppose that the on ly prob lem anyone could have w i t h compat ib i l i sm, is over the 
adequacy o f compat ib i l is t control /^"* 
So, much o f the contemporary debate over free w i l l has remained a debate over whether 
or not compat ib i l is t contro l is adequate for responsibi l i ty , or whether i t needs 
supplementing. In other words, the debate has tended to be over h o w much contro l we 
need, and wh i ch side of fers the most and at what costs. In the classic debate i t is 
accepted that the incompat ib i l is ts of fer more contro l than the compat ib i l is ts , but at 
heavy conceptual costs, wh i l s t the compat ib i l is ts of fer less cont ro l , but at least o f fer a 
more sober, ' d o w n to earth ' contro l . 
B u t according to the story I have suggested compat ib i l is t cont ro l is adequate, i t is jus t 
that free w i l l is not on ly about contro l . We want to be the u l t imate sources o f our 
act ions, and this is a basic demand, not one made i n order to increase our contro l i n any 
absolute sense. A n d there is an understandable (albeit mistaken) concern that the 
alternative possibi l i t ies needed to satisfy the ul t imate source demand w i l l erode our 
cont ro l . For that reason there is fel t to be a need for a d i f ferent k i nd o f cont ro l - path-
p i ck ing contro l . 
I do not have any way o f p rov ing that this story is correct. Bu t i t does seem to me at 
worst every-bi t as plausible as the more usual ant i - luckist rat ionale. I f we accept m y 
story above we should come to see that a lack o f incompat ib i l i s t cont ro l is a p rob lem 
on ly i f i t is true that hav ing genuine alternative possibi l i t ies does erode compat ib i l i s t 
cont ro l i n some signi f icant way. I have argued in Chapter 6 that i t does not. So， wh i l s t i t 
is perfect ly reasonable to th ink that agent-internal indetermin ism (so, genuine alternative 
possibi l i t ies) m igh t pose a r isk to our cont ro l , there's a case for saying that such fears 
՚ 2 4 W e see th is ve r y c lea r l y in F ischer . W h i l s t a c k n o w l e d g i n g that even i f F rank fu r t -S ty le cases w o r k and 
P A P is re fu ted , there is s t i l l r o o m fo r an i n c o m p a t i b i l i s t to insist that w e need to be the o r i g i na to rs o f our 
ac t ions , F ischer says that he sees " n o p r o m i s i n g strategy fo r a rgu m g that causal d e t e r m i n i s m threatens 
m o r a l r espons ib i l i t y apar t from its a l l eged l y r u l i n g ou t a l te rna t ive p o s s i b i l i t i e s " ( 1 9 9 4 , p. 151) . H e o n l y 
sees a l te rna t i ve poss ib i l i t i es as p laus ib l y requ i red , i f r equ i r ed to supp l y i n c o m p a t i b i l i s t c o n t r o l ( 1 9 9 9 a ) . 
'25 A s D o u b l e says o n b e h a l f o f the compa t i b i l i s t s ( D o u b l e is no t a c o m p a t i b i l i s t ) : 
W e compa t i b i l i s t s are magnanimous in the face o f d e t e r m i n i s m ; w e accept na ture , recogn ise 
that w e are part o f i t , and are at peace w i t h it and ourse lves. Y o u l iber ta r ians [ i n c o m p a t i b i l i s t s 
w h o a f f i r m free w i l l ] - w h o w a n t t o carve ou t a spec ia l n i che in the cosmos f o r free agents, 
h o w e v e r i ncomprehens ib l e it m i g h t be - are i n s u f f i c i e n t l y m a g n a n i m o u s . Y o u are v a i n , 
an tagon is t i c t o w a r d the cosmos , and t o o q u i c k to fly to ex t ravagances t o aggrand ize yourse lves . 
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are unfounded. S imi la r ly , there is a case for saying that incompat ib i l i s t contro l is not 
real ly needed after a l l . W e can expla in why incompat ib i l is t contro l is associated w i t h 
responsib i l i ty , and we can expla in w h y it is not actually needed after a l l . 
8.7 Frankfurt -Sty le Cases 
What I have argued here ch imes- in w i t h what I argued i n Chapter 3. For i n Chapter 3 I 
argued that Frankfurt-Style cases do not cal l into question the va l id i ty o f PAP. They do 
not cal l into question the idea that for responsibi l i ty we require genuine alternative 
possibi l i t ies and independence f r o m the past. However , I d id a l l ow that Fischer 'ร 
var ia t ion o f a Frankfurt-Style case d id cast doubt on the requirement for incompat ib i l i s t 
cont ro l . In other words, what Fischer 'ร var ia t ion actual ly calls in to quest ion the reason 
alternative possibi l i t ies are associated w i t h free w i l l and responsibi l i ty . Unless one is 
already disposed towards compat ib i l i sn i , then Fischer 'ร Frankfurt-Style case signposts 
the k i n d o f pos i t ion that I have been defending. 
8.8 Compat ib i l ism, Indispensabil i ty and Neutralisation 
Fischer, whose basic approach to the question o f luck I endorsed, is a compat ib i l is t . A s I 
po in ted out at the outset o f this chapter, the prob lem o f luck is one shared by both 
compat ib i l is ts and modest incompat ib i l is ts , once we accept that compat ib i l i s t cont ro l is 
the on ly k i nd we have. Bu t once one accepts the compat ib i l i t y o f luck and responsib i l i ty , 
w h y not jus t be a compat ib i l is t? This is certainly where Fischer intends that his 
argument should lead us: 
[ M ] y suggestion is that, once one sees that the picture that favours 
[Unrestr icted Cont ro l ] is seen to be inf lated and i l lusory, one m igh t have less 
inc l inat ion to accept an incompat ib i l is t ic source requirement of any sort for any 
reason. That is, once one sees that there are a huge (presumably in f in i te ) 
number o f factors w h i c h are entirely out o f m y contro l ( l i ke the รนท's coming 
out to shine) tat are such that, i f they were not present, m y agency w o u l d be 
very d i f ferent or not even non-existent, one m igh t be less inc l ined to object to 
Y o u s h o u l d accept y o u r f r e e d o m as it is and t r y to enhance it as y o u can , ra ther than engage in 
f a n c i f i i l specu la t ions . ( 1 9 9 6 , pp . 138-139) 
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(or f i nd problemat ic) the fact that, i f causal determin ism obtains, there w i l l be a 
cond i t ion ent irely "ex te rna l " to the agent and over w h i c h he has not contro l 
w h i c h is causally suf f ic ient for one's behaviour. (Fischer fo r thcoming b) 
There are a number o f reasons to stop short o f compat ib i l i sm. F i rs t ly , there are those 
problems to do w i t h C N C contro l and ownership about w h i c h I have said enough 
already. Bu t there is also another reason, this t ime i t is to do w i t h the very luck that 
Fischer th inks is not a p rob lem. Let us return to Z i m m e r m a n ' ร v i e w that wh i l s t luck 
does not preclude us hav ing contro l over what we do o f a k i n d suf f ic ient for 
responsibi l i ty , i t w o u l d nevertheless be unfair not to neutralise luck. I argued that i f one 
is ant i - luckist then one has to take this k i nd o f unfairness seriously. However , there's a 
case for saying that we should take this k i nd o f unfairness seriously even i f we are not 
ant i - luckist . Even i f one is a compat ib i l is t , and so even i f one accepts u l t imate luck is 
consistent w i t h one hav ing the requisite contro l over what one does, i t surely remains 
the case that there is something unfa i r about one's mora l responsibi l i ty being restr icted 
to what one actual ly does, rather than al l that one w o u l d do. 
H o w migh t Fischer respond to the threat o f luck neutral isation? W e l l , he could po in t out 
that neutral is ing luck in this way w o u l d y ie ld a si tuat ion i n w h i c h we are a l l v i r tua l l y as 
b lamewor thy and praiseworthy as each other, such that responsib i l i ty w o u l d be in effect 
dissolved - a point made above. There is something to this response. Bu t I bel ieve that 
the modest incompat ib i l is t has a better one. The modest incompat ib i l i s t can of fer a 
pr inc ip led reason why luck cannot be neutral ised. 
T o see this, return to ro l l -back cases. In a ro l l back case we ho ld everyth ing fixed pr ior 
to decision mak ing , and then run the sequence through an innumerable number o f t imes. 
I f modest incompat ib i l is t free w i l l condi t ions are met, then i n some re-runs the agent 
w i l l decide one way, and i n some another, at least on the occasion o f to rn decis ion 
mak ing . I f we apply Z i m m e r m a n ' ร luck neutral is ing po l icy , then the agent's 
responsib i l i ty should not be restricted to mak ing the decis ion that they made in the 
actual sequence. They should also, in fairness, be responsible for the decis ion that they 
w o u l d have made, had it not been for their d i f ferent ia l causal luck (and also responsible 
for the character they w o u l d have developed had their causal luck been d i f ferent) . In 
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Other words , when we are torn over w h i c h decision to make, we are responsible for both 
irrespective o f w h i c h we end up mak ing . 
No te that i f we do neutralise luck i n this way, then the agent w i l l lose the independence 
and ownership that the indetermin ism was brought in to secure. For now the agent's 
mora l responsibi l i ty w i l l be determined ent irely by factors external to their conscious 
w i l l . The i r mora l responsibi l i ty w i l l be a func t ion o f their c i rcumstant ia l and const i tut ive 
luck. It was after a l l , not down to the agent that they were to rn between dec id ing to X , or 
dec id ing to Y . A l l that i t was u l t imate ly d o w n to the agent to do, was decide one way or 
the other. Bu t the opt ion range i tse l f - that was not their do ing. 
So, w i t h the modest incompat ib i l i s t v i ew we have a pr inc ip led reason w h y luck cannot 
be neutral ised. I f luck were neutral ised one w o u l d lose the independence and ownership 
that are, in their tu rn , necessary requirements o f being responsible at a l l . Th is br ings out 
an impor tant di f ference according to whether one puts the stress on contro l or 
ownership. I f one's focus is cont ro l , then luck neutral isat ion looks unblockable. 
Granted, the compat ib i l is t can always point to the fact that u l t imate luck cannot by 
hypothesis, be a p rob lem. Bu t this k i nd o f response w i l l on ly go so far. Th is k i nd o f 
response w i l l on ly help you resist the suggestion that luck prevents responsib i l i ty gett ing 
a foo tho ld . But i t w i l l not real ly help one to argue against the unfairness charge. Bu t i f 
instead one puts the focus on ownership then we can b lock neutral isat ion, precisely 
because neutral isat ion w o u l d destroy the concept ion o f ownership i n quest ion. Th is on ly 
holds for an incompat ib i l i s t concept ion o f ownership - but then we have seen that there 
are independent reasons for favour ing such an account. 
M y v i e w has this advantage because it makes luck part o f the so lu t ion rather than part o f 
the prob lem. Luck is not a threat to responsibi l i ty , but part o f w h y w e are responsible. I t 
is on ly through do ing this, an admit tedly very radical move, that neutral isat ion can be 
avoided. Compat ib i l i s ts , either ignore u l t imate luck (as i n Dennett and H a j i ' ร case) or 
they argue that i t is not real ly such a prob lem (as w i t h Fischer). Bu t on ly the modest 
incompat ib i l i s t has, i f they 've courage enough 一 courage that I have t r ied to muster here 
― the resources to be able to celebrate luck , and give i t a pos i t ive, responsib i l i ty 
a f f i rm ing role. For on m y take on modest incompat ib i l i sm we are no longer mora l l y 
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responsible despite our exposure to luck ; we are responsible because o f our exposure to 
luck. L u c k o f a certain sort, procures ownership for us. 
T o some what I have jus t said w i l l sound preposterous. Kane and other modest 
incompat ib i l is ts at least have the decency to be embarrassed about the fact that their 
v iews leave one exposed to u l t imate luck; Kane tries his best to hide the fact, as we saw 
i n Chapter 5; van Inwagen hopes that there is something w rong w i t h the luck object ion 
and appeals to mystery in the mean t ime. I have openly admit ted u l t imate luck and made 
a v i r tue out o f i t , and in this respect I have gone even further than a compat ib i l i s t such 
as Fischer is w i l l i n g to , and placed myse l f beyond the pale. 
Bu t in response, we can return to a po in t made in Chapter 5. Kane po in ted out that when 
w e ta lk o f luck we usual ly mean "outs ide [our] con t ro l " (2003， p. 305). A n d i t is 
plausible that we normal ly take luck to be tox ic to responsibi l i ty precisely because we 
ident i fy luck w i t h being subject to external forces. In other words , to the extent that 
one's act ion was a matter o f luck, it was a matter determined by factors external to 
oneself. I f this is r ight , then luck inside the locus o f our cont ro l should be treated w i t h 
great care. W e should not be too qu ick to assume that our in tu i t ions about the tox ic i t y o f 
regular 'ex terna l ' l uck can be translated to ' in te rna l ' luck. For example, return again to 
the torn-decisions w h i c h we al l face, and w h i c h Kane (and myse l f ) believes to be the 
occasion o f indeterminacy in our w i l l s , and thus the occasion o f the object ionable luck 
i n quest ion 一 the luck w h i c h I am saying does posi t ive wo rk , but w h i c h Kane and others 
t ry to paper over. When we make a torn decis ion, can we not readi ly admi t that i t was a 
matter o f luck that we decided as we did? W h e n I make a torn decis ion i t seems quite 
p la in to me that i t was a matter o f luck that I decided as I d id . I admi t that on such 
occasions I m igh t jus t as easily have decided otherwise ― that 's jus t what it is to be torn 
about what to do. In fact, even i f we have incompat ib i l is t contro l over our decisions, 
surely our torn decisions are st i l l lucky , insofar as we make them arbi t rar i ly? A g a i n , that 
is my experience o f mak ing torn decisions. Note , I am not saying that I experience a 
lack o f incompat ib i l is t contro l . I may, for a l l I know, exercise incompat ib i l i s t contro l 
over m y torn decisions. S imi la r ly , I am not asking that the conc lus ion o f Chapter 6 be 
revoked. I do contro l m y torn decisions in the compat ib i l is t sense. Bu t I w o u l d st i l l say 
that I decided as I d id by luck. It does not real ly matter what k i nd o f contro l I have, my 
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to rn decisions are matters o f luck, because there's a very real sense in w h i c h I jus t 
arb i t rar i ly decide. Yet at the same t ime, evident though the luck o f m y to rn decis ion is, I 
w o u l d not for one instant th ink that I was not responsible for hav ing made it . I w o u l d 
not of fer , and nor w o u l d I accept as an excuse, that ' I cou ld jus t as easily have decided 
o therwise ' . For wh i ls t my decis ion was arbitrary, it was st i l l my decis ion, attr ibutable to 
me and me alone. Matters w o u l d be di f ferent i f i t cou ld be shown that me decis ion was 
not real ly d o w n to me after a l l . I f i t cou ld be shown that m y decis ion was jus t the 
inevi table consequence o f a process beyond the operat ion o f my conscious w i l l , then I 
w o u l d deny responsibi l i ty. Bu t the mere fact that I cou ld have arb i t rar i ly decided 
otherwise that does noth ing to suggest to me that I am not responsible. Qui te the 
opposite. 
8.9 Conclusion 
M y strategy in this chapter was to use a var iat ion o f Fischer 's recent Moore -Sh i f t 
argument to cast doubt on the rationale for incompat ib i l is t contro l . I argued that wh i l s t 
possession o f incompat ib i l is t cont ro l , i f we could have i t , w o u l d make us 
uncontrovers ia l ly responsible, i t w o u l d st i l l leave us heavi ly exposed to luck. I t w o u l d , i t 
is t rue, eradicate some luck, but not much. Th is is a serious p rob lem i f one insists upon 
the ant i - luckist rationale for incompat ib i l is t contro l . For one w i l l find onesel f commi t ted 
to grossly d is tor t ing our received concept ion o f responsibi l i ty. I n short, one w i l l be 
impa led on the p rob lem o f responsibi l i ty in f la t ion . 
I suggested instead what I took to be an equal ly plausible story behind incompat ib i l i s t 
cont ro l . Incompat ib i l i s t cont ro l , I conjectured, migh t be thought needed on ly i n some 
restorative capacity. Free w i l l and mora l responsibi l i ty, on this story, are actual ly 
associated w i t h the satisfaction o f a more fundamental demand than one o f cont ro l : the 
demand for independence f r o m the past, and so ownership over what one does and 
becomes. Incompat ib i l is t contro l is brought in through fear that w i thou t some addi t ional 
cont ro l , any gain in independence w i l l incur a corresponding cost i n one's cont ro l . I had 
already argued in Chapter 6 that the concerns over contro l erosion were misplaced, and 
as such those arguments should persuade at least some, that incompat ib i l i s t cont ro l 
m igh t not be needed after a l l . Even i f my arguments in Chapter 6 are not found 
persuasive, appreciat ing incompat ib i l i s t -cont ro l ' ร new role may persuade some that i t is 
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not needed anyway ― for they migh t ho ld that the gain in independence is w o r t h the cost 
in terms o f contro l . 
The impor tant po in t though, at least where luck is concerned, is that once the focus is on 
ownership rather than contro l one is no longer imper i l l ed by one's an t i - luck ism. One no 
longer faces the p rob lem o f responsibi l i ty in f la t ion. One is better equipped than any 
other f ree -w i l l theorist to expla in in a pr inc ip led way jus t w h y luck cannot be 
neutral ised. Because on this v iew, luck is actually seen i n a posi t ive l ight , as something 
w h i c h is not always tox ic but can actually prov ide us w i t h something that we value: the 
independence to make a real di f ference through our choices, and to in this way see 




I n these c los ing comments I w i l l summarise the arguments o f the preceding chapters and 
end w i t h some remarks about the w ider impl icat ions o f some o f the conclusions I have 
drawn. 
9.1 Retrospective 
I n Chapter 1 I presented the p rob lem o f free w i l l and f ramed it i n terms o f luck. I f 
determin ism is true then everyth ing we do is u l t imate ly a matter o f luck , and so too i f 
indetermin ism is true. Th is seems to rule out free w i l l o f the k i n d needed for mora l 
responsib i l i ty , because mora l responsibi l i ty presupposes contro l . 
I n the f o l l o w i n g three chapters I focused on the threat f r om determin ism. Our in tu i t ive 
picture o f free w i l l involves hav ing open pathways into the future and path-p ick ing 
cont ro l over w h i c h way we go. De te rmin ism rules out alternative possibi l i t ies and so 
seems to rule out possession o f this k i nd o f free w i l l . In Chapter 2 I considered some 
standard compat ib i l is t responses and I sketched an account o f compat ib i l i s t 'reason 
responsive' cont ro l . In Chapter 3 I considered in detai l a challenge to the in tu i t i ve 
picture o f free w i l l . The challenge is posed by Frankfurt-Style cases. I argued that such 
cases fa i l to prov ide any reason to disassociate alternative possibi l i t ies and responsib i l i ty 
g round ing free w i l l . However , I d id a l l ow that Fischer 'ร var ia t ion o f a Frankfur t -sty le 
case d i d prov ide some, albeit rather flimsy, evidence that compat ib i l i s t cont ro l m igh t be 
a l l the cont ro l needed for mora l responsibi l i ty. Bu t free w i l l is about more than jus t 
hav ing cont ro l , and so even i f there'ร a case for saying that compat ib i l i s t cont ro l is the 
only k i n d needed, that does not in i tse l f prov ide evidence against the in tu i t i ve idea o f 
free w i l l i n vo l v i ng alternative possibi l i t ies. In Chapter 4 I went on to prov ide what I 
considered to be the major p rob lem for compat ib i l i sm, and the p r imary threat f r o m 
determin ism. I f o l l owed others in arguing there is no relevant d i f ference between cases 
i n w h i c h an agent is subject to mora l responsibi l i ty subvert ing clandestine manipu la t ion 
and cases i n w h i c h an agent's actions are causally determined. Because clandestine 
man ipu la t ion does not disrupt an agent's compat ib i l is t con t ro l , the reason such 
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manipu la t ion (and determin ism) subverts responsibi l i ty must be for reasons to do w i t h 
ownership. A n d it is reasons to do w i t h ownership that account for at least part o f the 
attract ion o f the open pathways concept ion o f free w i l l . For i f we have genuine 
alternative possibi l i t ies then we have a degree o f independence f r o m the past and so can 
be said to be, to some extent, the u l t imate sources or or ig inators o f what we do. 
I then turned m y attent ion to incompat ib i l is t conceptions o f free w i l l . In Chapter 5 I 
argued that incompat ib i l i s t attempts to prov ide us w i t h pa th-p ick ing contro l o f a k i nd 
that w o u l d protect against u l t imate luck are either incoherent, or embarrassingly 
myster ious. At tempts to show how unassisted indetermin ism can prov ide any 
enhancement to compat ib i l is t contro l were shown to fa i l . However , i n Chapter 6 I 
argued that unassisted indetermin ism does not damage compat ib i l i s t cont ro l o f the 
reason responsive var iety. I n short, indetermin ism neither increases nor decreases our 
cont ro l . Th is means that in terms o f exposure to u l t imate luck, the incompat ib i l i s t is in 
the same pos i t ion as the compat ib i l is t . The on ly k i nd o f cont ro l we have over what we 
do is compat ib i l is t cont ro l o f the reason responsive variety. Bu t this does not put 
i ncompat ib i l i sm on a level w i t h compat ib i l i sm. In Chapter 7 I argued that p rov ided i t is 
found i n the r ight locat ions, indetermin ism can prov ide the k i nd o f independence and 
ownersh ip that we saw determin ism rule out in Chapter 4. Th is combinat ion o f 
compat ib i l i s t contro l w i t h genuine alternative possibi l i t ies y ie lds a modest 
incompat ib i l i s t pos i t ion. What is interesting about this v i e w is that i t makes a certain 
k i nd o f causal luck - agent internal causal luck - a source o f free w i l l rather than a 
threat to it. However , wh i l s t this k i nd o f modest incompat ib i l i s t pos i t ion is more 
attractive than compat ib i l i sm, there remain persistent concerns about exposure to 
u l t imate luck. Maybe luck can be a source o f ownership, but many w o u l d s t i l l want to 
say that luck rules out mora l responsibi l i ty. I t was to these concerns that I turned in 
Chapter 8. There I argued that incompat ib i l is t contro l - pa th-p ick ing contro l ― w o u l d do 
very l i t t le to reduce our exposure to luck. Yet the ant i - luck ism mot i va t ing the need for 
such contro l w o u l d c o m m i t us to neutral is ing luck. Th is w o u l d invo lve radical changes 
to our practices, rendering them to al l intents and риф08Є8 unrecognisable. I n part icular 
holders o f ant i - luckist v iews are exposed to the p rob lem o f responsib i l i ty in f la t ion . I 
suggested that i t was not sensible to insist upon an ant i - luckist rat ionale for path-p ick ing 
contro l and that there was an alternative rat ional avai lable. I also suggested that i f path-
p i ck ing contro l is needed, i t is needed in some restorative capacity. Bu t once this 
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alterat ive rat ionale is adopted, then one loses the mot i va t ion to reject s t ra ight forward 
modest incompat ib i l i sm. Just as modest incompat ib i l i sm is a more attractive v i e w than 
compat ib i l i sm, i t also appears more attractive - or at least as attractive - as ' con t ro l ' 
i ncompat ib i l i sm. 
9.2 Reservations 
I have dismissed the need for path-p ick ing contro l o f the type associated w i t h 
myster ious extra factors. Or rather, I have been seeing jus t how far w e can go w i thou t 
them. Bu t I do not pretend that my arguments on this f ront are decisive. I admi t that the 
modest incompat ib i l i s t v i e w that I advocate is more attractive when compared to 
compat ib i l i sm than it is when compared to contro l incompat ib i l i sm. I n other words , I 
t h ink a compat ib i l i s t has more reason than a cont ro l incompat ib i l i s t to move to modest 
i ncompat ib i l i sm ( I myse l f moved f r o m compat ib i l i sm to modest incompat ib i l i sm) . The 
contro l incompat ib i l i s t ' s conv ic t ion that compat ib i l is t contro l is inadequate for mora l 
responsib i l i ty is un l ike ly to be g iven up easily. I have presented what I t h ink are the 
strongest arguments showing the adequacy o f modest incompat ib i l i s t free w i l l . Bu t I 
accept that in the final analysis we migh t s t i l l feel that indetermin ism by i tse l f cannot do 
the t r i ck o f mak ing us t ru ly mora l l y responsible. 
Nevertheless, i f one does come to this conclus ion m y efforts w i l l not have been wasted. 
I w o u l d s t i l l ho ld that m y arguments for the pr io r i t y o f ownership are good ones. The 
same goes for m y arguments for reject ing ant i - luck ism. The conv ic t ion that we st i l l need 
someth ing extra in terms o f contro l does not cal l into question either o f m y c la ims 
above. I n other words, I ho ld that even i f we remain conv inced that we need 
incompat ib i l i s t cont ro l , we should accept that our need for such cont ro l does not stem 
f r o m the tox ic i t y o f luck. The commi t ted contro l incompat ib i l is t should see the need for 
incompat ib i l i s t contro l as basic. One either sees that i t is needed, or one doesn' t 一 
noth ing more can be said on the matter. The mistake that contro l incompat ib i l is ts tend 
to make is to o f fer a jus t i f i ca t ion for the need for incompat ib i l is t con t ro l : a jus t i f i ca t ion 
that invar iab ly makes ment ion o f luck and thereby commi ts the cont ro l incompat ib i l i s t 
to an t i - luck ism. M y arguments h igh l ight h o w this is a mistake. These arguments ho ld 
good even i f one does not see them as capable o f showing modest i ncompat ib i l i sm to be 
an improvement on contro l incompat ib i l i sm. 
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9,3 Wider Implications 
I f what I have said i n this thesis is r ight , then one upshot is that u l t imate luck is not tox ic 
to mora l responsibi l i ty . What , though, are the pract ical consequences o f th is posi t ion? 
The modest incompat ib i l is t pos i t ion does invo lve recognis ing that our mora l 
responsib i l i ty is a matter o f degree. In this respect it echoes compat ib i l i sm. Though 
str ict ly speaking there is no reason why a contro l incompat ib i l is t cannot accept that 
mora l responsibi l i ty is a matter o f degree also. In one sense everyth ing is lef t as i t is. 
Consider resultant luck. It is a much debated matter whether our mora l responsib i l i ty 
shouid extend to the consequences o f our actions. For instance, should the reckless 
dr iver w h o accidental ly k i l l s someone be deemed more b lamewor thy than the reckless 
dr iver w h o , by luck, k i l l s no-one? The v i e w that I have defended i n th is thesis is 
agnostic on this quest ion. A n d that, I ho ld , is jus t as w e l l . The s imple fact is that i t is not 
clear what the answer to this question should be. I f a v i e w on free w i l l comes d o w n 
clearly on one side rather than the other, then this v i e w paints i tse l f into a controversial 
corner. Modes t incompat ib i l i sm does not come down on either side. Bu t i t s t i l l of fers 
guidance. For i f u l t imate luck is not a p rob lem, indeed, i f luck is actual ly required for 
free w i l l , then we k n o w not to try to settle this quest ion using luck-based arguments. I n 
other words , in t ry ing to determine whether resultant luck should be a l lowed to affect 
b lameworth iness, we should not make recourse to luck arguments. W e should not argue 
that because it is jus t a matter o f luck that one reckless dr iver k i l l ed someone wh i l s t the 
other d idn ' t , that this shows w h y we should b lame both equal ly. To go d o w n this road 
is to endorse ant i - luck ism, and this, as we saw in Chapter 8， is a serious mistake. (As I 
j us t ment ioned, this is a serious mistake even i f one remains conv inced that we need 
incompat ib i l i s t contro l for mora l responsibi l i ty) . 
Once w e drop luck-based arguments the discussion over resultant luck can st i l l 
cont inue. For one can argue that mora l responsibi l i ty is responsib i l i ty for one's 
character. A n d as such there is no relevant di f ference between the t w o reckless dr ivers. 
B o t h show the same v ic ious character traits, and our tendency to react d i f ferent ly 
depending upon the consequences o f an agent'ร actions reflects certain epistemic 
l imi ta t ions. We do not have access to people 's thought processes and intent ions, and so 
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have to rely upon what a person's actions as a guide (Richards 1993; Rosebury 1995; 
Thomson 1993). But jus t as some migh t argue this way, others can argue that we are 
mora l l y responsible for our actions where this includes their consequences. S t i l l others 
m igh t take a more Kant ian l ine and argue that we are mora l l y responsible for our mental 
acts 一 our acts o f w i l l - rather than our background characters or the consequences o f 
our actions. The important po in t is that whichever way one goes here - whether one 
takes responsibi l i ty to be l im i ted to character or whether one takes responsib i l i ty to be 
determined by what one actual ly does (where this m igh t include the consequences o f 
what one does) ― i t should be determined by matters independent o f considerations o f 
luck. That is the contr ibut ion the modest incompat ib i l is t pos i t ion can make to the w ider 
debate over mora l luck. It draws attention to the non- tox ic i ty o f luck , and i n that way 
refocuses the debate over mora l luck rather than sett l ing i t . 
9.4 Conclusion 
The prob lem o f free w i l l has been described as "exc ruc ia t ing" and " the most d i f f i cu l t 
p rob lem in ph i losophy" (Double 2005, p. 24; W o l f 1990, p. v i i respect ively). Despite 
m i l l enn ia o f discussion i t is o f ten hard not to agree w i t h Nage l when he says that 
"no th ing bel ievable has. . . been proposed by anyone in the extensive pub l i c discussion 
o f the subject" (2003, p. 231). I t is also hard not to agree w i t h W o l f when she wams that 
" o n l y fools rush in , at this po in t , t h i ı ж i n g they have something to say about i t " (1990, 
v i i . ) . Nevertheless, I have r isked being foo l ish here because I bel ieve there is one v i e w 
on free w i l l w h i c h stands out as being less unbel ievable than the others. The modest 
incompat ib i l i s t posi t ion in quest ion has been ably defended by others before me, but 
w i thou t the stress on luck. I have argued that those who defend modest incompat ib i l i sm 
should be honest about the exposure to ul t imate luck and that the v i e w is made more 
defensible as a result rather than less. 
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